

## INTRODUCTION TO ANNOTATIONS SCR, CHAPTER 20

This document contains annotations to Wisconsin's Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Supreme Court Rules, Chapter 20. It is intended to assist the profession and the public in its research and understanding of how the ethics rules have been interpreted by the Supreme Court. Generally, cases are cited that interpret the rules in effect beginning July 1, 2007, the effective date of the rules implemented after Wisconsin completed review of the ABA proposed Ethics 2000 recommendations. In many cases, however, cases interpreting prior versions of the rules are noted where the information would be helpful and where more recent cases are few. Also, there is an occasional citation to a consent public or private reprimand where the information is helpful. Consent public or private reprimand summaries are not interpretations of the Supreme Court yet may provide helpful guidance.

This document contains the rules and comments in Supreme Court Rules, Chapter 20, as they were in effect on January 1, 2018. Following the comments to each rule, this document contains annotations based on cases contained in the Compendium of Professional Discipline located at OLR's website: [www.wicourts.gov/olr](http://www.wicourts.gov/olr).

This document will be updated regularly. The next update is expected to be published in the spring of 2019. Corrections and suggestions are welcome and may be forwarded to OLR using the email link at the bottom of the website homepage or by correspondence to the Director at the address on the homepage.

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### **PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES**

[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.

[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.

[3] In addition to these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a 3rd-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other matter. Some of these rules apply directly to lawyers who are or have served as 3rd-party neutrals. See, e.g., Rule 1.12 and Rule 2.4. In addition, there are rules that apply to lawyers who are not active in the practice of law or to practicing lawyers even when they are acting in a nonprofessional capacity. For example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a business is subject to discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. See Rule 8.4.

[4] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

[5] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.

[6] As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

[7] Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.

[8] A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their communications will be private.

[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.

[10] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.

[11] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal

authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.

[12] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.

[13] Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.

### **Scope**

[14] The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas under the rules in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and others. The rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add obligations to the rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the rules.

[15] The rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments are sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law.

[16] Compliance with the rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.

[17] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. See Rule 1.18. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact.

[18] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the

government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. These rules do not abrogate any such authority. Similarly, there are federally recognized Indian tribes with tribal governments in the State of Wisconsin and these tribes have rights of self-government and self-determination. It is not the intent of these rules to abrogate any such authority of tribal governments.

[19] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations.

[20] Violation of a rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In addition, violation of a rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Nevertheless, since the rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.

[21] The comment accompanying each rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

In addition to the ABA Comments, SCR Chapter 20 includes Wisconsin Committee Comments, which were proposed by the Wisconsin Ethics 2000 Committee, and Wisconsin Comments added by the Wisconsin Supreme Court where the court deemed additional guidance appropriate. These comments are not adopted, but will be published and may be consulted for guidance in interpreting and applying the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Comment [5]: Conforming conduct to the requirements of the law**

Using marijuana with clients violated SCR 20:8.4(b) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo*, 2007 WI 126 (engaging in conduct that failed to comply with the professional obligation to conform conduct to the requirements of the law and to demonstrate respect for the legal system)].

### **Comment [5]: Respect for the legal system, courts, judges, and other public officials**

Disrespectful language about a judge communicated in filings or during hearings will typically violate ethics rules, typically SCR 40.15 via SCR 20:8.4(g) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Coe*, 2003 WI 117 (excessive sarcasm and hyperbolic rhetoric toward the referee in a disciplinary case resulted in an admonition for incivility); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riordan*, 2012 WI 125 (a lawyer's comments about a judge in a civil proceeding failed to show respect to the judge and violated SCR 40.15 via SCR 20:8.4(g)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers*, 2012 WI 33 (referring to the court as a kangaroo court violated SCR 40.15 via SCR 20:8.4(g))].

In comparison, a lawyer's intemperate and inappropriate comments about local officials in letters to a local newspaper failed to show proper respect for officials, but did not constitute a violation of SCR 40.15 [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Williams*, 2005 WI 15].

A failure to demonstrate respect for the legal system was reason to find that a lawyer who used marijuana with clients violated SCR 20:8.4(b) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo*, 2007 WI 126].

### **Comment [9]: Resolving conflicting responsibilities**

The court dismissed conflict of interest allegations where the lawyer exercised sensitive and moral professional judgment to resolve a difficult ethical issue [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Torvinen*, 2010 WI 123].

### **Comment [12]: Professional independence and public interest**

The court rejected a lawyer's argument that SCR 20:1.1 only protected clients, by stating that "neglect of [the lawyer's] responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves" [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2007 WI 1].

### **Comment [20]: Rules as a basis for civil liability**

The language in the comment was relied on to find an ethical obligation to protect trust funds claimed by a third party where the lawyer had no contractual interest [*Disciplinary*

*Proceedings Against Barrock*, 2007 WI 24 (*concurring opinion*) (A lawyer who knew of prior counsel's lien on a settlement but declined to agree to honor the lien had no contractual obligation to protect the lien, but was nevertheless in violation of SCR 20:1.15 for failing to honor the lien)].

In comparison, the court relied on this comment to find that the constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence should be the same as the ethical duty under SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riek*, 2013 WI 81].

### **SCR 20:1.0 Terminology**

(ag) "Advanced fee" denotes an amount paid to a lawyer in contemplation of future services, which will be earned at an agreed-upon basis, whether hourly, flat, or another basis. Any amount paid to a lawyer in contemplation of future services whether on an hourly, flat or other basis, is an advanced fee regardless of whether that fee is characterized as an "advanced fee," "minimum fee," "nonrefundable fee," or any other characterization. Advanced fees are subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5, including SCR 20:1.5(f) or (g) and SCR 20:1.5(h), SCR 20:1.15(f) (3) b.4, and SCR 20:1.16(d).

(ar) "Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances.

(b) "Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.

(c) "Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See par. (f) for the definition of "informed consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.

(d) "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization, including a government entity.

(dm) "Flat fee" denotes a fixed amount paid to a lawyer for specific, agreed-upon services, or for a fixed, agreed-upon stage in a representation, regardless of the time required of the lawyer to perform the service or reach



the agreed-upon stage in the representation. A flat fee, sometimes referred to as "unit billing," is not an advance against the lawyer's hourly rate and may not be billed against at an hourly rate. Flat fees become the property of the lawyer upon receipt and are subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5, including SCR 20:1.5(f) or (g) and SCR 20:1.5(h), SCR 20:1.15(f) (3) b.4., and SCR 20:1.16(d).

(e) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.

(f) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.

(g) "Knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.

(h) "Misrepresentation" denotes communication of an untruth, either knowingly or with reckless disregard, whether by statement or omission, which if accepted would lead another to believe a condition exists that does not actually exist.

(i) "Partner" denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association authorized to practice law.

(j) A "prosecutor" includes a government attorney or special prosecutor (i) in a criminal case, delinquency action, or proceeding that could result in a deprivation of liberty or (ii) acting in connection with the protection of a child or a termination of parental rights proceeding or (iii) acting as a municipal prosecutor.

(k) "Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.

(l) "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.

(m) "Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.

(mm) "Retainer" denotes an amount paid specifically and solely to secure the availability of a lawyer to perform services on behalf of a client, whether designated a "retainer," "general retainer," "engagement retainer," "reservation fee," "availability fee," or any other characterization. This amount does not constitute payment for any specific legal services, whether

past, present, or future and may not be billed against for fees or costs at any point. A retainer becomes the property of the lawyer upon receipt, but is subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5 and SCR 20:1.16(d).

(n) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.

(o) "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.

(p) "Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.

(q) "Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording, and electronic communications. A "signed" writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

The Committee has added definitions of "consult," "misrepresentation," and "prosecutor" that are not part of the Model Rule. In the definition of "firm," the phrase "including a government entity" is added to make the coverage more explicit. Because the provisions of the rule are renumbered to preserve the alphabetical arrangement, caution should be used when referring to the ABA Comment.

#### WISCONSIN COMMENT

The definition of flat fee specifies that flat fees "become the property of the lawyer upon receipt." Notwithstanding, the lawyer must either deposit the advanced flat fee in trust until earned, or comply with the alternative in SCR 20:1.5(g). In addition, as specified in the definition, flat fees are subject to the requirements of all rules to which advanced fees are subject.

#### ABA COMMENT

### **Confirmed in Writing**

[1] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter.

### **Firm**

[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (c) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the Rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.

[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.

[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these Rules.

### **Fraud**

[5] When used in these Rules, the terms "fraud" or "fraudulent" refer to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform.

### **Informed Consent**

[6] Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a) and 1.7(b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation

reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent.

[7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9(a). For a definition of "writing" and "confirmed in writing," see paragraphs (n) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8(a) and (g). For a definition of "signed," see paragraph (n).

#### **Screened**

[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11, 1.12 or 1.18.

[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other information, including information in electronic form, relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other information, including information in electronic form, relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel.

[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **SCR 20:1.0(ag) Advanced fee.**

A fee received in contemplation of future services is an advanced fee regardless of its characterization as a nonrefundable fee or flat fee [*Public Reprimand of Delcore*, 2014-OLR-4; *Private Reprimand Summary 2013-18*].

### **SCR 20:1.0(f) Informed consent.**

Informed consent is required when a lawyer agrees to a settlement or fails to inform the client of a settlement [*Public Reprimand of Smith*, 2009-OLR-17 (agreeing that the client would pay costs in exchange for postponing a show cause violated SCR 20:1.2(a) and SCR 20:1.4(a)(1)); *Public Reprimand of Dahlberg*, 2013-OLR-6 (failing to inform the client of settlement offers violated SCR 20:1.2(a) and SCR 20:1.4(a)(1))].

### **SCR 20:1.0(g) Knowingly, known, knows.**

A disciplinary referee may or may not infer knowledge from circumstantial evidence [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goluba*, 2013 WI 32 (upholding a referee's finding that did not infer a lawyer knew of his wife's misappropriation of trust account funds despite the circumstantial evidence); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bach*, 2016 WI 95].

### **SCR 20:1.0(h) Misrepresentation.**

The reckless disregard standard for misrepresentation does not require proof of defamation or the tort of misrepresentation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hupy*, 2011 WI 38; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marks*, 2003 WI 114].

## CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

### **SCR 20:1.1 Competence**

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

When a lawyer is providing limited scope representation, competence means the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the limited scope representation.

## ABA COMMENT

### **Legal Knowledge and Skill**

[1] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature

of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances.

[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.

[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest.

[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2.

### **Thoroughness and Preparation**

[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. See Rule 1.2(c).

[6] Before a lawyer retains or contracts with other lawyers outside the lawyer's own firm to provide or assist in the provision of legal services to a client, the lawyer should ordinarily obtain informed consent from the client and must reasonably believe that the other lawyers' services will contribute to the competent and ethical representation of the client. See also Rules 1.2 (allocation of authority), 1.4 (communication with client), 1.5(e) (fee sharing), 1.6 (confidentiality), and 5.5(a) (unauthorized practice of law). The reasonableness of the decision to retain or contract with other lawyers outside the lawyer's own firm will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, experience and reputation of the nonfirm lawyers; the nature of the services assigned to the nonfirm lawyers; and the legal protections, professional conduct rules, and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly relating to confidential information.

[7] When lawyers from more than one law firm are providing legal services to the client on a particular matter, the lawyers ordinarily should consult with each other and the client about the scope of their respective representations and the allocation of responsibility among them. See Rule 1.2. When making allocations of responsibility in a matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules.

### **Maintaining Competence**

[8] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Legal Knowledge and Skill**

A lawyer is required to obtain the necessary knowledge and skill required for a representation. This may require the lawyer to obtain general knowledge about an area of practice or to associate with a lawyer having that knowledge [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grenisen*, 2013 WI 99 (representing a client in a guardianship matter, without knowledge or experience and without obtaining knowledge regarding guardianship proceedings); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Read*, 2012 WI 121; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (failing to acquire and use requisite knowledge to find the client in the prison system); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carson*, 2015 WI 26 (failing to obtain information about the administrative appeal process); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel*, 2015 WI 68 (failing to display the knowledge and skills necessary to competently represent a client in an Eighth Amendment civil rights case)].

In addition, a lawyer is required to do legal research required for the particular representation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Merriam*, 2010 WI 21 (failing to determine the effect of a bankruptcy filing on the transfer of a remainder interest in the debtor's home); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2011 WI 39 (failing to correctly identify the statute of limitations and failing to name necessary defendants)].

Procedural errors reflecting a failure to do legal research or to have legal knowledge may also result in a violation of this rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2009 WI 59 (filing a motion for an extension of time to file for post-conviction relief not available under the law); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trudgeon*, 2010 WI 103 (attempting to negotiate a waiver of future child support when such an agreement is unenforceable); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (filing a legally deficient petition for writ of certiorari and motion for sentence modification); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carson*, 2015 WI 26 (failing to exhaust administrative remedies); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll*, 2013 WI 101 (preparing an affidavit and advising the criminal defendant client to have the government witness sign the affidavit, which would result in recantation of statements the witness made against the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Templin*, 2016 WI 18 (filing a motion for relief from a divorce judgment years after the time limits had passed); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Vance*, 2016 WI 89 (not responding to requests for admission without seeking relief from the court)].

The failure to apply legal skills may likewise result in a violation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hudec*, 2014 WI 46 (engaging in a pattern of inexcusable inattention to details and making significant errors in filings with the court); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carson*, 2015 WI 26 (making multiple errors in a petition for writ of habeas corpus)].

Over-litigating may violate the rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Katerinos*, 2010 WI 28 (over-litigating a small claims case to the client's financial detriment because of a fixed but erroneous view of the law)].

OLR is not required to prove a claim would have succeeded in order to sustain a violation of a lack of competent representation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 110 (allowing the statute of limitations to expire was the result of complacency that constituted a lack of knowledge and skill; OLR was not required to prove the case would have been successful)].

### **Thoroughness and Preparation**

A lawyer possessing the requisite knowledge and skill may yet fail to provide competent representation by failing to apply that knowledge and skill [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2015 WI 7 (failing to take meaningful action to pursue a client's claim)].

A lawyer is required to investigate the factual background of a matter [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2007 WI 1 (failing to inquire into the veracity of suspicious documents the client provided in support of a harassment claim); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2009 WI 59 (alleging in a post-conviction motion that the judge had a relationship with the client's ex-wife without investigating whether the relationship existed); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovskiy*, 2012 WI 120 (rendering legal advice without speaking to the client, reading the trial transcript, or reviewing key evidence); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2013 WI 14 (failing to investigate and analyze prior OWI convictions before advising the client to plead to felony OWI 5<sup>th</sup>); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger*, 2009 WI 103 (failing to value estate assets in a timely manner, preparing an inventory with incorrect values, and by failing to determine tax filing requirements)].

The duty of competence applies to the drafting and filing of documents on behalf of the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fadner*, 2007 WI 18 (drafting documents in a paternity matter that contained numerous errors and were of no value to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2013 WI 20 (outsourcing the research and preparation of post-conviction filings and filing prepared documents that were legally insufficient and not tailored to the case)].

The duty of competence requires a lawyer to act to pursue or to protect the client's interests [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister*, 2007 WI 55 (failing to effect service on a defendant, failing to file a brief in response to a motion to dismiss, and failing to keep the client informed, which resulted in dismissal of the case and a judgment against the client; and in another matter failing to file an answer to a complaint, which resulted in a default judgment against the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gamino*, 2008 WI 107 (representing both parties in a divorce and failing to investigate and advise one client about rights to maintenance from the other client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*,



2009 WI 89 (failing to reduce to writing a settlement in an employment matter and unilaterally withdrawing the client's appeal, which precluded the client from seeking enforcement of the agreement); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Briggs*, 2014 WI 119 (failing to pursue enforcement of a default judgment)].

**SCR 20:1.2 Scope of representation and allocation of authority between lawyer and client**

(a) Subject to pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by SCR 20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case or any proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.

(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.

(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent. The client's informed consent must be in writing except as set forth in sub. (1).

(1) The client's informed consent need not be given in writing if:

- a. the representation of the client consists solely of telephone consultation;
- b. the representation is provided by a lawyer employed by or participating in a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization, a bar association, an accredited law school, or a court and the lawyer's representation consists solely of providing information and advice or the preparation of court-approved legal forms;
- c. the court appoints the lawyer for a limited purpose that is set forth in the appointment order;
- d. the representation is provided by the state public defender pursuant to Ch. 977, stats., including representation provided by a private attorney pursuant to an appointment by the state public defender; or
- e. the representation is provided to an existing client pursuant to an existing lawyer-client relationship.

(2) If the client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client, there shall be a presumption that:

- a. the representation is limited to the lawyer and the services described in the writing, and
- b. the lawyer does not represent the client generally or in matters other than those identified in the writing.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

With respect to subparagraph (c), a lawyer providing limited scope representation in an action before a court should consult s. 802.045, stats., regarding notice and withdrawal requirements.

The requirements of subparagraph (c) that require the client's informed consent, in writing, to the limited scope representation do not supplant or replace the requirements of SCR 20:1.5(b).

(cm) A lawyer may prepare pleadings, briefs, and other documents to be filed with the court so long as such filings clearly indicate thereon that "This document was prepared with the assistance of a lawyer." A lawyer shall advise the client to whom the lawyer provides assistance in preparing pleadings, briefs, or other documents for filing with the court that the pleading, brief, or other document must contain a statement that it was prepared with the assistance of a lawyer.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

A lawyer may prepare pleadings, briefs, and other documents to be filed with the court so long as such filings clearly indicate thereon that said filings are "prepared with the assistance of a lawyer." Such actions by the lawyer shall not be deemed an appearance by the lawyer in the case.

(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

(e) When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured pursuant to the terms of an agreement or policy requiring the insurer to retain counsel on the client's behalf, the representation may be limited to matters related to the defense of claims made against the insured. In such cases, the lawyer shall, within a reasonable time after being retained, inform the client in writing of the terms and scope of the representation the lawyer has been retained by the insurer to provide.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

The Model Rule does not include paragraph (e). Paragraph (e) was added to clarify the obligations of counsel for an insurer, in conjunction with the decision to retain Wisconsin's "insurance defense" exception in SCR 20:1.8(f).

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

The Committee has retained in paragraph (a) the application of the duties stated to "any proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty." The Model Rule does not include this language.

## ABA COMMENT

### **Allocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer**

[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.

[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3).

[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time.

[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14.

### **Independence from Client's Views or Activities**

[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities.

#### **Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation**

[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent.

[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1.

[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6.

#### **Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions**

[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.

[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1.

[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.

[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.

[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Subparagraph (a): Allocation of Authority**

A lawyer is required to consult with the client and abide by the client's decision regarding whether to settle or to proceed with the client's case [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mauch*, 2007 WI 109 (dismissing the client's case without consulting the client or obtaining the client's decision; *see also*, *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Paul*, 2007 WI 11); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jones*, 2008 WI 53 (failing to advise the client of a settlement offer and accepting the offer without obtaining the client's decision); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2009 WI 89 (signing a stipulation for dismissal without informing the client or abiding by the client's decision)].

Other decisions regarding the objectives of the representation also require the client's consent [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Langkamp*, 2009 WI 102 (failing to follow the client's decision to appeal a conviction); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Roethe*, 2010 WI 19 (failing to abide by the personal representative's decision not to transfer an asset of the estate)].

The duty to consult is distinct from the duty to abide by the client's decisions [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll*, 2013 WI 101 (failing to discuss with the client the implications of a plea offer and of his testimony at trial); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laux*, 2015 WI 59 (preparing a transition trust for the clients and failing to explain the consequences of such a trust, which was outside the purposes for which the clients hired the lawyer)].

### **Subparagraph (c): Limited scope representation**

By order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court effective January 1, 2015, SCR 20:1.2(c) was amended, and subparagraphs (1) and (2) were created [2014 WI 45]. In addition, the Court created subparagraph (cm) and made changes to several provisions in the rules of civil procedure.

Limitations on the scope of representation must be reasonable [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Booker*, 2015 WI 2 (ghost writing bankruptcy petitions and state debt relief petitions

that were noncompliant with court requirements and sometimes consisted of information the clients could have obtained at the courthouse without a fee)].

**Subparagraph (d): Criminal, fraudulent, and prohibited transactions**

The rule applies to conduct that is criminal [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Birdsall*, 2004 WI 143 (arranging a meeting between his client and the client's wife when a no-contact order existed and when violation constituted a criminal offense); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carson*, 2015 WI 26 (purchasing alcohol for a client in violation of the client's conditions of the bail bond)]; and to conduct that is fraudulent [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger*, 2006 WI 111 (advising a personal representative that additional funds above the personal representative fee could be obtained by the lawyer charging more fees than would be earned)].

The rule also applies to false filings with courts or governmental agencies [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Merriam*, 2010 WI 21 (preparing and providing a debtor a false Statement of Compliance with Credit Counseling Requirement); *Cf., Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arellano*, 2013 WI 24 (advising a client to omit identification of a child on an I-360 petition did not constitute a violation of SCR 20:1.2(d) when the evidence presented supported a conclusion that the omission was an oversight)].

Use of a lawyer's trust account for a family member's financial transactions did not result in a violation of the rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steffes*, 2014 WI 128 (a lawyer who allowed his son's business to deposit and disburse payments via the lawyer's trust account was not assisting a client to commit fraud)].

**SCR 20:1.3 Diligence**

A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

**ABA COMMENT**

[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.

[2] A lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.

[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the

client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.

[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. See Rule 1.4(a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 1.2.

[5] To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner's death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer's death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action. Cf. Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement R. 28 (2002) (providing for court appointment of a lawyer to inventory files and take other protective action in absence of a plan providing for another lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a deceased or disabled lawyer).

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Reasonable Diligence**

A lawyer must make reasonable efforts to advance the client's interests. Before filing an action or defending a client in an action, a lawyer must perform due diligence [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against DeMaio*, 2009 WI 95 (failing to ascertain the status of a sheriff's sale and the client's potential equity in property prior to filing a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy petition); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dade*, 2007 WI 66 (failing to investigate the amount of child support owed by the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Miller Carroll*, 2013 WI 101 (failing to research the implications of possible convictions on the client's commercial driver's license, and failing to adequately prepare the client to testify); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Armstrong*, 2015 WI 60 (preparing and filing the client's tax returns without accurate information already known or readily obtained)].

A violation of the rule occurs when the lawyer fails to take any meaningful action to advance the client's interests [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Joset*, 2008 WI 41 (failing

to advance the client's post-conviction interests, failing to meet with the client or to appear at scheduled appointments with the client, failing to file a client's appeal or to file a no-merit report); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lucius*, 2008 WI 12 (failing to obtain trial transcripts and to timely file a no-merit report, failing to respond to appellate court inquiries regarding a post-conviction matter, failing to make adequate arrangements to obtain trial transcripts from his client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Langkamp*, 2009 WI 102 (failing to advance a client's interests in eight traffic matters including failing to appear at hearings); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2013 WI 14 (failing to file a civil claim for nearly two years and failing thereafter to prosecute the case, resulting in dismissal with prejudice); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sayaovong*, 2014 WI 94 (failing to pursue the client's request to be appointed payee for benefits to his minor children for a period of ten months); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Read*, 2012 WI 121 (failing to take steps to perfect an appeal, move for post-conviction relief, or otherwise address the client's interests for two years); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chavez*, 2015 WI 29 (failing to order transcripts or take any post-conviction action on the client's behalf, failing to file notice of intent to appeal or an appeal or otherwise advance the client's interests, failing to enter an appearance in a client's traffic case); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krogman*, 2015 WI 113 (failing to file an adoption petition)].

When a lawyer has begun diligently to pursue the client's interests, a violation may yet occur when the lawyer fails to prosecute the matter to completion [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kasprovicz*, 2007 WI 67 (after filing a divorce petition, failing to advance the matter resulting in its administrative dismissal); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dade*, 2013 WI 21 (failing to file a financial disclosure statement and trial brief in a divorce, resulting in dismissal of the case); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bowe*, 2011 WI 48 (failing to serve a summons and petition for divorce resulting in a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction of the opposing party); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tishberg*, 2014 WI 118 (failing to obtain service on the defendant resulting in dismissal of the case with prejudice); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mauch*, 2007 WI 109 (allowing a disability insurance lawsuit to be dismissed for lack of prosecution); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Engelbrecht*, 2008 WI 29 (failing to obtain service of a summons and complaint resulting in dismissal of an employment discrimination suit); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2010 WI 9 (failing to keep himself informed of the status of litigation and failing to attend hearings regarding damages and enforcement of the judgment); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister*, 2010 WI 108 (failing to serve defendants and failing to appear at a scheduling conference and file a conference report as required by court rules); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jones*, 2008 WI 53 (failing to timely file an estate inventory and failing to attend a deposition); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Losby*, 2008 WI 8 (failing to file fiduciary tax returns or to close estates); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger*, 2009 WI 103 (failing to timely file an estate inventory and estate tax returns); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (after sending two demand letters in an attempt to resolve a dispute about a real estate transaction, failing to take further action to advance the client's interests); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woods*, 2008 WI 79 (failing to file an amended plan in a bankruptcy case); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Merriam*, 2010 WI 21 (failing to complete a reaffirmation agreement and to provide information to the bankruptcy trustee, and by failing to take reasonable steps to resolve the



effect of the client's transfer of the remainder interest in property on the bankruptcy proceeding); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dade*, 2014 WI 108 (failing to timely file a docketing statement with the appellate court resulting in sanctions); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krogman*, 2015 WI 113 (failing to advance the client's divorce, effect timely service, engage in settlement discussions, provide a financial disclosure statement to the opposing party); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stobbe*, 2015 WI 43 (failing to file a post-conviction motion or notice of appeal prior to the time expiring for such filings, failing to file briefs in an appeal after receiving orders from the court); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel*, 2015 WI 68 (failing to conduct any meaningful discovery)].

A lawyer may also violate the rule by failing to respond to actions of opposing parties or directives of the court *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Acker*, 2007 WI 117 (failing to respond to a claim against the client estate); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Zajac*, 2008 WI 42 (failing to investigate a claim against the estate or to promptly close the estate); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall*, 2008 WI 14 (failing to respond to a summary judgment motion); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raftery*, 2007 WI 137 (failing to respond to discovery requests and to a summary judgment motion); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper*, 2013 WI 55 (failing to request medical releases from his client and provide them to opposing counsel for over a year, resulting in dismissal of the client's worker's compensation claim); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2009 WI 25 (failing to comply with a court order to provide documents to the opposing party); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trudgeon*, 2009 WI 96 (failing to appear at a default motion hearing, and failing to confirm with the court or opposing counsel whether a trial could be continued, and failing to file an answer or to timely file financial disclosure forms); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winch*, 2009 WI 64 (failing to file a timely answer or to seek leave to file an answer after the deadline, and failing to respond to a motion to strike the answer, resulting in a default judgment against the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Anderson*, 2010 WI 39 (failing to respond to DEA civil forfeiture claims resulting in default judgment); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Theobald*, 2010 WI 102 (failing to maintain the client's bankruptcy case, failing to respond to the trustee's motion to dismiss, and failing to re-file after dismissal); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel*, 2015 WI 68 (failing to oppose defendants' motion for summary judgment by the court-ordered deadline)].

A lawyer also may violate the diligence rule by failing to take actions required to complete the representation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ermert*, 2007 WI 10 (failing to file a quit claim deed); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Niesen*, 2011 WI 97 (failing to prepare a deed for five months before abandoning his practice); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2007 WI 123 (failing to prepare an order for two years, and failing to prepare the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of divorce within the 30-day time limit); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2013 WI 8 (failing to timely file a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and failing to prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order despite numerous client requests and his knowledge that time was of the essence); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mauch*, 2010 WI 2 (failing to timely file a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief and a motion to extend the time to file); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mularski*, 2010 WI 113 (failing to resolve medical liens

after receiving a settlement in a personal injury case); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100 (failing to resolve claims of subrogated providers in a minor settlement for over two years); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Briggs*, 2014 WI 119 (failing to take steps to enforce a default judgment); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goluba*, 2013 WI 32 (failing to follow up on vehicle title transfers with the Department of Motor Vehicles; Cf. *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ginsberg*, 2009 WI 18 (after submitting a plea agreement in a traffic matter, failing to determine whether the agreement had been accepted and judgment entered, and when the client's license was subsequently suspended, was not a lack of reasonable diligence when the district attorney and clerk failed to notify the lawyer or the client of the entry of judgment)].

OLR is not required to prove a claim would have succeeded in order to sustain a violation of a lack of diligent representation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 110 (the lawyer "confuses the standard for a legal malpractice claim with the standard for a lawyer misconduct claim")].

### **Reasonable Promptness**

A lawyer must also represent a client with reasonable promptness. What constitutes reasonable promptness will depend upon the circumstances of the case. Missing a statute of limitations weighs toward a finding of a violation as the client's claim will be barred [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pitts*, 2007 WI 112 (failing to pursue a claim and allowing the statute of limitations to expire); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (failing to file a claim before the statute of limitations); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woods*, 2009 WI 7 (failing to file a personal injury action until the day before the statute of limitations and thereafter failing to serve the defendants, resulting in dismissal); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, (failing to file a habeas corpus petition until after the statutory deadline); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2007 WI 298 (failing to respond to deadlines in an employment discrimination matter and failing to file a lawsuit after the adverse administrative determination prior to the statutory bar)].

Missing other deadlines may also result in a violation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (failing to timely prepare a final order implementing a stipulation, failing to timely file a petition for writ of certiorari, failing to meet appellate court deadlines); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (failing to advance the client's divorce proceeding for over a year when the client's deteriorating health required prompt action, failing to comply with the deadlines in the court's scheduling order resulting in dismissal of the client's case with prejudice); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stobbe*, 2015 WI 43 (failing to file a post-conviction motion or notice of appeal prior to the time expiring for such filings, failing to file briefs in an appeal after receiving orders from the court)].

Other circumstances, such as the expectations of the client or when time is of the essence, may also result in a finding of a violation even when no deadlines are missed [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2010 WI 4 (failing to promptly file a motion when he accepted the representation two days before the effective date of his suspension); *Disciplinary*

*Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2013 WI 103 (failing to appeal the denial of a post-conviction motion for a month when the client believed a deadline had passed and when the lawyer failed to communicate to the client the belief was mistaken); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hackbarth*, 2013 WI 12 (when time was of the essence, failing to take action for two months to pursue the client's objective of acquiring a business)].

In some cases, the mere passage of time is sufficient to find a lack of reasonable promptness [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Engelbrecht*, 2007 WI 2 (failing for two years to file a bankruptcy action); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb*, 2011 WI 101 (failing to file a small claims complaint for eight months); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2011 WI 39 (failing to investigate a wrongful termination claim for over 3 years); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pierski*, 2011 WI 99 (failing to transfer real property to a trust for over a year); *Cf. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2011 WI 3 (failing to file a civil complaint for seven months was not a lack of diligence where the client was able to pursue the matter with subsequent counsel and achieve a satisfactory solution); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sayaovong*, 2015 WI 100 (failing to timely pursue collections actions)].

#### **SCR 20:1.4 Communication**

(a) A lawyer shall:

- (1) Promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in SCR 20:1.0(f), is required by these rules;
- (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
- (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
- (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by the client for information; and
- (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

#### **WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT**

Paragraph (a)(4) differs from the Model Rule in that the words "by the client" are added for the sake of clarity.

#### **ABA COMMENT**

[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.

## **Communicating with Client**

[2] If these Rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2(a).

[3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations — depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client — this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.

[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client communications.

## **Explaining Matters**

[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e).

[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it

is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.

### **Withholding Information**

[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Matters requiring informed consent**

A lawyer must inform the client of settlement offers, consult with the client about the contents of the offer, and obtain the client's informed consent [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Spangler*, 2016 WI 61 (agreeing to the dismissal of the client's lawsuit without having consent of the client); *Public Reprimand of Smith*, 2009-OLR-17 (entering into a stipulation with opposing counsel without first consulting the client and informing the client of the contents of the stipulation); *Public Reprimand of Dahlberg*, 2013-OLR-6 (failing to inform the client of offers to settle outstanding liens, and failing to consult and obtain informed consent)]. *See also*, SCR 20:1.2(a).

### **Consultation regarding the means to achieve the client's objectives**

A lawyer must discuss strategies for achieving the client's objectives [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Batt*, 2010 WI 7 (failing to consult with the client regarding the means by which the appeal of an adverse probation revocation decision was to be accomplished); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Merriam*, 2010 WI 21 (failing to consult with the client regarding how to respond to a bankruptcy trustee's efforts to nullify the transfer of property prior to the bankruptcy filing); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb*, 2011 WI 101 (failing to consult with a guardian of her grandchildren regarding the means by which he intended to protect her guardianship and respond to legal challenges by the mother); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2013 WI 8 (failing to reveal and discuss the lawyer's decision to allow the client's malpractice claim to be dismissed as a strategy for resolving a judgment against the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2013 WI 19 (in light of his pending suspension, failing to inform the client and consult regarding the means by which the client's objectives would be pursued); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Din*, 2015 WI 4 (failing to consult regarding the appropriate visa to pursue for the client's father, or how to best transfer funds for their business)]. *See also*, SCR 20:1.2(a).

### **Keeping the client reasonably informed**

A lawyer has an affirmative duty to provide information to the client. Failure to do so has

resulted in violations of the rule in a variety of circumstances [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cannaday*, 2015 WI 11 (abandoning the practice without informing clients of the status of their cases or that no meaningful action was being taken on their behalf); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dahle*, 2015 WI 29 (closing the lawyer's office without notice to clients); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carranza*, 2014 WI 121 (failing to communicate with the client from May to August and failing to inform the client of the status of the case and the lawyer's pending suspension; failing to inform the client that the lawyer had closed his office and moved); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Biester*, 2016 WI 74 (failing to inform the client that the lawyer had received and converted the client's funds)].

A lawyer must provide information regularly during the representation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2011 WI 3 (failing to communicate with the client between May and December); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Read*, 2012 WI 121 (failing to communicate with the client at all for a year); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sayaovong*, 2015 WI 100 (failing to keep clients informed of collection efforts)].

A lawyer must also provide information to clients about important circumstances relating to the representation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Langkamp*, 2009 WI 102 (failing to communicate with a client during a month prior to a scheduled hearing; failing to inform the client that he would not be at a hearing, and after missing the hearing failing to advise the client of the next hearing date); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Batt*, 2010 WI 7 (failing to notify the client of the denial of a request to extend the time for an appeal of a probation revocation decision); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb*, 2011 WI 101 (failing to inform the client of the status of critical events, such as hearings, contempt motions, negotiations, and the lawyer's pending suspension); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chavez*, 2015 WI 39 (failing to inform the client of the lawyer's pending suspension and inability to appear at a scheduled hearing); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mross*, 2013 WI 44 (failing to inform the client of the status of the bankruptcy and the requirement to file certification of completion of a financial management course in order to obtain a discharge); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McClure*, 2015 WI 25 (failing to inform the client of the lawyer's failure to pay medical providers from settlement funds); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel*, 2015 WI 68 (failing to inform the client of the defendants' motion for summary judgment or that the court had granted the motion)].

### **Responding to requests for information**

A lawyer has a duty to respond to requests for information from the client. Violations of subparagraph (a)(4) have been found where the lawyer engages in a pattern of failing to respond [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fisher*, 2010 WI 45 (failing to return numerous client calls concerning the status of the bankruptcy); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb*, 2011 WI 101 (failing to respond to multiple phone calls, emails, and attempted office visits); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pierski*, 2011 WI 99 (failing to respond to numerous calls); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Loew*, 2012 WI 40 (failing to respond to multiple calls over several months); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (failing to respond to monthly calls from the client from August to February); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goluba*, 2013 WI 32 (failing to respond to repeated telephone calls); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carranza*, 2014 WI 121 (various stretches where the lawyer was not returning client phone calls); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb*, 2015

WI 52 (failing to respond to client phone calls)].

Violations have also been found when there is an urgent or particular concern [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dade*, 2013 WI 21 (failing to respond to the client's calls over a six-week period regarding the client's need to adjourn a trial date); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Briggs*, 2014 WI 119 (failing to respond to repeated phone calls and emails inquiring about the status of the representation and billing issues); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2013 WI 8 (failing to respond to numerous emails and telephone calls regarding the status of the filing of a qualified domestic relations order); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2015 WI 7 (failing to return client phone calls, repeatedly failing to respond to requests for information, failing to respond to requests by successor counsel for the client file); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 110 (the court upheld referee findings that the lawyer was dismissive about the client's many requests for information about a subpoena and that the lawyer misled the client about the subpoena)].

