

APPENDIX

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**COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED**

June 10, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.

A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2018AP2128-CR

Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF10

STATE OF WISCONSIN

IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

v.

TRAVANTI D. SCHMIDT,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Grant County: CRAIG R. DAY, Judge. *Affirmed.*

Before Kloppenburg, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Travanti Schmidt appeals a judgment of conviction for one count of assault by a prisoner. He also appeals the circuit court order denying his motion for postconviction relief.

¶2 Schmidt raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Second, he contends that the charging documents and jury instructions were duplicitous because they failed to specify which of two correctional officers was the target of the charged assault. Third, Schmidt argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the jury instructions on the basis that they violated Schmidt's right to a unanimous verdict.

¶3 For the reasons set forth below, we reject all of Schmidt's arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶4 The State filed a criminal complaint charging Schmidt with one count of assault by a prisoner with a bodily substance, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 946.43(2m)(a) (2019-20).¹ The complaint alleged that Schmidt, a prisoner confined to the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility in Boscobel, Wisconsin, expelled saliva at or toward "Victim 1" while Victim 1 was escorting Schmidt from a holding cell to another cell.

¹ All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted. WISCONSIN STAT. § 46.43(2m)(a) has not changed since Schmidt's 2014 charged conduct.

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¶5 The case proceeded to trial. Correctional officers C.F. and S.P. testified to the following facts. On December 22, 2014, Schmidt was being moved through a hallway by correctional officers, including C.F., while S.P. stood off to the side. As he was being escorted, Schmidt shouted derogatory remarks and profanity at S.P. and another officer. Schmidt turned his head toward S.P., and C.F. instructed Schmidt to “face forward.” At approximately the time that C.F. gave Schmidt the instruction to face forward, C.F. and S.P. heard Schmidt clear his throat to bring up spit. As Schmidt prepared to spit, C.F. brought up his arm to block the spit. Schmidt spat in the direction of S.P., and the saliva landed on C.F.’s right arm, shoulder and chest.

¶6 Schmidt also testified at trial, stating that he never spat or yelled at any of the officers. Instead, he testified that he “had some painful expression coming out” because C.F. stepped on his injured foot. When asked if the substance seen in one of the videos shown to the jury was spit, Schmidt responded that it was not spit but was instead “light from the top of the ceiling” and that the placement of the camera near a bright light made the light appear as spit. The jury found Schmidt guilty as charged.

¶7 Schmidt filed his first appeal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his charge was duplicitous. In response, on March 8, 2018, this court issued an order (referred to in this opinion as the 2018 order) in which we concluded that Schmidt’s arguments may have implied a unanimity problem; therefore, we provided Schmidt with an opportunity to decide whether to pursue a jury unanimity claim. Schmidt decided to pursue the jury unanimity issue and, over the State’s objection, we dismissed the appeal without prejudice, concluding that Schmidt’s arguments were best addressed through the postconviction process.

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¶8 Schmidt filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel's failure to object to the jury instruction setting forth the elements of WIS. STAT. § 946.43(2m)(a), which Schmidt contends violated his right to a unanimous verdict. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing, concluding that, pursuant to § 946.43(2m)(a), the jury need only have unanimously agreed that a correctional officer was the target of Schmidt's assault and did not have to unanimously agree as to which correctional officer was the specific target. Schmidt appeals the judgment of conviction and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Additional background will be included as needed, below.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Schmidt argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the charging documents and jury instructions were duplicitous; and (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions, which Schmidt contends violated the requirement of jury unanimity. We address and reject each argument in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶10 Schmidt argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Notably, on appeal, Schmidt no longer contends that he did not spit at anyone. Instead, he argues that the State was required to prove that he had the "intent to abuse" C.F., upon whom the saliva landed, and that the evidence was insufficient to establish such intent. We reject Schmidt's insufficiency of the evidence argument because, as noted in our 2018 order and as explained below, it is predicated on an incorrect reading of the assault-by-prisoner statute.

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¶11 In evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the conviction. *State v. Poellinger*, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). We do not overturn a verdict unless the evidence is so lacking in probative value and force that no reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.* The defendant “bears a heavy burden in attempting to convince us to set aside the jury’s verdict.” *State v. Searcy*, 2006 WI App 8, ¶22, 288 Wis. 2d 804, 709 N.W.2d 497 (2005).

