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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JANUARY 16, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No.
95-1335-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
JAMES R. GRIFFIN,
and KATHERINE GRIFFIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
V & J FOODS, INC. a/k/a
V & I FOODS, INC.,
COMPCARE HEALTH SERVICES
INSURANCE CORPORATION,
and CONTINENTAL WESTERN
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MICHAEL J. SKWIERAWSKI, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Fine, JJ.
PER CURIAM. In the early morning hours of September 20,
1990, James R. Griffin was waiting to place an order in the
"drive-thru" lane of a Burger King when he was shot by a person
attempting to rob him. Griffin sued V
& J Foods (hereafter "Burger King"), the owner of the Burger
King, claiming that it failed to exercise ordinary care to protect him while he
was on the Burger King premises. After
a trial to the court, the circuit court held that Burger King had been
negligent, but not causally so. Griffin
appeals. Pursuant to this court's order
dated June 21, 1995, this case was submitted to the court on the expedited
appeals calendar. We affirm.
The relevant facts are
largely undisputed. The Burger King was
located in a high-crime area of Milwaukee.
It was 3:00 a.m. when Griffin was waiting in the drive-thru lane. The dining room was closed at that hour for
security reasons. Two cars ahead of
Griffin were waiting to place orders and, as a result, Griffin was behind the
building, out of sight of any Burger King employees.
Griffin testified that
as he waited, he noticed two black males "standing in the middle of the
parking lot." He stated that he
"assumed that they were waiting for somebody." When one of the cars ahead of him pulled
forward, Griffin pulled forward. He
then realized that only one of the black males remained in the parking lot, and
he turned his head "to see where the other guy was." As he turned his head, the "other
guy," subsequently identified as Anthony Hoskins, stuck a gun through the
open car window and told Griffin to "give it up." At Hoskins' criminal trial, Griffin
testified that it was "only a matter of seconds" from the time he first
saw Hoskins in the parking lot, and the time the gun was pointed at him.
Griffin testified that
he told Hoskins that he would give him nothing, and that he then attempted to
"block the gun" by raising his left arm. He also attempted to escape by placing his car in reverse. The car slipped into park, however. Hoskins' gun discharged, and Griffin was
struck in the left arm and seriously injured.
Hoskins fled.
Griffin drove his car to
the drive-thru speaker and told the employees that he had been shot. The Burger King manager called the
police. The police arrived at the scene
of the shooting seventeen minutes after the emergency call was placed.
Lynell Perry, a Burger
King employee, was working at the drive-thru window at the time of the
shooting. She testified that shortly
before the attempted robbery, Hoskins had walked up to the drive-thru window to
place an order. Perry stated that she
knew Hoskins, and that she had not had any previous trouble with him. She testified that she did not believe
Hoskins was a threat to the patrons or employees, and that Hoskins did not show
a weapon to her or threaten anyone. She
testified that she told Hoskins that she was forbidden from serving
"walk-ups." Perry testified
that she observed Hoskins approach some of the automobiles in the drive-thru
line, apparently in an attempt to have someone purchase food for him. Perry testified that she then told Hoskins
that he would not be allowed to purchase food from the drive-thru window, and
that he should leave the premises. She
testified that Hoskins then walked to the back of the building. Within one or two minutes, Perry heard the
gunshot.
Kenneth Grover, a
restaurant security expert, testified that Burger King was negligent in its
security arrangements. Grover noted
that the Burger King was located in a high-crime area, and that in the four
months prior to the attempted robbery of Griffin, there had been two other
robberies in the drive-thru lane.
Grover testified that Burger King was negligent for failing to ensure
that it could observe its entire premises.
He testified that he believed Burger King's negligent security
arrangements were a proximate cause of Griffin's injury because they permitted
Hoskins to loiter on the premises unobserved, and failed to ensure proper
monitoring of the area where Griffin was shot.
The trial court held
that Burger King was negligent. It
noted that the Burger King was being operated in a high-crime area, and that
robberies were therefore foreseeable by the owner. It noted that Burger King had taken some precautions to prevent robberies,
such as closing the dining room after 10:00 p.m. It noted that Burger King could have taken additional safety
precautions. Specifically, the trial
court noted that Burger King could have installed devices that would have
allowed employees to monitor the drive-thru lane, or it could have employed a
security guard.
The trial court found,
however, that Burger King's negligence had not caused Griffin's injuries. It rejected Griffin's contention that the
Burger King staff was negligent in failing to call the police shortly after
Hoskins approached the drive-thru window.
The court reasoned that, at that time, Hoskins was not threatening
people or brandishing a weapon. It held
that Hoskins' behavior at that time was not conduct "that would cause a
reasonable person, a reasonable business proprietor under those circumstances,
to immediately call the police."
