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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED SEPTEMBER
19, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1630-FT
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
IN THE
INTEREST OF
ERIC
P. Z., A PERSON
UNDER
THE AGE OF 18:
MARATHON
COUNTY,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
ERIC
P. Z.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Marathon County: MICHAEL W. HOOVER, Judge. Affirmed.
CANE,
P.J. Eric P. Z. appeals an order
finding him in need of protection and services because of habitual truancy.[1] He contends that an unexcused
"tardy" is not an unexcused absence for the purposes of § 48.13(6), Stats.
The order is affirmed.
The
facts are undisputed as a result of a stipulation of the parties. Eric's birthdate is December 28, 1980, and
he is enrolled at a junior high school where he had seven unexcused absences
and nine unexcused tardies during the school semester. Section 48.13(6), Stats., provides for jurisdiction over a child who is
habitually truant from school. Habitual
truant is defined under § 118.16(1)(a), Stats.,
as follows:
(a) "Habitual
truant" means a pupil who is absent from school without an acceptable
excuse under sub. (4) and s. 118.15 for either of the following:
1. Part
or all of 5 or more days out of 10 consecutive days on which school is held
during a school semester.
2. Part or all of 10 or more days on which
school is held during a school semester.
(Emphasis added.)
At
the hearing on Eric's motion to dismiss the truancy petition, the school
reports reflected seven unexcused days and nine unexcused tardies to
school. Eric contended that the times
he was tardy from school should not count as an unexcused absence for purposes
of the habitual truancy statute. The
state argued that the tardies must be included as unexcused absences because
they were part of the day, and the trial court agreed.
The
issue is whether an unexcused tardy constitutes an unexcused absence within the
meaning of § 48.13(6), Stats. A statutory interpretation is a question of
law which this court reviews de novo. State
v. Anderson, 178 Wis.2d 103, 107, 503 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1993).
Contrary
to Eric's argument, the statute is unambiguous regarding the definition of
habitual truant. If a child is absent
for part or all of a day for the number of days listed, there is a
truancy. Under the plain language of
the statute, any unexcused absence during part of a day is considered a
truancy.
Because
Eric was absent from school without a valid excuse sixteen times during the
school semester, the court had authority to conclude that Eric was habitually
truant and therefore in need of protection and services. The order is therefore affirmed.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.