### **Explaining Matters**

A lawyer must provide information to a client sufficient to enable the client to make decisions regarding the representation, such as 1) whether to file, settle, or dismiss a claim [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mauch*, 2007 WI 109 (failing to inform the client of motions and dismissal of the client's case, falsely advising that a settlement was obtained, making payments to the client to cover the false information); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (failing to inform the client of missed deadlines, opposing party motions for sanctions, and dismissal of the client's case); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tishberg*, 2014 WI 118 (failing to inform the client that personal service was not timely made, the defendants had moved to dismiss, and the client's case had been dismissed with prejudice)]; 2) whether to appeal or pursue post-trial or other relief [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2009 WI 59 (failing to inform the client that a motion to extend the time to file an appeal was denied until after the time to file an appeal expired); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hansen*, 2009 WI 56 (failing to provide a client any meaningful information regarding the post-conviction appeal processes or deadlines, failing to advise the client that the attorney's medical condition interfered with his ability to properly represent the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Langkamp*, 2009 WI 102 (failing to explain post-conviction options, prospects for an appeal, and applicable deadlines); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woods*, 2009 WI 7 (failing to explain the significance of dismissal of the client's lawsuit with prejudice); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (failing to explain the reason for not filing a timely petition for writ of certiorari, which prevented the client from making informed decisions about the forms of relief available or his right to seek other representation)]; and 3) whether to retain another lawyer [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2009 WI 40 (advising the client that work was being done on the case when in fact there was not); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trudgeon*, 2009 WI 96 (failing to advise the client that the attorney believed he no longer represented the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Anderson*, 2010 WI 39 (failing to explain a DEA notice of forfeiture of property and to explain that the scope of representation did not include charges in federal court); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2010 WI 41 (failing to notify the client of his appellate deadline and that the attorney was terminating her representation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Capistrant*, 2015 WI 88 (failing to advise clients that the lawyer's license was suspended)].

Commensurate with the duty to consult regarding the means used to achieve a client's objectives, a lawyer must provide information enabling the client to participate meaningfully in the representation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2007 WI 1 (failing to explain the lawyer's strategy of pursuing a complaint only to obtain discovery but not to obtain other relief); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jones*, 2008 WI 53 (failing to inform the client of scheduled mediation and explain its meaning); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2009 WI 89 (causing the client to think a party was named as a defendant when it was not and failing to explain the strategy to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trudgeon*, 2009 WI 96 (failing to advise the client there would be no response to a motion for default or to advise of the risk of being found in contempt for failure to complete financial disclosure forms); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Merriam*, 2010 WI 21 (failing to explain a bankruptcy client the strategy and options regarding their home); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll*, 2013 WI 101 (failing to advise the client regarding a plea agreement, the potential consequences of pleading guilty, and potential sentence enhancements); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laux*, 2015 WI 59 (failing to explain the benefits and detriments of estate planning options)].

Failure to communicate in any way with the client will also result in a violation of the rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks*, 2012 WI 11 (failing to communicate with the client in any way); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hackbarth*, 2013 WI 12 (failing to communicate with the client in any way); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2013 WI 8 (failing to consult with the client about the lawsuit, its objectives, and the status of the case)].

### **SCR 20:1.5 Fees**

- (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
- (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
  - (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
  - (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
  - (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
  - (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
  - (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
  - (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
  - (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.



(b)(1) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate as in the past. If it is reasonably foreseeable that the total cost of representation to the client, including attorney's fees, will be \$1000 or less, the communication may be oral or in writing. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in writing to the client.

(2) If the total cost of representation to the client, including attorney's fees, is more than \$1000, the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in writing.

(3) A lawyer shall promptly respond to a client's request for information concerning fees and expenses.

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by par. (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client, and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee:

(1) in any action affecting the family, including but not limited to divorce, legal separation, annulment, determination of paternity, setting of support and maintenance, setting of custody and physical placement, property division, partition of marital property, termination of parental rights and adoption, provided that nothing herein shall prohibit a contingent fee for the collection of past due amounts of support or maintenance or property division.

(2) for representing a defendant in a criminal case or any proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty.

(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:

(1) the division is based on the services performed by each lawyer, and the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved and is informed if the fee will increase as a result of their involvement; or

(2) the lawyers formerly practiced together and the payment to one lawyer is pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement between them; or

(3) pursuant to the referral of a matter between the lawyers, each lawyer assumes the same ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were partners in the same firm, the client is informed of the terms of the referral arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive and whether the overall fee will increase, and the client consents in a writing signed by the client.

(f) Except as provided in SCR 20:1.5(g), unearned fees and funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for payment of fees shall be held in trust until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to SCR 20:1.5(h). Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for payment of costs shall be held in trust until the costs are incurred.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

### **SCR 20:1.5(f) Advances for fees and costs.**

Lawyers are obligated to hold advanced fee payments in trust until earned, or use the alternative protection for advanced fees as set forth in SCR 20:1.5(g). Additional requirements for advanced fees are identified in SCR 20:1.0(ag). Sometimes the lawyer may receive advanced fee payments from 3rd parties. In such cases, the lawyer must follow the requirements of SCR 20:1.8(f). In addition, the lawyer should establish, upon receipt or prior to receipt of the advanced fee payment from a 3rd party, whether any potential refund of unearned fees will be paid to the client or 3rd-party payor. This may be done through agreement of the parties or by the lawyer informing the client and 3rd-party payor of the lawyer's policy regarding such refunds. Lawyers also receive cost advances from clients or 3rd parties. Since January 1, 1987, the supreme court has required cost advances to be held in trust. Prior to that date, the applicable trust account rule, SCR 20.50(1), specifically excluded such advances from the funds that the supreme court required lawyers to hold in trust accounts. However, by order dated March 21, 1986, the supreme court amended SCR 20.50(1) as follows: "All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts as provided in sub. (3) maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be deposited in such an account except as follows . . . ." This requirement is specifically addressed in SCR 20:1.5(f).

(g) A lawyer who accepts advanced payments of fees may deposit the funds in the lawyer's business account, provided that review of the lawyer's fee by a court of competent jurisdiction is available in the proceeding to which the fee relates, or provided that the lawyer complies with each of the following requirements:

(1) Upon accepting any advanced payment of fees pursuant to this subsection, the lawyer shall deliver to the client a notice in writing containing all of the following information:

- a. The amount of the advanced payment.
- b. The basis or rate of the lawyer's fee.
- c. Any expenses for which the client will be responsible.
- d. The lawyer's obligation to refund any unearned advanced fee, along with an accounting, at the termination of the representation.
- e. The lawyer's obligation to submit any unresolved dispute about the fee to binding arbitration within 30 days of receiving written notice of the dispute.
- f. The ability of the client to file a claim with the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection if the lawyer fails to provide a refund of unearned advanced fees.

(2) Upon termination of the representation, the lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of the following:

- a. A final accounting, or an accounting from the date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end of the representation, regarding the client's advanced fee payment.
- b. A refund of any unearned advanced fees and costs.
- c. Notice that, if the client disputes the amount of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to binding arbitration, the client must provide written notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of the mailing of the accounting.
- d. Notice that, if the lawyer is unable to resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute to binding arbitration.

(3) Upon timely receipt of written notice of a dispute from the client, the lawyer shall attempt to resolve that dispute with the client, and if the dispute is not resolved, the lawyer shall submit the dispute to binding arbitration with the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program or a similar local bar association program within 30 days of the lawyer's receipt of the written notice of dispute from the client.

(4) Upon receipt of an arbitration award requiring the lawyer to make a payment to the client, the lawyer shall pay the arbitration award within 30 days, unless the client fails to agree to be bound by the award of the arbitrator.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

### **SCR 20:1.5(g) Alternative protection for advanced fees.**

SCR 20:1.5(g) allows lawyers to deposit advanced fees into the lawyer's business account, as an alternative to SCR 20:1.5(f). The provision regarding court review applies to a lawyer's fees in proceedings in which the lawyer's fee is subject to review at the request of the parties or the court, such as bankruptcy, formal probate, and proceedings in which a guardian ad litem's fee may be subject to judicial review. In any proceeding in which the lawyer's fee must be challenged in a separate action, the lawyer must either deposit advanced fees in trust or use the alternative protections for advanced fees in this subsection. The lawyer's fee remains subject to the requirement of reasonableness under SCR 20:1.5(a) as well as the requirement that unearned fees be refunded upon termination of the representation under SCR 20:1.16(d). A lawyer must comply either with SCR 20:1.5(f) or SCR 20:1.5(g), and a lawyer's failure to do so is professional misconduct and grounds for discipline. The writing required under SCR 20:1.5(g)(1) must contain language informing the client that the lawyer is obligated to refund any unearned advanced fee at the end of the representation, that the lawyer will submit any dispute regarding a refund to binding arbitration, such as the programs run by the State Bar of Wisconsin and the Milwaukee Bar Association, within 30 days of receiving a request for refund, and that the lawyer is obligated to comply with an arbitration award within 30 days of the award. The client is not obligated to arbitrate the fee dispute and may elect another forum in which to resolve the dispute. The writing must also inform the client of the opportunity to file a claim in the event an unearned advanced fee is not refunded, and should provide the address of the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.

If the client's fees have been paid by one other than the client, then the lawyer's responsibilities are governed by SCR 20:1.8(f). If there is a dispute as to the ownership of any refund of unearned advanced fees paid by one other than the client, the unearned fees should be treated as trust property pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(e)(3).

SCR 20:1.5(g) applies only to advanced fees for legal services. Cost advances must be deposited into the lawyer's trust account.

Advanced fees deposited into the lawyer's business account pursuant to this subsection may be paid by credit card, debit card, prepaid or other types of payment cards, or an electronic transfer of funds. A cost advance cannot be paid by credit card, debit card, prepaid or other types of payment cards, or an electronic transfer of funds under this section. Cost advances are subject to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) or SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)b.

(h)(1) At least five business days before the date on which a disbursement is made from a trust account for the purpose of paying fees, with the exception

of contingent fees or fees paid pursuant to court order, a lawyer shall transmit to the client in writing all of the following:

- a. An itemized bill or other accounting showing the services rendered.
- b. Notice of the amount owed and the anticipated date of the withdrawal.
- c. A statement of the balance of the client's funds in the lawyer's trust account after the withdrawal.

(2) The lawyer may withdraw earned fees on the date that the invoice is transmitted to the client, provided that the lawyer has given prior notice to the client in writing that earned fees will be withdrawn on the date that the invoice is transmitted. The invoice shall include each of the elements required under SCR 20:1.5(h)(1).

(3) If a client makes a particularized and reasonable objection to the disbursement described in SCR 20:1.5(h)(1), the disputed portion shall remain in the trust account until the dispute is resolved. If the client makes a particularized and reasonable objection to a disbursement described in SCR 20:1.5(h)(1) or (2) within 30 days after the funds have been withdrawn, the disputed portion shall be returned to the trust account until the dispute is resolved, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the client's objections do not present a basis to hold funds in trust or return funds to the trust account under SCR 20:1.5(h). The lawyer will be presumed to have a reasonable basis for declining to return funds to trust if the disbursement was made with the client's informed consent, in writing. The lawyer shall promptly advise the client in writing of the lawyer's position regarding the fee and make reasonable efforts to clarify and address the client's objections.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

### **SCR 20:1.5(h) Withdrawal of non-contingent fees from trust account.**

SCR 20:1.5(h) applies to attorney fees, other than contingent fees. It does not apply to filing fees, expert witness fees, subpoena fees, and other costs and expenses that a lawyer may incur on behalf of a client in the course of a representation. In addition, this section does not require contingent fees to remain in the trust account or to be returned to the trust account if a client objects to the disbursement of the contingent fee, provided that the contingent fee arrangement is documented by a written fee agreement, as required by SCR 20:1.5(c). While a client may dispute the reasonableness of a lawyer's contingent fee, such disputes are subject to SCR 20:1.5(a), not to this subsection. A client's objection under SCR 20:1.5(h)(3) must offer a specific and reasonable basis for the fee dispute in order to trigger the lawyer's obligation to keep funds in the lawyer's trust account or return funds to the lawyer's trust account. A generalized objection to the overall amount of the fees or a client's unilateral desire to abrogate the terms of a fee agreement should not ordinarily be considered sufficient to trigger the lawyer's obligation. A lawyer may

resolve a dispute over fees by offering to participate and abide by the decision of a fee arbitration program. In addition, a lawyer may bring an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to § 806.04, Wis. Stats. to resolve a dispute between the lawyer and a client regarding funds held in trust by the lawyer. The court of appeals suggested employment of that method to resolve a dispute between a client and a 3rd party over funds held in trust by the lawyer. See, *Riegleman v. Krieg*, 2004 WI App 85, 271 Wis. 2d 798, 679 N.W.2d 857.

Additionally, when a lawyer's fees are subject to final approval by a court, such as fees paid to a guardian ad litem or lawyer's fees in formal probate matters, objections to disbursements by clients or 3rd party payors are properly brought before the court having jurisdiction over the matter. A lawyer should hold disputed funds in trust until such time as the appropriate court resolves the dispute.

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (b) differs from the Model Rule in requiring that fee and expense information usually must be communicated to the client in writing, unless the total cost of representation will be \$1000 or less. In instances when a lawyer has regularly represented a client, any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses may be communicated in writing to the client by a proper reference on the periodic billing statement provided to the client within a reasonable time after the basis or rate of the fee or expenses has been changed. The communication to the client through the billing statement should clearly indicate that a change in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses has occurred along with an indication of the new basis or rate of the fee or expenses. A lawyer should advise the client at the time of commencement of representation of the likelihood of a periodic change in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses that will be charged to the client.

In addition, paragraph (b) differs from the Model Rule in requiring that the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in writing and that a lawyer shall promptly respond to a client's request for information concerning fees and expenses. The lawyer should inform the client of the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee. Specifically, the lawyer should identify whether any portion, and if so what portion, of the fee is a retainer. A retainer is a fee that a lawyer charges the client not for specific services to be performed but to ensure the lawyer's availability whenever the client may need legal services. These fees become the property of the lawyer when received and may not be deposited into the lawyer's trust account. In addition, they are subject to SCR 20:1.15 and SCR 20:1.16. Retainers are to be distinguished from an "advanced fee" which is paid for future services and earned only as services are performed. Advanced fees are subject to SCR 20:1.5, SCR 20:1.15, and SCR 20:1.16. See also State Bar of Wis. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. E-93-4 (1993).

Paragraph (d) preserves the more explicit statement of limitations on contingent fees that has been part of Wisconsin law since the original adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct in the state.

Paragraph (e) differs from the Model Rule in several respects. The division of a fee "based on" rather than "in proportion to" the services performed clarifies that fee divisions need not consist of a percentage calculation. The rule also recognizes that lawyers who formerly practiced together may divide a fee pursuant to a separation or

retirement agreement between them. In addition, the standards governing referral arrangements are made more explicit.

### **Dispute Over Fees**

Arbitration provides an expeditious, inexpensive method for lawyers and clients to resolve disputes regarding fees. It also avoids litigation that might further exacerbate the relationship. If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. See also ABA Comment [9].

### **Fee Estimates**

Compliance with the following guidelines is a desirable practice: (a) the lawyer providing to the client, no later than a reasonable time after commencing the representation, a written estimate of the fees that the lawyer will charge the client as a result of the representation; (b) if, at any time and from time to time during the course of the representation, the fee estimate originally provided becomes substantially inaccurate, the lawyer timely providing a revised written estimate or revised written estimates to the client; (c) the client accepting the representation following provision of the estimate or estimates; and (d) the lawyer charging fees reasonably consistent with the estimate or estimates given.

## **ABA COMMENT**

### **Reasonableness of Fee and Expenses**

[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer.

### **Basis or Rate of Fee**

[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Generally, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation. A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding.

[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may

impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. Applicable law also may apply to situations other than a contingent fee, for example, government regulations regarding fees in certain tax matters.

### **Terms of Payment**

[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.

[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.

### **Prohibited Contingent Fees**

[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns.

### **Division of Fee**

[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the representation as a whole. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing. Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership. A lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.

[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.

### **Disputes over Fees**



[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Reasonableness of the fee**

A lawyer must perform the services for which a fee is charged [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hansen*, (keeping a charged fee for a representation when the representation was not completed); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2009 WI 40 (collecting a \$1,250 fee without performing any work); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ryan*, 2009 WI 39 (keeping a charged fee of \$10,000 where the lawyer did not enter an appearance, prepare briefs or pleadings, or a written analysis of an appeal for the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2010 WI 41 (accepting a \$3,000 fee and then failing to provide services necessary to preserve the client's rights); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb*, 2011 WI 101 (accepting \$700 to represent a client in a small claims matter and failing to advance the client's interests or to complete the representation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2013 WI 19 (charging \$2,000 for a representation he did not complete); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka*, 2014 WI 33 (accepting \$750 for a representation he did not complete); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cannaday*, 2015 WI 11 (accepting advanced fees but not performing work on the clients' behalf); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2015 WI 14 (retaining the entire fee paid for a representation despite having not performed the service)].

A lawyer must perform services contemplated by the contract that provide reasonable value for the fee [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fadner*, 2007 WI 18 (charging \$961.90 for work purportedly done was unreasonable when half the work was after the client terminated the representation, and when the work was of no benefit to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Phillips*, 2012 WI 119 (accepting \$1,500 as an advance on an hourly fee of \$150 per hour and keeping the entire amount after having performed only three hours of work); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovsky*, 2012 WI 120 (charging over \$8,000 for a post-conviction motion that had not been authorized by the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2013 WI 103 (accepting an advanced fee of \$2,500 to file an appeal for the client and keeping the entire fee when she had taken minimal action and had not filed an appeal); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Din*, 2015 WI 4 (charging and receiving significant fees without performing sufficient useful work)].

False billings are unreasonable [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schoenecker*, 2011 WI 76 (billing the client for services that were not provided); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovsky*, 2012 WI 120 (submitting duplicative and excessive charges); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman*, 2014 WI 15 (receiving \$604,000 in fees from an estate without adequate records and when earning the fees would have required the lawyer to work 75 hours a week all 52 weeks of 2002, 74 hours a week all 52 weeks of 2003, and 54 hours a

week all 52 weeks of 2004)].

Billing non-professional services at a professional services rate is unreasonable [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Armstrong*, 2015 WI 60 (charging \$4,118.95 to reduce a tax deficiency by \$1,020, charging \$3,265 to cancel an auto insurance policy and transfer a vehicle title, charging \$562.50 to pursue reissuance of a \$315 stale check, charging \$385 to cancel an AOL account, billing \$500 per month for services that generally required only 15 minutes of work per month, billing at a professional services rate of \$250 per hour for nonprofessional services)].

Billing for collection of the lawyer's fee violates the rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovsky*, 2012 WI 120 (charging \$400 for pursuing the lawyer's fees)].

### **Fee contracts and communications regarding fees**

A lawyer must communicate to the client the scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses; and, if the client is not regularly represented and the expected fees and expenses exceed \$1,000, the lawyer must communicate in writing [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grenisen*, 2013 WI 99 (failing to enter into a written fee agreement when the lawyer did not regularly represent the client and the fee was reasonably foreseen to exceed \$1,000); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moore*, 2013 WI 96 (failing to communicate in a clear and consistent manner the basis and rate of the fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mross*, 2013 WI 44 (failing to provide the clients a written fee agreement setting forth the scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the \$1,200 fee); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2013 WI 19 (accepting a \$2,000 advanced fee without a writing communicating the scope of representation, the basis or rate of the fee, and the purpose and effect of the advanced fee; failing to respond to the client's request for a refund of unearned fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (failing to enter into a written fee agreement when the contemplated fee exceeded \$1,000); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chavez*, 2015 WI 39 (failing to provide a written fee agreement to the client when accepting an advanced fee of \$1,500); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mulligan*, 2015 WI 96 (accepting \$5,000 to represent the client and failing to enter into a written fee agreement); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strouse*, 2015 WI 83 (the court rejected the lawyer's argument that a billing statement adequately communicated changes in the lawyer's fee)].

A lawyer must communicate the purpose and effect an advanced fee, and if more than \$1,000, must communicate in writing [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moore*, 2013 WI 96 (failing to communicate how advanced fees would be handled); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2013 WI 19 (accepting a \$2,000 advanced fee without a writing communicating the purpose and effect of the advanced fee)].

A lawyer must respond to client requests for information about the fees [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2013 WI 19 (failing to respond to the client's request for a refund of unearned fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (failing to provide the client a copy of the bill despite repeated requests); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (failing to respond to the client's requests for a billing statement); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2015 WI 14 (failing to respond to a client's requests for an accounting and refund of fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smoler*, 2015 WI 97 (failing to respond to requests for an accounting of fees and expenses

and failing to provide periodic statements and accountings)].

A lawyer may not charge a nonrefundable fee [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moore*, 2013 WI 96 (stating in the agreement that advanced fees would be nonrefundable)].

### **Contingent Fee Agreements**

Contingent fee agreements must be in writing [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2010 WI 4 (charging 10% of the recovery without a written contingent fee agreement); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper*, 2013 WI 97 (failure to have a contingent fee agreement in writing); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2015 WI 7 (failure to have contingent fee agreements in writing)].

At the conclusion of the representation, the lawyer must provide a written accounting stating the outcome of the matter and showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination [*Public Reprimand of McCartan*, 2012-OLR-3 (failure to provide the client a written settlement statement stating the outcome of the matter and showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination); *Public Reprimand of Dahlberg*, 2013-OLR-6 (failing to provide any kind of written statement or accounting to the clients regarding the settlement proceeds received)].

### **Divisions of fees**

A lawyer may divide fees with a lawyer outside the firm only when the total fee is reasonable, and the conditions in subparagraphs (e)(1), (e)(2), or (e)(3) are met. Violations were found in cases decided before the effective date of the current rule in circumstances that may be found to violate the current rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brown*, 2010 WI 104 (a lawyer contracted with outside counsel at a rate of \$90 per hour, but charged the client \$125 per hour without disclosing the agreement to the client); *Private Reprimand Summary 2006-14* (a lawyer who did not handle personal injury cases contacted a woman after she had been in an accident, referred her to another lawyer without an agreement and without providing services or assuming responsibility for the representation, and thereafter sued to collect a referral fee)].

### **Treatment of advanced fees and costs**

Effective July 1, 2016, the provisions of former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) and (4m) were moved to SCR 20:1.5(f) and (g). The following cases apply the former rule.

Subparagraphs (f) and (g) provide for alternative treatment for advanced fee and cost payments. Advanced fees are defined in SCR 20:1.0(ag). The general rule is that advanced fees and costs must be held in trust until earned or disbursed on behalf of the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Biester*, 2013 WI 85 (receiving an advanced fee of \$750 and failing to place it in trust until earned); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2013 WI 103 (receiving an advanced fee of \$2,500 and failing to place it in trust until earned); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritter*, 2013 WI 3 (receiving funds from the State Public Defender as payment for an investigator and failing to deposit those funds in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood*, 2014 WI 116 (failing to hold in trust \$400 advanced to the lawyer by the client for payment of anticipated costs)].

As an alternative to the general rule for advanced fees (not advanced payments of costs), the lawyer may deposit the fees in the lawyer's business account, provided the lawyer provides

all the notices required and provided the lawyer follows the dispute resolution procedures in subparagraph (g). Violations have been found where the lawyer fails to place advanced fees in trust and fails to comply with the notice and dispute resolution requirements of subparagraph (g) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2011 WI 3 (depositing an unearned advanced fee into the business account without providing the client with the written notice required by former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m))].

A lawyer must comply with all the notice requirements of the advanced fee alternative of subparagraph (g) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rajek*, 2015 WI 18 (failing to include all the notices to the client required by the advanced fee alternative constituted a violation of the rule)].

### **Disbursement of non-contingent fees to the lawyer**

Effective July 1, 2016, the requirements for disbursement of non-contingent fees moved from SCR 20:1.15 to SCR 20:1.5(h). The following cases applied the rule in effect prior to July 1, 2016.

A lawyer must provide notice to the client prior to disbursing fees from trust. The general rule provides that the lawyer must give notice at least 5 days prior to disbursement. The rule also provides for an alternative for regular invoicing. Failure to provide a notice has resulted in discipline [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (disbursing trust funds to himself without accounting to the owner); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (failing to advise the client that the lawyer was withdrawing fees from trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2015 WI 7 (disbursing funds out of trust for the lawyer's fee without notice to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krogman*, 2015 WI 113 (disbursing advanced fees from trust without prior notice)].

### **SCR 20:1.6 Confidentiality**

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in pars. (b) and (c).

(b) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another.

(c) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

- (1) to prevent reasonably likely death or substantial bodily harm;
- (2) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or

- has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
- (3) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's conduct under these rules;
  - (4) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;
  - (5) to comply with other law or a court order; or
  - (6) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.
- (d) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

The rule retains in paragraph (b) the mandatory disclosure requirements that have been a part of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules since their initial adoption. Paragraph (c) differs from its counterpart, Model Rule 1.6(b), as necessary to take account of the mandatory disclosure requirements in Wisconsin. The language in paragraph (c)(1) was changed from "reasonably certain" to "reasonably likely" to comport with sub. (b). Due to substantive and numbering differences, special care should be taken in consulting the ABA Comment.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (c)(6) differs from its counterpart, Model Rule 1.6(b)(7). Unlike its counterpart, paragraph (c)(6) is not limited to detecting and resolving conflicts arising from the lawyer's change in employment or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm. Paragraph (c)(6), like its counterpart, recognizes that in certain circumstances, lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest. ABA Comment [13] provides examples of those circumstances. Paragraph (c)(6), unlike its counterpart, also recognizes that in certain circumstances, lawyers may need to disclose limited information to clients and former clients to detect and resolve conflict of interests. Under those circumstances, any such disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the clients or former clients. The disclosure of any information, to either lawyers in different firms or to other clients or former clients, is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client. ABA Comment [13] provides examples of when the disclosure of any information would prejudice the client. Lawyers should err on

the side of protecting confidentiality.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the client. See Rule 1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client, Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer's prior representation of a former client and Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.

[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.

[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.

[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.

### **Authorized Disclosure**

[5] Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation. In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of

the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.

### **Disclosure Adverse to Client**

[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.

[7] Paragraph (b)(2) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(d), that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services. Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule. The client can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to reveal the client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c), which permits the lawyer, where the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation in limited circumstances.

[8] Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the situation in which the lawyer does not learn of the client's crime or fraud until after it has been consummated. Although the client no longer has the option of preventing disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by the affected person can be prevented, rectified or mitigated. In such situations, the lawyer may disclose information relating to the representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Paragraph (b)(3) does not apply when a person who has committed a crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense.

[9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

[10] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client,

the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(5) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been commenced.

[11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the Rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.

[12] Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.

[13] Paragraph (b)(7) recognizes that lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is considering an association with another firm, two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the purchase of a law practice. See Rule 1.17, Comment [7]. Under these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limited information, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new relationship have occurred. Any such disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved in a matter, a brief summary of the general issues involved, and information about whether the matter has terminated. Even this limited information, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that might arise from the possible new relationship. Moreover, the disclosure of any information is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client (e.g., the fact that a corporate client is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced; that a person has consulted a lawyer about the possibility of divorce before the person's intentions are known to the person's spouse; or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge). Under those circumstances, paragraph (a) prohibits disclosure unless the client or former client gives informed consent. A lawyer's fiduciary duty to the lawyer's firm may also govern a lawyer's conduct when exploring an association with another firm and is beyond the scope of these Rules.

[14] Any information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b)(7) may be used or further disclosed only to the extent necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest. Paragraph (b)(7) does not restrict the use of information acquired by means independent of any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (b)(7). Paragraph (b)(7) also does not affect the



disclosure of information within a law firm when the disclosure is otherwise authorized, see Comment [5], such as when a lawyer in a firm discloses information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking a new representation.

[15] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.

[16] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

[17] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). In exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other Rules. Some Rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), 8.1, and 8.3. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See Rule 3.3(c).

#### **Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality**

[18] Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1, and 5.3. The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, information relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer's ability to represent

clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use). A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be required by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client's information in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these Rules. For a lawyer's duties when sharing information with nonlawyers outside the lawyer's own firm, see Rule 5.3, Comments [3]-[4].

[19] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules.

#### **Former Client**

[20] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2). See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.

## ANNOTATIONS

A lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation of the client without client consent [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovskiy*, 2012 WI 120 (without client consent, discussing the client's case with the party paying for the client's legal services); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Atta*, 2016 WI 69 (without client consent, sending proposed findings of fact and other information to the lawyer's brother)], unless the lawyer is impliedly authorized to reveal the information [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Duchemin*, 2003 WI 19 (revealing to the client's mother, who referred the daughter to the lawyer, that the daughter had contacted him about representation, and asking the circumstances regarding gifts and loans between the mother and daughter, was impliedly authorized and not a violation)].

A lawyer has a duty to maintain the confidentiality of information relating to the representation after the representation has terminated. [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Niesen*, 2011 WI 97 (abandoning the practice without taking steps to ensure continued confidentiality of information in clients' files); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ramthun*, 2015 WI 94 (failing to pay the monthly storage bill and thereby subjecting former clients' files to be revealed at a public sale)].

A lawyer may reveal information adverse to a client to respond to allegations concerning the lawyer's representation of the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Thompson*, 2014 WI 25 (a lawyer who wrote to the court prior to a post-conviction hearing on the issue of the effectiveness of the lawyer's conduct during the criminal trial was permitted to respond to the allegations in the client's post-conviction motion)].

### **SCR 20:1.7 Conflicts of interest current clients**

(a) Except as provided in par. (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

- (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
- (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under par. (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

- (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
- (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
- (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
- (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client.

### **WISCONSIN COMMENT**

The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in requiring informed consent to be confirmed in a writing "signed by the client."

### **ABA COMMENT**

#### **General Principles**

[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(e) and (b).

[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: (1) clearly identify the client or clients; (2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; (3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and (4) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).

[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.

[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29].

[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).

#### **Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse**

[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit

involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.

[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

### **Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation**

[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.

### **Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons**

[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.

### **Personal Interest Conflicts**

[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).

[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the

lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.

[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).

#### **Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service**

[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.

#### **Prohibited Representations**

[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.

[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).

[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a conflict of interest.

[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a

mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0(m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).

### **Informed Consent**

[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).

[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.

### **Consent Confirmed in Writing**

[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

### **Revoking Consent**

[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

### **Consent to Future Conflict**

[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is

generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).

### **Conflicts in Litigation**

[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.

[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.

[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a



client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.

### **Nonlitigation Conflicts**

[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].

[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.

[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

### **Special Considerations in Common Representation**

[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on

a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.

[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing Rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.

[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.

[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).

[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.

### **Organizational Clients**

[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.

[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict.

The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.

## ANNOTATIONS

Absent a written waiver signed by the client, lawyers are not permitted to represent clients when representations are adverse [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gamino*, 2008 WI 107 (representing both parties in a divorce); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McCloskey*, 2009 WI 65 (representing two business partners in a collection action and taking actions under the direction of one partner to the detriment of the other without informing the other); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (representing joint petitioners in a divorce action without obtaining a written waiver of the conflict was a direct adversity conflict)].

Similarly, lawyers are not permitted to represent clients when the lawyer's responsibilities are materially limited [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knickmeier*, 2004 WI 115 (renting a client's house to another client, whom he had defended in an eviction action, and without informing either client that he represented the other); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2004 WI 116 (entering into lender-debtor relationships with clients without proof of a particular likelihood of an adverse effects was sufficient to show a material limitation conflict of interest); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Felli*, 2006 WI 73 (representing a client when the lawyer's independent professional judgment was influenced by the lawyer's own pecuniary interests in acquiring possession of the client's assets); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krueger*, 2006 WI 17 (representing a client in a bankruptcy when the client was in debt to the lawyer); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2008 WI 17 (acting as the attorney for an LLC when the lawyer was materially limited by the lawyer's personal financial interests as a member); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2014 WI 111 (representing clients when he had an adverse personal interest with them as a result of his business transactions with them); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Atta*, 2016 WI 69 (continuing to represent a client in a divorce when a romantic relationship developed during the representation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gatzke*, 2016 WI 37 (investing client funds in the lawyer's business ventures)].

### **SCR 20:1.8 Conflict of interest: prohibited transactions**

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:

(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;

(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and

(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.

(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these rules.

(c) A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, nor prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where (1) the client is related to the donee, (2) the donee is a natural object of the bounty of the client, (3) there is no reasonable ground to anticipate a contest, or a claim of undue influence or for the public to lose confidence in the integrity of the bar, and (4) the amount of the gift or bequest is reasonable and natural under the circumstances. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.

(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.

(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:

(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and

(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.

(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:

- (1) the client gives informed consent or the attorney is appointed at government expense; provided that no further consent or consultation need be given if the client has given consent pursuant to the terms of an agreement or policy requiring an organization or insurer to retain counsel on the client's behalf;
- (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
- (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by SCR 20:1.6.

(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.

(h) A lawyer shall not:

- (1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement; or
- (2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith; or
- (3) make an agreement limiting the client's right to report the lawyer's conduct to disciplinary authorities.

(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

- (1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
- (2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

(j) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.

- (1) In this paragraph, "sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or any other intentional touching of the intimate parts of a person or causing the person to touch the intimate parts of the lawyer.
- (2) When the client is an organization, a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) shall not have sexual relations with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.
- (k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing pars. (a) through (i) that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them.

### WISCONSIN COMMENT

This rule differs from the Model Rule in four respects. Paragraph (c) incorporates the decisions in *State v. Collentine*, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968), and *State v. Beaudry*, 53 Wis. 2d 148, 191 N.W.2d 842 (1971). Paragraph (f) adds a reference to an attorney retained at government expense and retains the "insurance defense" exception from prior Wisconsin law. But see SCR 20:1.2(e). Paragraph (h) prohibits a lawyer from making an agreement limiting the client's right to report the lawyer's conduct to disciplinary authorities. Paragraph (j)(2) includes language from ABA Comment [19].

### WISCONSIN COMMENT

ABA Comment [8] states that Model Rule 1.8 "does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position." This language is inconsistent with SCR 20:7.3(e), which prohibits a lawyer, at his or her instance, from drafting legal documents, such as wills or trust instruments, which require or imply that the lawyer's services be used in relation to that document. For this reason, ABA Comment [8] is inapplicable.

### ABA COMMENT

#### **Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer**

[1] A lawyer's legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a

client learns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, for example, the sale of title insurance or investment services to existing clients of the lawyer's legal practice. See Rule 5.7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.

[2] Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).

[3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client's consent to the transaction.

[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(1) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client as paragraph (a)(1) further requires.

#### **Use of Information Related to Representation**

[5] Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and

develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The Rule does not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients. Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1(b), 8.1, and 8.3.

### **Gifts to Lawyers**

[6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift, paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).

[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is a relative of the donee.

[8] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.

### **Literary Rights**

[9] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraphs (a) and (i).

### **Financial Assistance**

[10] Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination



and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts. Similarly, an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is warranted.

### **Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services**

[11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).

[12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-client). Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragraph. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing.

### **Aggregate Settlements**

[13] Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal case. The Rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.

### **Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims**

[14] Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement because they are

likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for his or her own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.

[15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.

#### **Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation**

[16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e). In addition, paragraph (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which liens are authorized by law. These may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of paragraph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by Rule 1.5.

#### **Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships**

[17] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent

client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client interests and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.

[18] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).

[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.

#### **Imputation of Prohibitions**

[20] Under paragraph (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual lawyer in paragraphs (a) through (i) also applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, one lawyer in a firm may not enter into a business transaction with a client of another member of the firm without complying with paragraph (a), even if the first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. The prohibition set forth in paragraph (j) is personal and is not applied to associated lawyers.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Business transactions with clients**

Several types of transactions have been found to be adverse to the client, and therefore subject to the rule regulating business transactions [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur*, 2005 WI 40 (contracts involving a joint venture with a client's logging business were not standard commercial transactions excluded from the rule); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Proost*, 2005 WI 144 (investing funds on behalf of clients); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pitts*, 2007 WI 112 (a loan to a client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Zajac*, 2008 WI 42 (paying a claim against the client from personal funds as a loan to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Creedy*, 2014 WI 114 (entering into a business relationship with a client to represent Social Security claimants); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Armstrong*, 2015 WI 60 (selling the client an annuity policy; acting as the real estate listing agent for a client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dahle*, 2015 WI 29 (borrowing money from clients)].

