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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED NOVEMBER
14, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1420-FT
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
WISCONSIN
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICHARD
E. ARTISON,
Sheriff
of Milwaukee County,
Defendant-Appellant,
MILWAUKEE
COUNTY,
Defendant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: WILLIAM J. HAESE, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with
directions.
Before
Sullivan, Fine and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Richard E. Artison, Milwaukee
County Sheriff, appeals from a circuit court order denying his motion to vacate
a permanent injunction entered in 1987 that prospectively enjoined him from
refusing to process and hold persons for five days or less when those persons
are detained solely on probation or parole holds issued by the Department of
Corrections (DOC). Because this case
was initiated in 1975, and because the only significant factual record underlying
the circuit court's injunction dates back to 1981, this court concludes that a
fresh and complete factual record must be made in order to permit the
resolution of the significant legal issues this case raises. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's
order pursuant to § 752.35, Stats.,
and remand this cause for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS), DOC's predecessor,
initiated an injunction action in 1975 against Sheriff Michael Wolke, Sheriff
Artison's predecessor, and Milwaukee County.
DHSS sought to enjoin Sheriff Wolke from releasing prisoners detained
for more than five days in the county jail on probation or parole holds. The action was venued in Dane County. On September 26, 1975, the Dane County
circuit court issued a temporary injunction requested by DHSS. Nothing further occurred in the case until
March 1, 1979, when a change of venue to Milwaukee County circuit court was ordered
pursuant to § 801.54(2), Stats. (1979-80).
In April 1980, Sheriff
Wolke and Milwaukee County moved the Milwaukee County circuit court, the
Honorable Hugh R. O'Connell presiding, to dissolve the temporary
injunction. The circuit court granted
the motion. On appeal, this court
reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case back to the circuit
court for trial and the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law
construing the phrase “temporary detention” found in § 53.31, Stats. (1979-80).[1] The circuit court conducted evidentiary
hearings in November 1981. Following
the completion of these hearings, Sheriff Wolke and Milwaukee County moved the
circuit court, in part, to dismiss the action.
The circuit court did not rule on the motion to dismiss, apparently
relying on a representation of DHSS that the matter would be settled pursuant
to negotiations.
The
circuit court's file reflects that the case then entered a six-year period
of inactivity that ended in October 1987 when the Honorable
Rudolph T. Randa, Judge O'Connell's successor on the case, issued a
“DECISION AND ORDER.” Judge Randa's
order permanently enjoined Sheriff Wolke “from refusing to accept temporary detainees
for not more than five days.”[2] The circuit court's file does not identify
the event triggering the issuance of the permanent injunction. Further, the record does not reflect that
the circuit court had before it any evidence or exhibits other than the
material and testimony submitted in November 1981.
After
the permanent injunction was entered, the case lapsed into a third period of
inactivity, this one lasting approximately seven years. The case was reactivated when Sheriff
Artison filed a motion in April 1995 to open the October 1987 order and set the
permanent injunction aside pursuant to § 806.07(1)(g), Stats.[3] The motion was supported by two affidavits
alleging in detail the dangerous and overcrowded conditions at Milwaukee County Jail caused by Milwaukee
County's acceptance of DOC's probation and parole detainees as necessitated by
the injunction.[4] DOC filed two affidavits in opposition to
the motion. Upon considering the
affidavits and briefs of the parties, the trial court denied Sheriff Artison's
motion to set the permanent injunction aside.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The initial issue
presented by this appeal is whether the trial court misused its discretion
in determining that it remains equitable within the meaning of
§ 806.07(1)(g), Stats., for
the injunction issued in 1987 to have continued prospective application. See Town of Seymour v. City of Eau
Claire, 112 Wis.2d 313, 322, 332 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Ct. App. 1983). The central conflict between the parties is
whether § 302.31, Stats.,[5]
the successor to § 53.31, Stats.
(1979-80), overrides Sheriff Artison's constitutional authority to control and
maintain the Milwaukee County Jail.
Section
302.31, Stats., permits DOC to
use county jails to detain temporarily certain persons, including, for example,
persons participating in the intensive sanctions program and persons subject to
probation or parole holds. At the same
time, however, the constitutional powers of the sheriff include the responsibility
to maintain “‘the custody of the common jail and of the prisoners
therein.'” Wisconsin Professional
Police Ass'n v. County of Dane, 106 Wis.2d 303, 310, 316 N.W.2d 656,
659 (1982) (citation omitted).[6] In 1987, the circuit court concluded that
§ 53.31, Stats. (1979-80),
allowed DHSS “the right to order the sheriff to detain probationers and
parolees in county facilities[.]”
