|
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 26, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2741-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROSS H. HERMANSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Dane County: ROBERT A. DE CHAMBEAU, Judge.
Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman, P.J., and Robert D. Sundby, Reserve Judge.
PER
CURIAM. Ross Hermanson appeals from a judgment convicting him
of second-degree reckless homicide and an order denying postconviction
relief. The issues are whether the
trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence Hermanson
contends was irrelevant and highly prejudicial and whether Hermanson received
effective assistance of trial counsel.
We reject his arguments on both issues, and therefore affirm.
The evidence against
Hermanson included testimony that he entered a ninety-degree highway turn at
sixty miles per hour, despite a passenger's warning to slow down, and lost
control of his car. It then spun over
the center line and struck an on-coming car, killing its driver.
Hermanson sought to
exclude additional evidence that while driving into the turn he had been
drinking beer from a bottle and placed the bottle between his legs between
sips. He also sought to exclude
evidence that he took bottles of beer that had been in his car and placed them
in and around the victim's car after the accident. The trial court refused to exclude this evidence, and it was used
against Hermanson at trial.
Before deliberations
began, the trial court instructed the jury that it could find Hermanson guilty
of the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide. However, Hermanson asserts that trial counsel's closing argument
undermined the lesser-included strategy and contradicted Hermanson's trial
testimony by arguing that the collision was purely accidental. Consequently, after he was convicted, he
filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. The trial court denied that
motion, resulting in this appeal.
Relevant evidence is
that which makes the existence of any consequential fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
The consequential fact in this case was whether Hermanson engaged in
criminal recklessness, which is conduct that creates an unreasonable and
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human being and the
actor is aware of that risk. Section
939.24(1), Stats. Whether Hermanson was holding a bottle of
beer in his hand or between his legs as he entered the curve at a high speed
was highly relevant to whether he was then engaged in criminal recklessness or,
for that matter, criminal negligence.
As for placing the remaining beer bottles in and around the victim's
car, acts of an accused which are intended to obstruct justice or avoid
punishment are admissible to prove consciousness of guilt. State v. Bettinger, 100 Wis.2d
691, 698, 303 N.W.2d 585, 589, amended, 100 Wis.2d 691, 305 N.W.2d 57
(1981).
The trial court properly
determined that admitting the evidence did not unfairly prejudice
Hermanson. Under § 904.03, Stats., relevant evidence should be
excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value. Hermanson was no doubt
prejudiced by the introduction of the evidence. However, the trial court could reasonably conclude that he was
not unfairly prejudiced to a degree requiring exclusion. The evidence was highly probative of
recklessness or negligence, and it could not have misled the jury into treating
this as a drunk driving case. Hermanson
undisputedly had no measurable blood alcohol content when the accident
occurred.
Hermanson failed to show
that counsel ineffectively represented him during the closing argument. The defendant bears the burden of proving
ineffective assistance of counsel. State
v. Pitsch, 124 Wis.2d 628, 633, 369 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1985). To meet that burden the defendant must
present the testimony of trial counsel at the postconviction motion
hearing. State v. Machner,
92 Wis.2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1979). Here, Hermanson did not call trial counsel
as a witness or explain his failure to do so.
That omission resolves the issue against him.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.