The written consent must be obtained in a document separate from the business transaction [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2004 WI 116 (entering into lender-debtor business relationships with clients without having obtained written, informed consent waivers prior to the transaction and in a document separate from the transaction);

*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur*, 2005 WI 40 (waiver requirements must be in a separate document and cannot be satisfied solely by a client signing the underlying transaction documents)].

The written consent must be obtained prior to the transaction [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knickmeier*, 2004 WI 115 (promissory note executed 12 days after the lawyer received a \$12,000 loan from a client was untimely and a violation of the rule); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2004 WI 116 (entering into lender-debtor business relationships with clients without having obtained written, informed consent waivers prior to the transaction and in a document separate from the transaction)].

The terms of the underlying transaction must be fair and reasonable to the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knickmeier*, 2004 WI 115 (the terms of a loan from the client were not fair and reasonable when the lawyer failed to make payments; a loan from the client used to purchase a motorcycle jointly with the client was not fair and reasonable when the client was not licensed to operate the motorcycle, the lawyer did not disclose his dire financial situation to the client, and when the motorcycle was sold without the return of any proceeds to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2004 WI 116 (erroneous accountings of loan transactions to clients rendered the transactions unfair and unreasonable); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Phillips*, 2006 WI 43 (a loan from a client was not fair and reasonable when there was no term for repayment or provision for payment of interest); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2014 WI 111 (failing to disclose the terms of a loan transaction to the client in a way the client could understand)].

### **Using information to the disadvantage of the client**

Violations of the rule have been found in the following circumstances [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Phillips*, 2006 WI 43 (taking advantage of the lawyer's knowledge of the client's father's estate to obtain two loans from the client totaling \$145,000); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Creedy*, 2014 WI 114 (providing information obtained in the course of representation to the district attorney and police department without the client's informed consent); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2014 WI 111 (using information regarding the client's finances the lawyer gained during his representation in subsequent loan transactions made with the client that ultimately let to the attorney owning the client's property)].

### **Gifts to lawyers**

The rule protects clients from undue influence by their lawyers [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammel*, 190 Wis. 2d 635 (1995) (preparing amendments to the client's trust gifting \$150,000 to the lawyer; having the client sign checks payable to the lawyer and members of the lawyer's family totaling \$285,600); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inderberg*, 201 Wis. 2d 555 (1997) (preparing wills and gift documents for clients that provided gifts to the lawyer); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strizic*, 2015 WI 57 (reciprocal discipline imposed when the lawyer exercised undue influence and prepared trust documents for a client that included the lawyer as a beneficiary); *Cf.*, *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kinast*, 192 Wis. 2d 36 (1995) (there was no violation when the lawyer declined to draft a will for a client who wished to leave her estate to the lawyer's daughter, and when the lawyer provided a social worker a blank will form and instructions, but did not provide the name of the beneficiary and was not present during the preparation and execution of the

will)].

### **Financial Assistance to a client**

Violations have been found in the following circumstances [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sheka*, 225 Wis. 2d 227 (1999) (giving the client money for the client's personal expenses); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2008 WI 17 (paying an outstanding lien on property belonging to an estate client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Zajac*, 2008 WI 42 (paying a claim against an estate client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2009 WI 89 (advancing the clients money on their personal injury claims)].

### **Person paying for a lawyer's services**

There have been consent reprimand stipulations for accepting payment from third parties in the following circumstances [*Public Reprimand of Mross 2006-10* (accepting payment to represent foreclosure defendants from a debtor assistance provider without consulting with the clients and obtaining informed consent); *Private Reprimand Summary 2005-2* (accepting payment to represent a woman in an immigration matter from the husband's employer without obtaining her consent)].

### **Aggregate settlements**

The Court found a violation of the rule in a case where the surviving spouse served as special administrator for her deceased husband's estate and had interests in the personal injury settlement in her personal and representative capacities [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against McNeely*, 2008 WI 91 and *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Berlin*, 2008 WI 4 (allocating one-hundred percent of the proceeds received for injuries to a deceased spouse to the surviving spouse, and allocating none of the proceeds to the estate of the deceased spouse without informing the surviving spouse of the conflict and without informing the probate court of the receipt of the funds)].

### **Limiting liability and settling malpractice claims**

Violations of the rule have been found in the following cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 158 Wis. 2d 1 (1990) (sending letters to clients asking them to authorize transfer of their cases to another firm and seeking a release from further responsibility and liability regarding their cases); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rutgers*, 176 Wis. 2d 811 (1993) (settling a potential malpractice claim against the lawyer when the client was not then represented by counsel); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2005 WI 39 and *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2006 WI 45 (obtaining a release of prospective liability prior to representation at a deposition without providing the client an opportunity to consult independent counsel)].

### **Client-Lawyer sexual relationships**

Prior to July 1, 2007, the applicable rule was SCR 20:1.8(k).

The rule generally prohibits sexual relations with a client when there was not a pre-existing sexual relationship [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2011 WI 2 (engaging in sexual relations with a vulnerable client while representing the client in ongoing legal matters, when there had not been sexual relations prior to the commencement of the attorney-client relationship); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ruppelt*, 2014 WI 53 (engaging in sexual relations with a client while representing the client, when there had not been sexual relations

prior to the commencement of the attorney-client relationship); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carson*, 2015 WI 26 (engaging in sexual relations with a client while representing the client, when there had not been sexual relations prior to the commencement of the attorney-client relationship)].

Proof of a violation requires evidence that sexual contact between the lawyer and the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo*, 2007 WI 126 (there was not a violation of the rule where the lawyer and the client engaged in sexual relations with the client's girlfriend and the evidence did not prove sexual contact between the lawyer and the client)].

Where the sexual relations do not fall within SCR 20:1.8(j), the conduct may still violate SCR 20:1.7 [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gamino*, 2005 WI 168 (engaging in sexual relations with the mother of a minor client was not a violation of this rule, but was a violation of SCR 20:1.7)].

### **SCR 20:1.9 Duties to former clients**

(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client.

(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:

- (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
- (2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by sub. (c) and SCR 20:1.6 that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client.

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:

- (1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or
- (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in requiring informed consent to be confirmed in a writing "signed by the client."

## ABA COMMENT

[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11.

[2] The scope of a "matter" for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.

[3] Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent

representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.

### **Lawyers Moving Between Firms**

[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the Rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the Rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.

[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm.

[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.

[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does



not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client.

[9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(e). With regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver, see Comment [22] to Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10.

## ANNOTATIONS

The Court has considered the former representation to be the same or substantially related matter in several cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gamino*, 2008 WI 107 (after initialing representing both parties in a divorce, the lawyer represented only the husband at the final hearing and informed the court the wife was proceeding pro se, but did not inform the wife he was ceasing to represent her); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brown*, 2010 WI 104 (representing deposed members of a tribe in matters against the tribe, the lawyer's former client, regarding elections and governance of the tribe); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kostich*, 2010 WI 136 (former rule: ten years after forming an attorney-client relationship with a child abuse victim and receiving confidential information, the lawyer represented the alleged abuser in defense of the former client's criminal allegations)]. In contrast, the Court has found a representation not to involve the same or substantially related matter [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Torvinen*, 2010 WI 123 (representation adverse to a former client was not substantially related when the former representation involved a real estate closing and the subsequent representation involved a dispute over a lease of the parking lot that was part of the property purchased by the former client)].

The rule regarding the use or disclosure of information relating to a former client was moved from subparagraph (b) to subparagraph (c) effective July 1, 2007. The rule is read in conjunction with SCR 20:1.6 [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Thompson*, 2014 WI 25 (where disclosure of information to the judge scheduled to conduct a hearing regarding the lawyer's ineffective assistance of counsel was determined not to violate SCR 20:1.6, the disclosure of the information also did not violate SCR 20:1.9(c))].

### **SCR 20:1.10 Imputed disqualification: general rule**

(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by SCR 20:1.7 or SCR 20:1.9 unless:

- (1) the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm;
- or
- (2) the prohibition arises under SCR 20:1.9, and

- (i) the personally disqualified lawyer performed no more than minor and isolated services in the disqualifying representation and did so only at a firm with which the lawyer is no longer associated;
  - (ii) the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
  - (iii) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable the affected client to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
- (b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless:
- (1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
  - (2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by SCR 20:1.6 and SCR 20:1.9(c) that is material to the matter.
- (c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in SCR 20:1.7.
- (d) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is governed by SCR 20:1.11.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (a) differs from the Model Rule in not imputing conflicts of interest in limited circumstances where the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from the matter.

#### ABA COMMENT

##### **Definition of "Firm"**

[1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0(c). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. See Rule 1.0, Comments [2]—[4].

##### **Principles of Imputed Disqualification**

[2] The Rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently

associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(b).

[3] The Rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified. On the other hand, if an opposing party in a case was owned by a lawyer in the law firm, and others in the firm would be materially limited in pursuing the matter because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the firm.

[4] The Rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did while a law student. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(k) and 5.3.

[5] Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).

[6] Rule 1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see Rule 1.7, Comment [22]. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(e).

[7] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, imputation is governed by Rule 1.11(b) and (c), not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private practice, nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer.

[8] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, paragraph (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.

## ANNOTATIONS

The rule in effect prior to July 1, 2007, was applied in a consent disposition [*Public Reprimand of Hahnfeld 2003-7* (while representing a party in a divorce, the lawyer employed the attorney representing the opposing party, who began work at the lawyer's firm while the divorce case was proceeding)].

### **SCR 20:1.11 Special conflicts of interest for former and current government officers and employees**

(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government:

(1) is subject to SCR 20:1.9(c); and

(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation.

(b) When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under par. (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.

(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this rule, the term "confidential government information" means information that has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.

(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee:

(1) is subject to SCR 20:1.7 and SCR 20:1.9; and

(2) shall not:

(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or

(ii) negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by SCR 20:1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in SCR 20:1.12(b).

(e) As used in this rule, the term "matter" includes:

(1) any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties, and

(2) any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.

(f) The conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government are not imputed to the other lawyers in the agency. However, where such a lawyer has a conflict that would lead to imputation in a nongovernment setting, the lawyer shall be timely screened from any participation in the matter to which the conflict applies.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (f) has no counterpart in the Model Rules, although it is based on statements made in paragraph [2] of the ABA Comment.

#### ABA COMMENT

[1] A lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a public officer or employee is personally subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against concurrent conflicts of interest stated in Rule 1.7. In addition, such a lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent.

[2] Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (d)(1) restate the obligations of an individual lawyer who has served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the government toward a former government or private client. Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts

of interest addressed by this Rule. Rather, paragraph (b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former government lawyers that provides for screening and notice. Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.

[3] Paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) apply regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse to a former client and are thus designed not only to protect the former client, but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of another client. For example, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of the government may not pursue the same claim on behalf of a later private client after the lawyer has left government service, except when authorized to do so by the government agency under paragraph (a). Similarly, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of a private client may not pursue the claim on behalf of the government, except when authorized to do so by paragraph (d). As with paragraphs (a)(1) and (d)(1), Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by these paragraphs.

[4] This Rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. On the other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. Thus a former government lawyer is disqualified only from particular matters in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. The provisions for screening and waiver in paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. The limitation of disqualification in paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) to matters involving a specific party or parties, rather than extending disqualification to all substantive issues on which the lawyer worked, serves a similar function.

[5] When a lawyer has been employed by one government agency and then moves to a second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat that second agency as another client for purposes of this Rule, as when a lawyer is employed by a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. However, because the conflict of interest is governed by paragraph (d), the latter agency is not required to screen the lawyer as paragraph (b) requires a law firm to do. The question of whether two government agencies should be regarded as the same or different clients for conflict of interest purposes is beyond the scope of these Rules. See Rule 1.13 Comment [9].

[6] Paragraphs (b) and (c) contemplate a screening arrangement. See Rule 1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). These paragraphs do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[7] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[8] Paragraph (c) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.

[9] Paragraphs (a) and (d) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government agency when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.

[10] For purposes of paragraph (e) of this Rule, a "matter" may continue in another form. In determining whether two particular matters are the same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which the matters involve the same basic facts, the same or related parties, and the time elapsed.

## ANNOTATIONS

The rule prohibits representation when the lawyer previously participated personally and substantially as a government employee [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shlimovitz*, 182 Wis. 2d 65 (1994) (applying the rule in effect prior to July 1, 2007) (the lawyer permitted an associate to work on a bankruptcy matter in which the associate had previously done substantial work while employed by the U.S. Trustee's Office)].

In a consent disposition, subparagraph (d)(2) of the rule was applied to negotiations for employment while participating in a matter as a government employee [*Public Reprimand of Boulware 2011-OLR-10* (while representing a Tribe in negotiations for the purchase of land to build a casino, the lawyer negotiated with the chief operating officer of the developer regarding a new company that would purchase land in anticipation of future agreements with tribes, and offered advice to the developer on dealing with the Tribe)].

### **SCR 20:1.12 Former judge, arbitrator, mediator or other 3rd-party neutral**

(a) Except as stated in par. (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person or as an arbitrator, mediator or other 3rd-party neutral.

(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or as an arbitrator, mediator or other 3rd-party neutral. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge or other adjudicative officer may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the

clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge or other adjudicative officer.

(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by par. (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.

(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party in the matter, provided that all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (a) differs from the Model Rule in that the conflict identified is not subject to waiver by consent of the parties involved. As such, paragraph [2] of the ABA Comment should be read with caution. Paragraph (d) differs in that written consent of the parties is required.

#### ABA COMMENT

[1] This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term "personally and substantially" signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. Compare the Comment to Rule 1.11. The term "adjudicative officer" includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2), and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not "act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto." Although phrased differently from this Rule, those Rules correspond in meaning.

[2] Like former judges, lawyers who have served as arbitrators, mediators or other third-party neutrals may be asked to represent a client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. This Rule forbids such representation unless all of the parties to the proceedings give their informed consent, confirmed in writing. See Rule 1.0(e) and (b). Other law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed disqualification. See Rule 2.4.



[3] Although lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals do not have information concerning the parties that is protected under Rule 1.6, they typically owe the parties an obligation of confidentiality under law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals. Thus, paragraph (c) provides that conflicts of the personally disqualified lawyer will be imputed to other lawyers in a law firm unless the conditions of this paragraph are met.

[4] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(k). Paragraph (c)(1) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[5] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

### **SCR 20:1.13 Organization as client**

(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.

(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.

(c) Except as provided in par. (d), if, (1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with par. (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not SCR 20:1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.

(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other

constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.

(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to pars. (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.

(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.

(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of SCR 20:1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by SCR 20:1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.

(h) Notwithstanding other provisions of this rule, a lawyer shall comply with the disclosure requirements of SCR 20:1.6(b).

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (h) differs from the Model Rule and calls attention to the mandatory disclosure provisions contained in Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:1.6(b).

#### ABA COMMENT

##### **The Entity as the Client**

[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other constituents" as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.

[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational

client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.

[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.

[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization.

[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation.

#### **Relation to Other Rules**

[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the

lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1)—(6). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyer's representation of the organization. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) may permit the lawyer to disclose confidential information. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)(1) may be required.

[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim.

[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.

#### **Government Agency**

[9] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope [18]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This Rule does not limit that authority. See Scope.

#### **Clarifying the Lawyer's Role**

[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the

conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged.

[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case.

### **Dual Representation**

[12] Paragraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder.

### **Derivative Actions**

[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.

[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.

## **SCR 20:1.14 Client with diminished capacity**

(a) When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.

(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.

(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by SCR 20:1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to par. (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under SCR 20:1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to

protect the client's interests.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions.

[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person has a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication.

[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the presence of such persons generally does not affect the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf.

[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d).

### **Taking Protective Action**

[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's

decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections.

[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.

[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.

#### **Disclosure of the Client's Condition**

[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one.

#### **Emergency Legal Assistance**

[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client.

[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken.

### **SCR 20:1.15 Safekeeping property; trust accounts and fiduciary accounts.**

#### **(a) Definitions.**

##### **In this section:**

- (1) "Draft account" means an account upon which funds are withdrawn through a properly payable instrument or an electronic transaction.
- (2) "Electronic transaction" means a paperless transfer of funds to or from a trust or fiduciary account. Electronic transactions do not include transfers initiated by voice or automated teller or cash dispensing machines.
- (3) "Fiduciary" means an agent, attorney-in-fact, conservator, guardian, personal representative, special administrator, trustee, or other position requiring the lawyer to safeguard the property of a client or 3rd party.
- (4) "Fiduciary account" means an account in which the lawyer deposits fiduciary property.
- (5) "Fiduciary property" means funds or property of a client or 3rd party that is in a lawyer's possession in a fiduciary capacity. Fiduciary property includes, but is not limited to, property held as agent, attorney-in-fact, conservator, guardian, personal representative, special administrator, or trustee, subject to the exceptions identified in sub. (m).
- (6) "Financial institution" means a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan association, or investment institution, including a brokerage house.
- (7) "Immediate family member" means the lawyer's spouse, registered domestic partner, child, stepchild, grandchild, sibling, parent, stepparent, grandparent, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew.
- (8) "Interest on Lawyer Trust Account or 'IOLTA account'" means a pooled interest-bearing or dividend-paying draft trust account, separate from the lawyer's business and personal accounts, which is maintained at an IOLTA participating institution. Typical funds that would be placed in an IOLTA account include earnest monies, loan proceeds, settlement proceeds, collection proceeds, cost advances, and advanced payment of fees that have



not yet been earned. An IOLTA account is subject to the provisions of the SCR Chapter 13 and the trust account provisions of subs. (a) to (i), including the IOLTA account provisions of subs. (c) and (d).

(9) "IOLTA participating institution" means a financial institution that voluntarily offers IOLTA accounts and certifies to WisTAF annually that it meets the IOLTA account requirements of sub. (d).

(10) "Properly payable instrument" means an instrument that, if presented in the normal course of business, is in a form requiring payment pursuant to the laws of this state.

(11) "Trust account" means an account in which the lawyer deposits trust property.

(12) "Trust property" means funds or property of clients or 3rd parties, which is not fiduciary property, that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation.

(13) "WisTAF" means the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation, Inc.

**(b) Segregation and safekeeping of trust property.**

(1) **Separate account.** A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation. All funds of clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in connection with a representation shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts.

(2) **Identification and location of account.** Each trust account shall be clearly designated as a "Client Account," a "Trust Account," or words of similar import. The account shall be identified as such on all account records, including signature cards, monthly statements, checks, and deposit slips. An acronym, such as "IOLTA," "IOTA," or "LTAB," without further elaboration, does not clearly designate the account as a client account or trust account. Each trust account shall be maintained in a financial institution that is authorized by federal or state law to do business in Wisconsin and that is located in Wisconsin or has a branch office located in Wisconsin and which agrees to comply with the overdraft notice requirements of sub. (h). A trust account may be maintained at a financial institution located in the jurisdiction where the lawyer principally practices law if that jurisdiction has an overdraft notification requirement.

(3) **Lawyer funds.** No funds belonging to a lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to pay monthly account service charges, may be deposited or retained in a trust account. Each lawyer or law firm that receives trust funds shall maintain at least one draft account, other than the trust account, for funds received and disbursed other than in a trust capacity,

which shall be entitled "Business Account," "Office Account," "Operating Account," or words of similar import.

(4) **Trust property other than funds.** Unless a client otherwise directs in writing, a lawyer shall keep securities in bearer form in a safe deposit box at a financial institution authorized to do business in Wisconsin. The safe deposit box shall be clearly designated as a "Client Account" or "Trust Account." The lawyer shall clearly identify and appropriately safeguard other property of a client or 3rd party.

(5) **Insurance and safekeeping requirements.** Each trust account shall be maintained at a financial institution that is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), or any other investment institution financial guaranty insurance. IOLTA accounts shall also comply with the requirements of sub. (d)(3). Lawyers using the alternative to the E-Banking Trust Account shall comply with the requirements of sub. (f)(3)c. Except as provided in subs. (b)(4) and (d)(3)b. and c., trust property shall be held in an account in which each individual owner's funds are eligible for insurance.

(c) **Types of trust accounts.**

(1) **IOLTA accounts.** A lawyer or law firm who receives client or 3rd-party funds that the lawyer or law firm determines to be nominal in amount or that are expected to be held for a short period of time such that the funds cannot earn income for the benefit of the client or 3rd party in excess of the costs to secure that income, shall maintain a pooled interest-bearing or dividend-paying draft trust account in an IOLTA participating institution.

(2) **Non-IOLTA accounts.** A lawyer or law firm who receives client or 3rd-party funds that the lawyer or law firm determines to be capable of earning income for the benefit of the client or 3rd party shall maintain an interest-bearing or dividend-paying non-IOLTA trust account. A non-IOLTA trust account shall be established as any of the following:

a. A separate interest-bearing or dividend-paying trust account maintained for the particular client or 3rd party, the interest or dividends on which shall be paid to the client or 3rd party, less any transaction costs.

b. A pooled interest-bearing or dividend-paying trust account with sub-accounting by the financial institution, the lawyer, or the law firm that will provide for computation of interest or dividends earned by each client's or 3rd party's funds and the payment of the interest or dividends to the client or 3rd party, less any transaction costs.

- c. An income-generating investment vehicle selected by the client and designated in specific written instructions from the client or authorized by a court or other tribunal, on which income shall be paid to the client or 3rd party or as directed by the court or other tribunal, less any transaction costs.
  - d. An income-generating investment vehicle selected by the lawyer to protect and maximize the return on funds in a bankruptcy estate, which investment vehicle is approved by the bankruptcy trustee or by a bankruptcy court order, or otherwise consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 345.
  - e. A draft account or other account that does not bear interest or pay dividends because it holds funds the lawyer has determined are not eligible for deposit in an IOLTA account because they are neither nominal in amount nor expected to be held for a short term such that the funds cannot earn income for the client or 3rd party in excess of the costs to secure the income, provided that the account has been designated in specific written instructions from the client or 3rd party.
- (3) **Selection of account.** In deciding whether to use the account specified in par. (1) or an account or investment vehicle specified in par. (2), a lawyer shall determine, at the time of the deposit, whether the client or 3rd-party funds could be utilized to provide a positive net return to the client or 3rd party by taking into consideration all of the following:
- a. The amount of interest, dividends, or other income that the funds would earn or pay during the period the funds are expected to be on deposit.
  - b. The cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account, including the cost of the lawyer's services and the cost of preparing any tax reports required for income accruing to a client's or 3rd party's benefit.
  - c. The capability of the financial institution, lawyer, or law firm to calculate and pay interest, dividends, or other income to individual clients or 3rd parties.
  - d. Any other circumstance that affects the ability of the client's or 3rd party's funds to earn income in excess of the costs to secure that income for the client or 3rd party.
- (4) **Professional judgment.** The determination whether funds to be invested could be utilized to provide a positive net return to the client or 3rd party rests in the sound judgment of the lawyer or law firm. If a lawyer acts in good faith in making this determination, the lawyer is not subject to any

charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

**(d) Interest on Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA) requirements.**

(1) **Location.** An IOLTA account shall be maintained only at an IOLTA participating institution.

**(2) Certification by IOLTA participating institutions.**

a. Each IOLTA participating institution shall certify to WisTAF annually that the financial institution meets the requirements of sub. (d)(3) to (6) for IOLTA accounts and that it reports overdrafts on draft trust accounts and draft fiduciary accounts of lawyers and law firms to the office of lawyer regulation, pursuant to the institution's agreements with those lawyers and law firms. WisTAF shall by rule adopted under SCR 13.03(1) establish the date by which IOLTA participating institutions shall certify their compliance.

b. WisTAF shall confirm annually, by a date established by WisTAF by rule adopted under SCR 13.03(1), the accuracy of a financial institution's certification under sub. (d)(2)a. by reviewing one or more of the following:

1. The IOLTA comparability rate information form submitted by the financial institution to WisTAF.
2. Rate and product information published by the financial institution.
3. Other publicly or commercially available information regarding products and interest rates available at the financial institution.

c. WisTAF shall publish annually, no later than the date on which the state bar mails annual dues statements to members of the bar, a list of all financial institutions that have certified, and have been confirmed by WisTAF as IOLTA participating institutions. WisTAF shall update the published list located on its website to add newly confirmed IOLTA participating institutions and to remove financial institutions that WisTAF cannot confirm as IOLTA participating institutions.

d. Prior to removing any financial institution from the list of IOLTA participating institutions or failing to include any financial institution on the list of IOLTA participating institutions, WisTAF shall first provide the financial institution with notice and sufficient time to respond. In the event a financial institution is removed from the list of IOLTA participating institutions, WisTAF shall notify the office of lawyer regulation and provide that office with a list of the lawyers and law firms maintaining IOLTA accounts at that financial institution. The office of lawyer regulation shall notify those lawyers and law firms of the removal of the financial institution from the list, and provide time for those lawyers and law firms to move their IOLTA accounts to an IOLTA participating institution.

e. Lawyers and law firms may rely on the most recently published list of IOLTA participating institutions for purposes of compliance with sub. (c)(1), except when the office of lawyer regulation notifies the lawyer or law firm of removal, in accordance with sub. (d)(2)d.

**(3) Safekeeping requirements.**

a. An IOLTA participating institution shall comply with the insurance and safety requirements of sub. (b)(5).

b. A repurchase agreement utilized for an IOLTA account may be established only at an IOLTA participating institution deemed to be "well-capitalized" or "adequately capitalized" as defined by applicable federal statutes and regulations.

c. An open-end money market fund utilized for an IOLTA account may be established only at an IOLTA participating institution in a fund that holds itself out as a money market fund as defined under the Investment Act of 1940 and, at the time of investment, has total assets of at least \$250,000,000.

**(4) Income requirements.**

a. **Beneficial owner.** The interest or dividends accruing on an IOLTA account, less any allowable reasonable fees, as allowed under par. (5), shall be paid to WisTAF, which shall be considered the beneficial owner of the earned interest or dividends, pursuant to SCR Chapter 13.

b. **Interest and dividend requirements.** An IOLTA account shall bear the highest non-promotional interest rate or dividend that is generally available to non-IOLTA customers at the same branch or main office location when the IOLTA account meets or exceeds the same eligibility qualifications, if any, including a minimum balance, required at that same branch or main office location. In determining the highest rate or dividend available, the IOLTA participating institution may consider factors in addition to the IOLTA account balance that are customarily considered by the institution at that branch or main office location when setting interest rates or dividends for its customers, provided the institution does not discriminate between IOLTA accounts and accounts of non-IOLTA customers and that these factors do not include that the account is an IOLTA account. However, IOLTA participating institutions may voluntarily choose to pay higher rates.

c. **IOLTA account.** An IOLTA participating institution may establish an IOLTA account as, or convert an IOLTA account to, any of the following types of accounts, assuming the particular financial institution at that branch or main office location offers these account types to its non-IOLTA customers, and the particular IOLTA account meets the eligibility qualifications to be established as this type of account at the particular branch or main office location:

1. A business checking account with an automated or other automatic investment sweep feature into a daily financial institution repurchase agreement or open-end money market fund. A daily financial institution repurchase agreement must be invested in United States government securities. An open-end money market fund must consist solely of United States government securities or repurchase agreements fully collateralized by United States government securities, or both. In this par. c.1., "United States government securities" include securities of government-sponsored entities, such as, but not limited to, securities of, or backed by, the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Government National Mortgage Association, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation;
  2. A checking account paying preferred interest rates, such as money market or indexed rates;
  3. An interest-bearing checking account such as a negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) account or business checking account with interest; and
  4. Any other suitable interest-bearing or dividend-paying account offered by the institution to its non-IOLTA customers.
- d. **Options for compliance.** An IOLTA participating institution may:
1. Establish the comparable product for qualifying IOLTA accounts, subject to the direction of the lawyer or law firm; or,
  2. Pay the highest non-promotional interest rate or dividend, as defined in sub. (d)(4)b., less any allowable reasonable fees charged in connection with the comparable highest interest rate or dividend product, on the IOLTA checking account in lieu of actually establishing the comparable highest interest rate or dividend product.
- e. **Paying rates above comparable rates.** An IOLTA participating institution may pay a set rate above its comparable rates on the IOLTA checking account negotiated with WisTAF that is fixed over a period of time set by WisTAF, such as 12 months.
- (5) **Allowable reasonable fees on IOLTA accounts.**
- a. Allowable reasonable fees on an IOLTA account are as follows:
    1. Per check charges.
    2. Per deposit charges.
    3. Fees in lieu of minimum balance.
    4. Sweep fees.
    5. An IOLTA administrative fee approved by WisTAF.
    6. Federal deposit insurance fees.

b. Allowable reasonable fees may be deducted from interest earned or dividends paid on an IOLTA account, provided that the fees are calculated in accordance with an IOLTA participating institution's standard practice for non-IOLTA customers. Fees in excess of the interest earned or dividends paid on the IOLTA account for any month or quarter shall not be taken from interest or dividends of any other IOLTA accounts. No fees that are authorized under SCR 20:1.15(d)(5) shall be assessed against or deducted from the principal of any IOLTA account. All other fees are the responsibility of, and may be charged to, the lawyer or law firm maintaining the IOLTA account. IOLTA participating institutions may elect to waive any or all fees on IOLTA accounts.

**(6) Remittance and reporting requirements.** A lawyer or law firm shall direct the IOLTA participating institution at which the lawyer or law firm's IOLTA account is located to do all of the following, on at least a quarterly basis:

a. Remit to WisTAF the interest or dividends, less allowable reasonable fees as allowed under par. (5), if any, on the average monthly balance in the account or as otherwise computed in accordance with the IOLTA participating institution's standard accounting practice.

b. Provide to WisTAF a remittance report showing for each IOLTA account the name of the lawyer or law firm for whose IOLTA account the remittance is sent, the rate and type of interest or dividend applied, the amount of allowable reasonable fees deducted, if any, the average account balance for the period for which the report is made, and the amount of remittance attributable to each IOLTA account.

c. Provide to the depositing lawyer or law firm a remittance report in accordance with the participating institution's normal procedures for reporting account activity to depositors.

d. Respond to reasonable requests from WisTAF for information needed for purposes of confirming the accuracy of an IOLTA participating institution's certification.

**(e) Prompt notice and delivery of property.**

**(1) Notice and delivery.** Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an interest, or in which a lawyer has received notice that a 3rd party has an interest identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client or 3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or 3rd party any funds or other property that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.

(2) **Accounting.** Upon final distribution of any trust property or upon request by the client or a 3rd party having an ownership interest in the property, a lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting regarding the property.

(3) **Disputes regarding trust property.** When a lawyer and another person or a client and another person claim an ownership interest in trust property identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer shall hold that property in trust until there is an accounting and severance of the interests. If a dispute arises regarding the division of the property, the lawyer shall hold the disputed portion in trust until the dispute is resolved. Disputes between the lawyer and a client are subject to the provisions of SCR 20:1.5(h).

(4) **Burden of proof.** A lawyer's failure to promptly deliver trust property to a client or 3rd party entitled to the trust property, promptly submit trust account records to the office of lawyer regulation or promptly provide an accounting of trust property to the office of lawyer regulation shall result in a presumption that the lawyer has failed to hold trust property in trust, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1). This presumption may be rebutted by the lawyer's production of records or an accounting that overcomes this presumption by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.

(f) **Security requirements and restricted transactions.**

(1) **Security of transactions.** A lawyer is responsible for the security of each transaction in the lawyer's trust account and shall not conduct or authorize transactions for which the lawyer does not have commercially reasonable security measures in place. A lawyer shall establish and maintain safeguards to assure that each disbursement from a trust account has been authorized by the lawyer and that each disbursement is made to the appropriate payee. Only a lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction or a person under the supervision of a lawyer having responsibility under SCR 20:5.3 shall have signatory and transfer authority for a trust account.

(2) **Prohibited transactions.**

a. **Cash.** No withdrawal of cash shall be made from a trust account or from a deposit to a trust account. No check shall be made payable to "Cash." No withdrawal shall be made from a trust account by automated teller or cash dispensing machine.

b. **Telephone transfers.** 1. Except as provided in SCR 20:1.15(f)(2)b.2., no deposits or disbursements shall be made to or from a pooled trust account by a telephone transfer of funds.



2. Wire transfers may be initiated by telephone, and telephone transfers may be made between non-pooled trust accounts that a lawyer maintains for a particular client.

c. **Electronic transfers by 3rd parties.** A lawyer shall not authorize a 3rd party to electronically withdraw funds from a trust account. A lawyer shall not authorize a 3rd party to deposit funds into the lawyer's trust account through a form of electronic deposit that allows the 3rd party making the deposit to withdraw the funds without the permission of the lawyer.

(3) **Electronic transactions.** A lawyer shall not make deposits to or disbursements from a trust account by way of an electronic transaction, except as provided in SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)a. through c.

a. **Remote Deposit.** A lawyer may make remote deposits to a trust account, provided that the lawyer keeps a record of the client or matter to which each remote deposit relates, and that the lawyer's financial institution maintains an image of the front and reverse of each remote deposit for a period of at least six years.

b. **E-Banking Trust Account.** A lawyer may accept funds paid by credit card, debit card, prepaid or other types of payment cards, and other electronic deposits, and may disburse funds by electronic transactions that are not prohibited by sub. (f)(2)c., provided that the lawyer does all of the following:

1. Maintains an IOLTA account, which shall be the primary IOLTA account, in which no electronic transactions shall be conducted other than those transferring funds from the primary IOLTA to the E-Banking Trust Account for purposes of making an electronic disbursement, or those transactions authorized by SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)a., (3)b.4.a., and (3)b.4.d.

2. Maintains a separate IOLTA account with commercially reasonable account security for electronic transactions, which shall be entitled: "E-Banking Trust Account."

3. Holds lawyer or law firm funds in the E-Banking Trust Account reasonably sufficient to cover monthly account fees and fees deducted from deposits and maintains a ledger for those account fees.

4. Transfers the gross amount of each deposit within three business days after the deposit is available for disbursement, and if necessary, adds funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm to cover any deduction of fees and surcharges relating to the deposit, in accordance with all of the following:

a. All advanced costs and advanced fees held in trust under SCR 20:1.5(f) shall be transferred to the primary IOLTA account by check or by electronic transaction.

- b. Earned fees, cost reimbursements, and advanced fees that are subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5(g) shall be transferred to the business account by check or by electronic transaction.
  - c. Any funds that the client has directed be disbursed by electronic transfer shall be promptly disbursed from the E-Banking Trust Account by electronic transaction.
  - d. All funds received in trust other than funds identified in SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)b.4.a., b., and c. shall be transferred to the primary IOLTA account by check or by electronic transaction.
  - e. Except for funds identified in SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)b.4.a. and b., a lawyer or law firm shall not be prohibited from deducting electronic transfer fees or surcharges from the client's funds, provided the client has agreed in writing to accept the electronic payment after being advised of the anticipated fees and surcharges.
5. Identifies the client matter and the reason for disbursement on the memo line of each check used to disburse funds; records in the financial institution's electronic payment system the date, amount, payee, client matter, and reason for the disbursement for each electronic transaction; and makes no disbursements by credit card, debit card, prepaid or other types of payment cards, or any other electronic payment system that does not generate a record of the date, amount, payee, client matter, and reason for the disbursement in the financial institution's electronic payment system.
6. Replaces any and all funds that have been withdrawn from the E-Banking Trust Account by the financial institution or card issuer, and reimburses the account for any shortfall or negative balance caused by a chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal within three business days of receiving actual notice that a chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal has been made against the E-Banking Trust Account; and reimburses the E-Banking Trust Account for any chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal prior to accepting a new electronic deposit or transferring funds from the primary IOLTA to the E-Banking Trust Account for purposes of making an electronic disbursement.
- c. **Alternative to E-Banking Trust Account.** A lawyer may deposit funds paid by credit card, debit card, prepaid or other types of payment cards, and other electronic deposits into a trust account, and may disburse funds from that trust account by electronic transactions that are not prohibited by sub. (f)(2)c., without establishing a separate E-Banking Trust Account, provided that all of the following conditions are met:
- 1. The lawyer or law firm maintains commercially reasonable account security for electronic transactions.

2. The lawyer or law firm maintains a bond or crime insurance policy in an amount sufficient to cover the maximum daily account balance during the prior calendar year.

3. The lawyer or law firm arranges for all chargebacks, ACH reversals, monthly account fees, and fees deducted from deposits to be deducted from the lawyer's or law firm's business account; or the lawyer or law firm replaces any and all funds that have been withdrawn from the trust account by the financial institution or card issuer within three business days of receiving actual notice that a chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal has been made against the trust account; and the lawyer or law firm reimburses the account for any shortfall or negative balance caused by a chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal. The lawyer shall reimburse the trust account for any chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal prior to disbursing funds from the trust account.

