|
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED February 14, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0274
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
JOHN DAGGETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAUL GETCHEL and
COLDWELL BANKER
SCHWAB REALTY LTD.,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Winnebago County:
THOMAS S. WILLIAMS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Anderson, P.J.,
Brown and Snyder, JJ.
PER CURIAM. John Daggett appeals pro
se from an order dismissing his complaint against Paul Getchel and Coldwell
Banker Schwab Realty Ltd. for damages allegedly caused by Getchel's sale of
property owned by Helen Daggett, John's mother. His basic contentions are that the trial court judge had a
conflict of interest and his due process rights were violated by the summary
judgment procedure. We reject his
claims and affirm the order.
At the outset, we find
Daggett's brief disorganized and incomprehensible. It contains a great deal of extraneous information and argument
pertaining to a guardianship proceeding over his mother.[1] Pro se appellants in a civil action are
bound by the same rules that apply to attorneys on appeal and must satisfy all
procedural requirements. Waushara
County v. Graf, 166 Wis.2d 442, 452, 480 N.W.2d 16, 20, cert. denied,
506 U.S. 894 (1992). Daggett fails to
meet the most basic requirement that his brief make a clear statement of the
issues, provide facts necessary to understand them, and present an argument
supported by cognizable reasoning. See
id.; Rule 809.19, Stats.
Further, Daggett presents no citations to legal authorities in support
of his contentions.
While some leniency may
be allowed, we do not have "a duty to walk pro se litigants through
the procedural requirements or to point them to the proper substantive
law." Graf, 166
Wis.2d at 452, 480 N.W.2d at 20.
Likewise, we are not required to sift through Daggett's brief to craft
an argument for him. Rather, we will
adopt the potential issues as framed by Getchel.
Getchel, as a sales
associate for Coldwell Banker Schwab Realty, Ltd., was retained to sell
property belonging to Daggett's mother, Helen.
On November 22, 1993, Oshkosh Family, Inc., the court-appointed guardian
of Helen, obtained an order from the circuit court in the guardianship
proceeding, the Honorable Thomas S. Williams presiding, approving the listing
of the properties for sale. At a
hearing held on December 29, 1993, Judge William E. Crane confirmed the sale of
certain lots in Omro, Wisconsin, for $35,000.
At a June 7, 1994 hearing, Judge Williams confirmed the sale of forty
acres of hunting land located in Waushara County for $25,000.
On June 6, 1994, Daggett
commenced this action alleging that Getchel suppressed knowledge of the value
of the Omro properties, that the hunting land was sold as vacant property when
a house and other buildings existed on that land, that the hunting land had
been sold to and occupied by Daggett, and that he suffered damages by Getchel's
act of selling the property without turning proceeds over to him. Getchel was not served with the summons and
complaint until June 22, 1994. Getchel
filed an answer on July 12, 1994.[2]
The case was dismissed
upon Getchel's motion for summary judgment.
When reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the
standards set forth in § 802.08, Stats.,
in the same manner as the trial court. Williams
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 180 Wis.2d 221, 226, 509 N.W.2d
294, 296 (Ct. App. 1993). The first
step requires us to examine the pleadings to determine whether a claim for
relief has been stated. Crowbridge
v. Village of Egg Harbor, 179 Wis.2d 565, 568, 508 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Ct.
App. 1993). If so, the inquiry shifts
to whether any factual issues exist. Id.
We agree with Getchel's
analysis that Daggett's complaint failed to state the necessary elements for
any remotely conceivable theories of recovery.
Those theories include breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence,
malpractice, fraud, conversion or adverse possession. The complaint failed to state a claim for relief and was properly
dismissed.
Daggett argues that the
trial court had a conflict of interest.
He makes references to alleged occurrences in the guardianship
proceeding involving his mother. Those
matters are not of record here. Nothing
suggests that Judge Williams was unable to act impartially with regard to this
action.
Daggett's other
arguments that his constitutional rights were violated all pertain to matters
that took place in the guardianship proceeding. This action is nothing more than an improper attempt to
collaterally attack the orders in the guardianship proceeding confirming the
sale of the real estate. Daggett did
not appear at the hearings to confirm the sales and did not appeal from those
orders. Getchel acted under orders from
the court in the guardianship proceeding.
Those orders are not subject to collateral attack in a later
proceeding. "It is settled law
that a judgment of a court which had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action cannot be impeached and is immune from and not subject to collateral
attack, even though patently erroneous."
Werner v. Riemer, 255 Wis. 386, 403, 39 N.W.2d 457, 466
(1949).
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] By an order of April 17, 1995, we rejected Daggett's appellant's brief for its failure to contain a coherent statement of the issues and facts and for including extraneous argument regarding the guardianship proceeding. Daggett was given ample time to file an appellant's brief which did not have these shortcomings.