District II
October 16, 2013
To:
Hon. Charles H. Constantine
Circuit Court Judge
Rose Lee
Clerk of Circuit Court
W. Richard Chiapete
Assistant District Attorney
Marguerite M. Moeller
Assistant Attorney General
Bryan Steven Miller
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
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2013AP381 |
State of State of |
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Before Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and Reilly, J.
Bryan Steven Miller appeals pro se from an order
denying his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2011-12)
motion for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.[1] Based on our review of the briefs and
the record, we conclude that summary disposition is appropriate. See
Wis. Stat. Rule 809.21. We affirm the order.
This appeal is a consolidation of two
Miller contends his defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to move to suppress, dismiss, or investigate the charges against
him. Miller’s claim fails on more than
one ground.
For one, Miller merely asserts in conclusory fashion
that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We generally do not address undeveloped
arguments. State v. Gracia, 2013 WI
15, ¶28 n.13, 345
For another, Miller does not include the transcript of
the hearing at which the trial court orally denied his postconviction
motion. Indeed, he represents in his
statement on transcript that a transcript was unnecessary to prosecute the
appeal. It is the appellant’s
responsibility to ensure that the appellate record is complete and, if it is
incomplete in connection with an issue he or she raises, “we must assume that
the missing material supports the trial court’s ruling.” Fiumefreddo v. McLean, 174
Thirdly, Miller’s guilty pleas waived any claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel relative to events occurring prior to and
unrelated to his pleas.
Miller next asserts that he should not have been charged with disorderly conduct in either underlying case and that the State did not prove the elements of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends the State “could have” charged him with a Class A misdemeanor under the “peeping Tom” statute, Wis. Stat. § 942.08, rather than with disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor. If an act forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than one statutory provision, prosecution may proceed under any or all such provisions. Wis. Stat. § 939.65; see also State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 611, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979).
Also, whether conduct can be considered “disorderly” depends on the conduct and circumstances of the particular case. State v. Schwebke, 2002 WI 55, ¶24, 253 Wis. 2d 1, 644 N.W.2d 666. In case number 08CF1524, a woman discovered Miller spying on her as she tanned in the nude during her twenty-minute session at a tanning salon. “Disorderly conduct” includes indecent behavior in a public place. Wis. Stat. § 947.01. Miller admitted to the elements of disorderly conduct when he entered his guilty plea. See State v. Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d 494, 509, 465 N.W.2d 490 (1991). In case number 09CF233, the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed and read in for sentencing. Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the circuit court is summarily affirmed, pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.21.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Court of Appeals
[1] By this court’s order dated May 29, 2013, these cases were consolidated for briefing and disposition.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless noted.