4. The lawyer or law firm identifies the client matter and the reason for disbursement on the memo line of each check used to disburse funds; records in the financial institution's electronic payment system the date, amount, payee, client matter, and reason for the disbursement for each electronic transaction; and makes no disbursements by credit card, debit card, prepaid or other types of payment cards, or any other electronic payment system that does not generate a record of the date, amount, payee, client matter, and reason for the disbursement in the financial institution's electronic payment system.

**(4) Availability of funds for disbursement.**

a. **Standard for trust account transactions.** A lawyer shall not disburse funds from any trust account unless the deposit from which those funds will be disbursed has cleared, and the funds are available for disbursement.

b. **Exception: Real estate transactions.** In closing a real estate transaction, a lawyer's disbursement of closing proceeds from funds that are received on the date of the closing, but that have not yet cleared, shall not violate sub. (f)(4)a. provided that the lawyer complies with sub. (f)(4)c., and that the closing proceeds are deposited no later than the first business day following the closing and are comprised of any of the following types of funds:

1. A cashier's check, teller's check, money order, official check or electronic transfer of funds, issued or transferred by a financial institution insured by the FDIC or a comparable agency of the federal or state government.

2. A check drawn on the trust account of any lawyer or real estate broker licensed under the laws of any state.

3. A check issued by the state of Wisconsin, the United States, or a political subdivision of the state of Wisconsin or the United States.

4. A check drawn on the account of or issued by a lender approved by the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development as either a supervised or a nonsupervised mortgagee as defined in 24 C.F.R. § 202.2.

5. A check from a title insurance company licensed in Wisconsin, or from a title insurance agent of the title insurance company, if the title insurance company has guaranteed the funds of that title insurance agent.

6. A non-profit organization check in an amount not exceeding \$5000 per closing if the lawyer has reasonable and prudent grounds to believe that the deposit will be irrevocably credited to the trust account.

7. A personal check or checks in an aggregate amount not exceeding \$5000 per closing if the lawyer has reasonable and prudent grounds to believe that the deposit will be irrevocably credited to the trust account.

c. **Uncollected funds.** Without limiting the rights of the lawyer against any person, it is the responsibility of the disbursing lawyer to reimburse the trust account for any funds described in sub. (f)(4)b. that are not collected and for any fees, charges, and interest assessed by the financial institution on account of the funds being disbursed before the related deposit has cleared and the funds are available for disbursement. The lawyer shall maintain a subsidiary ledger for funds of the lawyer that are deposited in the trust account to reimburse the account for uncollected funds and to accommodate any fees, charges, and interest.

d. **Exception: Collection trust accounts.** When handling collection work for a client and maintaining a separate trust account to hold funds collected on behalf of that client, a lawyer's disbursement to the client of collection proceeds that have not yet cleared does not violate sub. (f)(4)a. so long as those collection proceeds have been deposited prior to the disbursement.

(g) **Record keeping requirements for all trust accounts.**

(1) **Record retention.** A lawyer shall maintain and preserve complete records of trust account funds, all deposits and disbursements, and other trust property and shall preserve those records for at least six years after the date of termination of the representation. Electronic records shall be backed up by an appropriate storage device. The office of lawyer regulation shall publish guidelines for trust account record keeping.

(2) **Record production.** All trust account records have public aspects related to a lawyer's fitness to practice. Upon request of the office of lawyer regulation, or upon direction of the supreme court, the records shall be submitted to the office of lawyer regulation for its inspection, audit, use, and evidence under any conditions to protect the privilege of clients that the court may provide. The records, or an audit of the records, shall be produced at any disciplinary proceeding involving the lawyer, whenever material.

(3) **Burden of proof.** A lawyer's failure to promptly deliver trust property to a client or 3rd party entitled to that trust property, promptly submit trust account records to the office of lawyer regulation, or promptly provide an accounting of trust property to the office of lawyer regulation shall result in a presumption that the lawyer has failed to hold trust property in trust, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1). This presumption may be rebutted by the lawyer's production of records or an accounting that overcomes this presumption by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.

**(h) Dishonored payment notification (Overdraft notices).** All draft trust accounts, and any draft fiduciary account that is not subject to an alternative protection under sub. (k)(10), are subject to the following provisions on dishonored payment notification:

(1) **Overdraft reporting agreement.** A lawyer shall maintain draft trust and fiduciary accounts only in a financial institution that has agreed to provide an overdraft report to the office of lawyer regulation under par. (2). A lawyer or law firm shall notify the financial institution at the time a trust account or fiduciary account is established that the account is subject to this subsection.

(2) **Overdraft report.** In the event any properly payable instrument or electronic transaction is presented against or made from a lawyer trust or fiduciary account containing insufficient funds, whether or not the instrument or electronic transaction is honored, the financial institution shall report the overdraft to the office of lawyer regulation.

(3) **Content of report.** All reports made by a financial institution under this subsection shall be substantially in the following form:

a. In the case of a dishonored instrument or electronic transaction, the report shall be identical to an overdraft notice customarily forwarded to the depositor or investor, accompanied by the dishonored instrument or electronic transaction, if a copy is normally provided to the depositor or investor.

b. In the case of instruments or electronic transactions that are presented against insufficient funds and are honored, the report shall identify the financial institution involved, the lawyer or law firm, the account, the date

on which the instrument or electronic transaction is paid, and the amount of overdraft created by the payment.

(4) **Timing of report.** A report made under this subsection shall be made simultaneously with the overdraft notice given to the depositor or investor.

(5) **Confidentiality of report.** A report made by a financial institution under this subsection shall be subject to SCR 22.40, Confidentiality.

(6) **Withdrawal of report by financial institution.** The office of lawyer regulation shall hold each overdraft report for 10 business days to enable the financial institution to withdraw a report provided by inadvertence or mistake. The deposit of additional funds by the lawyer or law firm shall not constitute reason for withdrawing an overdraft report.

(7) **Lawyer compliance.** Every lawyer shall comply with the reporting and production requirements of this subsection, including filing of an overdraft notification agreement for each IOLTA account, each draft-type trust account and each draft-type fiduciary account that is not subject to an alternative protection under sub. (k)(10).

(8) **Service charges.** A financial institution may charge a lawyer or law firm for the reasonable costs of producing the reports and records required by this rule.

(9) **Immunity of financial institution.** This subsection does not create a claim against a financial institution or its officers, directors, employees, or agents for failure to provide a trust account overdraft report or for compliance with this subsection.

**(i) Trust account certificate and acknowledgements.**

(1) **Annual requirement.** A member of the state bar of Wisconsin shall file with the state bar of Wisconsin annually, with payment of the member's state bar dues or upon any other date approved by the supreme court, a certificate as to whether the member is engaged in the practice of law in Wisconsin. If the member is practicing law, the member shall certify the name, address, and telephone number of each financial institution in which the member maintains a trust account, a fiduciary account, or a safe deposit box. The state bar shall supply to each member, with the annual dues statement, or at any other time directed by the supreme court, a form on which this certification shall be made.

(2) **Certification by law firm.** A law firm shall file one certificate of accounts on behalf of the lawyers in the firm who are required to file a certificate under par. (1).

(3) **Compliance with SCR 20:1.15.** Each state bar member shall acknowledge on the annual dues statement, or another form approved by the

supreme court, that the member is aware of all of the following requirements of this rule:

a. That SCR 20:1.15 establishes fiduciary obligations for trust and fiduciary property that comes into the member's possession, including the duty to hold that property in trust separate from the member's own property, to safeguard that property, to maintain complete records of that property, to account fully for that property, and to promptly deliver that property to the owner.

b. That SCR 20:1.15 requires a member to maintain each IOLTA account in an IOLTA participating institution, to file an overdraft agreement with the office of lawyer regulation for each account that is subject to SCR 20:1.15(h) and (k)(10), and to annually report all trust and fiduciary accounts to the state bar of Wisconsin that are not subject to an exception under SCR 20:1.15(m).

(4) **Suspension for non-compliance.** A state bar member who fails to file the acknowledgements required by sub. (i)(3) or a trust account certificate, unless a certificate of accounts is filed by the law firm, is subject to the automatic suspension of the member's membership in the state bar in the same manner provided in SCR 10.03(6) for nonpayment of dues.

(j) **Multi-jurisdictional practice.** If a lawyer also licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or property in connection with a representation in the other state, the provisions of this rule shall not supersede the applicable rules of the other state.

**(k) Fiduciary property.**

(1) **Segregation of fiduciary property.** A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own funds or property, those funds or that property of clients or 3rd parties that are in the lawyer's possession when acting in a fiduciary capacity.

(2) **Accounting.** Upon final distribution of any fiduciary property or upon request by a client or a 3rd party having an ownership interest in the property, a lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting regarding the property.

(3) **Fiduciary accounts.** A lawyer shall deposit all fiduciary funds specified in par. (1) in any of the following:

a. A separate interest-bearing or dividend-paying fiduciary account on which interest or dividends shall be paid to the fiduciary entity or its beneficiary or beneficiaries, less any taxes and expenses of the fiduciary entity.

b. A pooled interest-bearing or dividend-paying fiduciary account with sub-accounting by the financial institution, the lawyer, or the law firm that will provide for computation of interest or dividends earned by each fiduciary entity's funds and the proportionate allocation of the interest or dividends to

each of the fiduciary entities, less any taxes and expenses of the fiduciary entity.

c. An income-generating investment vehicle, on which income shall be paid to the fiduciary entity or its beneficiary or beneficiaries, less any taxes and expenses of the fiduciary entity.

d. An income-generating investment vehicle selected by the lawyer and approved by a court for guardianship funds if the lawyer serves as guardian for a ward under Ch. 54 and subject to Ch. 881, Wis. Stats.

e. An income-generating investment vehicle selected by the lawyer to protect and maximize the return on funds in a bankruptcy estate, which investment vehicle is approved by the bankruptcy trustee, by a bankruptcy court order, or otherwise consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 345.

f. A draft account or other account that does not bear interest or pay dividends when, in the lawyer's professional judgment, placement in the account is consistent with the needs and purposes of the fiduciary entity or its beneficiary or beneficiaries.

(4) **Location.** Each fiduciary account shall be maintained in a financial institution as provided by the written authorization of the client, the governing trust instrument, organizational by-laws, an order of a court, or, absent such direction, in a financial institution that, in the lawyer's professional judgment, will best serve the needs and purposes of the client or 3rd party for whom the lawyer serves as fiduciary. If a lawyer acts in good faith in making this determination, the lawyer is not subject to any charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the fiduciary property is held in a draft account and the account is at a financial institution that is not located in Wisconsin or authorized by state or federal law to do business in Wisconsin, the lawyer shall comply with the requirements of sub. (k)(10)b., c., d., e., or f.

(5) **Prohibited transactions.**

a. **Cash.** No withdrawal of cash shall be made from a fiduciary account or from a deposit to a fiduciary account. No check shall be made payable to "Cash." No withdrawal shall be made from a fiduciary account by automated teller or cash dispensing machine.

b. **Card transactions.** A lawyer shall not authorize transactions by way of credit, debit, prepaid or other types of payment cards to or from a fiduciary account.

(6) **Availability of funds for disbursement.** A lawyer shall not disburse funds from a fiduciary account unless the deposit from which those funds will be disbursed has cleared and the funds are available for disbursement.



The exception for real estate transactions in sub. (f)(4)b. shall apply to fiduciary accounts.

(7) **Record retention.** A lawyer shall maintain and preserve complete records of fiduciary account funds, all deposits and disbursements, and other fiduciary property and shall preserve those records for the six most recent years during which the lawyer served as a fiduciary and shall preserve at a minimum, a summary accounting of all fiduciary funds and property for prior years during which the lawyer served as a fiduciary. After the termination of the fiduciary relationship, the lawyer shall preserve the records required by this paragraph for at least six years. Electronic records shall be backed up by an appropriate storage device. The office of lawyer regulation shall publish guidelines for fiduciary account record keeping.

(8) **Record production.** All fiduciary account records have public aspects related to a lawyer's fitness to practice. Upon request of the office of lawyer regulation, or upon direction of the supreme court, the records shall be submitted to the office of lawyer regulation for its inspection, audit, use, and evidence under any conditions to protect the privilege of clients that the court may provide. The records, or an audit of the records, shall be produced at any disciplinary proceeding involving the lawyer, whenever material.

(9) **Burden of proof.** A lawyer's failure to promptly submit fiduciary account records to the office of lawyer regulation or promptly provide an accounting of fiduciary property to the office of lawyer regulation shall result in a presumption that the lawyer has failed to hold fiduciary property in trust, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(k)(1). This presumption may be rebutted by the lawyer's production of records or an accounting that overcomes this presumption by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.

(10) **Dishonored payment notification or alternative protection.** A lawyer who holds fiduciary property in a draft account from which funds are disbursed through a properly payable instrument or electronic transaction shall take any of the following actions:

- a. Comply with the requirements of sub. (h) relating to dishonored payment notification (overdraft notices).
- b. Have the account independently audited by a certified public accountant on at least an annual basis.
- c. Hold the funds in a draft account, which requires the approval of a co-trustee, co-agent, co-guardian, or co-personal representative before funds may be disbursed from the account.
- d. Require and document the approval of two people from a group consisting of a lawyer or a member or employee of the lawyer's law firm before funds may be disbursed from the account.

e. In the case of an estate or trust, provide an accounting of the administration at least annually to all beneficiaries currently eligible to receive income distributions.

f. In the case of a guardianship proceeding in which annual financial accountings must be reviewed by a court, timely file those annual financial accountings with the court.

(11) **Fiduciary account certificate and acknowledgements.** Funds held by a lawyer in a fiduciary account are subject to the requirements of sub. (i).

(m) **Exceptions to this section.** This rule does not apply in any of the following instances in which a lawyer is acting in a fiduciary capacity:

(1) The lawyer is serving as a bankruptcy trustee, subject to the oversight and accounting requirements of the bankruptcy court or the office of U.S. Trustee.

(2) The lawyer is serving as an assignee or receiver under the provisions of Ch. 128, Wis. Stats.

(3) The property held by the lawyer when acting in a fiduciary capacity is property held for the benefit of an immediate family member of the lawyer.

(4) The lawyer is serving in a fiduciary capacity for a civic, fraternal, or non-profit organization that is not a client and has other officers or directors participating in the governance of the organization.

(5) The lawyer is acting in the course of the lawyer's employment by an employer not itself engaged in the practice of law, provided that the lawyer's employment is not ancillary to the lawyer's practice of law.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

A lawyer must hold the property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. All property that is the property of clients or 3rd parties must be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust or fiduciary accounts. Lawyers have duties to keep clear, distinct, and accurate records of all trust transactions, and to be able always to make a full accounting. See, *In re Trust Estate of Martin*, 39 Wis. 2d 437, 159 N.W.2d 660 (1968).

### **SCR 20:1.15(a)(2) Electronic transaction.**

The types of electronic transactions are developing. For examples of current types of electronic transactions, see the record-keeping guidelines published by the office of lawyer regulation.

### **SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) Separate accounts.**

With respect to probate matters, a lawyer's role may be to serve in a fiduciary capacity as the personal representative, to represent an estate's personal representative, or to act as both personal representative and attorney for an estate. SCR 20:1.15(k) applies to funds and property which a lawyer receives, holds, and distributes while serving in the fiduciary role of personal representative. Such funds and property may include, but are

not limited to, bank and investment accounts, stocks, and bonds. SCR 20:1.15(b)-(i) apply to funds and property which a lawyer receives, holds, and distributes in connection with the representation of a client/personal representative or an estate. Such funds include, but are not limited to, advanced legal fees and advanced costs. If a lawyer acts in good faith to safeguard funds and property received in connection with a probate matter, the lawyer is not subject to any charge of ethical impropriety for holding what may be determined to be fiduciary funds in a segregated trust account or in an IOLTA account for a limited period of time, or for holding what may be determined to be trust funds in a fiduciary account.

**SCR 20:1.15(b)(5) Insurance and safekeeping requirements.**

Pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(b)(5), trust accounts are required to be held in financial or IOLTA participating institutions that are insured by the FDIC, the NCUSIF, the SIPC or any other investment institution financial guaranty insurance. However, since federal law dictates the amount of insurance coverage available from the FDIC, the NCUSIF, and the SIPC, funds in excess of those limits are not insured. Federal law also limits the types of losses that are covered by SIPC insurance. Consequently, the purpose of the insurance and safety requirements is not to guarantee that all funds are adequately insured. Rather, it is to assure that trust funds are held in reputable financial or IOLTA participating institutions and that the funds are eligible for the insurance that is available. The exceptions to the SCR 20:1.15(b)(5) requirement relate to trust property other than funds and to IOLTA accounts that are subject to the safety requirements of SCR 20:1.15(d)(3)b. and c.

**SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) Safekeeping requirements.**

See comment to SCR 20:1.15(b)(5).

**SCR 20:1.15(d)(4) Income requirements.**

Pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(d)(4), IOLTA accounts shall bear the highest non-promotional interest rate or dividend that is generally available to non-IOLTA customers at the same branch or main office location when the IOLTA account meets or exceeds the same eligibility qualifications, if any, including a minimum balance. Investment products, including repurchase agreements and shares of mutual funds, are neither deposits nor federally or FDIC-insured. An investment in a repurchase agreement or money market fund may involve investment risk including possible loss of the principal amount invested. The rule, however, provides safeguards to minimize any potential risk by limiting investment products to repurchase agreements and open-end money market funds that invest in United States government securities only.

**SCR 20:1.15(e) Prompt notice and delivery of property.**

Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law, including SCR 20:1.15(e), to protect such 3rd-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly, may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the 3rd party. If a lawyer holds property belonging to one person and a second person has a contractual or similar claim against that person but does not claim to own the property or have a security interest in it, the lawyer is free to deliver the property to the person to whom it belongs.

**SCR 20:1.15(e)(4) Burden of proof.**

A lawyer's failure to comply with the delivery requirements of SCR 20:1.15(e)(1) or the accounting requirements of SCR 20:1.15(e)(2) will result in a presumption that the lawyer has failed to hold property in trust, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1). This presumption can be rebutted by the lawyer's production of records or an accounting that overcomes this presumption by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. See, *In re Trust Estate of Martin*, 39 Wis. 2d 437, 159 N.W.2d 660 (1968).

**SCR 20:1.15(f)(2)c. Electronic transfers by 3rd parties.**

Many forms of electronic deposit allow the transferor to remove the funds without the consent of the account holder. A lawyer must not only be aware of the financial institution's policy but also federal regulations pertaining to the specific form of electronic deposit, and must ensure that the transferor is prohibited from withdrawing deposited funds without the lawyer's consent.

**SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)a. Remote deposit.**

A remote deposit is an electronic deposit of a paper check to a lawyer's trust account. Subject to a lawyer's compliance with the requirements of this subsection, such transactions are permitted in an IOLTA account that is not an E-Banking IOLTA account. Unlike other types of electronic transactions, remote deposits can be traced to images of the front and reverse of the deposited check, which are retained for at least six years by the lawyer's financial institution, pursuant to banking regulations. This exception was established to facilitate deposits to an IOLTA account of a lawyer who does not utilize multiple types of electronic transactions, making the expense relating to an E-Banking IOLTA account unnecessary. Remote deposits may also be made to a non-pooled account for a particular client, subject to those same requirements.

**SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)b. Exception: E-Banking Trust Account.**

Financial institutions, as credit card issuers, routinely impose charges on vendors when a customer pays for goods or services with a credit card. That charge is deducted directly from the customer's payment. Vendors who accept credit cards routinely credit the customer with the full amount of the payment and absorb the charges. Before holding a client responsible for these charges, a lawyer needs to disclose this practice to the client in advance, and assure that the client understands and consents to the charges. In addition, the lawyer needs to investigate the following concerns before accepting payments by credit card:

**1. Does the credit card issuer prohibit a lawyer/vendor from requiring the customer to pay the charge?** If a lawyer intends to credit the client for anything less than the full amount of the credit card payment, the lawyer needs to assure that this practice is not prohibited by the credit card issuer's regulations and/or by the agreement between the lawyer and the credit card issuer. Entering into an agreement with a credit card issuer with the intent to violate this type of requirement may constitute conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).

**2. Does the credit card issuer require services to be rendered before a credit card payment for legal fees is accepted?** If a lawyer intends to accept fee advances by credit card, the lawyer needs to assure that fee advances are not prohibited by the credit card issuer's regulations and/or by the agreement between the lawyer and the credit card issuer. Entering into an agreement with a credit card issuer with the intent to violate this type of requirement may constitute conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).

**3. By requiring clients to pay the credit card charges, is the lawyer required to make certain specific disclosures to such clients and offer cash discounts to all clients?** If a lawyer intends to require clients to pay credit card charges, the lawyer needs to assure that the lawyer complies with all state and federal laws relating to such transactions, including, but not limited to, Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 206.

**SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)c. Alternative to E-Banking Trust Account.**

As an alternative to establishing an E-Banking Trust Account for the purpose of making electronic deposits and disbursements, a lawyer may make electronic deposits to and disbursements from an IOLTA account when additional protections are in place. This alternative may reduce the expense of maintaining two accounts. On the other hand, the alternative requires that the lawyer prevent the electronic withdrawal of funds from the IOLTA account that could occur through chargebacks or reversals against a credit card deposit, or other electronic withdrawals. Specifically, the lawyer must either establish agreements with the lawyer's financial institution and with payment providers to deduct fees, surcharges, and chargebacks from the law firm's business account or reimburse the account for such deductions with funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm within three business days after receiving notice of the deductions. In addition, the lawyer must establish an agreement with the financial institution to block debits from the IOLTA account.

**SCR 20:1.15(f)(4)b. Exception: Real estate transactions.**

SCR 20:1.15(f)(4)b. establishes an exception to the requirement that a lawyer only disburse funds that are available for disbursement, i.e., funds that have been credited to the account. This exception was created in recognition of the fact that real estate transactions in Wisconsin require a simultaneous exchange of funds. However, even under this exception, the funds from which a lawyer disburses the proceeds of the real estate transaction, i.e., the lender's check, draft, wire transfer, etc., must be deposited no later than the first business day following the date of the closing. In refinancing transactions, the lender's funds must be deposited as soon as possible, but no later than the first business day after the loan proceeds are distributed. Proceeds are generally distributed three days after the closing date.

**SCR 20:1.15(g)(2) Record production.**

The duty of the lawyer to produce client trust account records for inspection under SCR 20:1.15(g)(2) is a specific exception to the lawyer's responsibility to maintain the confidentiality of the client's information as required by SCR 20:1.6.

**SCR 20:1.15(g)(3) Burden of proof.**

A lawyer's failure to comply with the record production requirements of SCR 20:1.15(g)(2) or to provide an accounting for trust property will result in a presumption that the lawyer has failed to hold property in trust, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1). This presumption can be rebutted by the lawyer's production of records or an accounting that overcomes this presumption by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. See, *In re Trust Estate of Martin*, 39 Wis. 2d 437, 159 N.W.2d 660 (1968).

**SCR 20:1.15(k)(1) Segregation of fiduciary property.**

See comment to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).

**SCR 20:1.15(k)(9) Burden of proof.**

A lawyer's failure to comply with the record production requirements of SCR 20:1.15(k)(8) or to provide an accounting for fiduciary property will result in a

presumption that the lawyer has failed to hold fiduciary property in trust, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(k)(1). This presumption can be rebutted by the lawyer's production of records or an accounting that overcomes this presumption by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. See, *In re Trust Estate of Martin*, 39 Wis. 2d 437, 159 N.W.2d 660 (1968).

## ANNOTATIONS

On April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court ordered the repeal and recreation of SCR 20:1.15 and ordered amendments to related rules in SCR 20:1.0, 20:1.5, and 22.39, all with an effective date of July 1, 2016. The annotations reflect interpretations of the rule prior to July 1, 2016. Care should be taken to consider whether cases are affected by the new rules. Many provisions retained from the former rule are renumbered in the new rule.

### **Safeguarding and segregating trust property and fiduciary property**

A lawyer must hold trust property and fiduciary property in trust separate from the lawyer's own property. Fiduciary property and trust property are defined in subparagraphs (a)(5) and (a)(12), respectively. For information regarding obligations to hold advanced fees in trust, see SCR 20:1.5, subparagraphs (f), (g), and (h).

A lawyer must deposit trust funds and fiduciary funds in a trust account [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2009 WI 106 (receiving \$7,776.84 for work done while a shareholder at a firm without the knowledge of the firm and depositing the funds into a personal account violated duties to hold property in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goldstein*, 2010 WI 26 (failing to hold fiduciary property of an estate in a separate account); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2012 WI 17 (receiving advanced fees and advanced payments for costs and failing to hold them in trust until the fees were earned and the costs disbursed for expenses); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritter*, 2013 WI 3 (receiving funds from the State Public Defender as payment for an investigator and failing to deposit those funds in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (failing to promptly deposit the client's tax refund check into a trust account)].

A lawyer must safeguard the funds in trust [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against McKloskey*, 2009 WI 65 (it was improper to fail to title the account into which trust funds were deposited as a trust account); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goldstein*, 2010 WI 26 (it was improper to allow creditors to make electronic withdrawals from the trust account); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Engl*, 2013 WI 36 (placing funds in the trust account of another attorney with whom there was no professional association improperly placed the funds at risk of being improperly used by a third party); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steffes*, 2014 WI 128 (by allowing his son to make deposits and disbursements from the lawyer's trust account in connection with the son's business, the lawyer failed to protect client funds on deposit in the trust account)].

A lawyer must also safeguard trust property and fiduciary property other than funds [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strouse*, 2015 WI 83 (failing to clearly identify and appropriately safeguard fuel monitoring equipment left in his possession; failing to provide a signed receipt to the owner)].

A lawyer must not convert trust or fiduciary property or allow it to be converted [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tobin*, 2007 WI 50 (it was improper to close three trust accounts with 61 uncashed and outstanding checks totaling \$9,994.51, and to transfer \$9,283.80 to the lawyer's business account and use the proceeds to pay employees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2012 WI 17 (receiving advanced fees and advanced payments for costs and failing to hold them in trust until the fees were earned and the costs disbursed for expenses); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel*, 2012 WI 124 (lack of records and practice of advancing money belonging to some clients to pay funds owed to different clients met the burden to prove conversion of trust funds); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (failing to hold client funds in trust and converting them); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Labanowsky*, 2014 WI 18 (disbursing trust funds on behalf of clients who had insufficient funds in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laux*, 2015 WI 59 (failing to hold in trust over 2 million dollars of fiduciary property and transferring it to the lawyer's own account); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McClure*, 2015 WI 25 (converting settlement funds for the lawyer's personal use); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mulligan*, 2015 WI 96 (withdrawing bail money from the trust account and transferring it to the business account when a portion of the funds belonged to the client, disbursing funds belonging to clients from trust for payment of personal matters)].

Except for a nominal amount to cover account expenses, a lawyer must keep trust and fiduciary property separate from the lawyer's own property and may not place the lawyer's funds in a trust account [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Clark*, 2016 WI 36 (the lawyer deposited earned fees in trust to hide income from tax authorities); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo*, 2007 WI 126 (it was improper to keep a "cushion" of personal funds in trust to protect against overdrafts); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan*, 2011 WI 7 (during bankruptcy, the lawyer opened a trust account and used it to deposit and disburse personal funds); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (depositing earned fees into trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mulligan*, 2015 WI 96 (depositing over \$45,000 of personal funds into the trust account)].

A lawyer must maintain a business account [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Adent*, 2016 WI 19; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bishop*, 2016 WI 85 (*see*, SCR 20:1.15(b)(3) and former rule 20:1.15(b)(8)].

### **Treatment of advanced fees and costs**

Effective July 1, 2016, the provisions of former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) and (4m) were moved to SCR 20:1.5(f) and (g). See the annotations for treatment of advanced fees and costs following SCR 20:1.5.

### **The Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA) Program**

Lawyers who receive trust funds in nominal amounts to be held for a short time period must maintain a pooled interest-bearing trust account, the interest from which is paid to the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation. Failure to maintain this "IOLTA" account can be the basis for professional discipline [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against McKloskey*, 2009 WI 65 (failing to have trust account interest paid to the Wisconsin Trust Foundation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2014 WI 75 (failing to maintain a pooled interest-bearing trust account and failing to participate in the Interest on Trust Accounts Program)].

When the trust funds received are sufficient that interest earned for the owner would exceed the costs of maintaining the account the lawyer must maintain a non-IOLTA account that provides for the income to be paid to the owner. When a lawyer exercises good faith in exercising judgment, the lawyer is not subject to an ethics charge [*But see, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2014 WI 75 (failing to seek guidance from the court about holding funds in a separate fiduciary account when guardianship funds accumulated to a significant degree)].

### **Prompt notice and delivery; disputed funds**

Effective July 1, 2016, the requirements relating to prompt notice and delivery, and relating to disputed funds, moved from subparagraph (d) to subparagraph (e).

The notice and delivery requirement attaches when the lawyer receives funds or other property in which the client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has received notice that a 3<sup>rd</sup> party has an interest identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or contract [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Barrock*, 2007 WI 24 (failing to hold in trust personal injury settlement funds protected by prior counsel's attorney's lien, *cp.*, *Yorgan v. Durkin*, 2006 WI 60); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2009 WI 90 (failing to notify a chiropractor who had a contractual interest in settlement proceeds of the receipt of the proceeds and failing to promptly deliver the amounts due)].

When the lawyer receives funds covered by the rule, the lawyer must notify the owner or person with the interest in the funds and must promptly deliver the funds [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2009 WI 106 (receiving \$7,776.84 for work done while a shareholder at a firm without the knowledge of the firm and depositing the funds into a personal account violated duties to hold property in trust, to notify the firm, and to promptly deliver the funds to the firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (failing to distribute settlements to clients; failing to distribute or reissue 47 uncashed checks); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritter*, 2013 WI 3 (receiving funds from the State Public Defender as payment for an investigator and failing to promptly deliver the funds to the investigator); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (failing to apply the funds from the client's tax refund check promptly as directed by the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steinhafel*, 2013 WI 93 (failing to notify the opposing party of the receipt of the sale proceeds of a marital home to be divided during the divorce); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (failing to promptly disburse sale proceeds to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McClure*, 2015 WI 25 (failing to promptly deliver funds owed from a personal injury settlement to medical providers); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sayaovong*, 2015 WI 100 (failing to consistently and promptly notify clients of funds collected on their behalf and failing to provide an accounting)].

When the lawyer receives funds covered by the rule, the lawyer must also provide an accounting to the owner or person with an interest in the funds [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gende*, 2012 WI 107 (failing to provide the former firm an accounting of a personal injury settlement despite the former firm's ownership interest); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stange*, 2012 WI 66 (failing to provide a full written accounting to an estate); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (failing to provide an accounting for the disbursement of funds to the county treasurer); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan*, 2014 WI 39 (failing to provide a full written accounting of funds he received)].



When the ownership or interest in the funds is disputed, the lawyer must hold the disputed portion in trust until the dispute is resolved [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gende*, 2012 WI 107 (failing to provide the former firm an accounting of a personal injury settlement despite the former firm's ownership interest; failing to hold funds in trust that were disputed between the lawyer and the former firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (failing to hold disputed funds in trust until resolution of the dispute); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steinhafel*, 2013 WI 93 (failing to notify the opposing party of the receipt of the sale proceeds of a marital home to be divided during the divorce; failing to hold those sale proceeds in trust until there was an accounting and severance of interests)].

### **Operational requirements and prohibited transactions**

A trust account must be maintained in an institution located in Wisconsin or has a branch office in Wisconsin [*Public Reprimand of Starkweather*, 2012-OLR-6 (having a trust account in Utah when the only state of licensure was Wisconsin)].

A lawyer may not make disbursements of cash or by telephone transfer from a trust account or fiduciary account [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goldstein*, 2010 WI 26 (withdrawing cash from a fiduciary account); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (depositing funds into trust via telephone transfer); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood*, 2014 WI 116 (withdrawing funds from trust via teller cash transactions)].

A lawyer may not disburse funds when funds are not on deposit for the matter or are not yet available for disbursement [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel*, 2012 WI 124 (advancing money belonging to some clients to pay funds owed to other clients); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (disbursing funds in excess of what was on deposit for the payee in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McClure*, 2015 WI 25 (disbursing funds from trust without funds available resulting in the return of the check)].

A lawyer must maintain a business account [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan*, 2011 WI 7].

### **Record keeping, retention, and production requirements**

Effective July 1, 2016, recordkeeping requirements moved to subparagraph (g). A lawyer must keep complete records and must produce an accounting. Failure to produce an accounting of trust or fiduciary property may result in a presumption that the lawyer has failed to hold property in trust.

Detailed recordkeeping guidelines are available from OLR's website: [www.wicourts.gov/olr](http://www.wicourts.gov/olr). Many of the detailed recordkeeping requirements in the former rule have been removed and re-published as OLR Guidelines. The following cases applied the former rule.

A lawyer must keep complete records of a trust account and fiduciary account [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mularski*, 2010 WI 113 (it was improper to fail to maintain trust account records); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brown*, 2012 WI 51 (a lawyer must maintain a transaction register, individual client ledgers, and monthly reconciliations); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel*, 2012 WI 124 (the lawyer failed to maintain trust account deposit and disbursement records, a transaction register, individual subsidiary ledgers, and monthly reconciliation reports); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (the lawyer failed to maintain records, including a transaction register, subsidiary

client ledgers, deposit records, canceled checks, and monthly account reconciliations)].

A lawyer must keep records for at least 6 years after the date of termination of the representation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2013 WI 14 (failing to maintain trust account records for at least six years)].

A lawyer may keep electronic records, but must also maintain a back up copy [*Public Reprimand of Nikolay*, 2015-OLR-2 (failing to back up electronic trust account records)].

A lawyer must produce trust account and fiduciary account records to the Office of Lawyer Regulation. Failure to produce records constitutes grounds for discipline [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan*, 2011 WI 7 (failing to respond to requests by the Office of Lawyer Regulation for trust account records); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stange*, 2012 WI 66 (failing to keep trust account records; failing to produce trust account records during the investigation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (providing only incomplete and inaccurate trust records during an investigation)].

### **Disbursement of non-contingent fees to the lawyer**

Effective July 1, 2016, the requirements for disbursement of non-contingent fees moved from SCR 20:1.15 to SCR 20:1.5(h).

A lawyer must provide notice to the client prior to disbursing fees from trust. The general rule provides that the lawyer must give notice at least 5 days prior to disbursement. The rule also provides for an alternative for regular invoicing. Failure to provide a notice has resulted in discipline [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (disbursing trust funds to himself without accounting to the owner); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (failing to advise the client that the lawyer was withdrawing fees from trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2015 WI 7 (disbursing funds out of trust for the lawyer's fee without notice to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krogman*, 2015 WI 113 (disbursing advanced fees from trust without prior notice)].

### **Overdraft notification program**

A lawyer must provide for notification to the Office of Lawyer Regulation of overdrafts on a trust account [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against McKloskey*, 2009 WI 65 (failing to obtain an agreement for the bank to report overdrafts on the trust account); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McClure*, 2015 WI 25 (failing to have an overdraft reporting agreement on file with the Office of Lawyer Regulation)].

The requirement also applies to fiduciary accounts, unless the lawyer provides for an alternative protection under subparagraph (k)(10) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goldstein*, 2010 WI 26 (failing to have overdraft notification or an alternative protection in place for fiduciary accounts)].

### **Certification of compliance with trust account rules**

A lawyer must sign a certification each year on the annual bar dues statement. All of the lawyer's trust accounts and fiduciary accounts must be identified [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schoenecker*, 2011 WI 76 (it was improper to fail to identify the client trust account set up for the lawyer's separate private law practice on the annual certification form); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel*, 2012 WI 124 (it was improper to fail to disclose the existence of a trust account on the annual certification)].

Signing a false certificate has resulted in discipline [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brown*, 2012 WI 51 (falsely certifying on the annual certification that the lawyer was complying with recordkeeping requirements); *see also, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 and *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McClure*, 2015 WI 25; *Cf., Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall*, 2011 WI 21 (falsely certifying that an overdraft agreement was on file with the Office of Lawyer Regulation was not a violation because the applicable rule did not require certification that an agreement was on file).

Failure to sign the certificate may result in license suspension, during which a lawyer may not practice law [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43].

### **SCR 20:1.16 Declining or terminating representation**

(a) Except as stated in par. (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

- (1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
- (2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
- (3) the lawyer is discharged.

(b) Except as stated in par. (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:

- (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client;
- (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
- (3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
- (4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;
- (5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
- (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
- (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.

(c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.

(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

With respect to subparagraph (c), a lawyer providing limited scope representation in a matter before a court should consult s 802.045, stats., regarding notice and termination requirements.

