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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED May 29, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1027-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JASON TYRRELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JOHN A. FRANKE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Sullivan, Fine
and Schudson, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Jason Tyrrell appeals from a judgment of
conviction, following a jury trial, for first-degree intentional homicide while
armed, first-degree recklessly endangering safety while armed, and theft of a
firearm. He argues that the trial court
should have suppressed his lineup identification and the evidence gained in the
search of his room. He also argues that
the trial court improperly failed to sever the theft‑of‑a‑firearm
charge from the other two charges. We
reject his arguments and affirm.
On April 19, 1994, at
approximately 5:00 p.m., Tyrrell fatally shot Marcus Shaw and wounded Charles
Jones. Jones and another witness
identified Tyrrell as the assailant.
Immediately after the
shooting, police officers conducted a search of Tyrrell's bedroom. Tyrrell was living with his grandmother, who
gave the police permission to conduct the search. The police found several items that had been stolen ten days
earlier from a Milwaukee police officer's car.
Tyrrell subsequently admitted that, along with the stolen items found in
his bedroom, he had stolen the gun used in the shooting from the police
officer's car.
On May 9, 1994, the
police conducted a lineup with Tyrrell and three fill-ins. The record does not indicate who viewed the
lineup. According to the transcript
from the suppression hearing, three or four witnesses to the shooting viewed
the lineup and some of them knew Tyrrell by name at the time.
Tyrrell filed a motion
to suppress the fruits of the search of his bedroom and his lineup
identification. He also filed a motion
to sever the theft-of-the‑firearm count from the other two counts. The trial court denied these motions.
Tyrrell first argues
that the lineup identification should have been suppressed. He contends that the lineup was
“impermissibly suggestive” because the people “who filled in the array in no
way” resembled him.
This court independently
determines whether a lineup procedure is so impermissibly suggestive that it
denies a defendant due process. Powell
v. State, 86 Wis.2d 51, 64-66, 271 N.W.2d 610, 617 (1978). The appellant must show that the
identification procedure was so suggestive that it created a substantial
likelihood of misidentification. Id.,
86 Wis.2d at 64-66, 68, 271 N.W.2d at 616-617.
If a defendant can prove that the procedure was “impermissibly
suggestive,” then the burden shifts to the State to prove that the
identification was still reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 65-66, 271 N.W.2d at
617.
Tyrrell has failed to
meet the burden of proving unnecessary suggestiveness that created a
substantial likelihood of misidentification in the lineup procedure. Significantly, there was no dispute as to
the identity of the shooter. Tyrrell
had admitted that he shot Marcus and Jones; the disputed issue was self-defense. Additionally, there was no evidence
presented at trial with respect to the lineup.
Tyrrell next argues that
the trial court should have suppressed the evidence gained in the search of his
room. The trial court concluded that
Tyrrell's grandmother lacked actual authority to consent to the search but,
relying on Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), concluded
that the police were justified under the circumstances in relying on the
grandmother's apparent authority.
We review constitutional
issues de novo. State v.
West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 89-90, 517 N.W.2d 482, 489 (1994). The appellant bears the burden of proving
that a search was illegal or that he/she had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id., 185 Wis.2d
at 89, 517 N.W.2d at 489.
The police do not
violate the Fourth Amendment when they search an area in the reasonable, though
mistaken, belief that they had proper consent to do so. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186; see
also State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis.2d 960, 982-983, 468 N.W.2d
696, 705-706 (1991). There is no
dispute that the police were given consent to search Tyrrell's room by his
grandmother. They had no reason to
doubt the grandmother's statement that she was the “keeper of the house” and,
therefore, that she had the authority to consent to the search of a bedroom
located in her house.
Finally, Tyrrell argues
that the trial court improperly joined the theft-of-a-firearm charge because it
was not sufficiently related to the other two charges. He also argues that the probative value of
the theft-of-a-firearm charge was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.
Under § 971.12(1), Stats., charges may be joined if they
“are of the same or similar character or based on the same act or
transaction.” Once a defendant moves
for severance, a trial court must weigh the potential prejudice of joinder “against
the interests of the public in conducting a trial on the multiple counts.” State v. Locke, 177 Wis.2d
590, 597, 502 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993).
We will uphold the trial court's decision unless it erroneously
exercised its discretion and caused “substantial prejudice” to the
appellant. Id. In evaluating the potential for prejudice,
the risk of prejudice arising because of joinder is not significant when
evidence of the counts sought to be severed would be admissible in separate
trials. Id. Thus, an “other crimes” analysis is
required. Id. An “other crimes” analysis requires that a
court determine whether the evidence fits within one of the exceptions in
§ 904.04(2), Stats., which
includes opportunity and identity. Id.
at 597-598, 502 N.W.2d at 894-895. If
the § 904.04(2) step is satisfied, then the court must engage in a
§ 904.03 balancing of whether any unfair prejudice from the evidence
outweighs its probative value. Id.
We conclude that joinder
was proper and the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in
denying Tyrrell's motion to sever.
Tyrrell admitted to stealing the gun and the other items from the police
car ten days before the shooting. As
the State argues, Tyrrell's admission
certainly
proved [his] ... opportunity to commit the two shootings .... Because there is no dispute that the stolen
gun was the same gun used to shoot Shaw and Jones, it is obviously probative of
the appellant's identity as the shooter ....
Further,
Tyrrell has failed to show that unfair prejudice resulted from joining the
theft-of-a-firearm charge with the other two charges. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion in refusing to sever the theft-of-a-firearm charge from
the other charges.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.