The court noted that, even if Burger King had called police due to
Hoskins' behavior at that time, police would have likely ignored the call, given
Hoskins' then non-threatening behavior.
The trial court also
held that Burger King's negligence was not causal because Hoskins' assault
occurred quickly and without any apparent warning. The court noted that even if Burger King had installed security
devices that allowed employees to view the drive-thru lane, those devices would
not have prevented Hoskins' actions.
The trial court stated, "[V]iewing doesn't stop people from doing
something." In addition, the trial
court noted that it had taken police seventeen minutes to arrive after the
Burger King manager placed the emergency call.
It stated that "even if the restaurant was negligent for not
calling the police, it absolutely was not causal to Mr. Griffin's injuries
because the police would never have gotten there in time to do anything to
deter or stop" the shooting. The
trial court concluded that Griffin had failed to show that, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, the presence of additional security measures, or an
immediate call to the police would have deterred or prevented the shooting.
On appeal, Griffin
contends that, given the evidence adduced at trial, the trial court had no
option but to find that Burger King's negligence was causal. Griffin states: "[T]he causal nexus is
clear and irrefutable." We
disagree.
A trial court's factual
findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous. See § 805.17(2),
Stats. This standard is essentially the same as the "great weight
and clear preponderance" test, and we sometimes refer to that test for an
explanation of the "clearly-erroneous" standard. Noll v. Dimiceli's, Inc., 115
Wis.2d 641, 643, 340 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Ct. App. 1983). Under the "great weight and clear preponderance" test:
The
evidence supporting the findings of the trial court need not in itself
constitute the great weight or clear preponderance of the evidence; nor is
reversal required if there is evidence to support a contrary finding. Rather, to command a reversal, such evidence
in support of a contrary finding must itself constitute the great weight and
clear preponderance of the evidence.
Cogswell
v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis.2d 243, 249-50, 274
N.W.2d 647, 650 (1979). "When more
than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the credible evidence, the
reviewing court must accept the inference drawn by the trier of
fact." Id. at 250,
274 N.W.2d at 650.
Here, the trial court
used Weihert v. Piccione, 273 Wis. 448, 78 N.W.2d 757 (1956), as
the framework for analyzing the evidence presented. We agree that Weihert is instructive. In that case, a restaurant patron was
assaulted suddenly and without any warning by another patron. The assaulted patron sued the restaurant. When no evidence was produced at trial to
show that any one, including the patrons or the restaurant staff, anticipated
the assault, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
establish causal negligence on the part of the restaurant. Id. at 457-58, 78 N.W.2d at 762.
The supreme court upheld
the trial court's determination, reasoning that a restaurateur has a duty to
use ordinary care to protect patrons from harm caused by others on the premises
"if the proprietor by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered
that such acts were being done or were about to be done, and could have
protected" the patrons by controlling the actions of the others or by
giving a warning to the patrons that would have enabled them to avoid
harm. Id. at 455-56, 78
N.W.2d at 761. The supreme court noted,
however, that the trial court had determined the assault "occurred
instantly and without warning." It
also noted that neither the restaurateur or his employees "had notice or
knowledge" that the person who committed the assault possessed
"violent propensities."
A similar analysis of
the evidence adduced in the instant case supports the determination that Burger
King's negligence was not causal.
First, Hoskins was known to Perry, the employee at the drive-thru
window. She testified that she had
never had trouble with Hoskins in the past.
Perry told Hoskins that she could not serve him, and, after he was told
to leave the cars in the drive-thru lane alone, he apparently left the
premises. There was no evidence
produced to show that the Burger King staff had notice or knowledge of Hoskins'
"violent propensities."
Second, the trial
court's finding that Hoskins' attack on Griffin occurred so suddenly that it
could not have been prevented by additional security measures is supported by
the evidence. The trial court noted
that Hoskins' initial approach to the drive-thru window had not been
threatening, and concluded that Burger King's failure to call police at that
time was not negligent. It further
noted that, even if Burger King had installed additional security devices that
would have allowed them to view the rear of the building where the assault took
place, the assault occurred so suddenly that those security measures would have
made no difference. Griffin himself had
admitted that only "seconds" elapsed from the time he first saw
Hoskins to the time Hoskins pointed a gun at him. In addition, the evidence showed that even if Burger King had
summoned the police prior to the attempted robbery, the crime occurred so soon
after Hoskins left the drive-thru window that the police could not or would not
have responded prior to the robbery.
Because Griffin was
unable to establish that additional security measures or an earlier call to the
police would have prevented the attempted robbery, we are satisfied that the
trial court's determination that Burger King's negligence was not causal in
this case is supported by the great weight and clear preponderance of the
evidence.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.