District II
October 8, 2014
To:
Hon. Wilbur W. Warren III
Circuit Court Judge
Kenosha County Courthouse
912 56th Street
Kenosha, WI 53140
Rebecca Matoska-Mentink
Clerk of Circuit Court
Kenosha County Courthouse
912 56th Street
Kenosha, WI 53140
Nancy A. Noet
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53707-7857
Scott A. Szabrowicz
4227 W. Forest Home Ave.
Milwaukee, WI 53215
Robert D. Zapf
District Attorney
Molinaro Bldg
912 56th Street
Kenosha, WI 53140-3747
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013AP921-CR 2013AP922-CR |
State of Wisconsin v. Raymond L. Nieves (L.C. #2004CF583) State of Wisconsin v. Raymond L. Nieves (L.C. #2005CF510) State of Wisconsin v. Raymond L. Nieves (L.C. #2008CF562) |
|
|
|
|
Before Neubauer, P.J., Reilly and Gundrum, JJ.
In these consolidated appeals,
Raymond L. Nieves appeals from judgments of conviction and an order denying his
motion for postconviction relief. Nieves
contends that the circuit court erred in denying his request to withdraw his
pleas or, alternatively, modify his sentence.
Based on our
review of the briefs and record, we conclude at conference that these cases are
appropriate for summary disposition. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.21 (2011-12).[1] We affirm the judgments and order of the
circuit court.
Nieves was convicted following pleas of guilty or no
contest to one count of fleeing a traffic officer, as a repeater, one count of homicide
by intoxicated use of a vehicle, as a repeater, and four counts of bail
jumping. The charges stemmed from three
separate cases that were resolved together in the circuit court.
For his crimes, the circuit court sentenced Nieves to
an aggregate sentence of twenty-two years of initial confinement followed by
ten years of extended supervision.
Nieves filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his
pleas or, alternatively, modify his sentence.
The court denied the motion. These
appeals follow.
On appeal, Nieves first contends that the circuit
court erred in denying his request to withdraw his pleas. He argues that he did not enter his pleas knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently because his trial counsel misinformed him that
the circuit court had decided and denied his motions to dismiss, which were
based on the State’s alleged failure to comply with the Interstate Detainer
Act. Although such motions were raised
and briefed, the circuit court never ruled on them.
A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea after
sentencing must establish by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal is
necessary to avoid a manifest injustice.
See State v. Brown, 2006 WI
100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.
A defendant can meet this burden by showing that the plea was
involuntary or that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel. See
State
v. Daley, 2006 WI App 81, ¶20 n.3, 292 Wis. 2d 517, 716 N.W.2d
146.
When reviewing a decision on a motion to withdraw a
plea, this court accepts the circuit court’s findings of evidentiary or
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19. However, whether a plea was knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently entered or whether counsel was ineffective are questions of
constitutional fact that this court reviews independently. Id.; State v. Byrge, 2000 WI
101, ¶37 n.8, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477.
Here, the record conclusively refutes Nieves’ assertion
that he misunderstood the status of his motions to dismiss at the time that he
entered his pleas. As noted by the circuit
court and the State, Nieves was present for several hearings where his attorney
asked the court to withhold ruling on the motions because of ongoing plea
negotiations. In addition, when Nieves
entered his pleas, the court addressed the pending motions and explicitly asked
whether he understood that he was “giving up [his] right to pursue any relief
under the interstate detainer.” Nieves answered
in the affirmative and indicated that he did not have any questions about that
or the motions themselves. Finally,
toward the end of the plea hearing, Nieves’ attorney explained how the decision
to forego ruling on the motions factored into Nieves’ plea agreement with the
State:
Mr. Nieves is aware of the fact that he’s giving that issue up in some consideration for both the State’s position in regards to the plea issues and our request later at sentencing regarding what the Court’s going to do, and that was factored in and was part of the consideration in taking the offer.
Nieves confirmed that his
attorney’s statement was correct. In
light of the foregoing, we are satisfied that the circuit court properly denied
Nieves’ request to withdraw his pleas.
Nieves next contends that the circuit court erred in
denying his alternative request to modify his sentence. In particular, he complains that his sentence
was unduly harsh.
A circuit court’s exercise of its
sentencing discretion is presumptively reasonable and our review is limited to
determining whether a court erroneously exercised its discretion. State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶30,
326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409. At
sentencing, a court must consider “the gravity of the offense, the character of
the defendant, and the need to protect the public.” Id., ¶28. The weight a court gives to each of these
factors is left to its discretion. Id.
A defendant challenging a
sentence as an erroneous exercise of discretion on the ground that it was
unduly harsh must show that the sentence was “so excessive and unusual and so
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate
the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the
circumstances.” Ocanas v. State, 70
Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975).
Upon review of the record, we are not persuaded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion and imposed a sentence that was unduly harsh. Here, the court properly considered the gravity of the offenses, Nieves’ character, and the need to protect the public. State v. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, ¶23, 289 Wis. 2d 594, 712 N.W.2d 76. Given the fact that Nieves killed someone while driving drunk, the aggregate sentence, which was within the maximum, cannot be described as unduly harsh. Accordingly, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Nieves and denying his request to modify his sentence.
Upon the foregoing reasons,
IT
IS ORDERED that the judgments and order of the circuit court are summarily
affirmed, pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule
809.21.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Court of Appeals