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**DISTRICT II**

April 29, 2026

To:

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Circuit Court Judge  
Electronic Notice

Donald V. Latorraca  
Electronic Notice

Monica Paz  
Clerk of Circuit Court  
Waukesha County Courthouse  
Electronic Notice

Robert C. Stryker  
Electronic Notice

You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:

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2025AP897-CR	State of Wisconsin v. Robert C. Stryker (L.C. #2014CF1068)
2025AP898-CR	State of Wisconsin v. Robert C. Stryker (L.C. #2015CF985)

Before Neubauer, P.J., Gundrum, and Grogan, JJ.

**Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).**

In these consolidated appeals, Robert C. Stryker, pro se, appeals the circuit court's order denying his motion "for Restoration of Original Condition of Release." Based upon our review of the briefs and Record, we conclude at conference that this case is appropriate for summary disposition. *See* WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21 (2023-24).<sup>1</sup> We affirm.

Stryker was convicted in two separate cases of possession of child pornography and first-degree sexual assault of a child and sentenced concurrently to eight years of initial

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<sup>1</sup> All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

confinement followed by eight years of extended supervision. Stryker filed postconviction motions, which the circuit court denied. We affirmed the denial of the postconviction motions and the judgments of conviction. *See State v. Stryker*, No. 2020AP1482-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Dec. 29, 2021); *State v. Stryker*, No. 2021AP692-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App June 1, 2022).

This appeal arises from Stryker’s attempt to modify the terms of his extended supervision, which he began serving in December of 2024. The rules of his extended supervision included Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Rule of Supervision SP 001, which provided, as relevant here: “You shall have no contact with co-defendants, felons, gang members, or other individuals on community supervision, outside of treatment, without prior agent approval.”

Stryker, whose extended supervision was transferred to Minnesota under the Interstate Compact, asked his Minnesota supervising agent for permission to contact both a current and a former inmate at New Lisbon Correctional Institution. Wisconsin authorities told his Minnesota agent that Stryker was not allowed to have contact with felons.

Stryker then sent a letter to his Wisconsin supervision agent asking for a modification of the no-contact-with-felons rule. When his Wisconsin agent did not respond, Stryker submitted an Offender Request for Administrative Review—Form DOC-127—to his Wisconsin agent’s supervisor requesting permission to contact the two felons described above. A DOC supervisor denied Stryker’s request, explaining that “both are felon registrants with the Wisconsin Sex Offender Registry.”

Stryker next submitted Form DOC-127 to a regional chief from DOC's Division of Community Corrections seeking to modify the no-contact-with-felons rule. In response, the regional chief agreed with the supervisor's prior decision that the rule should remain in place.

Stryker later submitted Form DOC-127 to the administrator for DOC's Division of Community Corrections; and, after several weeks went by during which he received no response, Stryker filed the pro se motion for postconviction relief that is the subject of this appeal: his "Motion for Restoration of Original Condition of Release." The circuit court denied Stryker's motion, and Stryker appeals.

On appeal, the question before us is whether the circuit court had competency to decide his motion.<sup>2</sup> This is a question of law we review de novo. *City of Eau Claire v. Booth*, 2016 WI 65, ¶6, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738.

We conclude that while the sentencing court had the authority to modify the conditions that it imposed regarding Stryker's extended supervision, *see* WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7m)(a), it was not competent to modify the DOC's conditions or rules in these circumstances. Instead, the administrative review process governed the conditions Stryker sought to challenge, *see* WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DOC 328.12 (Nov. 2024),<sup>3</sup> and when the DOC did not grant Stryker the relief he sought, Stryker should have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, *see State ex rel. Macemon v.*

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<sup>2</sup> The circuit court denied Stryker's motion in part because Stryker did not establish the existence of a new factor. *See, e.g., State v. Harbor*, 2011 WI 28, ¶33, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828. The parties agree that the issue before us is not whether a new factor exists, but whether the circuit court had competency to decide the motion; therefore, this will be the focus of our discussion. *See State v. Smiter*, 2011 WI App 15, ¶9, 331 Wis. 2d 431, 793 N.W.2d 920 (we may affirm a circuit court's order on different grounds).

<sup>3</sup> All references to WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DOC are to the November 2024 Register.

*McReynolds*, 208 Wis. 2d 594, 596 n.1, 561 N.W.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1997) (challenges to Department of Corrections decisions should be raised through a petition for a writ of certiorari); *see also Halter v. Wisconsin Intersch. Athl. Ass’n*, 2025 WI 10, ¶28, 415 Wis. 2d 384, 19 N.W.3d 58.

Stryker concedes that his challenge should have proceeded via a petition for a writ of certiorari filed in the circuit court. Moreover, the facts show that Stryker understood how to challenge DOC Rule of Supervision SP 001. As noted, Stryker first contacted his supervision agent, and when that failed, he, using Form DOC-127, filed a request for administrative review with his agent’s supervisor, the regional chief, and finally the division administrator.

But even though he understood the correct process and concedes he should have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, Stryker argues we should liberally construe his motion as a writ of certiorari and order the circuit court to respond to it. We decline to do so. While we do liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings, “there is a limit to our lenience. A reviewing court might avert its eyes from the flaws on the peripheries, but it will not ignore obvious insufficiencies at the center of a motion.” *State v. Romero-Georgana*, 2014 WI 83, ¶69, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668.

Moreover, we do not agree with Stryker that *State ex rel. Taylor v. Linse*, 161 Wis. 2d 719, 469 N.W. 2d 201 (Ct. App. 1991), confers the circuit court with the authority to modify DOC terms and conditions of supervision in his case. In *Taylor*, the defendant, who was convicted of child neglect, challenged a DOC rule of probation that limited his travel and, in so doing, conflicted with the sentencing court’s goal of rehabilitating Taylor’s relationship with his child. *Id.* at 722. We determined that because the DOC’s complaint process was “inadequate to

address conflicts between court- and [DOC]-imposed conditions of probation,” Taylor could move the sentencing court to modify the conflicting DOC condition under WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(a). *Taylor*, 161 Wis. 2d at 724-25.

*Taylor* does not apply because its holding was limited to situations where a DOC rule *specific to the offender* conflicts with a sentencing court’s condition of probation. We noted, “the general rules of supervision established by the department for all probationers are not subject to direct court review but must be appealed through the administrative procedure established by [WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DOC 328.11].” *Taylor*, 161 Wis. 2d at 725. Unlike the offender-specific rule challenged in *Taylor*, the rule that Stryker challenges, DOC Rule of Supervision SP 001, which prohibits offenders from having contact with felons, is a general rule applicable to all persons on extended supervision, not just Stryker. Furthermore, unlike *Taylor*, the DOC rule at issue here does not conflict with any of the extended supervision rules that the sentencing court imposed.

Therefore, because the circuit court did not have competency to decide Stryker’s claim,

IT IS ORDERED that the order of the circuit court is summarily affirmed pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.

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*Samuel A. Christensen*  
*Clerk of Court of Appeals*