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**DISTRICT III**

September 23, 2025

To:

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Hector Salim Al-Homsi  
Electronic Notice

Kristi Severson  
Clerk of Circuit Court  
St. Croix County Courthouse  
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Jeffrey W. Jensen  
Electronic Notice

You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:

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2023AP1037-CR

State of Wisconsin v. Joshua Michael Cameron  
(L. C. No. 2020CF545)

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

**Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).**

Joshua Michael Cameron appeals a judgment convicting him of second-degree reckless homicide.<sup>1</sup> Cameron challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Based upon our review of the briefs and record, we conclude at conference that this case is appropriate for summary disposition. *See* WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21 (2023-24).<sup>2</sup> We reject Cameron's argument, and affirm.

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<sup>1</sup> Cameron was convicted of other offenses, but on appeal he challenges only his conviction for second-degree reckless homicide.

<sup>2</sup> All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

Cameron's conviction arises from the August 20, 2020 shooting death of the victim, Randy.<sup>3</sup> At approximately 9:40 p.m., Randy was shot while in the apartment of Gary Gores, who lived downstairs from Randy in the same apartment building. According to the trial testimony, Randy emerged from Gores's apartment yelling that he had been shot. He limped back to his apartment while his friends called the authorities and attempted to assist him. Randy was bleeding profusely, and he told several people that "Josh" or "Josh Cameron" had shot him. Randy died later from a severed femoral artery in his leg.

A neighbor testified that he was sitting outside on his deck when he saw a white van pull into Gores's driveway. At about 9:40 p.m., he heard five gunshots and saw somebody exit Gores's apartment yelling, "Call 9-1-1. That mother fucker shot me." Shortly thereafter, he saw someone run out of Gores's apartment, climb into the van, and rapidly leave. Investigators recovered a .22-caliber bullet from Randy's left thigh and another .22-caliber bullet from the apartment adjacent to Gores's unit, with a corresponding bullet hole in Gores's unit near the hallway floor. A medical examiner testified that Randy died from a gunshot wound and observed that Randy did not have any injuries consistent with a fight.

After the shooting, Cameron drove a white van to the home of Jennifer Burke and Brandon Fletch. Burke testified that Cameron showed up unexpectedly as she was putting her children to bed. She told Cameron that Fletch was not at home, and Cameron left. Cameron returned a short while later and asked to look at some rocks that Fletch, who collects agates and various other rocks, kept in the garage. Burke took Cameron to the garage to look at the rocks.

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<sup>3</sup> Because this case involves the victim of a crime, we use a pseudonym. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86.

The next morning, Fletch found a .22-caliber revolver in the bucket where he stored the rocks, along with five spent cartridge casings, which he turned over to the police.

Police located Cameron behind his apartment building shortly after the shooting. He threw a beer can at the police and attempted to run before he was apprehended. During a police interview, Cameron admitted going to Gores's apartment that evening with Andrew Helmueller and leaving in a white van. Officers found an unfired .22 cartridge in Cameron's gun safe with the same manufacturer insignia and characteristics as four of the five spent casings found in the revolver recovered from Fletch's garage.

At trial, Cameron testified he did not go into Gores's apartment but instead remained in the van while Helmueller went inside. He denied hearing gunshots or shouting, and he claimed that he rapidly drove away from Gores's apartment because Helmueller pointed a gun at him and told him to drive. Cameron admitted placing his gun in Burke and Fletch's garage.

“[A] defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden to show the evidence could not reasonably have supported a finding of guilt.” *State v. Beamon*, 2013 WI 47, ¶21, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681. We will sustain a verdict unless the evidence “is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” *State v. Poellinger*, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). In reviewing sufficiency, we examine the totality of the evidence, view it in the light most favorable to the State and the verdict, and adopt reasonable inferences supporting the verdict; where more than one reasonable inference may be drawn, the inference supporting the verdict controls. *State v. Smith*, 2012 WI 91, ¶¶24, 33, 36, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410.

A person is guilty of second-degree reckless homicide if he or she “recklessly causes the death of another human being.” *See* WIS. STAT. § 940.06(1); *State v. Johnson*, 2021 WI 61, ¶28, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18. Criminal recklessness “means that the actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human being and the actor is aware of that risk.” WIS. STAT. § 939.24(1). Thus, the question here is whether a reasonable jury could find that Cameron (1) caused Randy’s death and (2) did so by criminally reckless conduct.

As to the first element, the evidence amply supports the conclusion that Cameron caused Randy’s death. Multiple witnesses testified that Randy immediately and repeatedly identified Cameron as the shooter. Randy’s choice to flee Gores’s apartment—limping, bleeding, and calling for help—supports the inference that Randy sought safety from the person who shot him. Gores’s neighbor testified that he heard five gunshots. The autopsy confirmed the fatal thigh wound. The match between an unfired .22 cartridge in Cameron’s safe and the spent casings in the revolver further tied Cameron to the weapon.

As to the second element regarding criminal recklessness, the evidence supports the conclusion that Cameron created an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm and was aware of that risk. *See* WIS. STAT. § 939.24(1). The jury could reasonably infer that Cameron created that risk by firing multiple shots in close quarters in Gore’s apartment, striking Randy in the thigh and sending another bullet into the neighboring unit. The inference of intentional, volitional firing is reinforced by the evidence of multiple shots and the five spent casings in the revolver, which is inconsistent with accidental discharge of the weapon. Cameron’s postincident conduct—fleeing and stashing a revolver with five spent casings in a friend’s garage, and then running from and resisting officers—permitted the jury to infer

consciousness of guilt and involvement in the shooting. *Cf. State v. Kimbrough*, 2001 WI App 138, ¶18, 246 Wis. 2d 648, 630 N.W.2d 752.

Cameron argues that because no eyewitness described the instant of the shooting, any finding of recklessness is speculative. This assertion reflects a misapprehension of our standard of review. We do not require direct evidence of the shooting’s mechanics; circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences suffice, and where competing inferences exist, we accept the one supporting the verdict. *See Poellinger*, 153 Wis. 2d at 507. Here, the number of shots; the bullet trajectories; Randy’s immediate identifications; and Cameron’s flight, concealment, and inconsistent statements together provide a more than adequate basis to find criminal recklessness and awareness.

Cameron contends that the weapon may have accidentally discharged. The physical evidence of at least two shots (and a revolver with five spent casings) undermines this theory, and Cameron does not point to any trial evidence to support it; indeed, he denied being in the apartment at all during his trial testimony. This alternative theory does not undermine the sufficiency of the jury’s verdict.

Finally, Cameron contends the evidence was insufficient because the State did not prove exactly “what [he] was doing at the time the shot was fired,” and he invokes factors associated with the “utter disregard for human life” element of first-degree reckless homicide. But those factors are not elements of second-degree reckless homicide, the crime Cameron was found guilty of committing. *See* WIS. STAT. § 940.02(1); *Johnson*, 397 Wis. 2d 633, ¶28. This argument is unavailing.

In sum, under the highly deferential sufficiency of the evidence standard, we conclude that the evidence was not “so lacking in probative value and force” that no reasonable jury could find Cameron guilty of second-degree reckless homicide. *See Poellinger*, 153 Wis. 2d at 507.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the judgment is summarily affirmed pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.

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*Samuel A. Christensen*  
*Clerk of Court of Appeals*