COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED

November 17, 2026

Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.

A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. *See* WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP1177 **Cir. Ct. No. 2024TR25701**

STATE OF WISCONSIN **IN COURT OF APPEALS**
DISTRICT I

MILWAUKEE COUNTY,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ALI J. YOUSEF,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: LENA C. TAYLOR, Judge. *Affirmed*.

¶1 DONALD, C.J.[1] Ali J. Yousef appeals from the judgment of the circuit court which found him guilty of exceeding the posted speed limit by sixteen to nineteen miles per hour, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(5). Yousef

[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for the circuit court to find him guilty, and that he was denied due process and a fair trial when the court "repeatedly interrupted him, discouraged self-representation, and disregarded contradictory evidence." For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Yousef was cited on December 15, 2024, when Milwaukee County Sheriff's Deputy Riley Ancil observed him going approximately sixty-seven miles per hour in a posted fifty-mile-per-hour zone. At the initial return date, Yousef pleaded not guilty and the matter was set over for a court trial.

¶3 At trial, Milwaukee County called Deputy Ancil to testify. Ancil testified that he had been working as a Milwaukee County Sheriff's Deputy since July 2021 and was working in that capacity on the evening in question. Ancil stated that he was patrolling the area of Interstate 794 in the City of Milwaukee, and "was monitoring traffic from a stationary position in [his] fully marked ghost squad" utilizing his radar laser on southbound traffic. Ancil observed a black Honda travelling approximately sixty-seven miles per hour in a posted fifty-mile-per-hour zone, which prompted him to initiate a traffic stop of the vehicle.

¶4 Deputy Ancil also testified that he calibrated his laser every day "to make sure that the distance and everything is working" and that, as far as he remembered, it was working correctly on the day in question. Ancil identified Yousef in court as the driver of the vehicle. The squad camera video footage from the incident was also entered into evidence and played in court.

¶5 Yousef, appearing pro se, was given the opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Ancil, but had to be reminded multiple times by the circuit court

that the purpose of cross-examination was to ask questions of the witness; not for the purpose of Yousef himself testifying. Yousef repeatedly asked Ancil how the speeding vehicle could be identified as his own, given that there were multiple other vehicles in front of it. Ancil explained that he could identify the speeding vehicle by its headlights and then by following the vehicle into traffic.

¶6 After cross-examination, Yousef testified in his own defense. He questioned how Deputy Ancil could have identified his black Honda as the speeding vehicle, noting that the weather that day was foggy and asserting that he does not speed when the roads are wet because his tires are not good. Yousef also again pointed out that there were multiple cars immediately in front of his own. Additionally, Yousef, identifying himself as an engineer, opined that the radar laser would not work well given the angle at which Ancil was observing traffic and the foggy weather conditions.

¶7 After hearing closing arguments, the circuit court entered judgment and found Yousef guilty of the speeding violation. The court noted that, despite Yousef's questioning of the functioning of the radar laser, there was no actual testimony or evidence in the record that the laser was defective. The court pointed out that Yousef, though holding himself out as an engineer, was not trained in the use of the radar laser like Deputy Ancil. The court also noted that Yousef had provided no evidence that his status as an engineer would provide him with any specialized knowledge of how the radar laser worked.

¶8 Yousef continued to attempt to argue even after judgment was rendered. Yousef asked if the circuit court was able to identify his black Honda in the squad camera footage. The court explained to Yousef that it had relied on the evidence put into the record, and that the only evidence put into the record

indicated that Deputy Ancil utilized his radar laser and determined that Yousef was driving above the posted speed limit. The court noted that it found Ancil's testimony to be credible, and stated to Yousef that it may have been helpful for him to consult with an attorney about these issues. Yousef now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Yousef first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict is a question of law which we review de novo. ***State v. Smith***, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the County and will only reverse where the evidence "is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." ***Id.*** (citation omitted). "[I]t is not our function to review questions as to weight of testimony and credibility of witnesses. These are matters to be determined by the trier of fact[.]" ***Id.***, ¶33 (citation omitted). The findings of fact made by the circuit court "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." *See* WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2).

¶10 Yousef's challenges to the evidence consist largely of unsupported assertions such as "[h]eadlights under such conditions are indistinguishable among vehicles," and "[s]cientific studies recognize that fog interferes with laser accuracy[.]" Yousef provides no support for such claims, nor did he present any support for them at trial. We need not consider "unexplained and undeveloped" arguments. ***M.C.I., Inc. v. Elbin***, 146 Wis. 2d 239, 244-45, 430 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1988). Yousef's arguments also provide no citations to the record. "As a general rule, we do not consider arguments based on factual assertions that are unsupported by references to the record." ***Rock Lake Ests. Unit Owners Ass'n,***

Inc. v. Township of Lake Mills, 195 Wis. 2d 348, 360 n.5, 536 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1995).

¶11 The circuit court heard testimony from Deputy Ancil which it found to be "credible," and observed the footage from the squad car dash camera. Based on that evidence, the court found that the County had demonstrated that Yousef was guilty of driving in excess of the posted speed limit in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(5). Yousef has not shown that these findings were clearly erroneous, and he thus fails to demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict against him.

¶12 Yousef next contends that his due process rights were violated by the conduct of the circuit court. He argues that the circuit court repeatedly interrupted him, raised its voice, and "discouraged his self-representation by suggesting he should have retained counsel." This, he insists, undermined his right to present a defense. Whether one's due process rights were violated by the circuit court is a question of law which we review de novo. ***Gonzalez v. Teskey***, 160 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 465 N.W.2d 525 (Ct. App. 1990).

¶13 The record contradicts Yousef's assertions. At no point during the trial did the circuit court discourage Yousef from representing himself. During trial, the court assisted Yousef by explaining that he could cross-examine Deputy Ancil, but he could not at that point give his own testimony. There were other points during the trial where the court gave Yousef further guidance. These "interruptions" provided Yousef with guidance and explanation as to proper court procedure. A judge has the authority to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence" during court proceedings in order to "[m]ake the interrogation and presentation effective for the

ascertainment of the truth" and "[a]void needless consumption of time." WIS. STAT. § 906.11(1). It was within the realm of the court's discretion to give guidance and instruction to Yousef when he attempted to testify on his own behalf rather than cross-examine Ancil.

¶14 After rendering its verdict, the circuit court explained its reasoning to Yousef, who continued protesting; it was only at that point that the court indicated that it would have perhaps benefited Yousef to have retained counsel. Yousef provides no support for his contention that this comment violated his due process rights. "We may decline to review issues inadequately briefed." ***State v. Pettit***, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

¶15 In support, Yousef cites to ***State v. Lehman***, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987), and ***Faretta v. California***, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). However, these cases do not serve to support Yousef's arguments. ***Lehman*** is inapplicable, as its focus was primarily on whether the circuit court has the inherent authority to appoint counsel to assist a pro se defendant; that is not the question in the present case, as no counsel was appointed to assist Yousef. ***Lehman***, 137 Wis. 2d at 67. Similarly, ***Faretta*** dealt with "whether a state may constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him or her, even when he or she insists that he or she wants to conduct his or her own defense." ***Faretta***, 422 U.S. at 807 (citation modified). Again, that is not the question in the present case, as no counsel was appointed to represent Yousef.

¶16 Essentially, then, Yousef has provided us with no legal authority upon which to examine his argument, and "[a]rguments unsupported by references to legal authority will not be considered." ***Pettit***, 171 Wis. 2d at 646. We

therefore reject Yousef's argument that he was denied his right to a fair hearing or his right to self-representation.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. *See* WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.