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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED April 16, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1397
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
JOSEPH ANTHUBER
and HELEN ANTHUBER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
INTEGRITY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a domestic insurance
corporation,
and FRIENDLY INN
SUPPER CLUB, INC.,
a domestic
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents,
DONNA SHALALA,
Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human
Services,
Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MICHAEL J. BARRON, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Fine and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Joseph Anthuber appeals from a judgment in favor of
the Friendly Inn. Anthuber argues: (1) the trial court erroneously exercised its
discretion by precluding Anthuber's safety expert from testifying on the issue
of Anthuber's negligence; and (2) the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant
evidence of criminal activity at locations other than the Friendly Inn. We affirm.
Anthuber was shot and
injured by an unknown assailant in the parking lot of the Friendly Inn. He filed an action against the restaurant
and its insurer claiming that the Friendly Inn negligently failed to make its
premises as safe as reasonably permitted.
At trial, over Anthuber's objection, Dennis Gritzmacher, the owner of
Gritz'z Pzazz, a restaurant located near the Friendly Inn, testified regarding
the extent of criminal activity in the area and at his restaurant. Also, over Anthuber's objection, the trial
court received evidence of criminal activity at Gritz'z Pzazz from the
Milwaukee Police Department and a statistical breakdown of crime in the
district around the Friendly Inn. A
jury found Anthuber seventy-five percent negligent and the Friendly Inn twenty-five
percent negligent. After a hearing on
motions after the verdict, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the
Friendly Inn.
During the presentation
of Anthuber's case in chief, Walter Buzby, a safety expert, was called to
testify regarding Anthuber's negligence.
Counsel for Anthuber questioned Buzby:
QYou know that when he saw two
individuals in the parking lot he called out to them?
AThat's my understanding, yes.
QDo you fault him for doing that?
ANo sir, I do not.
QWhy not?
[Objection sustained]
QDo you believe that Mr. Anthuber was
negligent in the way he acted that night?
[Objection
sustained]
Anthuber
argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding Buzby's
testimony because such opinion testimony is expressly allowed under Rule 907.04, Stats.[1]
The admission of
evidence is generally within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Pharr, 115 Wis.2d
334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498, 501 (1983).
To uphold a discretionary decision, “there should be evidence in the
record that discretion was in fact exercised.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Regarding the first
objection, Anthuber argues that the trial court erred by not permitting him to
ask Buzby “why” he did not fault Anthuber for walking to his car. We are unable to address this issue since
the excluded evidence was not preserved.
In order to preserve excluded evidence for appellate review, an offer of
proof must be made unless the substance of the evidence is apparent from the
context within which the question was asked.
State v. Williams, 198 Wis.2d 516, 538, 544 N.W.2d 406,
415 (1996); Rule 901.03(1)(b),
Stats. Anthuber made no offer of proof as to why this testimony was
relevant or what he was attempting to establish. Further, he makes no viable argument in his brief as to how he
was harmed by the trial court's ruling.
Regarding the second
objection, Anthuber asserts that Rule 907.04,
Stats., allows for expert
testimony regarding whether a party was negligent. The trial court correctly excluded this line of questioning. Rule 907.04
was not intended to allow a witness to give legal conclusions. Thus, an expert generally cannot give an
opinion as to whether an individual was “negligent” because such an opinion
would require a legal conclusion. Lievrouw
v. Roth, 157 Wis.2d 332, 352, 459 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Ct. App. 1990). The trial court did not misuse its
discretion by excluding this testimony.
Anthuber also claims
that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of criminal activity at other
locations near the Friendly Inn. Over
Anthuber's objection, the trial court received into evidence incident reports
from the Milwaukee police regarding criminal activity at Gritz'z Pzazz. As noted, over Anthuber's objections, the
trial court allowed testimony from Dennis Gritzmacher regarding criminal
activity at the restaurant. Anthuber
argues that this error was compounded by the trial court's refusal to allow
Anthuber the opportunity to fully cross-examine Gritzmacher. Finally, Anthuber argues that the trial
court erred in receiving into evidence a statistical breakdown of crime in the
Friendly Inn's district as well as allowing this report to go into the jury
room.
Regarding the incident
reports from the Milwaukee Police Department at Gritz'z Pzazz and the
Gritzmacher testimony, we agree with Anthuber that this evidence was improperly
admitted. Outside the presence of the
jury, Anthuber raised an objection to Gritzmacher's testimony, arguing that
Gritzmacher would not be able to lay the proper foundation that the premises of
the two restaurants were substantially similar. The trial court allowed the testimony with the instruction that
defense counsel lay the proper foundation when Gritzmacher is called.[2] A review of the record reveals that
Gritzmacher's testimony was wholly inadequate in establishing that the premises
of the two restaurants were substantially similar. Further, since the testimony of the police officer hinged on the
proper foundation being laid during Gritzmacher's testimony, it should have
also been excluded. Although this was
error, it does not require reversal.
An error requires a new
trial if but for the error the result would have been different. Bychinski v. Sentry Ins., 144
Wis.2d 17, 20, 423 N.W.2d 178, 179 (Ct. App. 1988). We believe that the verdict would not have been different because
the trial court properly admitted evidence of a statistical breakdown of crime
in the district where the Friendly Inn and Gritz'z Pzazz were located, which,
of course, included the incidents of crime at Gritz'z Pzazz. Evidence of prior crimes at or near the
locus in question may be admitted to prove that the owner failed (or did not
fail) to take reasonable steps to protect patrons caused by the foreseeable
acts of third persons. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344
(1965). Further, Anthuber's theory of
his case was based, in part, on the Friendly Inn's violation of the safe place
statute. Anthuber thus requested Wis J I—Civil 8050, which
requires the jury to take into account the community crime rate and the extent
of assaultive or criminal activity in the area. The jury, therefore, was properly advised of all the crime in the
area, including Gritz'z Pzazz.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Rule 907.04, Stats., provides:
Opinion on ultimate issue. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
Now,
I don't know these restaurants intimately, but I have gone by both of those on
numerous occasions, and I know they're in close proximity to each other. I know that they look fairly similar in
size. They may be bigger or smaller one
or the other, but they're not that different from my personal knowledge of
going past all these.
I assume that Mr. Ratzel [defense counsel] is going to supply that when he has Mr. Gritzmacher on. If he doesn't so supply it, of course, the underpinnings for any opinions that are given by this witness will be thrown out.