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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JULY 25, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0392
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
THOMAS SPARKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Langlade County:
JAMES P. JANSEN, Judge. Affirmed.
LaROCQUE, J. Thomas Sparks appeals an order revoking his
driving privileges for refusal to take a chemical test following his OWI
arrest. Sparks contends that his
statement that he would not take the test "without my attorney"
should not be construed as a refusal because the police officer had a duty to
inform him that he had no right to counsel prior to chemical testing. Because Wisconsin law does not compel the
officer to so inform an accused, and because Sparks refused repeated requests
to take the test, this court affirms the order.
The relevant facts are
undisputed. Following the OWI arrest, a
deputy sheriff asked Sparks on four occasions to submit to a breath test. On each occasion, Sparks replied, "Not
without my attorney." The officer
then construed Sparks' response as a refusal.
Sparks concedes that
under Wisconsin law an accused drunk driver has no right to counsel prior to
chemical testing, State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis.2d 191, 289 N.W.2d 828
(1980), and that it is not necessary for the police to give the accused Miranda
warnings before requesting that he or she submit to a chemical test under our
implied consent law. State v.
Bunders, 68 Wis.2d 129, 133, 227 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1975). Sparks contends, however, that
"fundamental fairness as well as common sense and courtesy" require
the police to inform the accused who requests an attorney that he is not
entitled to counsel prior to deciding whether to take the test.
This court
disagrees. Neitzel
states: "Because the clear policy
of the statute is to facilitate the identification of drunken drivers and their
removal from the highways, the statute must be construed to further the
legislative purpose." Id.
at 193, 289 N.W.2d at 830. Thus, Neitzel
concluded, "it was for the legislature, not the court, to balance the
purpose of the statute against a possible statutory right to counsel prior to
testing." Id. at
204, 289 N.W.2d at 835. The statute has
been consistently construed to require only that the police officer inform the
accused of his or her rights and responsibilities therein described. The statute does not include the right to be
informed that a person accused of OWI has no right to counsel prior to testing.
Sparks cites a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, DOT v. O'Connell, 555 A.2d
873 (Pa. 1989), holding after an OWI accused has been given Miranda
warnings and then asks to contact an attorney, fairness dictates that the
police advise the accused that Miranda warnings have no
application to chemical testing, and that a test refusal will result in the
applicable penalties. The court
reasoned that the advice is necessary to avoid confusing the accused, who is
first told of a right to counsel, and, after attempting to exercise the right,
is told he has refused the test without further explanation. O'Connell,
555 A.2d at 878. There is no need to
decide whether to apply O'Connell in Wisconsin because the record
fails to demonstrate that Sparks was given Miranda warnings.
Sparks also cites a
decision of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Kheyfets v.
Commonwealth, 654 A.2d 102 (Pa. 1995), extending the requirement of an O'Connell
warning where the accused asked to speak to her husband before submission to a
test, and where no Miranda warnings had been given. This court rejects Kheyfets
for several reasons. First, the case
offers no rationale for its holding, whether it is founded upon constitutional
principles of due process or a public policy decision of the court. If Sparks is suggesting a new judicial
policy, that pronouncement should come from our supreme court. Further, the Kheyfets decision
appears to be inconsistent with the declared legislative policy of this state
to strictly enforce the provisions of the implied consent law in order to
remove drunk drivers from the public highways.
Finally, Kheyfets and Sparks cite no authority whatsoever
for the proposition that the absence of an O'Connell warning
reaches the level of a constitutional right.
The request for this court to impose the warning as a condition of
finding a refusal to take a chemical test unjustified is therefore rejected.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.