With respect to the last sentence of paragraph (d), it should be noted that a state bar ethics opinion suggests that lawyers in Wisconsin do not have a retaining lien with respect to client papers. See State Bar of Wis. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. E-95-4 (1995).

#### ABA COMMENT

[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been concluded. See Rules 1.2(c) and 6.5. See also Rule 1.3, Comment [4].

#### **Mandatory Withdrawal**

[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.

[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2. Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicable law before a lawyer withdraws from pending litigation. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations to both clients and the court under Rules 1.6 and 3.3.

#### **Discharge**

[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances.

[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to do so should be given a full explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring self-representation by the client.

[6] If the client has severely diminished capacity, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and may take reasonably necessary protective action as provided in Rule 1.14.

### **Optional Withdrawal**

[7] A lawyer may withdraw from representation in some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer may also withdraw where the client insists on taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.

[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.

### **Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal**

[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee only to the extent permitted by law. See Rule 1.15.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Mandatory Withdrawal**

Withdrawal is mandatory in three circumstances: 1) when continued representation will result in a violation of ethics rules or other law [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chavez*, 2015 WI 39 (failing to withdraw upon license suspension resulted in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Atta*, 2016 WI 69 (failing to withdraw when a romantic relationship developed with a divorce client)]; 2) when the lawyer is physically or mentally impaired [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hansen*, 2009 WI 56 (failing to withdraw when depression impaired the lawyer's ability to represent the client)]; and 3) when the lawyer is discharged [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trudgeon*, 2009 WI 96 (failing to file a motion to withdraw when the lawyer believed the client terminated the representation and when the lawyer decided to no longer represent the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kostich*, 2012 WI 118 (failing to withdraw from the client's case for over a month after receiving communications from the client terminating the representation)].

### **Permissive Withdrawal**

Withdrawal is permissible in the seven circumstances provided in subparagraphs (b)(1)

through (b)(7). Withdrawal is not appropriate when there are material adverse effects on the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Blise*, 2010 WI 34 (the lawyer abandoned efforts on an appeal without notice to the client and without allowing sufficient time before appeal deadlines were missed)].

### **Lawyer's obligation upon termination**

Upon termination, the lawyer must protect the client's interests. The lawyer must give adequate notice to the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Langkamp*, 2009 WI 102 (terminating the representation prior to a court hearing without notifying the client and without providing sufficient time to employ another attorney); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fisher*, 2010 WI 45 (unilaterally terminating representation without notice to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (failing to advise the client that the lawyer had decided not to seek to reopen the client's medical malpractice claim); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steinhafel*, 2013 WI 93 (failing to notify the client of the lawyer's move from one law firm to another and of the lawyer's termination of representation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood*, 2013 WI 11 (upon receipt of the client's email terminating the lawyer's services, the lawyer failed to inform the client of a pending motion and hearing date); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chavez*, 2015 WI 39 (upon being suspended, the lawyer failed to notify the client and to protect the client's appellate rights); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krogman*, 2015 WI 113 (failing to advise the client of the lawyer's suspension and inability to appear for a scheduling conference)].

The lawyer must allow time for employment of other counsel [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Langkamp*, 2009 WI 102 (terminating the representation prior to a court hearing without notifying the client and without providing sufficient time to employ another attorney)].

The lawyer must provide the file to the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fitzgerald*, 2010 WI 99 (failing to respond to requests by successor counsel for the client's file); *see Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister*, 2010 WI 108 (a suspended lawyer's argument that the client file was not promptly provided to successor counsel because the lawyer believed to do so would constitute practicing law during a suspension did not prevail; it was incumbent upon the lawyer to promptly provide the file)].

The lawyer must return property to the client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Loew*, 2010 WI 23 (failing to return the client's original documents); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2010 WI 4 (failing to return papers and property belonging to clients); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goluba*, 2013 WI 32 (failing to return the client's original title documents)].

The lawyer must refund any unearned fee and advanced payment for costs not incurred [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fisher*, 2010 WI 45 (failing to refund the portion of the fee that remained unearned); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Phillips*, 2012 WI 119 (accepting an advanced fee of \$1,500 for hourly representation at \$150 per hour, performing only three hours of work, and failing to refund the unearned portion of the fee); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (failing to refund advanced payments for costs and expenses)].

A lawyer must also respond to requests for an accounting of fees [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smead*, 2011 WI 102 (failing to provide the client an accounting of fees advanced and a refund of any unearned portion, and failing to address the client's post-representation requests for information about the fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carranza*, 2014 WI 121 (failing to provide accountings of unearned fees to clients); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sayaovong*, 2014 WI 94 (failing at the end of the representation to provide an itemized statement of services rendered and costs incurred in connection with the representation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carson*, 2015 WI 26 (failing to provide an accounting of the fee promptly after receiving a letter from the client terminating the lawyer's representation and inquiring as to the possibility of having the advanced fee returned)].

### **SCR 20:1.17 Sale of law practice**

A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, or an area of practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied:

- (a) The seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has been sold, in the geographic area or in the jurisdiction in which the practice has been conducted;
- (b) The entire practice, or the entire area of practice, is sold to one or more lawyers or law firms;
- (c) The seller gives written notice to each of the seller's affected clients regarding:
  - (1) the proposed sale;
  - (2) the client's right to retain other counsel or to take possession of the file; and
  - (3) the fact that the client's consent to the transfer of the client's files will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within ninety (90) days of receipt of the notice.

If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file.

- (d) The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale.

### **WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT**

Paragraph (c) requires notice only to "affected" clients, which is a limitation not contained in the Model Rule.

### **ABA COMMENT**

[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this Rule, when a lawyer or an entire firm ceases to practice, or ceases to practice in an area of law, and other lawyers or firms take over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4 and 5.6.

#### **Termination of Practice by the Seller**

[2] The requirement that all of the private practice, or all of an area of practice, be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice, or the area of practice, available for sale to the purchasers. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchasers but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances does not necessarily result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office or resigns from a judiciary position.

[3] The requirement that the seller cease to engage in the private practice of law does not prohibit employment as a lawyer on the staff of a public agency or a legal services entity that provides legal services to the poor, or as in-house counsel to a business.

[4] The Rule permits a sale of an entire practice attendant upon retirement from the private practice of law within the jurisdiction. Its provisions, therefore, accommodate the lawyer who sells the practice on the occasion of moving to another state. Some states are so large that a move from one locale therein to another is tantamount to leaving the jurisdiction in which the lawyer has engaged in the practice of law. To also accommodate lawyers so situated, states may permit the sale of the practice when the lawyer leaves the geographical area rather than the jurisdiction. The alternative desired should be indicated by selecting one of the two provided for in Rule 1.17(a).

[5] This Rule also permits a lawyer or law firm to sell an area of practice. If an area of practice is sold and the lawyer remains in the active practice of law, the lawyer must cease accepting any matters in the area of practice that has been sold, either as counsel or co-counsel or by assuming joint responsibility for a matter in connection with the division of a fee with another lawyer as would otherwise be permitted by Rule 1.5(e). For example, a lawyer with a substantial number of estate planning matters and a substantial number of probate administration cases may sell the estate planning portion of the practice but remain in the practice of law by concentrating on probate administration; however, that practitioner may not thereafter accept any estate planning matters. Although a lawyer who leaves a jurisdiction or geographical area typically would sell the entire practice, this Rule permits the lawyer to limit the sale to one or more areas of the practice, thereby preserving the lawyer's right to continue practice in the areas of the practice that were not sold.

#### **Sale of Entire Practice or Entire Area of Practice**

[6] The Rule requires that the seller's entire practice, or an entire area of practice, be sold. The prohibition against sale of less than an entire practice area protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchasers are required



to undertake all client matters in the practice or practice area, subject to client consent. This requirement is satisfied, however, even if a purchaser is unable to undertake a particular client matter because of a conflict of interest.

### **Client Confidences, Consent and Notice**

[7] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Model Rule 1.6 than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. See Rule 1.6(b) (7). Providing the purchaser access to information relating to the representation, such as the client's file, however, requires client consent. The Rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed.

[8] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the Rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. (A procedure by which such an order can be obtained needs to be established in jurisdictions in which it presently does not exist).

[9] All elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice or area of practice.

### **Fee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser**

[10] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing arrangements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser.

### **Other Applicable Ethical Standards**

[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice or a practice area are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure the client's informed consent for those conflicts that can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7 regarding conflicts and Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9).

[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16).

### **Applicability of the Rule**

[13] This Rule applies to the sale of a law practice of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these Rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this Rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met.

[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this Rule.

[15] This Rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice or an area of practice.

### **SCR 20:1.18 Duties to prospective client**

(a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.

(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information learned in the consultation, except as SCR 20:1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.

(c) A lawyer subject to par. (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in par. (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in par. (d).

(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in par. (c), representation is permissible if:

(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or

(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and

(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(ii) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.

ABA COMMENT

[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's consultations with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients.

[2] A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Whether communications, including written, oral, or electronic communications, constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For example, a consultation is likely to have occurred if a lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer's advertising in any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission of information about a potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable warnings and cautionary statements that limit the lawyer's obligations, and a person provides information in response. See also Comment [4]. In contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer's education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal information of general interest. Such a person communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is thus not a "prospective client." Moreover, a person who communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is not a "prospective client."

[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be.

[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial consultation to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation.

[5] A lawyer may condition a consultation with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received from the prospective client.

[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, under paragraph (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the

same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter.

[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this Rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d)(1), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. In the alternative, imputation may be avoided if the conditions of paragraph (d)(2) are met and all disqualified lawyers are timely screened and written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. See Rule 1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). Paragraph (d)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.

[8] Notice, including a general description of the subject matter about which the lawyer was consulted, and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[9] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see Rule 1.15.

## ANNOTATIONS

*Private Reprimand Summary 2014-6* (after discussing a prospective client's personal impressions and potential litigation strategies, the lawyer represented the opposing party in the matter contrary to subparagraph (c)).

## COUNSELOR

### **SCR 20:2.1 Advisor**

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation.

## ABA COMMENT

### **Scope of Advice**

[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.

Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.

[2] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations.

[3] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.

### **Offering Advice**

[4] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer offer advice if the client's course of action is related to the representation. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.

## **ANNOTATIONS**

A lawyer must exercise independent professional judgment in deciding whether to file an action [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay*, 209 Wis. 2d 241 (filing an action contrary to the lawyer's own professional judgment and in response to client pressure)].

### **SCR 20:2.2 Omitted.**

### **SCR 20:2.3 Evaluation for use by 3rd persons**

(a) A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes that

making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client.

(b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client gives informed consent.

(c) Except as disclosure is authorized in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by SCR 20:1.6.

## ABA COMMENT

### **Definition**

[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction or when impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. See Rule 1.2. Such an evaluation may be for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government agency; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business.

[2] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available.

### **Duties Owed to Third Person and Client**

[3] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation,

particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.

#### **Access to and Disclosure of Information**

[4] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations that are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. In no circumstances is the lawyer permitted to knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law in providing an evaluation under this Rule. See Rule 4.1.

#### **Obtaining Client's Informed Consent**

[5] Information relating to an evaluation is protected by Rule 1.6. In many situations, providing an evaluation to a third party poses no significant risk to the client; thus, the lawyer may be impliedly authorized to disclose information to carry out the representation. See Rule 1.6(a). Where, however, it is reasonably likely that providing the evaluation will affect the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer must first obtain the client's consent after the client has been adequately informed concerning the important possible effects on the client's interests. See Rules 1.6(a) and 1.0(e).

#### **Financial Auditors' Requests for Information**

[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975.

### **SCR 20:2.4 Lawyer serving as 3rd-party neutral**

(a) A lawyer serves as a 3rd-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a 3rd-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.

(b) A lawyer serving as a 3rd-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a 3rd-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.

(c)(1) A lawyer serving as mediator in a case arising under ch. 767, stats., in which the parties have resolved one or more issues being mediated may draft, select, complete, modify, or file documents confirming, memorializing, or implementing such resolution, as long as the lawyer maintains his or her neutrality throughout the process and both parties give their informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the parties to the mediation. For purposes of this subsection, informed consent requires, at a minimum, the lawyer to disclose to each party any interest or relationship that is likely to affect the lawyer's impartiality in the case or to create an appearance of partiality or bias and that the lawyer explain all of the following to each of the parties: a. The limits of the lawyer's role. b. That the lawyer does not represent either party to the mediation. c. That the lawyer cannot give legal advice or advocate on behalf of either party to the mediation. d. The desirability of seeking independent legal advice before executing any documents prepared by the lawyer-mediator.

(2) The drafting, selection, completion, modification, and filing of documents pursuant to par. (1) does not create a client-lawyer relationship between the lawyer and a party.

(3) Notwithstanding par. (2), in drafting, selecting, completing or modifying the documents referred to in par. (1), a lawyer serving as mediator shall exercise the same degree of competence and shall act with the same degree of diligence as SCR 20:1.1 and 20:1.3 would require if the lawyer were representing the parties to the mediation.

(4) A lawyer serving as mediator who has prepared documents pursuant to par. (1) may, with the informed consent of all parties to the mediation, file such documents with the court. However, a lawyer who has served as a mediator may not appear in court on behalf of either or both of the parties in mediation.

(5) Any document prepared pursuant to this subsection that is filed with the court shall clearly indicate on the document that it was "prepared with the assistance of a lawyer acting as mediator."

#### WISCONSIN COMMENT

Mediation is a process designed to resolve disputes between two or more parties through agreement facilitated by a neutral person. Although many lawyers routinely act as mediators, there has been some concern about the applicability of the SCR 20:1.1 and 20:1.3 to lawyers



acting as mediators. However, the selection, drafting, completion, modification, or filing of legal documents or agreements to memorialize or implement a mediated settlement does constitute the practice of law and is regulated by SCR Chapter 23. See SCR 23.01. The purpose of subsection (c) is to clarify that a lawyer serving as mediator in a Chapter 767 proceeding may, while acting in that capacity, memorialize the outcome of the mediation, if it can be done without compromising his or her neutrality and that, by doing so, the lawyer does not assume a client-lawyer relationship with either party. The lawyer serving as mediator may not at any stage of the process attempt to advance the interests of one party at the expense of any other party.

Although a lawyer acting as mediator should strive to anticipate the issues and resolve them prior to documenting the outcome of the mediation, the process of documenting itself may illuminate or create previously unforeseen issues. For this reason, the mediator should make it clear to the parties that the process of documentation is part of the mediation and the mediator must maintain neutrality throughout that process.

Likewise, even after documents confirming, memorializing, or implementing the resolution of issues have been finalized, other previously-unidentified or unresolved issues may arise. The mediator may, as an extension of the original mediation, continue in a neutral capacity to assist the parties in resolving and memorializing those issues. While this rule does not require the mediator to resolve or memorialize all issues, the prudent mediator may want to consider identifying any issues the parties have intentionally left unresolved.

Documents drafted, selected, completed or modified by a mediator can have consequences an unrepresented party might not perceive. Although an attorney acting as neutral mediator may attempt to explain those consequences to the parties in mediation, he or she does not stand in a client-lawyer relationship with either party and may not give legal advice to either or both parties while acting in that neutral capacity. Moreover, because the line between discussing consequences and dispensing advice is not always clear, a lawyer acting as mediator who chooses to explain those consequences should take care to avoid offering or appearing to offer legal advice. For these reasons, and to emphasize to the parties that the lawyer acting as mediator does not represent the parties, subsection (c)(1)(d) requires an attorney who has mediated a dispute between unrepresented parties to recommend that each seek independent legal advice before executing the documents that attorney has drafted, selected, completed, or modified.

Notwithstanding that no client-lawyer relationship is created when a lawyer-mediator drafts documents pursuant to this rule, subsection (c)(3) imposes duties of competence and diligence in connection with the drafting of such documents. A lawyer who fails to fulfill such duties violates SCR 20:2.4(c)(4).

Filing documents prepared pursuant to this subsection in court can often be accomplished most efficiently by a No. 16-04 6 lawyer familiar with the documents and, as long as done with the consent of the parties to the mediation, may be accomplished by the mediator without impairing his or her neutrality. However, any appearance by a lawyer in

court on behalf of one or more parties is so closely associated with advocacy that it could compromise the appearance of neutrality and/or provide an occasion to depart from it. For this reason, although a lawyer who has served as a mediator may file documents with the court, such a lawyer may not appear in court on behalf of one or both parties. A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral, such as a mediator in a matter, may not thereafter represent any party at any stage of the matter. See SCR 20:1.12.

Because the lawyer-mediator does not have a client-lawyer relationship with any of the parties, SCR 20:1.2(cm) does not apply. Subsection (5) makes it clear that the lawyer-mediator must make an equivalent disclosure. Filing of documents by a lawyer-mediator pursuant to this rule does not constitute an appearance in the matter.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court.

[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.

[3] Unlike nonlawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected.

[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12.

[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(m)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1..

## ADVOCATE

### **SCR 20:3.1 Meritorious claims and contentions**

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not:

(1) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;

(am) A lawyer providing limited scope representation pursuant to SCR 20:1.2(c) may rely on the otherwise self-represented person's representation of facts, unless the lawyer has reason to believe that such representations are false, or materially insufficient, in which instance the lawyer shall make an independent reasonable inquiry into the facts.

(2) knowingly advance a factual position unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous; or

(3) file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such an action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.

(b) A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

This Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in expressly establishing a subjective test for an ethical violation.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change.

[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

[3] The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Advancing unwarranted claims and defenses**

The standard for finding a violation of subparagraph (a)(1) is subjective; the lawyer must know the claim or defense to be unwarranted [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka*, 2009 WI 38 (there was no violation of SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) despite a civil court finding that a motion was frivolous when the evidence failed to prove the lawyer knew the motion was unwarranted; the Court distinguished the standards for frivolous motions in civil cases and disciplinary cases, citing *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lauer*, 108 Wis. 2d 746, 324 N.W.2d 432 (1982), and stating that the standard in a civil action is an objective one, while the standard in a disciplinary proceeding is subjective)].

The subjective standard was met in the following cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Katerinos*, 2010 WI 28 (rule in effect prior to July 1, 2007) (filing a motion for sanctions that repeated the grounds previously and unsuccessfully raised in a motion the court had already denied); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Templin*, 2016 WI 18 (filing a motion for relief from a divorce judgment years after the time limits had passed)].

### **Advancing unwarranted factual positions**

The standard for finding a violation of subparagraph (a)(1) is subjective; the lawyer must know the claim or defense to be unwarranted [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka*, 2009 WI 38 (rule in effect prior to July 1, 2007) (there was no violation of SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) despite a civil court finding that a motion was frivolous when the evidence failed to prove the lawyer knew the motion was unwarranted; the Court distinguished the standards for

frivolous motions in civil cases and disciplinary cases, citing *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lauer*, 108 Wis. 2d 746, 324 N.W.2d 432 (1982), and stating that the standard in a civil action is an objective one, while the standard in a disciplinary proceeding is subjective)].

### **Actions that harass or maliciously injure others**

The standard for finding a violation is objective [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bach*, 2016WI 95 (“violations of SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) are subject to an objective standard”)].

The standard has been met in a variety of circumstances, including 1) the lawyer’s failure to inquire into the merits of the action [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg*, 2010 WI 11 (the day after winning an acquittal for his client who was accused of domestic abuse, the lawyer filed a civil claim against the accuser for perjury and defamation without inquiring into the factual basis for the claims, which claims were dismissed upon findings that the claim was made in bad faith and for improper purposes)], 2) the lawyer’s reliance on information that is speculative, unreasonable, or false [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur*, 2004 WI 66 (filing a lawsuit alleging conspiracy and misconduct by counsel in a prior action based upon an affidavit that contained speculation and unreasonable inferences; filing a lawsuit alleging fraud and conspiracy despite previous trial court findings to the contrary)], 3) the lawyer filed the action with knowledge that the matter had already received an adverse ruling [*Arthur, infra*], 4) the lawyer’s rationale for filing is untruthful [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (taking steps to delay transfer of assets ordered to be paid to the ex-spouse for over two years where the court found the lawyer’s statements regarding the matter to be misleading and not truthful)], and 5) other circumstances prove the action was taken for an improper purpose [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2011 WI 2 (when being investigated for sexual abuse of a vulnerable client, the lawyer repeatedly intimidated the client and published confidential, personal and irrelevant information regarding the client in a manner intended to intimidate, embarrass, harass, or discredit the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Templin*, 2016 WI 18 (filing a motion for relief from a divorce judgment years after the time limits had passed, and filing a bankruptcy on behalf of the client seeking to discharge the lawyer’s sanction obligations)].

### **SCR 20:3.2 Expediting litigation**

A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.

#### **ABA COMMENT**

[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of

the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.

## ANNOTATIONS

Dilatory practices in litigation have been found to violate the rule in the following circumstances [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Frisch*, 2010 WI 60 (failing to act with diligence and promptness in handling assigned criminal prosecutions due to alcohol dependence); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood*, 2013 WI 11 (after filing suit, the lawyer failed to take any further actions, to respond to the client, or to cooperate with successor counsel resulting in the lawyer's removal from the case); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (after being retained as successor counsel in pending litigation, the lawyer failed to comply with the scheduling order or to respond to motions for sanctions, resulting in dismissal of the case with prejudice)].

### **SCR 20:3.3 Candor toward the tribunal**

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

(c) The duties stated in pars. (a) and (b) apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by SCR 20:1.6.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Unlike its Model Rule counterpart, paragraph (c) does not specify when the duties expire. For this reason, ABA Comment [13] is inapplicable.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(m) for the definition of "tribunal." It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false.

[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

### **Representations by a Lawyer**

[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b).

### **Legal Argument**

[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the

opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.

### **Offering Evidence**

[5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.

[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present the testimony that the lawyer knows is false.

[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9].

[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.

[9] Although paragraph (a)(3) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7].

### **Remedial Measures**

[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or



correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done—making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing.

[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.

#### **Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process**

[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer's client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.

#### **Duration of Obligation**

[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed.

#### **Ex Parte Proceedings**

[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision.

#### **Withdrawal**

[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may,

however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **False statements to a tribunal**

The false statement may be made 1) by commission [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (claiming in an affidavit to the court that the lawyer would retain funds in trust until further order of the court and withdrawing the funds from trust the very next day; claiming in court that the client had not paid the lawyer when the lawyer had withdrawn \$5,000 from trust for fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 90 (falsely asserting to the court that the lawyer had begun representing the client only two months prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation and that the BBE director advised the lawyer to file a pro hac vice petition while the lawyer's license was suspended)] 2) by omission [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper*, 2013 WI 97 (electronically filing bankruptcy petitions without obtaining the client's signature on the documents);] or 3) both [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovsky*, 2013 WI 100 (requesting a stay on grounds that the lawyer was incapacitated and taking a leave of absence when the lawyer was in fact continuing the practice and when the lawyer failed to disclose his criminal trial, conviction, and sentence as the real reason); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2014 WI 13 (falsely informing the court that the lawyer's license had been reinstated from suspension, and omitting relevant facts to create an impression that the lawyer had permission to practice law)].

Although subparagraph (a)(1) does not state that the false statement must be material, materiality has been a consideration in disciplinary cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Merry*, 2014 WI 30 (the lawyer's claim of a 14-foot easement was not a false statement to the court where the fire department provided a letter asserting a need for accessibility with no explicit reference to a 14-foot easement); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Isaacson*, 2015 WI 33 (asserting that the judge appointed a receiver in an ex parte hearing while knowingly failing to disclose that the lawyer had previously signed loan papers that expressly consented to appointment without notice was not sufficient to state a violation)].

Failing to correct a statement later learned to be false also violates subparagraph (a)(1) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (claiming in an affidavit to the court that the lawyer would retain funds in trust until further order of the court and withdrawing the funds from trust the very next day; after stating to the court that funds were set aside failing to inform the court that the lawyer had removed the funds from trust, causing the court to order that the funds be turned over to another party when the funds were

not available); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2014 WI 75 (misrepresenting information to the court when the lawyer knew or should have known the information and impressions were inaccurate, and failing to correct the misrepresentations once known to be inaccurate)].

### **Offering false evidence**

Prior to July 1, 2007, subparagraph (a)(3) was numbered (a)(4). The rule applies to 1) evidence offered at trial [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Alia*, 2006 WI 12 (“whiting out” adverse information from the lawyer’s expert’s report without the knowledge of the expert, counsel, or the court, and having the expert unwittingly testify that the altered report was the expert’s report)], 2) affidavits presented on motions [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (submitting an affidavit to the court from the client stating that \$8,700 was set aside in the lawyer’s trust account when the lawyer had already withdrawn \$5,000 of that amount for fees)], and 3) documents filed with the court [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Snyder*, 2001 WI 17 (filing forged and false receipts from beneficiaries of estate proceeds); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krezminski*, 2007 WI 21 (filing a receipt with the court indicating a party had been paid \$37,094.42 from an estate when the party had not been paid)].

A lawyer has a duty to remediate material false evidence [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riley*, 2016 WI 70 (the client’s false omission of employment was material to the court’s inquiry about the client’s ability to pay civil judgments)].

### **Disclosure to the tribunal**

A lawyer violated the version of subparagraph (d) in effect prior to July 1, 2007, by submitting a statement for fees to a probate court without disclosing that the fee was based on an agreement with the personal representative regarding the lawyer’s claim on the estate [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Morrissey*, 172 Wis. 2d 58, 492 N.W.2d 616 (1992)].

## **SCR 20:3.4 Fairness to opposing party and counsel**

A lawyer shall not:

- (a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
- (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
- (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;

(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;

(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or

(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:

(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.

#### ABA COMMENT

[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.

[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applicable law may require the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.

[3] With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a witness's expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law. The common-law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.

[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Altering evidence**

A lawyer violated subparagraph (a) by altering an expert report prior to trial without the knowledge of the expert, counsel, or the court, and by making further alterations after the expert testified and prior to seeking admission of the exhibit [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Alia*, 2006 WI 12].

### **Falsifying evidence**

A lawyer may not advise a witness to lie [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur*, 2005 WI 40 (instructing a witness to call in sick to avoid having to attend a deposition, and later to claim he was ill); *Cp.*, *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riley*, 2016 WI 70 (“the language of the rule . . . indicates that some action by the lawyer prior to or at the time of the witness’s false testimony is required”)].

A lawyer may not use an unwitting witness to present false testimony [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Alia*, 2006 WI 12 (altering an expert report without the knowledge of the expert, and having the expert testify to the authenticity of the altered report)].

### **Disobeying a tribunal**

A violation of an order requires evidence that the court’s language constituted an order [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dade*, 2014 WI 108 (the lawyer’s failure to file a docketing statement in an appeal did not violate an order when the relevant language in the court order informed the lawyer “that unless [the docketing statement] was filed within five days, the appeal would be subject to dismissal or other sanctions”)].

The obligation to obey an order arises when issued not only by a judge, but also by a court commissioner and an administrative law judge [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2015 WI 7 (failed to comply with a court commissioner’s order resulting in a contempt finding against the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper*, 2013 WI 55 (failing to comply with an administrative law judge’s order to provide medical releases from his client in a worker’s compensation case)].

A lawyer is obliged by the rule to obey court obligations when representing a party. The lawyer is also obliged when a party [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2012 WI 10 (consuming alcohol in violation of a court-ordered condition of bond to maintain absolute sobriety)] or when a witness [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2010 WI 9 (disregarding a subpoena to appear at a court hearing); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Martin*, 2012 WI 84 (failing to appear at a hearing after being served a subpoena)].

A lawyer is obliged to follow court rules of procedure [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bowe*, 2011 WI 48 (failing to serve a summons and petition for divorce as required by statute and prosecuting the case to judgment without informing the court of the jurisdictional

defect); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stobbe*, 2015 WI 43 (failing to file compliant appellate briefs and failing to pay sanctions imposed by the court); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2015 WI 104 (filing or causing his staff to file applications for fee waivers with the bankruptcy court that failed to disclose amounts held by the lawyer, in violation of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure)].

A lawyer is obliged to meet the deadlines in scheduling orders [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dade*, 2013 WI 21 (failing to file a financial disclosure statement and trial brief by the deadline set forth in a pretrial order); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood*, 2013 WI 11 (failing to comply with a court directive to file a witness list); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (disobeying the circuit court's various scheduling and sanction orders, leading to dismissal of the client's complaint)].

A lawyer is obliged to comply with other orders within the court's authority [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brady*, 2010 WI 98 (failing to turn over funds of an estate despite repeated court orders); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grenisen*, 2013 WI 99 (failing to comply with an order to return funds to an estate); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (failing to comply with a court order to file an amended motion for sentence modification and supporting brief); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chavez*, 2015 WI 39 (having been suspended and ordered by the court to write a letter to the client informing the client of a scheduled status conference, the lawyer failed to inform the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kaupie*, 2015 WI 81 (after the appeals court rejected the lawyer's no-merit brief and order the lawyer to pursue an appeal, the lawyer failed to respond); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bach*, 2016 WI 95 (continuing to file lawsuits related to the lawyer's son and communicating with the son's health care providers in contravention of an injunction); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Clark*, 2016 WI 36 (failing to hold in trust funds of a client ordered for payment of the client's debt to the opposing party); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kovac*, 2016 WI 62 (failing to respond to appellate court orders for information regarding the client's decision to seek post-conviction relief); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Templin*, 2016 WI 18 (failing to comply with a sanction order to pay the opposing party)].

A lawyer is obliged to obey court orders regulating the lawyer's practice before the court [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper*, 2013 WI 97 (filing bankruptcy petitions during times he was barred from doing so); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Briggs*, 2014 WI 119 (continuing to practice law after a court order suspending the lawyer's license)].

### **Discovery Requests**

A lawyer must make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with discovery requests. The lawyer failed to make a reasonably diligent effort in the following circumstances [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johann*, 216 Wis. 2d 118, 574 N.W.2d 218 (1998) (having been sued for defamation and served a discovery request for documents establishing the truth of the lawyer's statements, the lawyer failed to provide documents and falsely asserted not having been served a subpoena requiring production of the documents); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Teasdale*, 2005 WI 12 (failing to respond to a notice of

deposition and failing to notify the client or to appear); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kohler*, 2009 WI 24 (having charged a defendant with theft by contractor, the prosecutor failed to respond to defense discovery requests for copies of checks and other records for over a year despite court orders to provide the items); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Frisch*, 2010 WI 60 (failing to provide discovery to a criminal defendant in three cases); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (failing to disclose in response to interrogatories and requests for admissions that the lawyer had paid himself fees out of the trust account holding the client's rent payments)].

In contrast, the lawyer made a reasonably diligent effort when the lawyer complied with statutory discovery deadlines [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Humphrey*, 2012 WI 32 (the Court overturned a referee's summary judgment of a violation where the lawyer failed to respond to a discovery request seeking an incriminating statement of a witness the prosecutor intended to call at trial for over 2 months but disclosed the statement 13 days before the scheduled trial date)].

### **Asserting personal knowledge and opinion at trial**

A lawyer may not assert personal knowledge of facts in issue or state a personal opinion [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brittain*, 2013 WI 26 (during opening statement describing the lawyer's personal experience of violence, placing his hands on his client's shoulders and stating, "I know . . . a brave man when I see one")].

## **SCR 20:3.5 Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal**

A lawyer shall not:

- (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;
- (b) communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order or for scheduling purposes if permitted by the court. If communication between a lawyer and judge has occurred in order to schedule the matter, the lawyer involved shall promptly notify the lawyer for the other party or the other party, if unrepresented, of such communication;
- (c) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:
  - (1) the communication is prohibited by law or court order;
  - (2) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or
  - (3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment; or
- (d) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (b) differs from the Model Rule in that it expressly imposes a duty promptly to notify other parties in the event of an ex parte communication with a judge concerning scheduling.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are specified in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such provisions.

During a proceeding a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law or court order.

[2] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication.

[3] The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics. The duty to refrain from disruptive conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a deposition. See Rule 1.0(m).

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Ex parte communications**

Subparagraph (b) of the rule has been applied to pretrial matters [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dumke*, 227 Wis. 2d 340, 595 N.W.2d 703 (1999) (failing to notify adverse counsel of a written request for substitution of judge); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bowe*, 2011 WI 48 (failing to serve on the opposing party pleadings or notices filed with the court)], and on appeal [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hudec*, 2014 WI 46 (failing to serve opposing counsel with a copy of the reply brief filed in the court of appeals)].

Ex parte communication by a lawyer as a party has also been found to violate the rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Michael*, 2011 WI 96 (the lawyer, who was the respondent in a petition for a restraining order, sent a fax to the judge with derogatory information about the petitioner without notifying the petitioner)].

### **Disrupting a tribunal**



Prior to July 1, 2007, the rule was in subparagraph (c); currently, the rule is in subparagraph (d). The rule applies to court proceedings [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pangman*, 216 Wis. 2d 439, 574 N.W.2d 232 (1998) (arguing with the judge, interrupting the judge’s announcement of the decision, and impeding the proceeding for several minutes by “haranguing the court”); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers*, 2012 WI 33 (engaging in loud, disorderly, contemptuous, and insolent behavior during a hearing in a criminal case during which nine bailiffs rushed into the courtroom concerned there was a huge fracas and that someone was going to get hurt); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brittain*, 2013 WI 26 (suggesting to the jury during opening statement that the judge was creating obstacles to the defense; engaging in abusive, belligerent, and obstreperous conduct toward a judge including stating to the judge “your behavior is inappropriate,” and calling the judge’s statements about the lawyer’s behavior “ridiculous”).

The rule also applies to proceedings before court commissioners [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crossetto*, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991) (arguing with opposing counsel and the court commissioner, and calling the commissioner “a big-mouth” and “totally nuts”)] and in administrative agency proceedings [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg*, 2004 WI 14 (the lawyer “essentially high-jacked” an administrative agency hearing “by ignoring [the examiner’s] instructions, telling her to be quiet, and doing what he wanted to do)].

The rule is not violated where the conduct was not intended to disrupt the tribunal [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ray*, 2002 WI 116 (interrupting other attorneys during a conference in chambers and stating “Oh, brother” and Oh, what crap,” and arguing with the judge was not a violation where the evidence did not prove the lawyer intended to disrupt the tribunal; the conduct did, however, violate the attorney’s oath)].

### **SCR 20:3.6 Trial publicity**

(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.

(b) A statement referred to in par. (a) ordinarily is likely to have such an effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty, and the statement relates to:

- (1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
- (2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the

existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;

(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;

(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty;

(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or

(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

(c) Notwithstanding pars. (a) and (b)(1) through (5), a lawyer may state:

(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;

(2) information contained in a public record;

(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;

(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;

(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;

(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and

(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subs. (1) through (6):

(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;

(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;

(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and

(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.

(d) Notwithstanding par. (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial likelihood of undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.

(e) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to par. (a) shall make a statement prohibited by par. (a).

### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (b) contains provisions found in ABA Comment [5] but not contained in the Model Rule. Because of the addition of paragraph (b), this rule and the Model Rule have differing numbering, so that care should be used in consulting the ABA Comment.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.

[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. Rule 3.4(c) requires compliance with such rules.

[3] The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the Rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates.

[4] Paragraph (b) identifies specific matters about which a lawyer's statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, and should not in any event be considered prohibited by the general prohibition of paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which a lawyer may make a statement, but statements on other matters may be subject to paragraph (a).

[5] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to:

(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;

(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;

(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;

(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;

(5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or

(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

[6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding.

[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others.

[8] See Rule 3.8(f) for additional duties of prosecutors in connection with extrajudicial statements about criminal proceedings.

## ANNOTATIONS

Publication of information relating to the character of a party and to evidence in the proceeding is not permitted [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers*, 2012 WI 33 (accusing the prosecutor of unethical conduct during a newspaper reporter interview and disseminating emails from a website consisting of speculation, unproven allegations, and release of inadmissible evidence in a manner likely to prejudice the integrity of the judicial process); *but see*, *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Williams*, 2005 WI 15 (the lawyer's comments in a letter to the editor, at a time when a civil claim against the city was pending, accusing city officials of being corrupt was not found to violate the rule on trial publicity despite relating to the character of a party)].

Using publicity to influence the outcome of a proceeding is also not permitted [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers*, 2014 WI 103 (posting a letter on a website

during the pendency of a disciplinary case was an impermissible attempt to influence the outcome of disciplinary case)].

### **SCR 20:3.7 Lawyer as witness**

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

- (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
- (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or
- (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.

(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by SCR 20:1.7 or SCR 20:1.9.

### **ABA COMMENT**

[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and can also involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.

#### **Advocate-Witness Rule**

[2] The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.