¶12 As applicable to this case, in order to prove Schmidt guilty of assault by prisoner, the State was required to prove that Schmidt, while a prison inmate, expelled saliva at or toward a correctional officer without the officer’s consent, with the intent that the saliva contact the officer, and with intent to abuse the officer. *See* WIS. STAT. § 946.43(2m)(a).²

² WISCONSIN STAT. § 946.43(2m)(a) provides:

Any prisoner confined to a state prison or other state, county or municipal detention facility who throws or expels blood, semen, vomit, saliva, urine, feces or other bodily substance at or toward an officer, employee or visitor of the prison or facility or another prisoner of the prison or facility under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class I felony:

1. The prisoner throws or expels the blood, semen, vomit, saliva, urine, feces or other bodily substance with the intent that it come into contact with the officer, employee, visitor or other prisoner.

2. The prisoner throws or expels the blood, semen, vomit, saliva, urine, feces or other bodily substance with the intent either to cause bodily harm to the officer, employee, visitor or other prisoner or to abuse, harass, offend, intimidate or frighten the officer, employee, visitor or other prisoner.

(continued)

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¶13 Schmidt concedes that the State “proved that [he] intended to abuse S.P.” However, he argues that because C.F.—rather than S.P.—was the officer upon whom the saliva landed, the State was required to prove intent to abuse with respect to C.F., which the State did not do. He further argues that, as a result, his conviction for assault by prisoner could only be sustained by applying the doctrine of transferred intent, a doctrine he states should not be applied here, and that, at most, he could only have been found guilty of an *attempted* violation of WIS. STAT. § 946.43(2m)(a). Schmidt’s arguments are without merit.

¶14 As we stated in our 2018 order, “Under the elements of the charged statute, it is irrelevant which officer was struck, or whether any officer was struck at all. No element of this charge requires the jury to consider where the saliva landed.” Thus, we further explained that, if Schmidt expelled saliva at S.P. with the intent that it contact her and with the intent to abuse her, the “verdict would be proper regardless of the fact that saliva actually struck a different officer. The crime was complete or, to use Schmidt’s term, accomplished, when the saliva left Schmidt’s mouth.”

¶15 Schmidt does not dispute our interpretation of the assault-by-prisoner statute, despite the fact that these same legal conclusions are relied upon by the State in its response brief. Instead, Schmidt simply repeats the same

3. The officer, employee, visitor or other prisoner does not consent to the blood, semen, vomit, saliva, urine, feces or other bodily substance being thrown or expelled at or toward him or her.

Schmidt acknowledges that the circuit court’s jury instructions for this provision complied with the pattern injury instruction, WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1779A.

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arguments rejected in our 2018 order, summarizing the issue in his reply brief as follows: “The central question is, if a defendant spits at [officer] A, intending to hit A with spittle, but the spittle hits [officer] B[] instead, was there an assault on B under this statute?” As both the assault-by-prisoner statute and our prior order make clear, the answer to this question is yes—the crime of assault by prisoner may be committed under such facts. WISCONSIN STAT. § 946.43(2m)(a) does not require that the saliva contact anyone, much less that it contact the officer that it was intended for; it requires only that the prisoner intend that it contact the officer. *See* § 946.43(2m)(a)1. Thus, we reject Schmidt’s argument that the jury would have to rely on the doctrine of transferred intent to find him guilty of the charged crime, and we likewise reject his argument that this was an attempted but not completed assault.

¶16 Accordingly, Schmidt has failed to show that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.

II. Duplicity

¶17 Schmidt argues that the charging documents and the jury instructions are duplicitous. “Duplicity is the joining in a single count of two or more separate offenses.” *State v. Lomagro*, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 586, 335 N.W.2d 583 (1983). In *Lomagro*, our supreme court articulated five purposes behind the prohibition against duplicity:

(1) to assure that the defendant is sufficiently notified of the charge; (2) to protect the defendant against double jeopardy; (3) to avoid prejudice and confusion arising from evidentiary rulings during trial; (4) to assure that the defendant is appropriately sentenced for the crime charged; and (5) to guarantee jury unanimity.