Accordingly, this lawsuit presents the question of whether it continues
to be equitable to compel Sheriff Artison to take state prisoners under
§ 302.31 when, in his judgment, the addition of the state prisoners to
Milwaukee County Jail's population will violate his duty to control and
maintain the Milwaukee County Jail.
A
prospective injunction, like the one under scrutiny here, is an equitable
remedy. See Nelson v. Taff, 175
Wis.2d 178, 187-88, 499 N.W.2d 685, 689 (Wis. App. 1993). An equitable remedy, like a prospective
injunction, “must, of necessity, place heavy reliance on the facts of the
particular controversy.” Prince
v. Bryant, 87 Wis.2d 662, 667-68, 275 N.W.2d 676, 678 (1979). It follows, therefore, that a judicial
exercise of discretion to determine the continuing equity of a prospective
judgment challenged under § 806.07(1)(g), Stats.,
must also “place heavy reliance on the facts of the particular
controversy.” Id.
This
lawsuit is entering its third decade; the injunction will shortly be entering
its second decade. Significant gaps in
time exist between the evidentiary hearings conducted in 1981 and the issuance
of the permanent injunction in 1987 and the present 1995 challenge under §
806.07(1)(g), Stats. The trial judge who entered the
permanent injunction in 1987 did not preside over this case when it was tried
in 1981. In view of this unique
situation, this court concludes that an adequate determination of the important
legal issues raised by this litigation must be predicated on a new and full
airing of the facts underlying the controversy. See § 752.35, Stats.,[7]
and see United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Sewerage Comm'n, 114
Wis.2d 258, 262-63, 338 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Ct. App. 1983) (court of appeals, on
its own motion, reversed judgment of circuit court dismissing case, and ordered
cause consolidated and tried with companion case to obviate prospect of
conflicting rulings in parallel cases).
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court's order must be reversed
and the cause remanded for a trial on the merits of whether it remains
equitable for the injunction issued in 1987 to have continued prospective
application to Sheriff Artison and Milwaukee County.
By
the Court.—Order reversed and
cause remanded with directions.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1]53.31 Use of
jails. The county jail may be used for the detention of persons
charged with crime and committed for trial; for the detention of persons
committed to secure their attendance as witnesses; to imprison persons
committed pursuant to a sentence or held in custody by the sheriff for any
cause authorized by law; for the detention of persons sentenced to imprisonment
in state penal institutions or the Milwaukee county house of correction, until
they are removed to said institutions; for the temporary detention of persons
in the custody of the department; and for other detentions authorized by law.
[2] Sheriff Artison
was elected to the office in 1983.
Nevertheless, Sheriff Artison first learned of the October 1987
injunction on January 6, 1995, when he was provided a copy of the injunction by
attorneys for the Department of Corrections.
[3]806.07 Relief
from judgment or order. (1) On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or legal
representative from a judgment, order or stipulation for the following reasons:
. . . .
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application.
[4] On January 3,
1995, Sheriff Artison informed the Department of Corrections that he would no
longer book and hold prisoners taken into custody solely on probation or parole
holds when doing so would cause the Milwaukee county jail population to exceed
1000 prisoners. The new Milwaukee
County jail facility was opened in 1993 and was designed and built to
accommodate 744 residential beds and fifty-four short term beds for special
needs.
[5]302.31 Use of
Jails. The county jail may be used for the
detention of persons charged with crime and committed for trial; for the
detention of persons committed to secure their attendance as witnesses; to
imprison persons committed pursuant to a sentence or held in custody by the
sheriff for any cause authorized by law; for the detention of persons sentenced
to imprisonment in state penal institutions or a county house of correction,
until they are removed to those institutions; for the detention of persons
participating in the intensive sanctions program; for the temporary detention
of persons in the custody of the department; and for other detentions
authorized by law. The county jail may
be used for the temporary placement of persons in the custody of the
department, and persons who have attained the age of 18 years but have not attained
the age of 25 years who are in the legal custody of the department of health
and social services under s. 48.355(4) or 48.366 and who have been taken
into custody pending revocation of aftercare supervision under s. 48.357(5) or
48.366(5) or corrective sanctions supervision under s. 48.357(5).