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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED January 31, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2427
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
In the Interest of
Joshua F.D.,
A Child Under the Age
of 18:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JOSHUA F.D.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Winnebago County:
THOMAS S. WILLIAMS, Judge. Affirmed.
SNYDER, J. Joshua
F.D. appeals from a juvenile court order finding him delinquent on an
aggravated battery charge contrary to §§ 940.19(3) and 48.12, Stats.
Pursuant to § 48.34(7), Stats.,
the court suspended Joshua's privilege to apply for a driver's license until
restitution was paid in full, or for a period of one year, whichever came
first. Joshua appeals that suspension,
arguing that the discretionary suspension is not available because the charged
crime, aggravated battery, does not include as an element the use of a motor
vehicle. Because we conclude that
suspending his driving privilege was appropriate under the facts of this case,
we affirm.
The underlying incident
occurred after Joshua had an angry discussion with another juvenile,
Christopher P., outside a bowling alley.
Following an exchange of words, Christopher got into his car and drove
off. When he noticed that he was being
followed by a car containing Joshua and two other youths, Christopher stopped
his car and got out. The car containing
Joshua also stopped and a fight ensued.
Christopher was punched and kicked before the fight was broken up by a
passing motorist.
Joshua admitted to the
information in the delinquency petition, and disposition followed. The court ordered that Joshua's name be
released to the victim, enabling Christopher to seek civil restitution, and the
court suspended Joshua's right to apply for a driver's license.[1] Joshua now appeals that part of the order
suspending his right to obtain a driver's license.
The disposition of a
child's juvenile adjudication lies within the sound discretion of the
court. State v. James P.,
180 Wis.2d 677, 682, 510 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Ct. App. 1993). The court's disposition is premised upon a
presumption of reasonableness. Id. The exercise of discretion requires the
application of relevant law to the facts to reach a rational conclusion. Id. at 683, 510 N.W.2d at 732.
The juvenile court based
its decision to suspend Joshua's ability to obtain a driver's license on §
48.34(7), Stats. It states in relevant part:
The
judge may restrict, suspend or revoke the operating privilege, as defined in s.
340.01(40), of a child who is adjudicated delinquent under a violation of any
law in which a motor vehicle is involved.
Joshua
reads this statute as requiring the violated law to include the use of a motor
vehicle as one of its essential elements.
Because the elements of aggravated battery do not include the use of a
motor vehicle, Joshua argues that the court misused its discretion.
The interpretation of a
statute is a question of law which we review independently. Rhonda R.D. v. Franklin R.D.,
191 Wis.2d 680, 703, 530 N.W.2d 34, 43 (Ct. App. 1995). The first step in statutory construction is
to look at the language; if it is unambiguous, the reviewing court's inquiry
ends. Id. However, if reasonably well-informed persons
could differ as to a statute's meaning, it is ambiguous. In that case, we look to the scope, history,
context and subject matter in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Id. at 703-04, 530 N.W.2d at
43.
We conclude that the
statute is ambiguous. On its face it is
not clear whether the legislature intended it to be applied only when a
juvenile violated a law requiring a motor vehicle as an element, or when
the violation merely included the use of a motor vehicle.
Section 48.01(2), Stats., mandates a liberal construction
of the juvenile code in order to effect its objectives. Those objectives include instituting programs
of supervision, care and rehabilitation for juveniles committing delinquent
acts. See
§ 48.01(1)(c). In general, the
Children's Code does not explicitly or implicitly require a juvenile's
disposition to be related to the violation that resulted in the
delinquency. James P.,
180 Wis.2d at 683, 510 N.W.2d at 732.
In § 48.34(7), Stats., however, the legislature has
mandated that suspension or revocation of driving privileges can only be
imposed if the law violated involves the use of a motor vehicle. The statute does not specify particular
types of offenses which have a motor vehicle as an element, or even examples of
such offenses, only that the violation must involve the use of a vehicle.
When a word is not
defined in a statute, the word must be construed according to its accepted and
ordinary meaning. Rhonda R.D.,
191 Wis.2d at 704, 530 N.W.2d at 43. It
is proper to consult a dictionary for that purpose. Id. Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1191 (1976) lists the following definition for “involve:”
5a: to have within or as part of itself: contain,
include ....
Joshua
argues in his brief that a similar definition for involve “means just that,
that a motor vehicle was an element or a part of the law that was violated,
that the motor vehicle was a necessary feature or consequence of the
crime.” We disagree with this
interpretation. Neither the wording of
the statute nor the dictionary definition provides unambiguous proof that a
motor vehicle must be an essential element of the crime, only that a vehicle
must have been included in the commission of the delinquent act.
Recognizing the liberal
construction afforded the Children's Code and the fact that the legislature did
not specify the types of violations for which this disposition would be
appropriate, we conclude that the trial court did not misuse its discretion.[2]
The motor vehicle, while
not an element of aggravated battery, clearly provided the means for Joshua to
engage in this delinquent behavior. Had
it not been for the availability of a car, enabling Joshua to pursue
Christopher, this incident would never have occurred. The trial court's disposition applied an appropriate consequence
to Joshua's behavior.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.