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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED March 14, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0188
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
RHONDA K. DOLLAK,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
ANTHONY R. DOLLAK,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Dane County:
ANGELA B. BARTELL, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Gartzke, P.J.,
Sundby and Vergeront, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Anthony Dollak appeals from a judgment divorcing him
from Rhonda Riedner. The appeal
concerns the marital property division.
We conclude that the trial court properly divided the property and
therefore affirm.
The parties divorced
after nearly fourteen years of marriage.
The trial court valued their marital assets at $234,000. Dollak received $138,000 worth of those
assets, including the family homestead.
Riedner received $96,000 in property and an equalization payment of
$21,000. Dollak asserts that the trial
court erred by overvaluing the parties' four cars, by not setting his cars off
against home furnishings and other personal property awarded to Riedner, by
discounting Riedner's retirement accounts by twenty-five percent, and by
discounting Riedner's award of stocks by a potential capital gains tax if they
were sold. He also asserts that the
trial court failed to properly credit him for homeowner's insurance paid after
the divorce commenced, for property brought to the marriage, and for paying
certain of Riedner's expenses during the proceeding.
The division of marital
property is discretionary. Haugan
v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 215, 343 N.W.2d 796, 804 (1984). We affirm discretionary awards if the trial
court articulates its reasoning, bases the award on facts of record and the
correct legal standards, and the award is neither excessive nor
inadequate. Id. at
215-16, 343 N.W.2d at 804.
The trial court properly
valued the parties' four cars. Dollak
received the two more valuable cars and therefore desired a lower value for
them. He suggests that the court erred
by using the standard book values for the make and model year without evidence
that the cars were in standard condition.
However, Dollak did not object when those values were introduced into
evidence. Nor did he offer any evidence
himself on the condition of the cars.
The issue is therefore waived.
The trial court properly
determined that Riedner should receive an equalization payment to compensate
for the lesser value of her cars.
Dollak contends that the result was unfair because Riedner's stipulated
share of the household furnishings was worth substantially more than Dollak's
share. However, the trial court found
on the evidence that the furnishings were equally divided. Dollak's testimony to the contrary was
rejected on credibility grounds. That
credibility determination is not subject to review. Leciejewski v. Sedlak, 116 Wis.2d 629, 637, 342
N.W.2d 734, 738 (1984).
The trial court reasonably
discounted Riedner's retirement accounts by twenty-five percent. Future taxes reduce the present value of
retirement plans. Corliss v.
Corliss, 107 Wis.2d 338, 344, 320 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Ct. App. 1982). In calculating that reduction, the trial court
must assume that future tax rates will at least equal present rates. Id. The trial court reasonably concluded that Riedner's future state
and local tax rates would amount to at least twenty-five percent. The trial court also reasonably factored in
the possibility that Riedner might have to cash in the accounts before
retirement and pay a withdrawal penalty.
The trial court
reasonably discounted the value of stock awarded Riedner by the potential
capital gains tax on that stock. Dollak
contends that it was unfair to give Riedner a capital gains discount on her
stock but refuse him one on the homestead.
However, the evidence showed no contemplated sale of the homestead,
while Riedner testified that she intended to sell the stock in order to
purchase a home for herself. The trial
court expressly found her testimony credible, and it reasonably explained the
disparity in valuing the assets. See
Brandt v. Brandt, 145 Wis.2d 394, 419, 427 N.W.2d 126, 135 (Ct.
App. 1988) (the trial court must consider the tax consequences if a taxable
sale of assets appears likely).
The trial court properly
refused to credit Dollak for paying the pre-divorce homeowner's insurance
premium, and for certain of Riedner's pre-divorce expenses. The trial court reasonably concluded that
Dollak should not receive credit for the premium because he was the primary
beneficiary of the insurance after Riedner removed herself and her share of the
furnishings from the homestead. Dollak
has not offered her a credit for the renter's insurance she subsequently
purchased. In any event, the premium
was a minimal factor in the property division.
As for Riedner's pre-divorce expenses, those Dollak identifies were
ordinary and anticipated expenses paid from a joint account. Dollak did not offer Riedner credit for
pre-divorce payments made for his benefit out of that account.
The trial court properly
refused Dollak credit for property he brought to the marriage. He claims that his premarital assets
exceeded Riedner's by at least $12,000. The trial court acknowledged a disparity but concluded that
deviation from an equal property division was not warranted because those
assets were not maintained as separate property and Riedner also brought some
assets to the marriage. The court also
considered the length of the marriage, and Riedner's extraordinary efforts
during the marriage in working, raising two children and obtaining a college
degree. Those factors provide a
reasonable basis for adhering to a presumptively equal property division.
After entry of the
divorce judgment, Dollak failed to make full payment on Riedner's $21,000
equalization award. As a result, the
family court commissioner found Dollak in contempt and he seeks review of that
contempt order. However, appeals from
orders of a family court commissioner are heard in the trial court, not this
court. Section 767.13(6), Stats.
Additionally, we could not review the order anyway because Dollak failed
to identify it in his notice of appeal as a subject of this appeal. Rule
809.10(1)(a), Stats.; State
v. Ascencio, 92 Wis.2d 822, 825, 285 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Ct. App.
1979).
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.