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Id. at 586-87. It is undisputed that Schmidt failed to make any duplicity objection in the circuit court at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, we may consider the duplicity arguments waived. *See* WIS. STAT. § 971.31(2) (“[D]efenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the proceedings, insufficiency of the complaint, information or indictment ... shall be raised before trial ... or be deemed waived.”); WIS. STAT. § 805.13(3) (“Failure to object at the [jury instruction] conference constitutes a waiver of any error in the proposed instructions or verdict.”).³

¶18 Schmidt asks that we overlook his failure to timely assert a duplicity objection to either the charging documents or jury instructions in light of what he asserts is our discretion to review challenges to jury instructions which raise federal constitutional questions going to the integrity of the fact-finding process. *See State v. Zelenka*, 130 Wis. 2d 34, 44-45, 387 N.W.2d 55 (1986) (our supreme court “may choose to review challenges to jury instructions which raise federal constitutional questions going to the integrity of the fact-finding process”). He also contends that we are not required to find his duplicity argument waived because the rule of waiver is one of judicial administration and not of appellate

³ This statute applies to criminal proceedings. *See* WIS. STAT. § 972.11(1); *State v. Schumacher*, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 402 n.11, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988). We also note that these two statutes use the word “waiver” rather than “forfeiture.” In *State v. Ndina*, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶28-32, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, our supreme court clarified the distinction between the terms “forfeiture” and “waiver.” The *Ndina* court stated, “Although cases sometimes use the words ‘forfeiture’ and ‘waiver’ interchangeably, the two words embody very different legal concepts. ‘Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” *Id.*, ¶29 (quoted source omitted). Because our supreme court has used the term waiver rather than forfeiture when discussing failure to object to a jury instruction, we do so here. *See State v. Trammell*, 2019 WI 59, ¶2, 387 Wis. 2d 156, 928 N.W.2d 564 (“We conclude that [the defendant] waived his right to object to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 by failing to object to its use at the jury instruction and verdict conference, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3).”).

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jurisdiction. See *State v. Cox*, 2007 WI App 38, ¶6, 300 Wis. 2d 236, 730 N.W.2d 452 (“[T]he rule of waiver is one of judicial administration and not of appellate jurisdiction.”).

¶19 In arguing that we should disregard waiver as to the duplicity issue, Schmidt does not distinguish between his duplicity argument as raised against the charging documents and his argument as raised against the jury instructions. We address these arguments separately here.

¶20 Schmidt argues that the charging documents—namely, the complaint and information—are duplicitous, and that we may choose to address this issue despite his failure to object. See *Brown v. State*, 230 Wis. 2d 355, 370, 602 N.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1999) (“We do not generally consider issues on appeal that were not raised in the trial court, although we have the discretion to do so.”). Because Schmidt’s duplicity argument appears to be intertwined with his unanimity argument, we briefly address his duplicity argument with respect to the charges, despite his failure to object in the circuit court. See *Lomagro*, 113 Wis. 2d at 590 n.3 (“The defendant never raised the issue of duplicitous charging until he was before this court in this review. Such an objection is waived if not raised before the trial court. However, we have discussed this issue because of its interrelation to the issue of the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict.” (citations omitted)).

¶21 A charging document is not duplicitous unless it states more than one offense. *Id.* at 586-87 (“Duplicity is the joining in a single count of *two or more separate offenses*.... The first step in determining whether a criminal complaint is duplicitous is to examine its factual allegations to determine whether it states *more than one offense*.” (emphasis added)). If the complaint states more

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than one offense in a single count, the court then examines the allegations “in light of the purposes of the prohibition against duplicity,” and the complaint “may be found to be duplicitous only if any of these dangers are present and cannot be cured by instructions to the jury.” *Id.* at 589. As explained below, Schmidt’s duplicity argument fails at the first step because he does not show that either the criminal complaint or the information states more than one offense.

¶22 Schmidt concedes that the factual allegations in the charging documents do not state more than one act, stating, “Here, there is no question of a continuing series of acts—it was only alleged and proved that there was one gob of spit that ended up on an officer.” He acknowledges that “it is fruitless to discuss whether there were multiple acts.” In addition, as we stated in our 2018 order, both the criminal complaint and information name only one victim. The complaint refers to “Victim 1” and refers to that person as a male and as the individual who had been escorting Schmidt, was struck by the saliva, and went to a health care center for exposure to foreign bodily substances, all of which describe C.F. The information likewise refers to only one victim, identified only as “Victim 1.” Thus, Schmidt has failed to show how the charges state more than one offense as required for a duplicity claim.

¶23 Instead of explaining how the legal standards for duplicity were satisfied here, Schmidt relies on assertions that appear to be unrelated to this inquiry, stating that the “State did not want to commit as to who[] the victim of the act was” and that “[c]harging in this matter let the State avoid the whole issue of whether the act against S.P. was actually an attempt rather than an accomplished assault.” Schmidt fails to connect these assertions to any duplicity principles. His duplicity argument with respect to the charging documents is undeveloped and,

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therefore, we do not consider it further. See *State v. Pettit*, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (we need not address undeveloped arguments).

