COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED November 14, 2012 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
Cir. Ct. No. 2010CF5450 |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Edward J. Warrior, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: david a. hansher, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Fine, Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Edward J. Warrior appeals a judgment of conviction entered upon his
guilty pleas to two counts of armed robbery.
He contends that the circuit court should have suppressed the evidence
that police officers found when they entered his home because, he claims,
police coerced his family’s consent to the entry by making false
statements. We conclude that Warrior
forfeited his claim by failing to raise it in the circuit court. We affirm.
¶2 A
litigant who fails to raise a claim in circuit court forfeits the right to
raise the issue on appeal.[1] See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d
597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501, 505 (1997). The party seeking to raise a claim on appeal
has the burden to show that the claim was raised first in circuit court. Ibid.
We therefore must determine whether Warrior has carried his
burden here. Our inquiry requires us to
review the proceedings and legal principles that underlie the challenge Warrior
hopes to pursue.
¶3 Warrior
moved to suppress evidence after the State charged him with two counts of armed
robbery. In support of his motion, he
alleged that the police found the evidence after entering his home without consent.
¶4 Law
enforcement entry into a home is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the
Wisconsin Constitution. See State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443,
449, 340 N.W.2d 516, 521 (1983). Although
the Federal and the Wisconsin Constitutions generally require that law
enforcement conduct searches pursuant to a warrant, one exception to the
warrant requirement is a search conducted with consent. See State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 98,
112–113, 648 N.W.2d 385, 390–391.
¶5 At
the suppression hearing in this case, Milwaukee Police Officer Eric Draeger
testified for the State that he and a fellow officer knocked on the door of
Warrior’s home after a confidential informant reported that “a person [and]
property related to a robbery would be located in that residence.” Warrior’s mother, Sheila Watson, opened the
door. According to Draeger, he made
false statements to Watson that the police were investigating a complaint of
shots fired in the home, and he asked Watson for permission to enter the home
to talk. Draeger testified that Watson “said
‘yes,’ and opened the door more fully so [the officers] could come in.” After entering the home, the police found
evidence linking Warrior to a robbery.
¶6 Warrior
presented witnesses who testified that his mother and brother stood in the
doorway of the family’s home and refused to permit the officers to come
inside. Warrior’s witnesses said that
the officers did not accept the refusal and instead walked into the home.
¶7 Warrior
argued that his witnesses were credible and that no one in his household gave
the officers consent to enter his home. The
circuit court, however, believed Draeger. It denied the suppression motion upon a
finding that the police entered Warrior’s home with consent.
¶8 Whether
an individual consented in fact to the police entering a home is a question of
historical fact. State v. Artic, 2010 WI
83, ¶30, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 413, 786 N.W.2d 430, 440. We will not disturb the circuit court’s
finding of consent in fact unless the finding is contrary to the great weight
and clear preponderance of the evidence.
Ibid. Moreover, the
circuit court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses testifying
at a suppression hearing. State
v. Harrell, 2010 WI App 132, ¶8, 329 Wis. 2d 480, 489, 791 N.W.2d
677, 682.
¶9 On
appeal, Warrior does not challenge either the circuit court’s credibility
determinations or the circuit court’s finding that police entered his home with
Watson’s permission. Instead, Warrior
points to the evidence that Draeger lied to Watson about the reason police
sought entry into the home. Relying on
that evidence, Warrior contends that any consent Watson gave was involuntary
because “it was given through the use of coercion, trickery, and deceit.”
¶10 The State responds to Warrior’s appellate
arguments by asserting that Warrior challenges the voluntariness of Watson’s
consent for the first time on appeal. Warrior
disagrees, asserting that voluntariness is a component of the analysis whenever
the State offers consent as the justification for a warrantless search. See Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶30, 327
Wis. 2d at 412–413, 786 N.W.2d at 440 (reflecting that the consent
exception to the warrant requirement involves two components: first, whether police received consent in
fact, and second, whether the consent was given voluntarily). We agree with the State.
¶11 “Wisconsin law requires movants to ‘state
with particularity the grounds for the motion.’” Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 605, 563
N.W.2d at 505 (citation and brackets omitted).
The rule includes no exception for Fourth Amendment challenges. Id., 210 Wis. 2d at 606, 563
N.W.2d at 505. The particularity requirement
ensures that the opposing party and the circuit court have notice of the
specific issue that the movant intends to challenge. Id., 210 Wis. 2d at 605, 563
N.W.2d at 505.
¶12 We determine whether a movant raised an
issue by examining both the written motion and the courtroom proceedings. Id., 210 Wis. 2d at 606, 563
N.W.2d at 505. In this case, Warrior’s
suppression motion did not include an allegation that police entered Warrior’s
home pursuant to an involuntary consent.
Rather, Warrior alleged only that “the evidence to be elicited at the
evidentiary hearing will establish that Watson did not give law enforcement
permission to enter her home.” Warrior
also failed to make an argument during the suppression hearing that police
entered his home pursuant to a consent given involuntarily.
