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DISTRICT IV

August 27, 2026

To:

Hon. Ryan D. Nilsestuen
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice

Jeff Okazaki
Clerk of Circuit Court
Dane County Courthouse
Electronic Notice

Peter D. Bear
Electronic Notice

Allen Steven Porter
Electronic Notice

Lee Joseph Drone

You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:

2025AP1530	Petitioner v. Lee Joseph Drone (L.C. #2023CV2927)
2025AP1531	Petitioner v. Lee Joseph Drone (L.C. #2023CV2928)

Before Graham, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.

Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

Lee Joseph Drone appeals circuit court orders granting harassment injunctions against him in two separate cases, which we have consolidated on our own motion by order dated August 24, 2026, pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.10(3) (2023-24).¹

Based on our review of the briefs and records, we conclude at conference that these consolidated cases are appropriate for summary disposition, *see* WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21, and we affirm the circuit court orders.

¹ All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

Two individuals (“Petitioner A” and “Petitioner B,” or, collectively, “the Petitioners”) each filed petitions for harassment injunctions against Drone.² The Petitioners both served Drone by publication after they were unable to serve him personally. At a hearing on both petitions at which Drone did not appear, the circuit court granted the petitions and issued four-year harassment injunctions against Drone.

After the petitions were granted, Drone moved to reopen both cases and to vacate the harassment injunction issued in each. Drone argued that the injunctions were void on the basis that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he had not been properly served.

Drone first moved to reopen the proceedings and to vacate the harassment injunction in Petitioner A’s case. The circuit court agreed with Drone’s argument regarding the lack of personal jurisdiction and granted Drone’s motion to reopen the proceedings and vacate the harassment injunction. Petitioner A moved the court to reconsider its decision.

After the circuit court reopened Petitioner A’s case and vacated the harassment injunction as to Petitioner A, Drone then also moved to reopen the proceedings and to vacate the harassment injunction in Petitioner B’s case, raising the same argument regarding personal jurisdiction.

In both Petitioner A’s case and in Petitioner B’s case, Drone subsequently filed motions that, without maintaining his jurisdictional objections, sought various types of affirmative relief,

² The Petitioners also petitioned for temporary restraining orders, which the circuit court granted based on the facts alleged in the petitions.

including perjury sanctions against the Petitioners and protective orders enjoining the Petitioners from owning firearms and filing any legal actions against Drone. In Petitioner A's reply brief in support of her motion to reconsider, she argued that by failing to maintain his jurisdictional objection and seeking these types of relief, Drone submitted to the personal jurisdiction of the circuit court, and Petitioner A requested that the court consider the merits of her petition for a harassment injunction. Petitioner B made the same argument in response to Drone's motion to reopen and vacate the injunction in that case.

The circuit court granted Petitioner A's motion for reconsideration in part. The court did so after it concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over Drone based on the following language from case law:

It is well settled in this court that if a litigant desires to avail himself of want of jurisdiction of his person he must keep out of court for all purposes except that of objecting to jurisdiction, or, what is the same thing, moving to dismiss on that ground. If he takes any step consistent with the idea that the court has jurisdiction of his person, such appearance amounts to a general appearance and gives the court jurisdiction for all purposes.

Stroup v. Career Acad., Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 284, 288, 156 N.W.2d 358 (1968) (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted). The court also quoted the following language from *Lees v. DILHR*, 49 Wis. 2d 491, 499, 182 N.W.2d 245 (1971): “[W]here an appearance is made and relief is sought on other matters, an objection of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived.” Relying on the same case law, the court reached the same conclusion in Petitioner B's case. The court reopened both cases and scheduled a hearing to address the merits of the requests for harassment injunctions.