¶24 As stated, Schmidt also argues that the jury instructions are duplicitous. To the extent Schmidt’s duplicity argument pertains to the jury instructions, we do not reach the issue. As the State notes, our supreme court has explained that this court “has no power to reach an unobjected-to jury instruction because the court of appeals lacks a discretionary power of review.” *State v. Trammell*, 2019 WI 59, ¶25, 387 Wis. 2d 156, 928 N.W.2d 564; see also *State v. Schumacher*, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 409-10, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) (concluding that “the court of appeals had no power to reach the unobjected-to instructions” because “the court of appeals has no general power of review”); *State v. Becker*, 2009 WI App 59, ¶16, 318 Wis. 2d 97, 767 N.W.2d 585 (“[T]he court of appeals is prohibited from reviewing instructions and verdict forms absent a timely objection by the defendant.” (quoted source omitted)).

¶25 In his reply brief, Schmidt responds that *Trammell* is inapplicable because a different jury instruction was at issue in that case, and argues that the question presented here is of “sufficient public interest” to merit a decision.⁴

⁴ In support, Schmidt cites *State v. DeRango*, 229 Wis. 2d 1, 34, 599 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1999), *aff’d*, 2000 WI 89, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833, in which this court addressed the defendant’s unanimity challenge to the criminal information and the jury instruction, even though the defendant had not objected at trial. See *id.* (despite no objection at trial, “we choose to address the [jury unanimity] issue on the merits because ‘it is one of sufficient public interest to merit decision’”) (quoted source omitted). Notably, however, the *DeRango* court did not address case law holding that this court may not review unobjected-to jury instructions, and the *DeRango* opinion does not suggest that this issue was before the court. Regardless, our supreme court recently reaffirmed that we are without power to reach arguments challenging unobjected-to jury instructions, *Trammell*, 387 Wis. 2d 156, ¶25, and Schmidt points to no authority from our supreme court making an exception to this rule based on “sufficient public interest.” We are bound by decisions of our supreme court. See *County of Fond du Lac v. Derksen*, 2002 WI App 160, ¶8, 256 Wis. 2d 490, 647 N.W.2d 922.

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However, he provides no authority for the proposition that a difference in the specific jury instruction at issue is a proper basis upon which to distinguish a statement by our supreme court regarding the extent of this court's powers with respect to jury instructions generally. Furthermore, we disagree that Schmidt's case presents a question of sufficient public interest to merit bypassing our issue-preservation rules, but even if we concluded otherwise, under *Trammell* and other established supreme court precedent, we may not reach the duplicity argument as it pertains to jury instructions. Accordingly, we do not address Schmidt's duplicity argument with respect to the unobjected-to jury instructions.⁵

¶26 In sum, we reject Schmidt's duplicity arguments with respect to both the charging documents and the jury instructions.

III. Jury Unanimity

¶27 Schmidt argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the circuit court's jury instructions on the elements of assault by prisoner. Schmidt contends that the jury instructions violated his right to a unanimous verdict by not requiring the jury to agree as to which specific officer—C.F. or

⁵ We note that Schmidt has not raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to his duplicity argument; therefore, we do not address whether counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the jury instructions on the basis that they were duplicitous. See *Trammell*, 387 Wis. 2d 156, ¶19 n.8 (“We note that [the defendant] does not assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his trial counsel's failure to timely object at the jury instruction and verdict conference. We therefore will not address whether [the defendant]'s trial counsel was ineffective”). Nor does Schmidt argue that the real controversy has not been tried. See *Vollmer v. Luety*, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 4, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990) (court of appeals “properly applied *State v. Schumacher*, because the error which the plaintiff failed to preserve for appellate consideration by a proper objection, an allegedly deficient verdict question, appears from the record to have prevented the real controversy from being fully tried, and hence, under the provisions of sec. 752.35, Stats., it was within the court of appeals' statutory discretion to reverse the judgment and to remand for a new trial.”). We likewise do not consider this issue.

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S.P.—was his intended target.⁶ Schmidt raised this argument in a postconviction motion following our 2018 order, and the circuit court denied Schmidt’s motion without a hearing, concluding that the statute did not require jury unanimity as to the identity of the saliva’s target.