¶13 Warrior, however, directs our attention to
a comment made by the State. During its
argument to the circuit court, the State remarked that “the issue with consent
is whether it’s voluntary, meaning free from coercion.” We do not agree that this comment by the State
demonstrates that Warrior raised and argued the claim that consent was
involuntary. Indeed, the totality of the
arguments offered by the State reflect its understanding that Warrior
challenged only the police officer’s version of the historical facts, specifically,
that the police received permission to enter his home. The State argued: “the issue would be whether [Warrior’s family
members] in fact consented at all or whether the police simply pushed past them
when they were telling [the police] not to come in. And I guess to answer that question, the court
looks at the credibility of the witnesses.”
¶14 We add that the prosecutor did not try to
handcuff Warrior to the State’s characterization of the issues, but said: “the defense can correct me if I’m
wrong. Their – [t]heir complaint is
about the initial entry. And I guess
that’s the credibility issue.”
¶15 Warrior offered no correction. To the contrary, he argued: “to an extent I agree. I think the issues are clear. The issue is whether there was consent to
enter.” Warrior went on:
there was this conversation about why the cops were there. And there was suspicion about why they were there. And [the citizens] did not give [the police] consent to enter. And that it was the officers that took it upon themselves to enter the home without consent. And that’s the challenge here.
¶16 Warrior’s contention that he preserved the
question of voluntariness for appellate review is further undermined by the
circuit court’s discussion of the parties’ arguments. The circuit court described the State’s
position that police officers are permitted to misrepresent the reason that
they seek permission to enter a home, and the circuit court noted that Warrior did
not challenge that position:
[t]here’s no argument that [the officers] could, under the case cited by the State, they could come up with that story [that] there was a shooting in the area and they wanted to talk to [Warrior’s family members] to see if anything -- if it came from the house. And that’s not being argued by the defense.
Warrior did not respond by suggesting that the circuit court
misunderstood the basis for his motion or had overlooked any of his arguments.
¶17 A defendant must raise an issue with enough
prominence to ensure that the circuit court understands it is asked to make a
ruling. See Bishop v. City of Burlington, 2001 WI App 154, ¶8, 246 Wis. 2d 879, 889, 631 N.W.2d 656,
660. The Record here shows that Warrior
did not demonstrate to the circuit court that he sought a ruling on a claim
that police entered his home pursuant to an involuntary consent. He therefore forfeited the claim on appeal. See
id.,
2001 WI App 154, ¶9, 246 Wis. 2d at 889, 631 N.W.2d at 660.
¶18 The rule that issues are forfeited if not
raised in the circuit court serves principles of fairness and policies of
judicial administration. See Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids School District,
2010 WI 86, ¶45, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 597–598, 786 N.W.2d 177, 190–191. The rule does not deprive an appellate court
of power to consider, in the exercise of judicial discretion, a forfeited issue
in a proper case. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d
at 609, 563 N.W.2d at 506–507. Nonetheless,
we usually do not make an exception to the forfeiture rule unless the issue
presented is one of law and involves no questions of fact. See
State
v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 737, 595 N.W.2d 330, 339 (1999). Such is not the case here.
¶19 “The determination of ‘voluntariness’ is a
mixed question of fact and law based upon an evaluation of ‘the totality of all
the surrounding circumstances.’” Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶32, 327 Wis. 2d at 414, 786 N.W.2d at
440–441 (citation omitted). Resolution
of the question involves examining multiple
factors surrounding the consent and assessing the characteristics of the person
who consented; no single factor controls.
Id., 2010 WI 83, ¶33, 327 Wis. 2d at 414, 786 N.W.2d at 441. We therefore conclude that the issue Warrior
presents is particularly inappropriate for our consideration now. Fairness and sensible judicial policy
militate against addressing the merits of a fact-intensive question that
Warrior did not pursue in circuit court and that the State might have developed
in detail had it received proper notice that the issue was in dispute. Accordingly, we follow our normal practice and
decline to consider a forfeited claim for the first time on appeal.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] The
supreme court used the word “waived” to describe the effect of a litigant’s
failure to raise an issue in circuit court in State v. Caban, 210
Wis. 2d 597, 604, 608, 563 N.W.2d 501, 505, 506 (1997). We instead use the term “forfeited,” in light
of the decision in State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653,
761 N.W.2d 612. The Ndina court explained that, while courts sometimes use
“forfeiture” and “waiver” interchangeably, the terms represent distinct
concepts. Id., 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315
Wis. 2d at 670, 761 N.W.2d at 620. When
the right to make an objection or to assert a claim on appeal is lost because a
party failed to raise the issue in the circuit court, the proper term is
“forfeiture.” See id., 2009 WI 21, ¶¶29–31, 315
Wis. 2d at
670–671, 761 N.W.2d at 620.