PUBLISHED OPINION
Case Nos.: 95-1336-CR
& 95-1410-CR
†
Petitions for review filed.
Complete Title
of Case:
No. 95-1336-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FRANCISCO MATA,
Defendant-Respondent.†
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No. 95-1410-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOSE A. SIANEZ,
Defendant-Respondent.†
Submitted on Briefs: December 5, 1995
Oral Argument: ---
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: January 9, 1996
Opinion Filed: January
9, 1996
Source of APPEAL Appeal from orders
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Milwaukee
(If
"Special", JUDGE: DENNIS P. MORONEY
so indicate)
JUDGES: Sullivan, Fine and Schudson, JJ.
Concurred: ---
Dissented: ---
Appellant
ATTORNEYSFor the plaintiff-appellant the cause was submitted on
the briefs of E. Michael McCann, district attorney, and Thomas J.
McAdams, assistant district attorney, of Milwaukee.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSFor the defendant-respondent Francisco Mata, the cause
was submitted on the briefs of Brennan, Ramirez, Wilmouth & Sesini,
with Peter L. Ramirez, of Milwaukee.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSFor the defendant-respondent Jose Sianez, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Randall E. Paulson, assistant state public
defender, of Milwaukee.
|
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED January
9, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
Nos. 95-1336-CR
95-1410-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
No. 95-1336-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FRANCISCO
MATA,
Defendant-Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 95-1410-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOSE
A. SIANEZ,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL
from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: DENNIS P. MORONEY, Judge. Reversed and causes remanded.
Before
Sullivan, Fine and Schudson, JJ.
SCHUDSON,
J. In these consolidated cases, the
State of Wisconsin appeals from the trial court orders dismissing carrying
concealed weapon charges against Francisco Mata and Jose Sianez. The trial court concluded that § 941.237(3)(d),
Stats., permitting a tavern owner
to go armed with a handgun in the owner's tavern, precluded prosecution of the
tavern owner under § 941.23, Stats.,
for carrying a concealed weapon in the owner's tavern. We reverse.
The
facts relevant to resolution of these appeals are undisputed.[1] The State charged Mata with committing three
crimes on January 13, 1995, one of which was carrying a concealed weapon, in
violation of § 941.23, Stats. In a separate case, the State charged Sianez
with carrying a concealed weapon on February 24, 1995, in violation of the same
statute. Each defendant moved to
dismiss the weapon charge, arguing that he was the owner of the tavern where he
was carrying the gun and, under § 941.237(3)(d), Stats., that he was permitted to do so.[2] The trial court agreed and dismissed the charges.
The
State argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that the exemption for
tavern owners under § 941.237(3)(d), Stats.,
effectively trumps the prohibition of carrying a concealed weapon under §
941.23, Stats. The State is correct.
Statutory
interpretation presents a question of law, subject to de novo
review. City of Milwaukee v.
Dyson, 141 Wis.2d 108, 110, 413 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Ct. App. 1987). When interpreting a statute, we first look
to the language of the statute itself. Id. If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, we do not resort to extrinsic aids for statutory
construction. Id. Further, of particular significance here,
“it is a basic precept of statutory construction that the legislature is
presumed to act with full knowledge of existing laws.” State v. Roling, 191 Wis.2d
755, 763, 530 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Ct. App. 1995).
Moreover, we will not assume that one statute revokes or repeals another
statute by implication. See State
v. Struzik, 113 Wis.2d 245, 248, 335 N.W.2d 432, 433 (Ct. App. 1983).
With
these solid standards in place, we consider the statutes at issue.
941.23
Carrying concealed weapon. Any person except a peace
officer who goes armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon is guilty of a
Class A misdemeanor.
941.237
Carrying handgun where alcohol beverages may be sold and consumed.
....
(2) Whoever intentionally goes armed with a handgun on any premises for
which a Class “B” or “Class B” license or permit has been issued under ch. 125
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to any of the following:
....
(d) The licensee, owner, or manager of the premises, or any
employe or agent authorized to possess a handgun by the licensee, owner, or
manager of the premises.
Wisconsin law has prohibited carrying a concealed weapon
since 1872. See Laws of 1872,
ch. 7, § 1. Section 941.237, Stats., was enacted in 1993. See 1993 Wis. Act 95, § 2 and
1993 Wis. Act 491, § 260. Section
941.237 makes no reference to § 941.23.
Looking
to the unambiguous words of § 941.23, Stats.,
it is clear that the statute applies to all persons with only one
exception: peace officers. Further, it encompasses not only handguns,
but all dangerous weapons that are concealed.
Thus, under its express terms, a violation of the statute would be
committed by a tavern owner carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon,
including a handgun, even if the offense occurred in the owner's tavern. Mata and Sianez do not argue otherwise. They contend, however, that § 941.237(3)(d),
Stats., carries them beyond the
reach of § 941.23. The words of
§ 941.237(3)(d) however, refute their claim.
Looking
to the unambiguous words of § 941.237(2), Stats.,
it is clear that the statute applies not to all dangerous weapons, but only to
handguns. Further, it is clear that the
statute applies not only to those who go armed with a concealed handgun, but
rather, to “[w]hoever intentionally goes armed with a handgun” at a tavern,
unless the person or the possession falls under one of the many exceptions of §
941.237(3), Stats. Nothing in § 941.237, however, permits
a tavern owner to carry a concealed weapon.
Thus, while § 941.237 allows a tavern owner to go armed with a handgun
on his or her tavern premises, it does not allow the tavern owner to go armed
with the gun concealed.
We
acknowledge Mata's and Sianez's argument that this strict statutory
interpretation leads to what they consider a curious result: a tavern owner would be required to display
a handgun in order to carry it lawfully on the tavern premises. They argue that this is absurd. Although we understand their point of view,
we also acknowledge another equally persuasive argument: a tavern owner's display of a handgun may
deter crime while concealment of the gun probably would not. We offer this observation not to address the
question or take sides in this debate, but
rather, to explain why we reject Mata's and Sianez's contention that
strict statutory interpretation necessarily leads to absurd results. Their contention is debatable and perhaps
appropriate for consideration by the legislature. “If a statute fails to cover a particular situation, and the
omission should be cured, the remedy lies with the legislature, not the
courts.” LaCrosse Lutheran Hosp.
v. LaCrosse County, 133 Wis.2d 335, 338, 395 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Ct. App.
1986).
Therefore,
we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the carrying concealed
weapon charges against Mata and Sianez.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court orders and remand the cases for
resumption of the prosecutions on these charges.
By
the Court.—Orders reversed and
causes remanded.
[1] In Mr. Sianez's
case, the State had argued in the trial court that “the facts and circumstances
surrounding this incident are substantially different than [those in Mr. Mata's
case].” The parties agree, however,
that the principal legal issue on appeal in the two cases is the same. For purposes of the motions to dismiss in
the trial court and for purposes of appeal, the parties agree that Mata and
Sianez were licensees of Class B taverns where they were arrested and that they
were carrying concealed handguns.