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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED October 24, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1895-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
IN THE INTEREST OF
JERMAINE D.P.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE
OF 18:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JERMAINE P.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
CHRISTOPHER R. FOLEY, Judge. Affirmed.
WEDEMEYER, P.J.[1] Jermaine P., a juvenile, appeals from an
order adjudging him delinquent entered after a jury convicted him of
first-degree reckless homicide, first-degree recklessly endangering safety, and
possession of a dangerous weapon by a child, contrary to §§ 940.02(1),
941.30(1), 948.60(2), Stats. Jermaine claims that remarks made during the
State's rebuttal closing argument violated his due process right to a fair
trial.[2] Because the trial court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion in determining that the remarks at issue, even if
improper, were not prejudicial, this court affirms.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of
a shooting incident that occurred on July 4, 1994. After a fight between Jermaine and another
child, Jermaine and his friends went to a friend's home. Four other boys approached and Jermaine hid. The four boys, one of whom was pointing a
gun, indicated they were looking for Jermaine.
One of the four saw Jermaine hiding in the bushes and said “there he
is.” One of the four pointed his gun
and it was discharged twice. Jermaine
shot back with his gun. As a result of
the shooting, one juvenile was shot and killed, another was shot and injured.
Jermaine was charged for
these crimes. He presented a
self-defense theory to the jury. During
Jermaine's closing argument, his lawyer reflected on society's impact on
Jermaine, stating:
Now, relative to a 14-year-old boy walking
around with a gun, you may not feel comfortable with that concept....
But I don't live in reality, Jermaine's
world. I haven't been shot.
I haven't had a tube in my chest for seven days
in the hospital. I don't have to
encounter the daily fear in my neighborhood that shootings and drugs and gangs
bring on. Jermaine does.
....
You know it satisfies that measure of [how]
society is [by] how they treat their children.
Given what we have heard in this case so far[,] I am not sure that
society has been real fair to Jermaine.
Don't fail him now[,] because it's [the prosecutor's] burden as
representing the State in this case to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of guilt of [Jermaine].
In
response to this argument, the prosecutor argued in his rebuttal closing:
Finally, he is appealing to you for his client
was brought up in that situation and that you should give him some kind of
consideration. Well, are you going to
talk about passion or be concerned about someone else, concerned about a young
man that was killed, that his life in this case was snuffed out. Was that fair to him? Who was the cause of it? Society was the cause of his death, David
M.'s death. Society or Jermaine P.?
How do you think his mother feels? How do you think his mother feels,
relatively speaking?
You should also balance that. But frankly, that's not what the law calls
for what you are going to do.
The
jury convicted Jermaine on all three counts.
Jermaine moved for a new trial on the grounds that the prosecutor's
remarks were improper. The trial court
denied the motion. Jermaine now
appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Whether prosecutorial
misconduct occurred and whether such conduct requires a new trial is left to
the discretion of the trial court. State
v. Bembenek, 111 Wis.2d 617, 634, 331 N.W.2d 616, 625 (Ct. App.
1983). This court will not reverse
unless the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion. Id.
The trial court, in
deciding this issue in the instant case, reasoned:
The
prosecutor[']s comments can only be characterized as a “pertinent and measured
reply....”, State v. Edwardsen, 146 Wis.2d 198, 215, 430 N.W. 2d
604 (1988), “invited” by the earlier comments of defense counsel, United
States v. Young, 470 US 1, 11 (1985), citing Lawn v. United
States, 355 US 339, 359 (1958) and intended to “‘right the
scale’”, Young, at
12. Further, the arguments were
exceedingly brief and in the context of an otherwise perfectly appropriate
closing and rebuttal argument. The jury
was fully and repeatedly admonished as to their duty to decide guilt or
innocence based solely on the evidence received and instructions given by the
court.... Notably, they were specifically
instructed that the arguments of the lawyers were not evidence and, in that
context, reminded of the obligation to decide the case based upon the evidence
and instructions.
Finally, it is imperative to note that
immediately following the improper comments, the prosecutor himself admonished
the jury not to focus on irrelevant issues but to decide guilt or innocence
based upon the critical issue in the trial.
....
Based upon the factors cited above, I am
absolutely convinced this was a fair proceeding and the challenged comments had
no effect on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly and impartially.
It is
clear from this exposition that the trial court considered the pertinent facts,
applied the proper law, and reached a rational conclusion. The trial court found that, although the
comments were improper in this case, the comments were “invited,” and that
despite the comments, the jury was not prejudiced by the comments because of
curative instructions. Based on the
foregoing, this court concludes that the trial court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion in deciding this issue. Accordingly, this court affirms.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[2] Jermaine's attorney did not make a contemporaneous objection to the remarks. Hence, if this court determines that the issue was waived, Jermaine argues, in the alternative, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. Because this court rejects the prosecutorial misconduct claim on the merits, it is not necessary to address the ineffective assistance claims. See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only dispositive issue need be addressed).