[3] To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as advocate and necessary witness except in those circumstances specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3). Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony.

[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the tribunal and the opposing party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the

lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The conflict of interest principles stated in Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 have no application to this aspect of the problem.

[5] Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm will testify as a necessary witness, paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to do so except in situations involving a conflict of interest.

### **Conflict of Interest**

[6] In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer will be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a conflict of interest that will require compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer the representation involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with Rule 1.7. This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by paragraph (a) from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness because the lawyer's disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who might be permitted to simultaneously serve as an advocate and a witness by paragraph (a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a conflict of interest, the lawyer must secure the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking the client's consent. See Rule 1.7. See Rule 1.0(b) for the definition of "confirmed in writing" and Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of "informed consent."

[7] Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a). If, however, the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from representing the client in the matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from representing the client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

## **ANNOTATION**

A lawyer involved in an intimate relationship with a divorced father was removed as counsel for the father in post-divorce litigation because she was deemed a necessary witness, given her financial support to the father [*Consent Private Reprimand* 2014-22].

### **SCR 20:3.8 Special responsibilities of a prosecutor**

(a) A prosecutor in a criminal case or a proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty shall not prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.

(b) When communicating with an unrepresented person in the context of an investigation or proceeding, a prosecutor shall inform the person of the prosecutor's role and interest in the matter.

(c) When communicating with an unrepresented person who has a constitutional or statutory right to counsel, the prosecutor shall inform the person of the right to counsel and the procedures to obtain counsel and shall give that person a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.

(d) When communicating with an unrepresented person a prosecutor may discuss the matter, provide information regarding settlement, and negotiate a resolution which may include a waiver of constitutional and statutory rights, but a prosecutor, other than a municipal prosecutor, shall not:

(1) otherwise provide legal advice to the person, including, but not limited to whether to obtain counsel, whether to accept or reject a settlement offer, whether to waive important procedural rights or how the tribunal is likely to rule in the case, or

(2) assist the person in the completion of (i) guilty plea forms (ii) forms for the waiver of a preliminary hearing or (iii) forms for the waiver of a jury trial.

(e) A prosecutor shall not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:

(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;

(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and

(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.

(f) A prosecutor, other than a municipal prosecutor, in a criminal case or a proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty shall:

(1) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and

(2) exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under SCR 20:3.6.

(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible, and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit

an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall do all of the following:

- (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority; and
- (2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction:
  - (i) promptly make reasonable efforts to disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay; and
  - (ii) make reasonable efforts to undertake an investigation or cause an investigation to be undertaken, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.
- (h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.

### WISCONSIN COMMENT

The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in several respects: (1) paragraph (b) adds the reference to "in the context of an investigation or proceeding"; (2) paragraphs (c) and (d) expand the rule by deleting a reference to communications occurring only "after the commencement of litigation"; (3) paragraphs (d) and (f) exempt municipal prosecutors from certain requirements of the rule. Care should be used in consulting the ABA Comment.

Wisconsin prosecutors have long embraced the notion that the duty to do justice requires both holding offenders accountable and protecting the innocent. New Rule 20:3.8(g) and (h) reinforces this notion. The Wisconsin rule differs slightly from the new A.B.A. rule to recognize limits in the investigative resources of Wisconsin prosecutors.

This rule was not designed to address significant changes in the law that might affect the incarceration status of a number of prisoners, such as where a statute is declared unconstitutional.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor



and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.

[2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused persons. Paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence.

[3] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.

[4] Paragraph (e) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship.

[5] Paragraph (f) supplements Rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6(b) or 3.6(c).

[6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3, which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work for or are associated with the lawyer's office. Paragraph (f) reminds the prosecutor of the importance of these obligations in connection with the unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In addition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making improper extrajudicial statements, even when such persons are not under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

[7] When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (g) requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, paragraph (g) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court-authorized delay, to the defendant. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant's counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for

the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate.

[8] Under paragraph (h), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted.

[9] A prosecutor's independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (g) and (h), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Charging without probable cause**

The evidence did not prove a prosecutor knew a charge filed against defense counsel on the eve of trial in another case was unsupported by probable cause where the referee found the prosecutor should have known, but did not know that the factual basis for the charge was incorrect [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lucareli*, 2000 WI 55].

### **Disclosure of exculpatory evidence**

The prosecutor's ethical duty under SCR 20:3.8(f) is consistent with the constitutional requirements imposed pursuant *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riek*, 2013 WI 81 (the court declined to establish an ethical standard broader than *Brady*, which requires that the evidence be material)].

## **SCR 20:3.9 Advocate in nonadjudicative proceedings**

A lawyer representing a client before a legislative body of administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of SCR 20:3.3(a) through (c), SCR 20:3.4(a) through (c), and SCR 20:3.5.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the

submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body must deal with it honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedure. See Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c) and 3.5.

[2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this Rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts.

[3] This Rule only applies when a lawyer represents a client in connection with an official hearing or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to which the lawyer or the lawyer's client is presenting evidence or argument. It does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental agency or in connection with an application for a license or other privilege or the client's compliance with generally applicable reporting requirements, such as the filing of income-tax returns. Nor does it apply to the representation of a client in connection with an investigation or examination of the client's affairs conducted by government investigators or examiners. Representation in such matters is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4.

## ANNOTATION

A lawyer who disrupted an administrative agency hearing violated SCR 20:3.5, which applies to appearances before administrative tribunals pursuant to this rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg*, 2004 WI 14].

### **SCR 20:3.10 Omitted.**

## TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS

### OTHER THAN CLIENTS

#### **SCR 20:4.1 Truthfulness in statements to others**

- (a) In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
- (1) make a false statement of a material fact or law to a 3rd person; or
  - (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a 3rd person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by SCR 20:1.6.
- (b) Notwithstanding par. (a), SCR 20:5.3(c)(1), and SCR 20:8.4, a lawyer may advise or supervise others with respect to lawful investigative activities.

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (b) has no counterpart in the Model Rule. As a general matter, a lawyer may advise a client concerning whether proposed conduct is lawful. See SCR 20:1.2(d). This is allowed even in circumstances in which the conduct involves some form of deception, for example the use of testers to investigate unlawful discrimination or the use of undercover detectives to investigate theft in the workplace. When the lawyer personally participates in the deception, however, serious questions arise. See SCR 20:8.4(c). Paragraph (b) recognizes that, where the law expressly permits it, lawyers may have limited involvement in certain investigative activities involving deception.

Lawful investigative activity may involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future.

## ABA COMMENT

### **Misrepresentation**

[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements. For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of representing a client, see Rule 8.4.

### **Statements of Fact**

[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.

### **Crime or Fraud by Client**

[3] Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. Paragraph (b) states a specific application of the principle set forth in Rule 1.2(d) and addresses the situation where a client's crime or fraud takes the form of a lie or misrepresentation. Ordinarily, a lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. If the lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **False assertion of fact**

False assertions of material fact to third parties violate subparagraph (a)(1) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2013 WI 8 (naming a person as a plaintiff in a lawsuit and falsely representing to an opposing party that the lawyer represented that person when the lawyer never met that person and when that person had not agreed to representation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (advising the company holding the client's IRA to refrain from transferring assets to the opposing party pursuant to a court order because an appeal was pending, when the appeal had concluded and affirmed the court order); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mitz*, 2015 WI 37 (failing to notify a party entitled to proceeds from a personal injury settlement of the receipt of settlement funds, and after the funds had been disbursed, falsely telling the party the funds had not been received and later that the funds remained in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Atta*, 2016 WI 69 (falsely denying to opposing counsel that the lawyer had a romantic relationship with the lawyer's client)].

### **Failure to disclose material fact**

Subparagraph (a)(2) is violated when a lawyer fails to disclose a material fact [*Consent Public Reprimand of Voss*, 2006-2 (arranging a meeting with the client and an incarcerated person and failing to advise jail personnel of a no-contact order prohibiting the client from contact with the incarcerated person)].

### **SCR 20:4.2 Communication with person represented by counsel**

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.

(b) An otherwise unrepresented party to whom limited scope representation is being provided or has been provided in accordance with SCR 20:1.2(c) is considered to be unrepresented for purposes of this rule unless the lawyer providing limited scope representation notifies the opposing lawyer otherwise.

### **ABA COMMENT**

[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those

lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of information relating to the representation.

[2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.

[3] The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not permitted by this Rule.

[4] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another. See Rule 8.4(a). Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a client concerning a communication that the client is legally entitled to make. Also, a lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so.

[5] Communications authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government. Communications authorized by law may also include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule.

[6] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury.

[7] In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. Consent of the organization's lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent. If a constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). In communicating with a current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. See Rule 4.4.

[8] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious.

[9] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3.

## ANNOTATIONS

When a lawyer knows a person is represented by counsel, the lawyer may not communicate about the representation either directly or indirectly [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Robinson*, 2005 WI 88 (after receiving notice that a party was represented by counsel, the lawyer attempted to contact the party directly and through a third party)].

Whether a communication with a represented person was about the subject of the representation is a question of fact [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gamino*, 2006 WI 32 (after receiving notice that the client had retained successor counsel, the lawyer contacted the former client directly to apologize for his neglect of the case); *Cp.*, *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goldstein*, 2010 WI 26 (there was no violation of the rule when the evidence showed the lawyer told an employee of a creditor represented by counsel to thank the employer for continuing to do business despite not being paid, but did not show the lawyer discussed the pending case)].

### **SCR 20:4.3 Dealing with unrepresented person**

(a) In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall inform such person of the lawyer's role in the matter. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

(b) An otherwise unrepresented party to whom limited scope representation is being provided or has been provided in accordance with SCR 20.1.2(c) is considered to be unrepresented for purposes of this rule unless the lawyer providing limited scope representation notifies the opposing lawyer otherwise.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

A municipal prosecutor's obligations under this rule should be read in conjunction with SCR 20:3.8(d) and (f).

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

This Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in requiring lawyers to inform unrepresented persons of the lawyer's role in the matter, whereas the Model Rule requires only that the lawyer not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. A similar obligation to clarify the lawyer's role is expressed in SCR 20:1.13(f), SCR 20:2.4, SCR 20:3.8(b), and SCR 20:4.1.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f).

[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented person's interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations.

## ANNOTATIONS

A lawyer stipulated to a violation of the rule after sending the opposing party a notice of court hearing stating that the opposing party's attendance was not required, without clarifying the lawyer's role in the matter [*Consent Private Reprimand*, 2003-15].



#### **SCR 20:4.4 Respect for rights of 3rd persons**

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a 3rd person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.

(b) A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.

(c) A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information contains information protected by the lawyer-client privilege or the work product rule and has been disclosed to the lawyer inadvertently shall:

- (1) immediately terminate review or use of the document or electronically stored information;
- (2) promptly notify the person or the person's lawyer if communication with the person is prohibited by SCR 20:4.2 of the inadvertent disclosure; and
- (3) abide by that person's or lawyer's instructions with respect to disposition of the document or electronically stored information until obtaining a definitive ruling on the proper disposition from a court with appropriate jurisdiction.

#### **WISCONSIN COMMENT**

This Rule, unlike its Model Rule counterpart, contains paragraph (c), which specifically applies to information protected by the lawyer-client privilege and the work product rule. If a lawyer knows that the document or electronically stored information contains information protected by the lawyer-client privilege or the work product rule and has been disclosed to the lawyer inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to immediately terminate review or use of the document or electronically stored information, promptly notify the person or the person's lawyer if communication with the person is prohibited by SCR 20:4.2 of the inadvertent disclosure, and abide by that person's or lawyer's instructions with respect to disposition of the document or electronically stored information until obtaining a definitive ruling on the proper disposition from a court with appropriate jurisdiction.

Due to substantive and numbering differences, special care should be taken in consulting the ABA Comment.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer relationship.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive documents that were mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been wrongfully obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, "document" includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission subject to being read or put into readable form.

[3] Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.

## ANNOTATIONS

No substantial purpose was found for the lawyer's conduct that embarrassed or burdened a third person in the following cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg*, 2004 WI 14 (repeatedly calling a police dispatcher from a bar, demanding to speak with a detective due to a "life or death emergency" when there was no such emergency, using vulgar language, threatening to "have his badge," and referring to the detective as an "asshole" and "thug"); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2011 WI 2 (sending derogatory information about a vulnerable client who had accused him of sexual misconduct to two circuit court judges when there was no case pending)].

### **SCR 20:4.5 Guardians ad litem**

A lawyer appointed to act as a guardian ad litem or as an attorney for the best interests of an individual represents, and shall act in, the individual's best interests, even if doing so is contrary to the individual's wishes. A lawyer so appointed shall comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct that are consistent with the lawyer's role in representing the best interests of the individual rather than the individual personally.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

The Model Rules do not contain a counterpart provision. This rule reflects established case law that a guardian ad litem in Wisconsin is a lawyer who represents the best interests of an individual, not the individual personally. See *Paige K.B. v. Molepske*, 219 Wis. 2d 418, 580 N.W.2d 289 (1998); *In re Steveon R.A.*, 196 Wis. 2d 171, 537 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1995). Supreme Court Rules, Chapters 35—36, govern eligibility for appointment as guardian ad litem in certain situations.

This rule expressly recognizes that a lawyer who represents the best interests of the individual does not have a client in the traditional sense but must comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct to the extent the rules apply.

## LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS

### **SCR 20:5.1 Responsibilities of partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers**

(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(c). This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal

services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm.

[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.

[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules.

[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a).

[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.

[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation.

[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.

[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a).

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Establishing measures ensuring ethics compliance**

A partner or comparable manager in a firm must establish policies and procedures to ensure compliance with ethical requirements [*Consent Public Reprimand of Mullen*, 2013-OLR-9 (failing to establish internal procedures to prevent improper billing of the State Public Defender’s Office)].

### **Supervising another lawyer**

A lawyer was not responsible for a violation of a subordinate lawyer and did not fail to properly supervise a subordinate lawyer by directing the lawyer to represent a client, when the court found that the representation did not create a conflict of interest [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Torvinen*, 2010 WI 123].

### **Vicarious liability**

A lawyer may be responsible for a subordinate lawyer when the lawyer knows of conduct in violation of the rules and fails to take action to avoid or mitigate the conduct [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks*, 2004 WI 12 (knowingly allowing the subordinate to deposit settlement checks in the firm’s business account, and failing to ensure the subordinate responded to the client’s questions regarding the accounting of settlement funds)].

A lawyer may be found in violation of subparagraph (c) when the lawyer has joint responsibility to represent a client [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2006 WI 45 (failing to respond to client requests for information “by reason of his own conduct and based upon the joint responsibility” to represent the client)].

### **SCR 20:5.2 Responsibilities of a subordinate lawyer**

(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.

(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character.

[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.

### **SCR 20:5.3 Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistance**

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

ABA COMMENT

[1] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm and nonlawyers outside the firm who work on firm matters act in a way compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. See Comment [6] to Rule 1.1 (retaining lawyers outside the firm) and Comment [1] to Rule 5.1 (responsibilities with respect to lawyers within a firm). Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over such nonlawyers within or outside the firm. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for the conduct of such nonlawyers inside or outside the firm that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer.

[2] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.

[3] A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client. Examples include the retention of an investigative or paraprofessional service, hiring a document management company to create and maintain a database for complex litigation, sending client documents to a third party for printing or scanning, and using an Internet-based service to store client information. When using such services outside the firm, a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the services are provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. The extent of this obligation will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, experience and reputation of the nonlawyer; the nature of the services involved; the terms of any arrangements concerning the protection of client information; and the legal and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly with regard to confidentiality. See also Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.2 (allocation of authority), 1.4 (communication with client), 1.6 (confidentiality), 5.4(a) (professional independence of the lawyer), and 5.5(a) (unauthorized practice of law). When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, a lawyer should communicate directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.

[4] Where the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer service provider outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the client concerning the allocation of responsibility for monitoring as between the client and the lawyer. See Rule 1.2. When making such an allocation in a matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Supervising a non-lawyer**

A lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure a non-lawyer assistant's conduct is compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. The lawyer must be able to supervise the assistant [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Compton*, 2008 WI 3 (failing to supervise a non-lawyer assistant who was working from prison)]. The lawyer must review the assistant's work [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brandt*, 2009 WI 43 (failing to review trust account bank statements, canceled checks and other records, thereby enabling his assistant to convert funds of clients and third persons)]. The lawyer must have standards and procedures in place [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Biester*, 2013 WI 85 (allowing a non-lawyer assistant to receive fees without ensuring they were deposited in the firm's accounts, and allowing the assistant to remove files from the office and take them to the assistant's home and other locations); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2015 WI 104 (failing to ensure the staff prepared documents accurately and in conformance with court rules)]. The lawyer must communicate with the assistant adequately to ensure clients are properly served [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Creedy*, 2014 WI 114 (failing to communicate with a non-lawyer assistant about who would represent the client as a Social Security hearing did not violate the rule when the non-lawyer assistant appeared and was permitted to represent the client)].

### **Vicarious liability**

A lawyer is responsible for the conduct of an assistant when the lawyer ratifies the conduct [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Roethe*, 2010 WI 19 (ratifying the lawyer's assistant's conduct in notarizing signatures of persons who did not appear, and allowing the documents to be filed in court)].

### **SCR 20:5.4 Professional independence of a lawyer**

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:

- (1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
- (2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of SCR 20:1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;
- (3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and



- (4) a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter.
- (b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
- (c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
- (d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
- (1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
  - (2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation; or
  - (3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.

#### ABA COMMENT

[1] The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment.

[2] This Rule also expresses traditional limitations on permitting a third party to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering legal services to another. See also Rule 1.8(f) (lawyer may accept compensation from a third party as long as there is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the client gives informed consent).

#### ANNOTATIONS

##### **Sharing fees with non-lawyers**

Agreeing to share legal fees with a non-lawyer violates subparagraph (a) of the rule. Whether an arrangement constitutes a legal fee will depend upon the services performed and the qualifications of the non-lawyer [*Cp. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg*, 2013 WI 37 (agreeing to split fees 50/50 with a non-lawyer in worker's

compensation matters where the non-lawyer was not authorized to appear before the agency without being associated with a lawyer); and *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Creedy*, 2014 WI 114 (it was permissible to allow a non-lawyer to share fees in social security matters where the non-lawyer was authorized to appear before the agency and receive fees)].

### **Partnership with non-lawyers**

A lawyer may not partner with non-lawyers [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laux*, 2015 WI 59 (entering into a business entity that provided estate planning and other legal services with partners who were non-lawyers); Cf. *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Creedy*, 2014 WI 114 (it was permissible to allow a non-lawyer to share fees in social security matters where the non-lawyer was authorized to appear before the agency and receive fees, and where the non-lawyer had an independent business)].

### **SCR 20:5.5 Unauthorized practice of law; multijurisdictional practice of law**

(a) A lawyer shall not:

- (1) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction except that a lawyer admitted to practice in Wisconsin does not violate this rule by conduct in another jurisdiction that is permitted in Wisconsin under SCR 20:5.5 (c) and (d) for lawyers not admitted in Wisconsin; or
- (2) assist another in practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.

(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:

- (1) except as authorized by this rule or other law, establish an office or maintain a systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or
- (2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to the practice of law in this jurisdiction.

(c) Except as authorized by this rule, a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction but who is admitted to practice in another jurisdiction of the United States and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction for disciplinary reasons or for medical incapacity, may not provide legal services in this jurisdiction except when providing services on an occasional basis in this jurisdiction that:

- (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
- or

- (2) are in, or reasonably related to, a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized; or
  - (3) are in, or reasonably related to, a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of, or are reasonably related to, the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or
  - (4) are not within subsections (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of, or are reasonably related to, the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.
- (d) A lawyer admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction or in a foreign jurisdiction, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction for disciplinary reasons or medical incapacity, may provide legal services through an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction that:
- (1) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates after compliance with SCR 10.03 (4) (f), and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or
  - (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law or other rule of this jurisdiction.
- (e) A lawyer admitted to practice in another jurisdiction of the United States or a foreign jurisdiction who provides legal services in this jurisdiction pursuant to sub. (c) and (d) above shall consent to the appointment of the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court as agent upon whom service of process may be made for all actions against the lawyer or the lawyer's firm that may arise out of the lawyer's participation in legal matters in this jurisdiction.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

See also SCR 10.03(4) (requirements for admission pro hac vice and registration of in-house counsel).

This Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in that an attorney is not precluded from seeking admission pro hac vice if the attorney is administratively suspended from practice in a jurisdiction other than the attorney's primary jurisdiction of practice. An attorney must not be suspended or disbarred in his or her primary

jurisdiction of practice. Due to substantive and numbering differences, special care should be taken in consulting the ABA Comment.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person. For example, a lawyer may not assist a person in practicing law in violation of the rules governing professional conduct in that person's jurisdiction.

[2] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3.

[3] A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.

[4] Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a lawyer who is not admitted to practice generally in this jurisdiction violates paragraph (b)(1) if the lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not physically present here. Such a lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. See also Rules 7.1(a) and 7.5(b).

[5] There are occasions in which a lawyer admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of their clients, the public or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four such circumstances. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized. With the exception of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), this Rule does not authorize a lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here.

[6] There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on a "temporary basis" in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c). Services may be "temporary" even though the lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation.

[7] Paragraphs (c) and (d) apply to lawyers who are admitted to practice law in any United States jurisdiction, which includes the District of Columbia and any state, territory or commonwealth of the United States. The word "admitted" in paragraph (c) contemplates that the lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted and excludes a lawyer who while technically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the lawyer is on inactive status.

[8] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For this paragraph to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client.

[9] Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a lawyer does not violate this Rule when the lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the lawyer to obtain that authority.

[10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted pro hac vice. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction.

[11] When a lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, paragraph (c)(2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the lawyer responsible for the litigation.

[12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a lawyer admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. The lawyer, however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so require.

[13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a lawyer admitted in another jurisdiction to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted but are

not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers.

[14] Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. A variety of factors evidence such a relationship. The lawyer's client may have been previously represented by the lawyer, or may be resident in or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction. In other cases, significant aspects of the lawyer's work might be conducted in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the matter may involve the law of that jurisdiction. The necessary relationship might arise when the client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each. In addition, the services may draw on the lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law. Lawyers desiring to provide pro bono legal services on a temporary basis in a jurisdiction that has been affected by a major disaster, but in which they are not otherwise authorized to practice law, as well as lawyers from the affected jurisdiction who seek to practice law temporarily in another jurisdiction, but in which they are not otherwise authorized to practice law, should consult the [Model Court Rule on Provision of Legal Services Following Determination of Major Disaster].

[15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a lawyer who is admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, and is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), a lawyer who is admitted to practice law in another jurisdiction and who establishes an office or other systematic or continuous presence in this jurisdiction must become admitted to practice law generally in this jurisdiction.

[16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a lawyer who is employed by a client to provide legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the lawyer's work.

[17] If an employed lawyer establishes an office or other systematic presence in this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the lawyer may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education.

[18] Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that a lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent. See, e.g., The ABA Model Rule on Practice Pending Admission.

[19] A lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5(a).

[20] In some circumstances, a lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. For example, that may be required when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction. See Rule 1.4(b).

[21] Paragraphs (c) and (d) do not authorize communications advertising legal services in this jurisdiction by lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how lawyers may communicate the availability of their services in this jurisdiction is governed by Rules 7.1 to 7.5.

## WISCONSIN COMMENT

Lawyers desiring to provide pro bono legal services on a temporary basis in the State of Wisconsin when it has been affected by a major disaster, when they are not otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Wisconsin, as well as lawyers from a jurisdiction affected by a major disaster who seek to practice law temporarily in this jurisdiction, but who are not otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Wisconsin, should consult Supreme Court Rule 23.03.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Unauthorized practice in another jurisdiction**

A lawyer licensed in Wisconsin may be disciplined for practicing in another jurisdiction in violation of the rules of that jurisdiction [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bolte*, 2005 WI 132 (Colorado law applied to determine that the lawyer provided legal advice to a client and represented the client without being licensed in Colorado and without protection from the pro hac vice rule); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hooker*, 2014 WI 41 (Colorado Supreme Court findings that the lawyer practiced law in violation of applicable regulations supported the lawyer's petition for revocation of her Wisconsin license); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strizic*, 2015 WI 57 (a lawyer who held himself out as a lawyer in Arizona where he was not licensed was disciplined by the Arizona Supreme Court, which provided the basis for reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin)].

### **Unauthorized practice in Wisconsin by lawyers licensed in Wisconsin**

Subparagraph (a) of the rule has been applied to lawyers licensed in Wisconsin who practice law in violation of Wisconsin rules [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2014 WI 13 (practicing in Wisconsin after the lawyer's license was suspended by the Supreme Court); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan*, 2014 WI 39 (after having been suspended, the lawyer held himself out as authorized to practice law)].

### **Assisting another in practicing in violation of the rules**

A lawyer may not assist or allow another person to practice law in violation of the rules [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knight*, 2008 WI 13 (allowing a lawyer who was unlicensed in Wisconsin to use the lawyer's name and bar number to represent clients in Wisconsin courts); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2013 WI 20 (affiliating with the National Legal Professional Association, an out of state organization, and allowing the organization to do legal research and draft legal documents that were legally insufficient and that the lawyer filed under her signature)].

### **SCR 20:5.6 Restrictions on right to practice**

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

- (a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
- (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.

#### **ABA COMMENT**

[1] An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm.

[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client.

[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17.

### **SCR 20:5.7 Limited liability legal practice**

(a)(1) A lawyer may be a member of a law firm that is organized as a limited liability organization solely to render professional legal services under the laws of this state, including chs. 178 and 183 and subch. XIX of ch. 180. The lawyer may practice in or as a limited liability organization if the lawyer is otherwise authorized to practice law in this state and the organization is registered under sub. (b).

(2) Nothing in this rule or the laws under which the lawyer or law firm is organized shall relieve a lawyer from personal liability for any acts, errors or



omissions of the lawyer arising out of the performance of professional services.

(b) A lawyer or law firm that is organized as a limited liability organization shall file an annual registration with the state bar of Wisconsin in a form and with a filing fee that shall be determined by the state bar. The annual registration shall be signed by a lawyer who is licensed to practice law in this state and who holds an ownership interest in the organization seeking to register under this rule. The annual registration shall include all of the following:

- (1) The name and address of the organization.
- (2) The names, residence addresses, states or jurisdictions where licensed to practice law, and attorney registration numbers of the lawyers in the organization and their ownership interest in the organization.
- (3) A representation that at the time of the filing each lawyer in the organization is in good standing in this state or, if licensed to practice law elsewhere, in the states or jurisdictions in which he or she is licensed.
- (4) A certificate of insurance issued by an insurance carrier certifying that it has issued to the organization a professional liability policy to the organization as provided in sub. (bm).
- (5) Such other information as may be required from time to time by the state bar of Wisconsin.

(bm) The professional liability policy under sub. (b)(4) shall identify the name of the professional liability carrier, the policy number, the expiration date and the limits and deductible. Such professional liability insurance shall provide not less than the following limits of liability:

- (1) For a firm composed of 1 to 3 lawyers, \$100,000 of combined indemnity and defense cost coverage per claim, with a \$300,000 aggregate combined indemnity and defense cost coverage amount per policy period.
- (2) For a firm composed of 4 to 6 lawyers, \$250,000 of combined indemnity and defense cost coverage per claim, with \$750,000 aggregate combined indemnity and defense cost coverage amount per policy period.
- (3) For a firm composed of 7 to 14 lawyers, \$500,000 of combined indemnity and defense cost coverage per claim, with \$1,000,000 aggregate combined indemnity and defense cost coverage amount per policy period.

- (4) For a firm composed of 15 to 30 lawyers, \$1,000,000 of combined indemnity and defense cost coverage per claim, with \$2,000,000 aggregate combined indemnity and defense cost coverage amount per policy period.
- (5) For a firm composed of 31 to 50 lawyers, \$4,000,000 of combined indemnity and defense cost coverage per claim, with \$4,000,000 aggregate combined indemnity and defense cost coverage amount per policy period.
- (6) For a firm composed of 51 or more lawyers, \$10,000,000 of combined indemnity and defense cost coverage per claim, with \$10,000,000 aggregate combined indemnity and defense cost coverage amount per policy period.
- (c) Nothing in this rule or the laws under which a lawyer or law firm is organized shall diminish a lawyer's or law firm's obligations or responsibilities under any provisions of this chapter.
- (d) A law firm that is organized as a limited liability organization under the laws of any other state or jurisdiction or of the United States solely for the purpose of rendering professional legal services that is authorized to do business in Wisconsin and that has at least one lawyer licensed to practice law in Wisconsin and who also has an ownership interest in the firm may register under this rule by complying with the provisions of sub. (b).
- (e) A lawyer or law firm that is organized as a limited liability organization shall do all of the following:
- (1) Include a written designation of the limited liability structure as part of its name.
  - (2) Provide to clients and potential clients in writing a plain-English summary of the features of the limited liability law under which it is organized and the applicable provisions of this chapter.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

This Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule has no counterpart in the Model Rules. Model Rule 5.7, concerning law-related services, is not part of these rules.

#### **SCR 20:5.8 Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services**

- (a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:

- (1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or
  - (2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
- (b) The term "law-related services" denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case.

[2] Rule 5.7 applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed and whether the law-related services are performed through a law firm or a separate entity. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4.

[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services must adhere to the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in paragraph (a)(1). Even when the law-related and legal services are provided in circumstances that are distinct from each other, for example through separate entities or different support staff within the law firm, the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the lawyer as provided in paragraph (a)(2) unless the lawyer takes reasonable measures to assure that the recipient of the law-related services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not apply.

[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with

others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.

[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a).

[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing.

[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit.

[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity that the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting.

[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(a), (b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6 relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take

special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law.

[11] When the full protections of all of the Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).

## PUBLIC SERVICE

### **SCR 20:6.1 Voluntary pro bono publico service**

Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility the lawyer should:

(a) provide a substantial majority of the 50 hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:

- (1) persons of limited means or
- (2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and

(b) provide any additional services through:

- (1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;
- (2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or
- (3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.

In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi—criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post—conviction death penalty appeal cases.

[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law.

[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but nevertheless, cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term "governmental organizations" includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies.

[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory attorneys' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means.

[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remained unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and

judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b).

[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups.

[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section.

[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph.

[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities.

[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible.

[11] Law firms should act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide the pro bono legal services called for by this Rule.

[12] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.

### **SCR 20:6.2 Accepting appointments**

A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause, such as:

(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or

(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client—lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.

#### ABA COMMENT

[1] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See Rule 6.1. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services.

#### **Appointed Counsel**

[2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust.

[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules.

#### **SCR 20:6.3 Membership in legal services organization**

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization:

(a) if participating in the decision would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under SCR 20:1.7; or

(b) where the decision could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.



## ABA COMMENT

[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed.

[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances.

### **SCR 20:6.4 Law reform activities affecting client interests**

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefited by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client—lawyer relationship with the organization. Otherwise, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. See also Rule 1.2(b). For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefited.

### **SCR 20:6.5 Nonprofit and court-annexed limited legal services programs**

(a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization, a bar association, an accredited law school, or a court, provides

short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter:

(1) is subject to SCR 20:1.7 and SCR 20:1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and

(2) is subject to SCR 20:1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by SCR 20:1.7 or SCR 20:1.9(a) with respect to the matter.

(b) Except as provided in par. (a)(2), SCR 20:1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this rule.

### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Unlike the Model Rule, paragraph (a) expressly provides coverage for programs sponsored by bar associations and accredited law schools.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as advice or the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.

[2] A lawyer who provides short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.

[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter.

[4] Because the limited nature of the services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that

Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.

[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable.

## INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES

### **SCR 20:7.1 Communications concerning a lawyer's services**

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:

(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;

(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or

(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated; or

(d) contains any paid testimonial about, or paid endorsement of, the lawyer without identifying the fact that payment has been made or, if the testimonial or endorsement is not made by an actual client, without identifying that fact.

## WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraphs (b) through (d) of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule are not contained in the Model Rule.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] This Rule governs all communications about a lawyer's services, including advertising permitted by Rule 7.2. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them must be truthful.

[2] Truthful statements that are misleading are also prohibited by this Rule. A truthful statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer's communication considered as a whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is also misleading if there is a substantial likelihood that it will lead a reasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services for which there is no reasonable factual foundation.

[3] An advertisement that truthfully reports a lawyer's achievements on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if presented so as to lead a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be obtained for other clients in similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances of each client's case. Similarly, an unsubstantiated comparison of the lawyer's services or fees with the services or fees of other lawyers may be misleading if presented with such specificity as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comparison can be substantiated. The inclusion of an appropriate disclaimer or qualifying language may preclude a finding that a statement is likely to create unjustified expectations or otherwise mislead the public.

[4] See also Rule 8.4(e) for the prohibition against stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Material misrepresentations**

A lawyer may not make a material misrepresentation or omit material information relating the lawyer or lawyer's services [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ness*, 2002 WI 114 (asserting the lawyer was admitted to practice in federal courts and Minnesota when not true, asserting the firm was a national law firm concentrating on federal false claims cases when not true); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brandt*, 2003 WI 138 (advertising that the firm included attorneys when the firm had only one attorney); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knight*, 2008 WI 13 (soliciting clients with letters that stated without qualification that the lawyer had located the addressee's escheated funds, when the lawyer did not know if the addressee was the correct claimant, omitted a necessary fact and created a false expectation about the results that could be achieved); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2009 WI 106 (sending invoices to clients with the firm's letterhead and directing them to sent payment to a post office box not associated with the firm constituted false and misleading communications that the payments would go to the firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100 (making false and misleading statements regarding the name and organizational status of the firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2014 WI 13 (using firm letterhead while the lawyer was suspended and otherwise communicated that the lawyer was permitted to practice); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Capistrant*, 2015 WI 88 (using a letterhead stating the lawyer was authorized to practice in Wisconsin when the lawyer had been suspended); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schwitzer*, 2017 WI 53 (causing the website to identify the firm as an LLC when no LLC existed, and inviting visitors to call for a fee consultation when the lawyer was suspended)].

A misrepresentation may be shown upon notice to the lawyer [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich*, 2005 WI 36 (having received notice of suspension, the lawyer's use of letterhead indicating licensure in Wisconsin was per se false and misleading, even though the lawyer may not have been personally aware of his suspension)].

A misrepresentation must be material to violate the rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hupy*, 2011 WI 38 (a 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary sticker on the lawyer's letterhead was not false and misleading where the lawyer could not establish lineage of more than 30 years because the difference would not have materially influenced a decision whether to hire the firm)].

### **Creating unjustified expectations**

A lawyer's communications may not create unjustified expectations [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knight*, 2008 WI 13 (soliciting clients with letters that stated without qualification that the lawyer had located the addressee's escheated funds, when the lawyer did not know if the addressee was the correct claimant, omitted a necessary fact and created a false expectation about the results that could be achieved)].

## **SCR 20:7.2 Advertising**

(a) Subject to the requirements of SCR 20:7.1 and SCR 20:7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication, including public media.

(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may:

(1) pay the reasonable cost of advertisements or communications permitted by this rule;

(2) pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referral service that has been approved by an appropriate regulatory authority;

(3) pay for a law practice in accordance with SCR 20:1.17; and

(4) refer clients to another lawyer or nonlawyer professional pursuant to an agreement not otherwise prohibited under these rules that provides for the other person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer, if

(i) the reciprocal referral arrangement is not exclusive;

(ii) the client gives informed consent;

(iii) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and

(iv) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by SCR 20:1.6.

(c) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content.

### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Paragraph (b)(4) differs from the Model Rule by requiring additional safeguards consistent with those found in SCR 20:1.8(f). Lawyers should consider the "fee-splitting" provisions contained in SCR 20:5.4 when considering their obligations under this provision.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] To assist the public in learning about and obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.

[2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address, email address, website, and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance.

[3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television and other forms of advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against "undignified" advertising. Television, the Internet, and other forms of electronic communication are among the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. But see Rule 7.3(a) for the prohibition against a solicitation through a real-time electronic exchange initiated by the lawyer.

[4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.

**Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer**

[5] Except as permitted under paragraphs (b) (1) – (4), lawyers are not permitted to pay others for recommending the lawyer's services or for channeling professional work in a manner that violates Rule 7.3. A communication contains a recommendation if it endorses or vouches for a lawyer's credentials, abilities, competence, character, or other professional qualities. Paragraph (b)(1), however, allows a lawyer to pay for advertising and communications permitted by this Rule, including the costs of print directory listings, on-line directory listings, newspaper ads, television and radio airtime, domain-name registrations, sponsorship fees, Internet-based advertisements, and group advertising. A lawyer may compensate employees, agents and vendors who are engaged to provide marketing or client-development services, such as publicists, public-relations personnel, business-development staff and website designers. Moreover, a lawyer may pay others for generating client leads, such as Internet-based client leads, as long as the lead generator does not recommend the lawyer, any payment to the lead generator is consistent with Rules 1.5(e) (division of fees) and 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer), and the lead generator's communications are consistent with Rule 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer's services). To comply with Rule 7.1, a lawyer must not pay a lead generator that states, implies, or creates a reasonable impression that it is recommending the lawyer, is making the referral without payment from the lawyer, or has analyzed a person's legal problems when determining which lawyer should receive the referral. See also Rule 5.3 duties of lawyers and law firms with respect to the conduct of nonlawyers; Rule 8.4(a) (duty to avoid violating the Rules through the acts of another).

[6] A lawyer may pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A legal service plan is a prepaid or group legal service plan or a similar delivery system that assists people who seek to secure legal representation. A lawyer referral service, on the other hand, is any organization that holds itself out to the public as a lawyer referral service. Such referral services are understood by the public to be consumer-oriented organizations that provide unbiased referrals to lawyers with appropriate experience in the subject matter of the representation and afford other client protections, such as complaint procedures or malpractice insurance requirements. Consequently, this Rule only permits a lawyer to pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service. A qualified lawyer referral service is one that is approved by an appropriate regulatory authority as affording adequate protections for the public. See, e.g., the American Bar Association's Model Supreme Court Rules Governing Lawyer Referral Services and Model Lawyer Referral and Information Service Quality Assurance Act (requiring that organizations that are identified as lawyer referral services (i) permit the participation of all lawyers who are licensed and eligible to practice in the jurisdiction and who meet reasonable objective eligibility requirements as may be established by the referral service for the protection of the public; (ii) require each participating lawyer to carry reasonably adequate malpractice insurance; (iii) act reasonably to assess client satisfaction and address client complaints; and (iv) do not make referrals to lawyers who own, operate or are employed by the referral service.)

[7] A lawyer who accepts assignments or referrals from a legal service plan or referrals from a lawyer referral service must act reasonably to assure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. See Rule 5.3. Legal service plans and lawyer referral services may communicate with the public, but such

communication must be in conformity with these Rules. Thus, advertising must not be false or misleading, as would be the case if the communications of a group advertising program or a group legal services plan would mislead the public to think that it was a lawyer referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar association. Nor could the lawyer allow in-person, telephonic, or real-time contacts that would violate Rule 7.3.

[8] A lawyer also may agree to refer clients to another lawyer or a nonlawyer professional, in return for the undertaking of that person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer. Such reciprocal referral arrangements must not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment as to making referrals or as to providing substantive legal services. See Rules 2.1 and 5.4(c). Except as provided in Rule 1.5(e), a lawyer who receives referrals from a lawyer or nonlawyer professional must not pay anything solely for the referral, but the lawyer does not violate paragraph (b) of this Rule by agreeing to refer clients to the other lawyer or nonlawyer professional, so long as the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive and the client is informed of the referral agreement. Conflicts of interest created by such arrangements are governed by Rule 1.7. Reciprocal referral agreements should not be of indefinite duration and should be reviewed periodically to determine whether they comply with these Rules. This Rule does not restrict referrals or divisions of revenues or net income among lawyers within firms comprised of multiple entities.

## ANNOTATIONS

A lawyer may advertise, but must include in an advertisement the name and address of the lawyer or law firm responsible for the content [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Booker*, 2015 WI 2 (failure to include an attorney's name and address in advertisements); *see also Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2009 WI 59].

Unless one of the four exceptions applies, a lawyer may not pay another to recommend the lawyer's services [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 158 Wis. 2d 1, 460 N.W.2d 749 (1990) (paying persons to refer clients where these persons approached potential clients at the scene of an accident, at a car repair shop, and at the hospital)].

### **SCR 20:7.3 Solicitation of clients**

(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit professional employment when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted:

- (1) is a lawyer; or
- (2) has a family, close personal or prior professional relationship with the lawyer.

(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by written, recorded or electronic communication or by in-person, telephone or real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise prohibited by par. (a), if:



- (1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person makes it unlikely that the person would exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer; or
  - (2) the target of solicitation has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; or
  - (3) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
- (c) Every written, recorded or electronic communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employment from anyone known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter shall include the words "Advertising Material" on the outside envelope, if any, and at the beginning and ending of any printed, recorded or electronic communication, unless the recipient of the communication is a person specified in pars. (a)(1) or (a)(2), and a copy of it shall be filed with the office of lawyer regulation within five days of its dissemination.
- (d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in par. (a), a lawyer may participate with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an organization not owned or directed by the lawyer that uses in-person or telephone contact to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not known to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan.
- (e) Except as permitted under SCR 11.06, a lawyer, at his or her instance, shall not draft legal documents, such as wills, trust instruments or contracts, which require or imply that the lawyer's services be used in relation to that document.

### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in that paragraph (b)(1) has been added, as have the last clause of paragraph (c) and all of paragraph (e). These provisions are carried forward from the prior Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule.

When a lawyer uses standard form solicitations that are mailed to many prospective clients, the lawyer satisfies the filing obligation in subparagraph (c) by filing one copy of each version of the solicitation form with the office of lawyer regulation, and by maintaining in the lawyer's files the names and addresses to which the solicitation was mailed.

Because of differences in content and numbers between the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule and the Model Rule, care should be used in consulting the ABA Comment.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] A solicitation is a targeted communication initiated by the lawyer that is directed to a specific person and that offers to provide, or can reasonably be understood as offering to

provide, legal services. In contrast, a lawyer's communication typically does not constitute a solicitation if it is directed to the general public, such as through a billboard, an Internet banner advertisement, a website or a television commercial, or if it is in response to a request for information or is automatically generated in response to Internet searches.

[2] There is a potential for abuse when a solicitation involves direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact by a lawyer with someone known to need legal services. These forms of contact subject a person to the private importuning of the trained advocate in a direct interpersonal encounter. The person, who may already feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services, may find it difficult fully to evaluate all available alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate self-interest in the face of the lawyer's presence and insistence upon being retained immediately. The situation is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching.

[3] This potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic solicitation justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyers have alternative means of conveying necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. In particular, communications can be mailed or transmitted by email or other electronic means that do not involve real-time contact and do not violate other laws governing solicitations. These forms of communications and solicitations make it possible for the public to be informed about the need for legal services, and about the qualifications of available lawyers and law firms, without subjecting the public to direct in-person, telephone or real-time electronic persuasion that may overwhelm a person's judgment.

[4] The use of general advertising and written, recorded or electronic communications to transmit information from lawyer to the public, rather than direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact, will help to assure that the information flows cleanly as well as freely. The contents of advertisements and communications permitted under Rule 7.2 can be permanently recorded so that they cannot be disputed and may be shared with others who know the lawyer. This potential for informal review is itself likely to help guard against statements and claims that might constitute false and misleading communications, in violation of Rule 7.1. The contents of direct in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact can be disputed and may not be subject to third-party scrutiny. Consequently, they are much more likely to approach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accurate representations and those that are false and misleading.

[5] There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against a former client, or a person with whom the lawyer has close personal or family relationship, or in situations in which the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain. Nor is there a serious potential for abuse when the person contacted is a lawyer. Consequently, the general prohibition in Rule 7.3(a) and the requirements of Rule 7.3(c) are not applicable in those situations. Also, paragraph (a) is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from participating in constitutionally protected activities of public or charitable legal-service organizations or bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee or trade organizations whose purposes include providing or recommending legal services to their members or beneficiaries.

[6] But even permitted forms of solicitation can be abused. Thus, any solicitation which contains information which is false or misleading within the meaning of Rule 7.1, which involves coercion, duress or harassment within the meaning of Rule 7.3(b)(2), or which involves contact with someone who has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer within the meaning of Rule 7.3(b)(1) is prohibited. Moreover, if after sending a letter or other communication as permitted by Rule 7.2 the lawyer receives no response, any further effort to communicate with the recipient of the communication may violate the provisions of Rule 7.3(b).

[7] This Rule is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from contacting representatives of organizations or groups that may be interested in establishing a group or prepaid legal plan for their members, insureds, beneficiaries or other third parties for the purpose of informing such entities of the availability of and details concerning the plan or arrangement which the lawyer or lawyer's firm is willing to offer. This form of communication is not directed to people who are seeking legal services for themselves. Rather, it is usually addressed to an individual acting in a fiduciary capacity seeking a supplier of legal services for others who may, if they choose, become prospective clients of the lawyer. Under these circumstances, the activity which the lawyer undertakes in communicating with such representatives and the type of information transmitted to the individual are functionally similar to and serve the same purpose as advertising permitted under Rule 7.2.

[8] The requirement in Rule 7.3(c) that certain communications be marked "Advertising Material" does not apply to communications sent in response to requests of potential clients or their spokespersons or sponsors. General announcements by lawyers, including changes in personnel or office location, do not constitute communications soliciting professional employment from a client known to be in need of legal services within the meaning of this Rule.

[9] Paragraph (d) of this Rule permits a lawyer to participate with an organization which uses personal contact to solicit members for its group or prepaid legal service plan, provided that the personal contact is not undertaken by any lawyer who would be a provider of legal services through the plan. The organization must not be owned by or directed (whether as manager or otherwise) by any lawyer or law firm that participates in the plan. For example, paragraph (d) would not permit a lawyer to create an organization controlled directly or indirectly by the lawyer and use the organization for the in-person or telephone solicitation of legal employment of the lawyer through memberships in the plan or otherwise. The communication permitted by these organizations also must not be directed to a person known to need legal services in a particular matter, but is to be designed to inform potential plan members generally of another means of affordable legal services. Lawyers who participate in a legal service plan must reasonably assure that the plan sponsors are in compliance with Rules 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3(b). See Rule 8.4(a).

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Direct contact with potential clients**

Subparagraph (a) provides that a lawyer may not solicit professional employment by in-person or live contact unless the person contacted is a lawyer, or has a family, close

personal or prior professional relationship with the lawyer [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ryan*, 2009 WI 39 (making an unsolicited call to an incarcerated person's father for the purpose of offering legal services)].

The direct contact is prohibited even when undue pressure is not apparent [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arellano*, 2013 WI 24 (an unsolicited phone call to a potential client was a violation of the rule, even where the element of undue pressure did not seem to exist)].

### **Other contacts with potential clients**

Subparagraph (c) requires written, recorded, or electronic communications soliciting professional employment sent to persons known to be in need of legal services must be labelled "Advertising Material," and a copy must be provided to OLR within 5 days of dissemination [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knight*, 2008 WI 13].

OLR review of advertising material is intended to promote compliance with this rule, but does not constitute a review of other ethics rules [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hupy*, 2011 WI 38 (OLR review of advertising sent by a lawyer to prospective clients concerned compliance with SCR 20:7.3, but was not "a stamp of approval that the advertisement complies with all ethical rules")].

### **Drafting legal documents requiring the lawyer's services**

Subparagraph (e) [subparagraph (f) prior to July 1, 2007] of the rule prohibits a lawyer, at the lawyer's insistence, from drafting legal documents requiring the lawyer's services. This rule has been applied in disciplinary cases to the drafting of wills and trusts [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Conmey*, 2005 WI 166 (drafting a will which named the lawyer as personal representative of an estate); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Felli*, 2006 WI 73 (preparing trust documents that named the lawyer as trustee)].

## **SCR 20:7.4 Communication of fields of practice**

- (a) A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law.
- (b) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "patent attorney" or a substantially similar designation.
- (c) A lawyer engaged in admiralty practice may use the designation "admiralty," "proctor in admiralty" or a substantially similar designation.
- (d) A lawyer shall not state or imply that a lawyer is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law, unless:

- (1) the lawyer has been certified as a specialist by an organization that has been approved by an appropriate state authority or that has been accredited by the American Bar Association; and
- (2) the name of the certifying organization is clearly identified in the communication.

#### ABA COMMENT

[1] Paragraph (a) of this Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in a specified field or fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. A lawyer is generally permitted to state that the lawyer is a "specialist," practices a "specialty," or "specializes in" particular fields, but such communications are subject to the "false and misleading" standard applied in Rule 7.1 to communications concerning a lawyer's services.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes the long-established policy of the Patent and Trademark Office for the designation of lawyers practicing before the Office. Paragraph (c) recognizes that designation of Admiralty practice has a long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce and the federal courts.

[3] Paragraph (d) permits a lawyer to state that the lawyer is certified as a specialist in a field of law if such certification is granted by an organization approved by an appropriate state authority or accredited by the American Bar Association or another organization, such as a state bar association, that has been approved by the state authority to accredit organizations that certify lawyers as specialists. Certification signifies that an objective entity has recognized an advanced degree of knowledge and experience in the specialty area greater than is suggested by general licensure to practice law. Certifying organizations may be expected to apply standards of experience, knowledge and proficiency to insure that a lawyer's recognition as a specialist is meaningful and reliable. In order to insure that consumers can obtain access to useful information about an organization granting certification, the name of the certifying organization must be included in any communication regarding the certification.

#### **SCR 20:7.5 Firm names and letterheads**

(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates SCR 20:7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise in violation of SCR 20:7.1.

(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name or other professional designation in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional

limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.

(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.

(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] A firm may be designated by the names of all or some of its members, by the names of deceased members where there has been a continuing succession in the firm's identity or by a trade name such as the "ABC Legal Clinic." A lawyer or law firm may also be designated by a distinctive website address or comparable professional designation. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that legislation may prohibit the use of trade names in professional practice, use of such names in law practice is acceptable so long as it is not misleading. If a private firm uses a trade name that includes a geographical name such as "Springfield Legal Clinic," an express disclaimer that it is a public legal aid agency may be required to avoid a misleading implication. It may be observed that any firm name including the name of a deceased partner is, strictly speaking, a trade name. The use of such names to designate law firms has proven a useful means of identification. However, it is misleading to use the name of a lawyer not associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm, or the name of a nonlawyer.

[2] With regard to paragraph (d), lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact associated with each other in a law firm, may not denominate themselves as, for example, "Smith and Jones," for that title suggests that they are practicing law together in a firm.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **False and misleading information on letterheads**

Subparagraph (a) requires that firm names and letterheads not be false or misleading. Letterheads have been misleading when they 1) do not accurately identify the law firm [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2009 WI 106 (sending invoices on the firm's letterhead misdirecting payments owed to the firm to a post office box to which only the lawyer had access); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100 (referring to the law firm on letterhead to be a couple different limited liability companies)]; 2) state or imply that an ineligible lawyer is authorized to practice [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brandt*, 2003 WI 138 (listing a lawyer as "of counsel" on the letterhead without noting that the lawyer was not licensed in Wisconsin); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2014 WI 13 (use of firm letterhead while suspended from practice); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Capistrant*, 2015 WI 88 (while suspended, the lawyer used letter head stating the lawyer was admitted to practice)].

Subparagraph (a) is not violated unless the false communication is material [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hupy*, 2011 WI 38 (affixing a 35<sup>th</sup> Anniversary sticker to the lawyer's letterhead when the firm could trace its lineage only 30 years was not false and misleading because no reasonable person would be influenced by the five-year difference)].

### **Indicating jurisdictional limitations**

When a lawyer has an office in a jurisdiction, the letterhead must indicate limitations of a lawyer not licensed in that jurisdiction [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ness*, 2002 WI 114 (the lawyer maintained an office in Minnesota although not licensed there, and failed to indicate on the letterhead that the lawyer was not licensed in Minnesota)].

### **Asserting partnership status**

Subparagraph (d) requires that lawyers state or imply they practice in a partnership only when that is the fact [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brandt*, 2003 WI 138 (stating that the practice was a partnership when it was not); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brown*, 2010 WI 104 (allowing a lawyer not licensed in Wisconsin falsely to hold himself out as an employee, associate, or partner of the firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2014 WI 75 (allowing a lawyer in an office-sharing arrangement falsely to hold himself out as a partner)].

## **SCR 20:7.6 Political contributions to obtain government legal engagements or appointments by judges**

A lawyer or law firm shall not accept a government legal engagement or an appointment by a judge if the lawyer or law firm makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for the purpose of obtaining or being considered for that type of legal engagement or appointment.

### **ABA COMMENT**

[1] Lawyers have a right to participate fully in the political process, which includes making and soliciting political contributions to candidates for judicial and other public office. Nevertheless, when lawyers make or solicit political contributions in order to obtain an engagement for legal work awarded by a government agency, or to obtain appointment by a judge, the public may legitimately question whether the lawyers engaged to perform the work are selected on the basis of competence and merit. In such a circumstance, the integrity of the profession is undermined.

[2] The term "political contribution" denotes any gift, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of anything of value made directly or indirectly to a candidate, incumbent, political party or campaign committee to influence or provide financial support for election to or retention in judicial or other government office. Political contributions in

initiative and referendum elections are not included. For purposes of this Rule, the term "political contribution" does not include uncompensated services.

[3] Subject to the exceptions below, (i) the term "government legal engagement" denotes any engagement to provide legal services that a public official has the direct or indirect power to award; and (ii) the term "appointment by a judge" denotes an appointment to a position such as referee, commissioner, special master, receiver, guardian or other similar position that is made by a judge. Those terms do not, however, include (a) substantially uncompensated services; (b) engagements or appointments made on the basis of experience, expertise, professional qualifications and cost following a request for proposal or other process that is free from influence based upon political contributions; and (c) engagements or appointments made on a rotational basis from a list compiled without regard to political contributions.

[4] The term "lawyer or law firm" includes a political action committee or other entity owned or controlled by a lawyer or law firm.

[5] Political contributions are for the purpose of obtaining or being considered for a government legal engagement or appointment by a judge if, but for the desire to be considered for the legal engagement or appointment, the lawyer or law firm would not have made or solicited the contributions. The purpose may be determined by an examination of the circumstances in which the contributions occur. For example, one or more contributions that in the aggregate are substantial in relation to other contributions by lawyers or law firms, made for the benefit of an official in a position to influence award of a government legal engagement, and followed by an award of the legal engagement to the contributing or soliciting lawyer or the lawyer's firm would support an inference that the purpose of the contributions was to obtain the engagement, absent other factors that weigh against existence of the proscribed purpose. Those factors may include among others that the contribution or solicitation was made to further a political, social, or economic interest or because of an existing personal, family, or professional relationship with a candidate.

[6] If a lawyer makes or solicits a political contribution under circumstances that constitute bribery or another crime, Rule 8.4(b) is implicated.

## MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

### **SCR 20:8.1 Bar admission and disciplinary matters**

An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

- (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
- (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,



except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by SCR 20:1.6.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. Paragraph (b) of this Rule also requires correction of any prior misstatement in the matter that the applicant or lawyer may have made and affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware.

[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule.

[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship, including Rule 1.6 and, in some cases, Rule 3.3.

### ANNOTATIONS

False statements during a disciplinary investigation are normally charged as violations of SCR 20:8.4(c) or SCR 22.03(6) via SCR 20:8.4(f). False statements, whether by assertion or by omission, may also be charged as violations of this rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kessler*, 2010 WI 121 (the evidence failed to prove the lawyer falsely denied that she knew who had filed a judicial commission complaint against the lawyer's election opponent when the lawyer's husband testified he acted without the lawyer's knowledge); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Urban*, 2002 WI 63 (failing to identify a probate matter the lawyer was representing in response to a lawful request from the disciplinary agency for a list of all probate matters pending in any court, advising the disciplinary agency that estate funds were under the control of the personal representative without also disclosing that the lawyer was the personal representative)].

#### **SCR 20:8.2 Judicial and legal officials**

(a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications

or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.

(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the code of judicial conduct.

### ABA COMMENT

[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity.

[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.

### ANNOTATIONS

Statements made against a judge or other officer violate the rule when false, or when made with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pangman*, 216 Wis. 2d 439, 574 N.W.2d 232 (1998) (accusing the judge of directing a court reporter to remove portions of the official transcript of a proceeding was a violation whether known to be false, or made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity)].

Statements are made with reckless disregard when 1) the lawyer has not investigated the truth or falsity [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2009 WI 59 (a lawyer's assertion that the judge had a relationship with a defendant's former wife was made with reckless disregard where the lawyer had not investigated the truth or falsity of the assertion)], 2) the lawyer can not provide a factual basis for the assertions [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Katerinos*, 2010 WI 28 (a lawyer's assertion that a relationship between the judge and opposing counsel victimized the lawyer's client violated the rule when the assertion was false and when the lawyer could not provide a factual basis for the assertion)], 3) the lawyer's statements are scurrilous or vilifying [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Isaacson*, 2015 WI 33 ("trying a matter . . . is like sending the Jews back to Germany during the Holocaust;" referring to a judge as a "dirty" and "dastardly" Jesuit)], and 4) the lawyer's statements are made in an over-emotional outburst [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers*, 2012 WI 33 (in a loud outburst in court accusing the judge of a cover up, having tunnel vision and a vested interest in the state's case, and running a kangaroo court)].

Statements during a lawyer disciplinary hearing did not result in a finding of a violation, but did result in an admonishment for violating the rules of civility in SCR, Chapter 62 [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Coe*, 2003 WI 117)].

### **SCR 20:8.3 Reporting professional misconduct**

- (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
- (b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
- (c) If the information revealing misconduct under subs. (a) or (b) is confidential under SCR 20:1.6, the lawyer shall consult with the client about the matter and abide by the client's wishes to the extent required by SCR 20:1.6.
- (d) This rule does not require disclosure of any of the following:
- (1) Information gained by a lawyer while participating in a confidential lawyers' assistance program.
  - (2) Information acquired by any person selected to mediate or arbitrate disputes between lawyers arising out of a professional or economic dispute involving law firm dissolutions, termination or departure of one or more lawyers from a law firm where such information is acquired in the course of mediating or arbitrating the dispute between lawyers.

### **WISCONSIN COMMENT**

The change from "having knowledge" to "who knows" in SCR 20:8.3(a) and (b) reflects the adoption of the language used in the ABA Model Rule. See also SCR 20:1.0(g) defining "knows." The requirement under paragraph (c) that the lawyer consult with the client is not expressly included in the Model Rule.

It deletes reference to judges. The reference to confidential lawyers' assistance programs includes programs such as the state bar sponsored Wisconsin Lawyers' Assistance Program (WISLAP), the Law Office Management Assistance Program (LOMAP), or the Ethics Hotline.

### **ABA COMMENT**

[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary

investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.

[2] A report about misconduct is not required where it would involve violation of Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests.

[3] If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure to report any violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, therefore, required in complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term "substantial" refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. A report should be made to the bar disciplinary agency unless some other agency, such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate in the circumstances. Similar considerations apply to the reporting of judicial misconduct.

[4] The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer whose professional conduct is in question. Such a situation is governed by the Rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship.

[5] Information about a lawyer's or judge's misconduct or fitness may be received by a lawyer in the course of that lawyer's participation in an approved lawyers or judges assistance program. In that circumstance, providing for an exception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Rule encourages lawyers and judges to seek treatment through such a program. Conversely, without such an exception, lawyers and judges may hesitate to seek assistance from these programs, which may then result in additional harm to their professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of clients and the public. These Rules do not otherwise address the confidentiality of information received by a lawyer or judge participating in an approved lawyers' assistance program; such an obligation, however, may be imposed by the rules of the program or other law.

## ANNOTATIONS

Subparagraph (a) requires lawyers to report professional misconduct to OLR. A lawyer's threats to report another lawyer to OLR may be part of a pattern of harassing conduct under SCR 20:3.1(a)(3) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur*, 2005 WI 40 (the requirement to report professional conduct was not a defense to a lawyer's threats against opposing counsel where the disciplinary referee found that the lawyer had engaged in a pattern of harassing conduct for more than a decade)].

### **SCR 20:8.4 Misconduct**

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

#### WISCONSIN COMMENT

In addition to the obligations in this rule, Wisconsin Attorneys should note the obligations concerning notification set forth in SCR 21.15(5) and SCR 22.22(1).

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(d) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

(e) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or

(f) violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers;

(g) violate the attorney's oath;

(h) fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or SCR 22.04(1); or

(i) harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's professional activities. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate par. (i).

#### WISCONSIN COMMENT

Intentional violation of tax laws, including failure to file tax returns or failure to pay taxes may violate SCR 20:8.4(f), absent a showing of inability to pay. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cassidy, 172 Wis. 2d 600, 493 N.W.2d 362 (1992).

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

Failure to cooperate, paragraph (h), was previously enforced as a violation of paragraph (f). Paragraph (h) was added to the rule to provide better notice to lawyers of the obligation to cooperate. Other statutes, rules, orders, and decisions continue to be included within the definition of misconduct and are enforceable under paragraph (f).

Paragraphs (f) through (i) do not have counterparts in the Model Rule. What constitutes harassment under paragraph (i) may be determined with reference to anti-discrimination legislation and interpretive case law. Because of differences in content and numbering, care should be used when consulting the ABA Comment.

## ABA COMMENT

[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.

[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.

[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule.

[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.

[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.

## ANNOTATIONS

### **Attempts, Assists, and Inducements**

The object of the lawyer's attempt, assistance, or inducement must be a violation of the Rules of Professional Misconduct [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2005 WI 39 (having a client sign a document releasing the lawyer's partner from liability for malpractice in violation of SCR 20:1.8); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Robinson*, 2005 WI 88 (attempting to contact a represented party in violation of SCR 20:4.2 through a third party); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knight*, 2008 WI 13 (assisting an

unlicensed person to practice law in Wisconsin in violation of SCR 20:5.5 by allowing the unlicensed person to use the lawyer's name and attorney number); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2008 WI 17 (the lawyer was ineligible to obtain a liquor license due to a pending OWI case and induced another person to apply for a license in the lawyer's stead contrary to SCR 20:8.4(b)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brown*, 2010 WI 104 (allowing the lawyer's husband, who was not licensed in Wisconsin or a part of the lawyer's firm, to hold himself out as "of counsel" to the firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Roethe*, 2010 WI 19 (directing the lawyer's assistant to change the date and the name of the preparer on a deed after it had been signed and without the knowledge of the grantors, which violated SCR 20:8.4(c)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2013 WI 20 (signing the lawyer's name to briefs prepared by the National Legal Professional Association assisted the unauthorized practice of law by the Association in violation of SCR 20:5.5). Cf. [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goldstein*, 2010 WI 26 (the lawyer did not attempt to contact a represented person through another where the referee found that the lawyer told the other person to thank the party for continuing to business with the lawyer, and did not discuss the subject of the representation such that there would have been no violation of SCR 20:4.2); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kessler*, 2010 WI 120 (inducing a third party to file a judicial commission complaint against an election opponent as a means to conceal the campaign as the source of the complaint and suggesting that if questioned the third party say she learned of the matter at a cocktail party did not violate subparagraph (a) because the false statement was not made, therefore, there was no violation of SCR 20:8.4(c))].

### **Criminal Conduct by a Lawyer**

Criminal conduct related to the practice of law or to the representation of a client will generally be found to reflect adversely on a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Birdsall*, 2004 WI 143 (aiding and abetting the client's violation of a no-contact order constituting bail-jumping); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Paulus*, 2004 WI 71 (accepting bribes while holding office as district attorney); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hausmann*, 2005 WI 131 (a kickback scheme in a client referral agreement deprived clients of the "intangible right to honest services" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2314 and 2)].

Criminal conduct wholly unrelated to the practice of law has been found also to reflect adversely on a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peterson*, 2006 WI 41 (using cocaine); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Soldon*, 2010 WI 27 (retail theft); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2012 WI 10 (disorderly conduct in a domestic dispute, breaching a bond condition); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2015 WI 14 (illegal transportation and disposal of hazardous waste); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Switalski*, 2015 WI 99 (possession of child pornography)].

Criminal conduct may be in violation of the rule even if the conduct did not result in a criminal charge or conviction [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schoenecker*, 2011 WI 76 (although not criminally charged, the lawyer was found to have committed criminal

bankruptcy fraud and to have violated SCR 20:8.4(b); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Netzer*, 2014 WI 7 (conduct resulting in charges that were “read in” and considered for sentencing were considered with charges resulting in conviction to find that the lawyer violated SCR 20:8.4(b)].

Not all criminal conduct violates the rule, but only criminal conduct that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness. *Cp. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brandt*, 2009 WI 43 (the referee’s conclusion that convictions for OWI 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> did not reflect adversely on the lawyer’s fitness was rejected by the Supreme Court, which decided that while each case must be reviewed on the particular facts presented, the lawyer’s conviction of multiple OWIs demonstrated a pattern of misconduct evincing a serious lack of respect for law that reflected adversely on the lawyer’s fitness), and *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stearn*, 2004 WI 73 (homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle), with *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johns*, 2014 WI 32 (homicide by use of a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration was not found to reflect adversely on the lawyer’s fitness where the disciplinary complaint was filed over 7 years after the offense, the misconduct was a one-time aberration, the lawyer had otherwise lived an exemplary professional and personal life).

Criminal conduct involving an element of dishonesty violates the rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Paulus*, 2004 WI 71 (accepting bribes while holding office as district attorney); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hausmann*, 2005 WI 131 (a kickback scheme in a client referral agreement deprived clients of the “intangible right to honest services” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2314 and 2); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur*, 2006 WI 127 (assisting the lawyer’s spouse to commit bankruptcy fraud and money laundering); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Acker*, 2007 WI 117 (fabricating and forging estate closing certificates); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gral*, 2007 WI 22 (mail fraud); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goldstein*, 2010 WI 26 (conversion of estate funds while acting as special administrator); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Soldon*, 2010 WI 27 (retail theft); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stokes*, 2012 WI 105 (theft by fraudulent billings for State Public Defender work, and perjury during a John Doe proceeding investigating the fraudulent billings); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bielinski*, 2012 WI 123 (felony theft by misrepresenting that the lawyer represented clients seeking to recover surplus funds from mortgage foreclosure cases); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Berman*, 2014 WI 2 (conspiracy to commit securities fraud); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kranitz*, 2014 WI 47 (conspiracy to commit securities fraud); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Semancik* 2015 WI 31 (felony theft – embezzlement)].

An alleged act involving dishonesty was found not to be criminal, and therefore not to violate the rule when the dishonesty was not material [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2009 WI 106 (applying for a post office box as a principal of the firm when the lawyer was of counsel was false and misleading, but not material such that the lawyer violated 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2)].



Criminal conduct not involving an element of dishonesty may also violate the rule. This determination will be made on a case by case basis [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brandt*, 2009 WI 43 (the referee's conclusion that convictions for OWI 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> did not reflect adversely on the lawyer's fitness was rejected by the Supreme Court, which decided that while each case must be reviewed on the particular facts presented, the lawyer's conviction of multiple OWIs demonstrated a pattern of misconduct evincing a serious lack of respect for law that reflected adversely on the lawyer's fitness)]. Some other forms of criminal conduct found to be in violation of the rule include [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hubatch*, 2013 WI 94 (felony armed robbery); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2014 WI 120 (PAC as repeater, consumption of alcohol and commission of crime in violation of bond, violation of a no-contact order); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2015 WI 14 (illegal transportation and disposal of hazardous waste); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Switalski*, 2015 WI 99 (possession of child pornography)].

Categories of criminal conduct not involving an element of dishonesty typically found to violate the rule include drug offenses [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peterson*, 2006 WI 41 (rule in effect prior to July 1, 2007) (using cocaine); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Compton*, 2010 WI 112 (possession of heroin); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moore*, 2013 WI 96 (asking the client to purchase marijuana for the lawyer resulting in the lawyer's conviction of possession as a party to a crime)]; OWI cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carranza*, 2014 WI 121 (OWI 2<sup>nd</sup>); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Belke*, 2015 WI 41 (OWI 2<sup>nd</sup>); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against LeSieur*, 2010 WI 117 (OWI 3<sup>rd</sup>); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steinhafel*, 2013 WI 93 (OWI 3<sup>rd</sup> with a minor in the vehicle); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ewald-Herrick*, 2014 WI 40 (OWI 4<sup>th</sup>)]; disorderly conduct cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2009 WI 59 (disorderly conduct); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2012 WI 10 (disorderly conduct in a domestic dispute, breaching a bond condition); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovsky*, 2013 WI 100 (battery and disorderly conduct as acts of domestic abuse; "Domestic violence is an undisputedly serious crime that reflects adversely on . . . honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman*, 2014 WI 15 (disorderly conduct in a domestic violence situation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Belke*, 2015 WI 41 (disorderly conduct domestic abuse)]; and sexual misconduct cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winch*, 2009 WI 64 and *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Switalski*, 2015 WI 99 (possession of child pornography); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Addison*, 2012 WI 38 and *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Butler*, 2012 WI 37 (reckless endangerment and sexual gratification in public); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Engl*, 2013 WI 36 (child enticement-sexual contact and sexual assault of a child under 16); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Evenson*, 2015 WI 38 (delivery of a controlled substance and fourth degree sexual assault)].

### **Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation**

A finding of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation does not require proof of the tort of misrepresentation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marks*, 2003 WI 114

(asserting and maintaining a lien on settlement proceeds of 25% after the client terminated the representation and where the engagement agreement provided for payment of an hourly fee of \$1812.24. The court concluded that a finding of misrepresentation under Supreme Court Rule 8.4(c) does not require proof of the tort of misrepresentation, citing *In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schalow*, 131 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 388 N.W.2d 176 (1986). The court determined that the lawyer knew his fee was not to be calculated on a contingent basis.)]

Neither does a violation require proof of intent [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100 (recklessly claiming a \$122,000 tax deduction for business expenses that were either unsubstantiated or had been previously reimbursed); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mulligan*, 2015 WI 96 (“A lawyer must hold the property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. SCR 20:1.15 (Wisconsin Comment). A finding of wrongful intent is not necessary to prove a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). A violation of SCR 20:8.4 (c) can be based on an attorney's "carelessness and neglect." See, e.g., *Carroll*, 248 Wis. 2d 662; *Usow*, 214 Wis. 2d 596. Similarly, an attorney's claim of good faith does not preclude a determination of misconduct in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). See, e.g., *In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Edgar*, 230 Wis. 2d 205, 601 N.W.2d 284 (1999)”. Cf., *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Podell*, 2013 WI 25 (duplicate requests for reimbursement of expenses were unintentional and careless mistakes, and did not violate the rule where the lawyer admitted the requests were improper and mistaken, and where the lawyer promptly repaid the amount due and would not submit any further requests for reimbursement); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steffes*, 2014 WI 128 (a lawyer who allowed his son to deposit funds into and disburse funds from the lawyer's trust account for the son's business purposes and who knew the son to have financial difficulties violated trust account rules but did not engage in dishonesty or fraud where the lawyer did not benefit personally and where the referee found the lawyer to be careless but not engaged in fraud)].

Proof of misrepresentation requires evidence showing the lawyer had actual knowledge of the falsity of the representation or acted with reckless disregard [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goluba*, 2013 WI 32 (the evidence failed to prove the lawyer falsely asserted to the court that a beneficiary had been paid where the referee found the lawyer did not know the assertion to be false at the time it was made. The court cited the definition of misrepresentation in SCR 20:1.0(h), “communication of an untruth, either knowingly or with reckless disregard, whether by statement or omission, which if accepted would lead another to believe a condition exists that does not actually exist.”)].

Examples of knowing misrepresentations include *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2012 WI 54 (backdating letters to OLR to falsely represent the letters were prepared before investigative deadlines); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovsky*, 2012 WI 120 (backdating a document prior to the date information in the document would have been available and known, and submitting the backdated document to OLR during the investigation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2012 WI 17 (filing a post-suspension affidavit with OLR falsely asserting the lawyer was representing only

one client and that the lawyer had no funds in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper*, 2013 WI 55 (falsely asserting to the client that the lawyer had received a settlement offer from opposing counsel); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper*, 2013 WI 97 (altering the date on a bankruptcy petition); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moore*, 2013 WI 96 (providing his client \$400 to buy marijuana, subsequently falsely asserting that the purpose was a good faith buy to show an ability to work with law enforcement and was done with the knowledge of law enforcement authorities); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (filing an affidavit with OLR misrepresenting the lawyer's compliance with terms and conditions of suspension); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (misrepresenting to the client that work had been done when the work had not been done); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Briggs*, 2014 WI 119 (providing false factual information to OLR regarding the timing of his communications with a client and regarding notice to clients of his suspension from practice); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (providing false information to a third party regarding the status of the client's appeal and a motion for rehearing); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2014 WI 120 (providing false information to the court in defense of an allegation that the lawyer violated a domestic abuse injunction); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 90 (falsely asserting to the court clerk that time limits were not in issue, submitting a draft order containing findings never made by the court); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chavez*, 2015 WI 39 (providing false information to a client about the status of the case, falsely telling a client the lawyer could continue the representation after the lawyer was suspended, agreeing to represent a client and receiving funds knowing the lawyer would soon be suspended and without advising the client of the impending suspension); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mitz*, 2015 WI 37 (misrepresenting to a lien holder that settlement funds were in trust when the lawyer knew the funds had already been disbursed; misrepresenting to OLR that the lawyer learned of the lien on trust funds after the funds had been disbursed)].

A misrepresentation may be made by omission [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovsky*, 2013 WI 100 (requesting a stay from the court on grounds of a health care leave of absence, when the lawyer appeared in other cases during the stay, and when the lawyer failed to disclose his criminal trial, conviction, and sentence as a reason for a stay); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2013 WI 8 (failing to advise the client that the client's case was dismissed, advising the client the case was still viable when the lawyer knew it had been dismissed, and allowing the case to be dismissed in order to mislead a creditor of the client and gain an advantage for the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tishberg*, 2014 WI 118 (engaging in a course of conduct to hide from the client the fact that the client's personal injury lawsuit had been dismissed, and deceiving the client into believing the client had obtained a settlement); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2014 WI 111 (engaging in a pattern of conduct in which the lawyer obtained clients' real estate in business transactions with the clients that did not involve a meeting of the minds or in which the terms were not fair and reasonable to the client, and in which the clients' relied on their trust in the lawyer to their detriment); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koenig*, 2015 WI 16 (receiving \$39,920 in legal fees for legal work performed for client of his law firm and others using the firm's resources

without reporting the fees to the firm and when falsifying billing statements to conceal the conduct); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2015 WI 104 (filing applications for fee waivers in bankruptcy cases that failed to disclose the funds being held in trust by the lawyer for payment of filing fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel*, 2015 WI 68 (concealing from the client that the client's case had been dismissed pursuant to a motion for summary judgment); *Cf.*, *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Isaacson*, 2015 WI 33 (default judgment was not granted for an allegation or misrepresentation by omission when the lawyer accused a judge of appointing a receiver ex parte without also disclosing that the lawyer had signed loan papers consenting to appointment without notice because the allegations in the complaint alone were not sufficient to show the lawyer consented to the appointment of a receiver without notice).]

A deceptive statement may violate the rule even if not used to defraud another; however, inducing another to make a deceptive statement did not violate the rule where the deceptive statement had not been made [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kessler*, 2010 WI 120].

Dishonesty generally has been found where a lawyer converts client or third party funds [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brown*, 2012 WI 51; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stange*, 2012 WI 66; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grenisen*, 2013 WI 99 (having an incompetent client transfer property to the lawyer without the knowledge or approval of the court or the guardian ad litem); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritter*, 2013 WI 3 (receiving funds from the State Public Defender owed to a third person and converting the funds for the lawyer's own benefit); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter*, 2014 WI 126 (converting a client's funds and providing the client false information regarding the funds); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2014 WI 75 (converting funds from a guardianship estate and misrepresenting to the court the handling of the assets); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bartz*, 2015 WI 61 (misappropriating funds held in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laux*, 2015 WI 59 (converting \$585,000 of client funds for the lawyer's own purposes, misrepresenting to the client the status of the funds, and forging documents to cover the misrepresentation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mulligan*, 2015 WI 96 (disbursing trust funds for personal use was dishonest despite OLR's inability to prove "the conversion of any particular client funds" where the lawyer knew he was withdrawing funds from some client, citing *In Re Trust Estate of Martin*, 39 Wis. 2d 437 (1968), "A trustee is not handling his own funds but funds of others and he must always be able to make a full accounting of his stewardship. When a trustee's accounts are not clear and accurate, all presumptions are against him and the obscurities and doubts are to be taken adversely against him."); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Runyon*, 2015 WI 95 (converting funds from client matters in order to cover checks issued in other client matters for which there were not sufficient funds in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hotvedt*, 2016 WI 93 (converting fees owed to the law firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lunde*, 2016 WI 84 (maintaining a trust account balance that fell below the amount of funds received and to be held for a client)].

Dishonesty also has been found where a lawyer fails to obey a court order or to honor an agreement regarding the preservation of funds [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raneda*, 2012 WI 42 (knowing the court directed funds to be set aside in trust, the lawyer asserted to the court that funds were deposited into trust without informing the court that the lawyer had also withdrawn the funds for payment of the lawyer's fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steinhafel*, 2013 WI 93 (disbursing proceeds of a sale to the client in contravention of an agreement made with adverse counsel and misrepresenting to adverse counsel that the funds remained in trust); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100 (despite a court order to pay subrogated parties before taking a fee and to reduce the fee if funds were not sufficient to pay subrogated parties, the lawyer first took the entire fee without paying the subrogated parties; converting trust funds to the lawyer's own purposes)].

In certain cases, the lawyer's obtaining of fees may violate this rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman*, 2014 WI 15 (using a position of trust as lawyer, trustee, and financial power of attorney to \$604,000 from a client in excessive fees); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Caspari*, 2016 WI 72 (false billings to the State Public Defender); *Cf.*, *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strouse*, 2015 WI 83 (the referee's findings of fact were insufficient to support a violation of dishonesty where the lawyer was found in civil court to have increased the fee without the client's consent because the civil court proceeding required a lower burden of proof)].

Other types of cases with findings of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation have involved 1) the violation of tax laws [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (failing to file tax returns and pay tax on income earned); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100 (failing to report a real estate transaction and any accompanying gains or losses on the lawyer's tax return; recklessly claiming a \$122,000 tax deduction for business expenses that were either unsubstantiated or had been previously reimbursed); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McClure*, 2015 WI 25 (placing the lawyer's funds into trust in an effort to protect the funds from seizure to pay tax warrants)]; and 2) breaches of fiduciary duties to the lawyer's law firm [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Siderits*, 2013 WI 2 (inflating billable hours in the firm's accounting system to qualify for a bonus, and subsequently deleting billable time from the accounting system to evade detection); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koenig*, 2015 WI 16 (receiving \$39,920 in legal fees for legal work performed for client of his law firm and others using the firm's resources without reporting the fees to the firm and when falsifying billing statements to conceal the conduct)].

**Stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law**

A lawyer violated the rule by asserting to a client that he could obtain a favorable result in a matter because the assistant district attorney was the lawyer's brother-in-law [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koehn*, 2006 WI 50].

## **Violating a statute, rule, order or decision regulating the conduct of lawyers**

Not all statutes, rules, orders, or decisions regulate the conduct of a lawyer. [*Cp.*, SCR 20:3.4(c), which establishes that a lawyer obey obligations under the rules of a tribunal.] Nevertheless, where the statute, rule, order, or decision establishes a standard regulating the conduct of a lawyer, the Supreme Court has applied SCR 20:8.4(f).

### *Violating a statute*

A statute relating to civil or criminal procedure may be considered to regulate the conduct of lawyers under SCR 20:8.4(f) [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riek*, 2013 WI 81 (the lawyer did not violate Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(h), which requires a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence within a reasonable time before trial, when the prosecutor disclosed the information 4 days before trial); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sylvan*, 202 Wis. 2d 123 (1996) (charging a 3% fee for probating an estate in violation of Wisconsin Stat. §851.40(2)(e)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Roethe*, 2010 WI 19 (contracting for a percentage fee to probate an estate contrary to statute); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Conmey*, 2005 WI 166 (receiving fees as lawyer for the estate and personal representative without first obtaining court approval in violation of Wisconsin Stat. §857.05(3))].

### *Violating a rule*

Rules regulating the conduct of lawyers enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f) are generally those established by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Court's constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law. These rules relate to obligations of State Bar membership, compliance with continuing legal education requirements, and regulatory enforcement.

A lawyer is obligated to notify the State Bar of a change in address [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fisher*, 2010 WI 45; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Niesen*, 2011 WI 97 (failing to notify the State Bar of the lawyer's change of address in violation of SCR 10.03(2))].

A lawyer is also obligated to pay State Bar dues; failure to pay dues may result in suspension of the license to practice law, and discipline for practicing while suspended [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bryant*, 2014 WI 43 (appearing in court and filing documents with the court during an administrative suspension for failing to pay dues and file a trust account certification in violation of SCRs 10.03(6), 20:1.15(i)(4), and 22.26(2)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 90 (a lawyer whose Wisconsin license was suspended, and who attempted to appear pro hac vice in a Wisconsin court, engaged in the practice of law while his license was administratively suspended, in violation of SCRs 10.03(6), 31.10(1), 22.26(2)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sayaovong*, 2015 WI 100 (sending a proposed stipulation to opposing counsel while the lawyer's license was suspended due to failure to pay bar dues violated SCR 10.03(6) and SCR 22.26(2))].

A lawyer is obligated to obtain and report continuing legal education credits; failure to obtain and report credits may result in suspension of the license to practice law, and discipline for practicing while suspended [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trudgeon*, 2010 WI 103 (practicing law while suspended for failing to comply with continuing legal education requirements in violation of Supreme Court Rules 22.26(2) and 31.10(1)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2011 WI 3 (appearing in court with clients during the lawyer's suspension for failing to comply with CLE requirements in violation of Supreme Court Rule 31.10(1)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka*, 2014 WI 34 (submitting a letter brief to a court on behalf of a client, thereby practicing law, during a time when the lawyer's license was suspended violated SCR 31.10 and SCR 22.26(2)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Capistrant*, 2015 WI 88 (practicing law when the lawyer's license was suspended violated SCR 22.26(2) and SCR 31.10(1)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chavez*, 2015 WI 39 (practicing law when the lawyer's license was suspended violated SCR 22.26(2) and SCR 31.10(1))].

A lawyer is required to notify in writing OLR and the Clerk of the Supreme Court when the lawyer is found guilty or convicted of a crime [SCR 21.15(5)]. Failure to notify OLR and the Clerk in writing within 5 days after the finding of guilt or conviction is misconduct [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schoenecker*, 2011 WI 76 (failing to notify OLR and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the lawyer's convictions of crimes in violation of Supreme Court Rule 21.15(5)). *Cp. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johns*, 2014 WI 32 (an allegation that the lawyer failed to notify OLR in writing of his conviction was dismissed where counsel for the lawyer had an off the record discussion with OLR prior to the lawyer's plea, and the court concluded that the violation was of the most technical variety); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Netzer*, 2014 WI 7 (the Court upheld a finding that failure to notify OLR and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the lawyer's conviction within five days violated SCR 21.15(5) when the notice was slightly tardy, but deemed the violation de minimus)]. A lawyer must report a conviction from another jurisdiction [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rollins*, 2012 WI 48 (failing to notify OLR and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the lawyer's criminal conviction in another jurisdiction in violation of Supreme Court Rule 21.15(5)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2015 WI 14 (failing to report a conviction in Ohio to OLR and the Clerk of the Supreme Court violated SCR 21.15(5))].

Upon suspension of the license to practice, the lawyer has obligations to notify clients, courts with matters pending, and opposing counsel [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis*, 2011 WI 3 (failing to notify clients, courts, and opposing counsel of the lawyer's suspension in violation of Supreme Court Rule 22.26(1)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100 (failing to notify a client of the lawyer's suspension and falsely claiming in an affidavit to OLR that all clients had been notified violated SCR 22.26(1))].

Upon suspension, the lawyer must also cease practicing law and may be disciplined for practicing during a suspension [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2012 WI 17 (continuing to represent a client when suspended from the practice of law in violation of

Supreme Court Rule 22.26(2)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Maynard*, 2014 WI 13; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Capistrant*, 2015 WI 88].

#### *Violating an order*

Violating the Supreme Court's disciplinary order may result in subsequent discipline [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Broadnax*, 225 Wis. 2d 440 (1999) (failing to abstain from use of a controlled substance in violation of the court's previous license suspension order); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister*, 2012 WI 102 (where OLR filed a motion to enforce a Supreme Court disciplinary order, the OLR could have instead conducted an investigation and pursued discipline under Supreme Court Rule 20:8.4(f), which provides that it is professional misconduct to violate a Supreme Court order)].

#### *Violating a decision*

The Supreme Court has established ethical standards in disciplinary decisions. Most common of these standards relate to violations of tax laws, fiduciary duties to the lawyer's firm, and lawyer's duties in probate cases.

In *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Owens*, 172 Wis. 2d 54 (1992), the Supreme Court established a standard of conduct that subjects a lawyer to discipline for willful violations of tax laws. Violations have been found for willful failures to file tax returns [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woods*, 2009 WI 7; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against McClure*, 2015 WI 25], to pay taxes [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woods*, 2009 WI 7 (failing to file tax return, pay taxes and satisfy tax warrants); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27], to report income [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman*, 2014 WI 15; *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100], and claiming deductions to which the lawyer was not entitled [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman*, 2014 WI 100].

In *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea*, 190 Wis. 2d 560 (1995), the Supreme Court established a lawyer's fiduciary duty to the law firm [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schoenecker*, 2011 WI 76 (establishment of a clandestine law office and failure to disclose fees earned in the separate law office constituted a breach of fiduciary duty to the lawyer's firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Siderits*, 2013 WI 2 (misrepresenting billable time in order to receive bonuses to which the lawyer was not entitled, and circumventing the firm's bookkeeper to prevent disclosure constituted violations of the fiduciary duty to the firm and the duty of honesty in professional dealings with the firm); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman*, 2014 WI 15 (concealing from the firm fees earned in the lawyer's position as a trustee violated a standard of conduct set forth in *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea*, 190 Wis. 2d 560 (1995)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ruppelt*, 2014 WI 53 (providing false information to the firm regarding the nature and timing of the lawyer's sexual relationship with a firm's client violated a standard of conduct set forth in *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea*, 190 Wis. 2d 560 (1995)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koenig*, 2015 WI 16 (receiving \$39,920 in legal fees without reporting the fees to the



firm and falsifying billing statements to cover up the embezzlement violated SCR 20:8.4(f)].

In *State v. Hartman*, 54 Wis. 2d 47 (1972), the Supreme Court established a requirement that a lawyer representing an estate act in good faith regarding the distribution of assets; the court enforced the standard in a subsequent case [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Flessas*, 199 Wis. 2d 204 (1996) (a lawyer violated the standard of conduct in by failing to seek court approval of the sale of estate property to the lawyer's son)].

In *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sylvan*, 202 Wis. 2d 123 (1996) the Supreme Court disciplined a lawyer for charging a fee in a probate matter in violation of statute. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court found similar conduct to be in violation of the Sylvan Standard [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kasprovicz*, 2004 WI 151 (charging a percentage fee to probate an estate in violation of the standard in *Sylvan*)].

### **Violating the Attorney's Oath**

The Attorney's Oath is at Supreme Court Rule 40.15. Disciplinary cases involving violations of the oath typically involve the offensive personality clause and the respect due to courts clause.

Violations of the offensive personality clause have been found in the following circumstances [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beaver*, 181 Wis. 2d 12 (1994) (verbally threatening to kill a man who was an adversary party in pending litigation and striking and pushing that man's vehicle with his own); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sandy*, 208 Wis. 2d 375 (1997) (directing an obscenity at the lawyer's client in the presence of others); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Blask*, 216 Wis. 2d 129 (1998) (physical altercations with a referee after a high school basketball game and with a 67-year-old man outside the courthouse office of the register in probate); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johann*, 216 Wis. 2d 118 (1998) (distributing a handout with a picture of the father in the lawyer's paternity lawsuit with a caption "Accused Serial Rapist" and urging a boycott of the father's business); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ray*, 2002 WI 116 (yelling at the sister and friend of the opposing party in a custody dispute and threatening them with jail constituted offensive personality in violation of the Attorney's Oath); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beatse*, 2006 WI 115 (making offensive sexual comments to a court reporter and using the state email system to send and receive numerous messages containing inappropriate sexual content); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2011 WI 2 (publishing confidential, personal, and irrelevant information regarding a client, with whom the lawyer had a sexual relationship, in a manner that served to intimidate, embarrass, and harass the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kratz*, 2014 WI 31 (while serving as a district attorney, by sending text messages to a domestic abuse victim in a case the lawyer was prosecuting, and by making sexual comments to a social worker the lawyer engaged in offensive personality); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Evenson*, 2015 WI 38 (urging an intoxicated woman to accompany him, providing her with "ecstasy" and alcohol, and sexually assaulting her)].

In contrast, the lawyer was found not to have engaged in offensive personality when a lawyer's letters to the editor were insulting and accused city officials of corruption, but were intended to protect the interests of the client; and the conduct was not as egregious as found to violate the oath in other cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Williams*, 2005 WI 15].

Violations of the respect due to courts clause have been found in the following circumstances [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pangman*, 216 Wis. 2d 439 (1998) (disrupting the court, in violation of SCR 20:3.5(c) also constituted a failure to maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ray*, 2002 WI 116 (interrupting opposing counsel and arguing with the judge during a hearing constituted failure to maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers in violation of the Attorney's Oath); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg*, 2004 WI 14 (during a department of transportation hearing, the lawyer was rude, abusive, and controlling; and ignored the examiner's instructions and told the examiner to be quiet); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riordan*, 2012 WI 125 (court filings containing negative rhetoric accusing the judge of bias and a lack of integrity); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers*, 2012 WI 33 (the lawyer failed to maintain the respect due courts and judicial officers by engaging in loud, disorderly, contemptuous, and insolent behavior during a hearing and by falsely accusing the Judge of a cover up and running a kangaroo court); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2014 WI 120 (failing to appear in court in person and falsely representing to the court that the lawyer had permission to appear by telephone resulting in a contempt finding); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sommers*, 2014 WI 103 (issuing a press release, entitled, "Corruption in Wisconsin Courts – Supreme Court Candidate Speaks Out," in which the lawyer purported to explain how judges are permitted to falsify the record); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 90 (arguing with the judge about the judge's denial of the lawyer's pro hac vice motion); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Isaacson*, 2015 WI 33 (filing court documents with unfounded, scurrilous, vilifying statements and religious slurs directed against judges and city officials)].

### **Failing to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance**

The rule references several Supreme Court Rules that require lawyers to cooperate with the disciplinary agency [SCR 21.15(4) requiring cooperation in the investigation, prosecution and disposition of grievances, complaints and petitions for reinstatement; SCR 22.001(9)(b) defining failure to cooperate as a form of professional misconduct; SCR 22.03(2) requiring a lawyer to fully and fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served a request for a written response; SCR 22.03(6) providing that willful failure to provide relevant information, to answer questions fully, to furnish documents, or to make a misrepresentation are misconduct; and SCR 22.04(1) requiring a lawyer to cooperate with an investigation by district committee].

*SCR 21.15(4)*

SCR 21.15(4) states:

Every attorney shall cooperate with the office of lawyer regulation in the investigation, prosecution and disposition of grievances, complaints filed with or by the director, and petitions for reinstatement. An attorney's wilful failure to cooperate with the office of lawyer regulation constitutes violation of the rules of professional conduct for attorneys.

The language of this rule does not limit the lawyer's duty to cooperate to those situations where the lawyer is the respondent or a petitioner in a matter. While it may apply to lawyers who are not the subject of an investigation but who are potential witnesses or who have relevant information, it appears that the rule has been applied only in cases where the lawyer was the subject of the investigation.

The rule is frequently cited with other rules requiring cooperation, as illustrated by the following cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pitts*, 2007 WI 112 (failing to produce trust account records requested by OLR); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jones*, 2008 WI 53 (failing to respond to requests for an interview by the district committee); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hansen*, 2009 WI 56 (misrepresenting to OLR that the lawyer would refund an advance payment of fees within a few days); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister*, 2010 WI 108 (failing to respond to six phone calls from the district committee investigator constituted a failure to cooperate where the lawyer's assertions that his phone service was not working was not supported by phone service records); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Erspamer*, 2011 WI 85 (although the lawyer agreed to answer questions in writing, the lawyer failed to cooperate by refusing to speak with a special investigator on the phone when a phone conversation was necessary for the special investigator to evaluate the lawyer's mental health)].

The cooperation required by the rule prevents lawyers from improperly interfering with an OLR investigation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall*, 2011 WI 21 (the lawyer improperly interfered with OLR's investigation by sending a demand for additional fees to a former client coupled with a demand that the former client withdraw his grievance; but the lawyer did not improperly interfere with another OLR investigation where the evidence did not link the lawyer's refund of fees to a client with the client's withdrawal of his grievance); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arellano*, 2013 WI 24 (OLR agreed to dismiss an allegation of failure to cooperate where the attorney told a witness not to speak with an investigator, but the witness had also been persuaded by grievants to provide false information to the investigator); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2014 WI 111 (attempting to persuade grievants to withdraw their grievances or to cease cooperating with OLR's investigation)].

*SCR 22.001(9)(b)*

SCR 22.001(9)(b) includes in the definition of misconduct: "Failure to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance." The rule is rarely cited in disciplinary cases, but has been applied to a respondent's failure to cooperate in a grievance investigation [*Disciplinary*

*Proceedings Against Cotten*, 2002 WI 112 (failing to provide a written response to a grievance and failing to provide additional information requested by the district committee violated SCR 22.001(9)(b)); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gilbert*, 2003 WI 131 (failing to provide OLR a written supplemental response constituted a failure to cooperate as defined in SCR 22.001(9)(b), in violation of SCR 22.03(6)].

SCR 22.03(2)

SCR 22.03(2) states:

Upon commencing an investigation, the director shall notify the respondent of the matter being investigated unless in the opinion of the director the investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a request for a written response. The director may allow additional time to respond. Following receipt of the response, the director may conduct further investigation and may compel the respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and present any information deemed relevant to the investigation.

The rule requires a lawyer to respond within 20 days after being served notice of a formal investigation by ordinary mail [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister*, 2007 WI 55 (delayed responses to OLR requests for information were not excused when the lawyer asked for extensions and subsequently failed to provide the information by the extended deadline, and when OLR withdrew motions for temporary suspension upon the receipt of the belated response); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Zajac*, 2008 WI 42 (failing to provide a timely response); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fisher*, 2010 WI 45 (a lawyer who abandoned the practice and left the country could not be contacted despite attempts by OLR and failed to respond to grievances failed to cooperate)].

The rule requires a lawyer to provide a full and fair disclosure of all facts and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Zajac*, 2008 WI 42 (failing to provide all the records and information requested); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka*, 2009 WI 38 (a lawyer did not answer questions fully when the lawyer's response stated "it would be unproductive for me to answer all of your questions" and the lawyer provided the contents of the file and directed the investigator to review the file); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb*, 2011 WI 101 (failing to file a timely response and failing to provide all the information requested constituted failure to cooperate); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Isaacson*, 2015 WI 33 (failing to timely respond, failing to fully and fairly respond to questions, failure to provide requested documents, and submitting 3,000 photos and 4,000 pages of documents having no discernible relevance to OLR's inquiries); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ruppelt*, 2014 WI 53 (failing to provide relevant information in the response to OLR about the scope and time of his representation of a client and of his

relationship with the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hotvedt*, 2016 WI 93 (failing to disclose the extent of funds converted from the law firm and the existence of an account used for the conversions)].

The rule requires a lawyer to comply with subsequent requests for information [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Scanlan*, 2006 WI 38 (delayed responses to OLR requests for information constituted failure to cooperate; personal and psychological problems mitigated the sanction); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elverman*, 2014 WI 15 (failing to comply with the district committee's request for tax returns or an authorization to obtain copies of them)].

The rule is violated when a lawyer interferes with OLR's requests for information [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Armonda*, 2003 WI 136 (attempting to have the clients withdraw their grievance); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2012 WI 54 (failing to provide a timely response to grievances and backdating letters to give the false impression that they had been prepared before the response deadlines)].

SCR 22.03(6)

SCR 22.03(6) states:

In the course of the investigation, the respondent's willful failure to provide relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted in the grievance.

The rule is violated when a lawyer willfully fails to provide relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka*, 2009 WI 38 (the lawyer's response to OLR's request for information, that it would be unproductive for the lawyer to answer OLR's questions, was found to be a willful failure to answer questions; and the lawyer's argument that his ultimately answering the questions before the court suspended his license for noncooperation precluded a finding of a violation was rejected); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sayaovong*, 2014 WI 94 (failing to timely file the response to the grievance and doing so only after the Court suspended the lawyer's license for willful noncooperation, and failing to provide a complete response to OLR's request for information); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steffes*, 2014 WI 128 (failing to respond to OLR's requests for information resulting in temporary license suspension); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz*, 2013 WI 27 (failing to provide trust account records to OLR)].

Evidence of a lawyer's depression was not a defense to willful failure to provide information where the lawyer responded after the third request, where the lawyer failed to respond to several enumerated questions, and where the lawyer promised to send responses but failed to do so until OLR sought a suspension of the lawyer's license [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris*, 2013 WI 8].

The rule is violated when a lawyer interferes with OLR's investigation [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall*, 2011 WI 21 (the lawyer improperly interfered with OLR's investigation by sending a demand for additional fees to a former client coupled with a demand that the former client withdraw his grievance; but the lawyer did not improperly interfere with another OLR investigation where the evidence did not link the lawyer's refund of fees to a client with the client's withdrawal of his grievance); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arellano*, 2013 WI 24 (OLR agreed to dismiss an allegation of failure to cooperate where the attorney told a witness not to speak with an investigator, but the witness had also been persuaded by grievants to provide false information to the investigator); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2014 WI 111 (attempting to persuade individuals to withdraw their grievances or cease cooperating with OLR's investigation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laux*, 2015 WI 59 (making inconsistent statements to district committee investigators and failing to produce requested documents); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kitchen*, 2004 WI 83 (misleading OLR by suggesting on several occasions that the lawyer would submit documentation when the lawyer did not have the documentation)].

The rule is violated when a lawyer makes a misrepresentation in a disclosure to OLR [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Converse*, 2007 WI 42 (asserting to the OLR intake investigator that the lawyer drafted motions and was awaiting the client's approval, when the motions had not been drafted); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper*, 2007 WI 37 (making misrepresentations to OLR regarding payment for a vocational assessment, the handling of settlement checks, and the sending of a document); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Engelbrecht*, 2007 WI 2 (providing OLR evasive and untruthful information); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mauch*, 2007 WI 109 (falsely advising OLR that an overdraft did not relate to a settlement and providing a ledger which misrepresented the source and purpose of payments); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pitts*, 2007 WI 112 (falsely asserting to OLR that the lawyer told the client he would not pursue a claim, which was contradicted by information showing actions taken thereafter on the claim); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Raftery*, 2007 WI 137 (falsely asserting to OLR that the lawyer advised the client to seek new counsel, that the case had been dismissed, and that he had sent letters to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tobin*, 2007 WI 50 (misrepresenting to OLR the lawyer's attempts to locate the rightful owners of trust account funds); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Berlin*, 2008 WI 4 (misrepresenting to OLR that the lawyer had filed a brief on a certain date); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Engelbrecht*, 2008 WI 29 (falsely asserting to OLR that the client was responsible to serve a summons and complaint and providing OLR with a fabricated letter); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Zajac*, 2008 WI 42 (misrepresenting that the lawyer advised the client of a hearing date and providing OLR a fabricated note); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hansen*, 2009 WI 56 (misrepresenting that the lawyer would refund an advanced payment of fees within a few days); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery*, 2009 WI 89 (misrepresenting to OLR the disposition of the client's discrimination claim and misrepresenting to OLR what the lawyer advised the client about the merits of the client's case); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winch*, 2009 WI 64 (misrepresenting to OLR the disposition of funds in the lawyer's trust account); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fitzgerald*, 2010 WI 99 (misrepresenting to OLR that

the lawyer had sent the client's file to successor counsel); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Goldstein*, 2010 WI 26 (misrepresenting to OLR that the lawyer did not pay invoices because the client had not paid him, when records showed the client had paid the lawyer and when the lawyer was converting funds for the lawyer's personal purposes); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mularski*, 2010 WI 113 (misrepresenting the circumstances under which the lawyer endorsed a check and submitting a fabricated letter allegedly sent to a collection agency); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorokhovskiy*, 2012 WI 120 (backdating a letter to the client on a date when information contained in the letter established that it could not have been written until at least 13 days later and submitting a copy of the backdated letter to OLR); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2012 WI 17 (falsely informing OLR that the lawyer had discussed his impending suspension with his client and made arrangements for handling her case); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Martin*, 2012 WI 84 (misrepresenting the time the lawyer left and was out of town, deliberately redacting relevant information on a credit card statement, and deliberately failing to provide relevant documents to OLR, all of which impeded the investigation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg*, 2013 WI 37 (falsely asserting that the lawyer had never entered into a fee-splitting agreement and falsely asserting that a letter had not been sent to an ALJ); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll*, 2013 WI 101 (asserting to OLR that the lawyer advised the client to seek other counsel and the client did so before the filing of the notice of appeal, when the lawyer represented the client on the appeal); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Smith*, 2013 WI 98 (asserting that the lawyer was too ill to file pleadings for the client when the lawyer had appeared in court on behalf of numerous other clients during the time period); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Merry*, 2014 WI 30 (giving evasive answers when asked for the source of information relating to an assertion the lawyer had made to a tribunal was determined to be a de minimis violation meriting dismissal where the underlying statement to the tribunal was not proven to be false); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ruppelt*, 2014 WI 53 (providing false information to OLR about the scope and time of his representation of a client and about the nature of his relationship with his client where the lawyer was engaged in a sexual relationship with the client during his representation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 90 (falsely stating to OLR that he had begun representing a client only two months before the statute of limitations expired, that the BBE director advised him to file a petition to appear pro hac vice during a period of administrative suspension, and that his petition for reinstatement was pending at the time he filed his pro hac vice petition); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ramthun*, 2015 WI 94 (misrepresenting to OLR the reason the lawyer failed to make payments in client matters); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel*, 2015 WI 68 (having concealed information from the client, the lawyer represented to OLR that he had informed the client)].

The evidence was not sufficient to prove misrepresentation to OLR in the following circumstances [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jacobson*, 2004 WI 152 (the evidence was not sufficient to prove the lawyer misrepresented to OLR that a \$4,000 payment from the client was for attorney fees, where the referee found the lawyer's belief to be reasonable and the client's testimony that the payment was for other purposes insufficient to prove misrepresentation); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Polich*, 2005 WI 36

(allegations that the lawyer misrepresented information to OLR were not proved where the lawyer had a reasonable belief for his assertion); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steinberg*, 2007 WI 113 (the lawyer's explanation to OLR that he was confused when he deposited \$2,000 from his trust account into his business account that had been overdrawn for two weeks was found credible by the referee, who observed that the lawyer appeared confused at the hearing); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Molinaro*, 2009 WI 61 (an allegation that the lawyer provided OLR with a number of conflicting and inaccurate accountings of the disposition of funds and the amount the lawyer received from the settlement was dismissed where the referee found the lawyer made a good faith effort to supply the information OLR requested); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss*, 2011 WI 2 (OLR failed to prove a misrepresentation based upon an allegation that the lawyer falsely stated he provided all correspondence to the client when he had omitted a letter to the client); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Steffes*, 2014 WI 128 (asserting that the lawyer's son's business was allowed to make deposits and disbursements from the lawyer's trust account during a period beginning on May 1, 2003 when bank records proved that deposits and disbursements were made prior to that date was a temporal discrepancy that did not prove the lawyer's assertion was willful)].

Misrepresentations to OLR made in administrative matters and not in the course of a grievance or investigation may be charged as violations of the dishonesty rule [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trudgeon*, 2010 WI 103 (by filing an affidavit with OLR pursuant to SCR 22.26 after suspension for failing to comply with continuing legal education requirements, when the affidavit falsely stated the lawyer had not engaged in the practice of law was charged and found to be a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c))].

#### *SCR 22.04(1)*

SCR 22.04(1) states, "A respondent has the duty to cooperate specified in SCR 21.15(4) and 22.03(2) in respect to the district committee."

A lawyer has a duty to respond to requests for information from the district committee [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cavendish-Sosinski*, 2004 WI 30 (failing to respond to letters and phone calls from the district committee investigator until being served a notice to appear); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd*, 2009 WI 59 (failing to provide records from the client file regarding telephone contacts, retainer agreement, and work on the client's sentencing adjustment); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2009 WI 25 (failing to appear at scheduled interviews, and after explaining that failure to appear was due to medical reasons, failing to provide documentation of the medical reasons); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb*, 2011 WI 101 (failing to respond to telephone calls and letters from the district committee investigator, failing to appear at an investigative meeting, and failing to provide a copy of the client file for review); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther*, 2012 WI 116 (failing to appear at an appointment with the district committee investigator and failing to respond to subsequent attempts at contact); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hahnfeld*, 2013 WI 14 (failing to respond to letters from the district committee investigator requesting a meeting);



*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin*, 2014 WI 111 (failing to provide documentation requested by the district committee investigator)].

A lawyer also has a duty to provide truthful information to the district committee [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carson*, 2015 WI 26 (denying to the district committee that he purchased clothing for his client during a trip and asserting that it was impossible for him to have looked through a window of the client's home and observe her and her boyfriend, when both statements were false)].

**Harrassing a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's professional activities**

Conduct in connection with the lawyer's professional activities has been found to constitute harassment in the following cases [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kratz*, 2014 WI 31 (sending deliberate, unwelcome, and unsolicited sexually suggestive text messages to a domestic abuse crime victim while prosecuting the perpetrator; making sexually explicit statements to a county social worker and witness in a case while acting in the capacity of district attorney); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Isaacson*, 2015 WI 33 (making religious slurs directed against judges, counsel, appointed officers and third parties in a series of documents the lawyer created or signed that were filed in cases before various federal courts)].

Related conduct may be charged as a violation of the attorney's oath [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beatse*, 2006 WI 115 (making offensive sexual comments to a court reporter and using the state email system to send and receive numerous messages containing inappropriate sexual content); *Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kratz*, 2014 WI 31 (making a comment during a court proceeding to a social worker that the reporter had big beautiful breasts)].

**SCR 20:8.5 Disciplinary authority; choice of law**

(a) **Disciplinary authority.** A lawyer admitted to the bar of this state is subject to the disciplinary authority of this state regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted to the bar of this state is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this state if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this state. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this state and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.

(b) **Choice of law.** In the exercise of the disciplinary authority of this state, the Rules of Professional Conduct to be applied shall be as follows:

- (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and
- (2) for any other conduct,
- (i) if the lawyer is admitted to the bar of only this state, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this state.
  - (ii) if the lawyer is admitted to the bars of this state and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices, except that if particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to the bar, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that conduct.
  - (iii) if the lawyer is admitted to the bar in another jurisdiction and is providing legal services in this state as allowed under these rules, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this state.
- (c) A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur.

#### WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT

SCR 20:8.5 differs from the ABA Model Rule 8.5. Due to substantive and numbering differences, special care should be taken in consulting the ABA Comment.

#### ABA COMMENT

##### **Disciplinary Authority**

[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to other lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rules 6 and 22, ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. A lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.

## **Choice of Law**

[2] A lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.

[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.

[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer's conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction.

[5] When a lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule.

[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.

[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise.

## **ANNOTATIONS**

### **Disciplinary Authority**

A person admitted to practice law in Wisconsin is subject to the Court's disciplinary authority regardless of the location of the lawyer's practice [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cyrak*, 197 Wis. 2d 401 (1995) (the Court rejected the lawyer's argument that the federal bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over his conduct before that court)]. *Cp. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle*, 2015 WI 90 [In a case involving conduct both in and out of the state, the Court declined to consider misconduct occurring before a federal court in another state for the purposes of deciding the appropriate level of discipline, and instead considered only the misconduct occurring in Wisconsin; the dissent asserted SCR 20:8.5(a) for the proposition that the Court has jurisdiction "to adjudicate disciplinary cases involving lawyers licensed to practice in this state regardless of where the alleged misconduct occurred"].

A lawyer whose license is administratively suspended remains subject to discipline [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Horsch*, 2017 WI 105, not citing SCR 20:8.5, but citing SCR 21.15(1) and SCR 10.03(7)].

### **Choice of Law**

The choice of law rule provides a standard for determining which jurisdiction's rule governs a lawyer's conduct. The rule provides that a Wisconsin disciplinary proceeding may allege a violation of another state's rules [*Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marks*, 2003 WI 114 (OLR successfully appealed the referee's dismissal of allegations that the lawyer violated Michigan's ethics rules where the conduct charged occurred in a proceeding before a Michigan court)].