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**DISTRICT I**

June 10, 2025

To:

Hon. David L. Borowski  
Circuit Court Judge  
Electronic Notice

Anna Hodges  
Clerk of Circuit Court  
Milwaukee County Safety Building  
Electronic Notice

Jill Marie Skwor  
Electronic Notice

Jennifer L. Vandermeuse  
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Julean Marquez Matos-Rodriguez 710106  
Oshkosh Correctional Institution  
P.O. Box 3530  
Oshkosh, WI 54903-3530

You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:

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2024AP1085-CRNM      State of Wisconsin v. Julean Marquez Matos-Rodriguez  
(L.C. # 2021CF1160)

Before White, C.J., Donald, P.J., and Geenen, J.

**Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).**

Julean Marquez Matos-Rodriguez appeals a judgment convicting him of one count of third-degree sexual assault and one count of exposing genitals to a child. Appellate counsel, Jill Marie Skwor, filed a no-merit report pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.32 (2023-24), and *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).<sup>1</sup> Matos-Rodriguez received a copy of the report and was advised of his right to file a response, but has not done so. We have independently reviewed the

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<sup>1</sup> All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

record and the no-merit report as mandated by *Anders*. We conclude that there are no issues of arguable merit that could be pursued on appeal. We therefore summarily affirm.

The State charged Matos-Rodriguez with second-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of sixteen. According to the complaint, Matos-Rodriguez sexually assaulted a thirteen-year-old girl while she was sleeping and under the influence of drugs. An amended information later charged Matos-Rodriguez with one count of third-degree sexual assault and one count of exposing genitals. Matos-Rodriguez pled guilty to the amended charges. The circuit court conducted a colloquy with Matos-Rodriguez and accepted his pleas. The court imposed an eight-year sentence for the charge of third-degree sexual assault, bifurcated into four years of initial confinement and four years of extended supervision. The court also imposed a concurrent, two-year sentence for the exposing genitals charge. The court ordered the sentence to be served consecutive to any other previously imposed sentence. This no-merit report follows.

Appellate counsel's no-merit report addresses two issues: (1) whether there is a basis to withdraw Matos-Rodriguez's guilty pleas; and (2) whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion.

With regard to Matos-Rodriguez's guilty pleas, our review of the record—including the plea questionnaire/waiver of rights form, the addendum, the jury instructions, and the plea hearing transcript—confirms that the circuit court complied with its obligations for taking guilty pleas pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 971.08, *State v. Bangert*, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 261-62, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and *State v. Brown*, 2006 WI 100, ¶35, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. These obligations exist specifically to help ensure the validity of any plea. We thus agree with appellate counsel's conclusion in the no-merit report that there is no arguable merit to seeking

plea withdrawal based on a claim that Matos-Rodriguez's pleas were anything other than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The record does not establish that any other form of a manifest injustice exists. See *State v. Villegas*, 2018 WI App 9, ¶18, 380 Wis. 2d 246, 908 N.W.2d 198 (stating that a defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing must prove that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice).

With regard to the circuit court's sentencing decision, we note that sentencing is a matter for the circuit court's discretion. See *State v. Gallion*, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. At sentencing, a court should consider the principal objectives of sentencing, including the protection of the community, the punishment and rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to others. See *State v. Ziegler*, 2006 WI App 49, ¶23, 289 Wis. 2d 594, 712 N.W.2d 76. It should also determine which objective or objectives are of greatest importance. See *Gallion*, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶41. In seeking to fulfill the sentencing objectives, the circuit court must consider several primary factors, including the gravity of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public, as well as additional factors it may wish to consider. See *State v. Odom*, 2006 WI App 145, ¶7, 294 Wis. 2d 844, 720 N.W.2d 695. The weight to be given to each factor is committed to the court's discretion. See *id.* The record reveals that the court considered and applied the relevant sentencing factors. The resulting sentence was within the potential maximum authorized by law, see *State v. Scaccio*, 2000 WI App 265, ¶18, 240 Wis. 2d 95, 622 N.W.2d 449, and is not so excessive so as to shock the public's sentiment, see *Ocanas v. State*, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975).

Our independent review of the record reveals no other potential issues of arguable merit.

Upon the foregoing, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the judgment is summarily affirmed. *See* WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Jill Marie Skwor is relieved of further representation of Julean Marquez Matos-Rodriguez in this matter. *See* WIS. STAT. RULE 809.32(3).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.

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*Samuel A. Christensen*  
*Clerk of Court of Appeals*