After hearing testimony from the Petitioners, the circuit court issued harassment injunctions against Drone in both cases.³ The court also heard argument from Drone regarding a series of motions that Drone filed after the court's ruling regarding personal jurisdiction and before the injunction hearing, including a motion requesting that the court reconsider its ruling regarding personal jurisdiction. The court denied those motions. Drone appeals.⁴

On appeal, Drone argues that the harassment injunctions are void because the circuit court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over him. However, Drone does not explain how the court erred. That is, Drone does not address the reasoning underlying the court's determination that it had personal jurisdiction over Drone or any of the legal authority that the court relied on in reaching that determination. For example, Drone argues that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because he was not properly served. But Drone does not argue that the court erred when it determined that Drone waived his objection to personal jurisdiction by failing to maintain his objection and by seeking affirmative relief from the court. Moreover, the Petitioners, in their response briefs, rely on the same reasoning that the circuit court did, but Drone did not file a reply brief in either case and thus did not refute these arguments, thereby conceding them. See *Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price*, 2012 WI App 69, ¶14, 342 Wis. 2d 162, 816 N.W.2d 914 (treating the failure of an appellant to file a reply brief as a concession to a

³ Drone did not present any evidence or make any arguments regarding the merits of whether the petitions for harassment injunctions should be granted.

⁴ The parties' briefs do not comply with WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(8)(bm), which addresses the pagination of appellate briefs. See RULE 809.19(8)(bm) (providing that, when paginating briefs, parties should use "Arabic numerals with sequential numbering starting at '1' on the cover"). As our supreme court explained when it amended the rule, the pagination requirement ensures that the numbers on each page of the brief "will match ... the page header applied by the eFiling system, avoiding the confusion of having two different page numbers" on every page of a brief. S. Ct. Order 20-07 cmt. at x1.

respondent's argument that was not rebutted by the appellant's opening brief). Because Drone does not develop an argument as to how the circuit court erred or refute the Petitioners' arguments that rely on the same reasoning that the court did, we reject Drone's arguments and conclude that the court did not err in determining that it had personal jurisdiction over Drone.

Separately, Drone raises several other arguments, all of which we reject. We observe as an initial matter that many of Drone's arguments are undeveloped. We address the minimally developed arguments as best we can; some arguments, however, are too inadequately developed to warrant consideration. *See State v. Pettit*, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that this court need not consider arguments that are unsupported by legal authority or are otherwise undeveloped).

Drone argues that the circuit court violated WIS. STAT. § 801.08(1) by considering the merits of the Petitioners' harassment injunctions before determining that it had jurisdiction. This assertion is contradicted by the record, which shows that the court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over Drone before scheduling a hearing to address the merits of the petitions for harassment injunctions. Drone also appears to argue that, before reaching the merits of the harassment injunctions, the court was required to decide Drone's motion for reconsideration regarding the court's decision on the jurisdictional issue. However, this argument is not supported by the language of § 801.08(1), and Drone does not cite any additional legal authority in support of this argument. *See* § 801.08(1) ("All issues of fact and law raised by an objection to the court's jurisdiction over the person ... shall be heard by the court ... in advance of any issue going to the merits of the case. If, after such a hearing on the objection, the court decides that it has jurisdiction, the case may proceed on the merits[.]"). Accordingly, we reject this argument. *See Pettit*, 171 Wis. 2d at 646.

Drone also argues that his due process rights were violated when opposing counsel, less than 24 hours before the injunction hearing, emailed exhibits to Drone rather than serving Drone with the exhibits consistent with WIS. STAT. § 801.14(2). However, these exhibits all appear to relate to the merits of the harassment injunctions, which Drone did not challenge at the injunction hearing, and which Drone explicitly states he does not challenge on appeal. And Drone does not develop an argument as to how this issue bears on his argument regarding personal jurisdiction or otherwise entitles him to relief on appeal.

Relatedly, Drone argues that his due process rights were violated when the circuit court made a “blanket denial” of the motions that Drone filed in advance of the hearing on the Petitioners’ requests for harassment injunctions. However, our review of the transcript shows that the court did not issue a “blanket denial,” but rather went through and addressed each of Drone’s motions individually and explained why each one was being denied. Drone asserts that the court, in denying his motions, “made no written findings,” but we reject this argument as undeveloped. Drone does not explain what findings he argues the court was required to make or why a lack of written findings would deprive him of due process. And although Drone cites various legal authorities, he does not explain how these authorities support his assertion, and it is not apparent that they do.

IT IS ORDERED that the orders are summarily affirmed. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.

Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals