|
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED APRIL 9, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2370-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
GLENN STATEZNY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY
REVIEW
COMMISSION, DON
SCHROEDER
FARMS, LTD., and
THRESHERMEN'S
MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Langlade County:
JAMES P. JANSEN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Glenn Statezny appeals a judgment affirming a decision
of the Labor and Industry Review Commission that Statezny suffered no permanent
partial disability.[1] He argues that LIRC's decision was not
"grounded in a reasoned analysis and supported by credible evidence"
and that this court should adopt a rule giving treating physicians a
presumption of greater credibility than physicians hired for litigation. We reject these arguments and affirm the
judgment.
This court must uphold
LIRC's finding because it is supported by credible and substantial
evidence. See § 102.23(6), Stats.
Dr. David Ketroser examined Statezny twice and concluded that he
exaggerated his physical condition and put forth poor effort on muscle
testing. Dr. Ketroser concluded:
"Since the only evidences of disfunction at this time are due to patient
exaggeration, there is no permanent disability due to the aforementioned
factors." This evidence is sufficient
to raise a legitimate doubt that Statezny suffered a permanent injury. LIRC was therefore required to deny his
claim. See Leist v. LIRC,
183 Wis.2d 450, 457, 515 N.W.2d 268, 270 (1994).
Statezny argues that Dr.
Ketroser's testimony was contradicted by numerous other medical witnesses. Because LIRC is the sole judge of the weight
and credibility of the witnesses' testimony, its findings on disputed medical
testimony are conclusive. Semons
Dep't Store v. DILHR, 50 Wis.2d 518, 528-29, 184 N.W.2d 871, 876
(1971). Statezny also faults LIRC for
rejecting part of Dr. Ketroser's opinion but adopting other parts. LIRC, not the reviewing court, is
responsible for reconciling inconsistencies and conflicts in the testimony and
may base its decision on any part of the testimony that it finds credible. See Valadzic v. Briggs &
Stratton Corp., 92 Wis.2d 583, 598, 286 N.W.2d 540, 547 (1979).
Statezny argues that
LIRC did not provide the required "reasoned analysis" to support its
decision. Additional analysis is
necessary when LIRC disregards unrefuted expert medical testimony. In this case, LIRC's decision was supported
by Dr. Ketroser's testimony. LIRC is
only required to make findings of ultimate fact as distinguished from
evidentiary fact. See Goranson
v. DILHR, 94 Wis.2d 537, 546, 289 N.W.2d 270, 275 (1980).
Finally, Statezny's
suggestion that this court should create a presumption in favor of a treating
physician was rejected in Conradt v. Mt. Carmel School, 197
Wis.2d 60, 67-70, 539 N.W.2d 713, 716-17 (1995). Published decisions of any panel of this court have state-wide
precedential effect. See In
re Court of Appeals, 82 Wis.2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149, 149-50
(1978).
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.