¶28 We may uphold the dismissal of a postconviction motion without a hearing “if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief.” *Nelson v. State*, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972). Whether jury unanimity requires jurors to agree on a particular fact is a question of law that we review independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court. *State v. Badzinski*, 2014 WI 6, ¶26, 352 Wis. 2d 329, 843 N.W.2d 29. For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the record conclusively demonstrates that Schmidt is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of

⁶ The court instructed the jury as follows:

Assault by a prisoner is committed by one who is a prisoner confined to a State Prison and who throw or expels a bodily substance at or toward an officer of the prison or facility where the prisoner intends to abuse the other person and the other person does not consent to the substance being expelled. Before you may find Mr. Schmidt guilty of this offense the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following five elements were present. One, that Mr. Schmidt was a prisoner confined to a State Prison. This requires that Mr. Schmidt was confined in a prison as a result of a violation of the law. The Wisconsin Secure Program Facility is a State Prison. Two, that [S.P.] and [C.F.] were officers of the Wisconsin Secure Program facility. Three, that Mr. Schmidt threw or expelled a bodily substance at or toward a correctional officer with intent that the bodily substance come into contact with a correctional officer. Saliva is a bodily substance. Four, that Mr. Schmidt intended to abuse a correctional officer. Five, the correctional officer did not consent to the substance being expelled at or toward the correctional officer.

counsel claim, and we therefore affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the postconviction motion.

A. Principles Governing Jury Unanimity

¶29 Wisconsin courts have long recognized that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Sections 5 and 7 of Article I of the Wisconsin Constitution includes the right to a unanimous verdict. *Holland v. State*, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979). The unanimity requirement is linked with the due process requirement, under which the prosecution is required to “prove each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.* Together, the unanimity requirement and the reasonable-doubt standard require “that the jury must agree unanimously that the prosecution has proved each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt before a valid verdict of guilty can be returned.” *Id.* However, unanimity is not required “with respect to the alternative means or ways in which the crime can be committed.” *Id.* at 143. The jury need not “agree on the manner in which the defendant participated in the crime if under any of the alternative ways the defendant would be guilty of the crime charged.” *Id.*

¶30 When determining whether a statute creates multiple offenses or a single offense with multiple modes of commission, we consider the following four factors: “1) the language of the statute, 2) the legislative history and context of the statute, 3) the nature of the proscribed conduct, and 4) the appropriateness of multiple punishment for the conduct.” *State v. Derango*, 2000 WI 89, ¶¶14-15, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833.

¶31 “If more than one crime is presented to the jury, unanimity is required as to each.” *State v. Elverman*, 2015 WI App 91, ¶47, 366 Wis. 2d 169, 873 N.W.2d 528 (quoting *Lomagro*, 113 Wis. 2d at 592). However, if the jury

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was presented with only one crime with alternative modes of commission, this court applies the “due process”/“fundamental fairness” test used by the United States Supreme Court in *Schad v. Arizona*, 501 U.S. 624, 637-45 (1991), to determine whether unanimity is required with respect to the alternative means of committing the crime. *State v. Dearborn*, 2008 WI App 131, ¶19, 313 Wis. 2d 767, 758 N.W.2d 463.

¶32 Under this fundamental fairness test, the court looks to two factors to determine whether unanimity is required as to the means of satisfying an element. The first factor, where applicable, is the common-law history and “wide practice” of the law in question. *Id.* at ¶39. The second is the “moral and practical equivalence” of the alternate means of committing the crime. *Id.* The end goal is to determine whether treating the crime as one crime with alternative modes of commission complies with the due process concepts of “fundamental fairness” and “rationality.” *Id.*

B. Principles Governing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

¶33 “To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish both that counsel performed deficiently and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” *State v. Jacobsen*, 2014 WI App 13, ¶13, 352 Wis. 2d 409, 842 N.W.2d 365 (2013) (citing *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “To prove deficient performance, a defendant must point to specific acts or omissions by the lawyer that are ‘outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.’” *State v. Beauchamp*, 2010 WI App 42, ¶15, 324 Wis. 2d 162, 781 N.W.2d 254 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). Thus, we look to “whether the attorney’s performance was reasonably effective considering all the circumstances.” *State v. Balliette*, 2011 WI 79, ¶23, 336

Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334. When considering whether deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, we ask whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶34 There is a strong presumption that counsel provided adequate assistance. *State v. Domke*, 2011 WI 95, ¶36, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364. Counsel’s performance will not be deemed deficient for the failure to make a meritless objection. *State v. Cummings*, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 747 n.10, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996). Similarly, counsel will not be deemed deficient for failing to make an argument based on unsettled law. *State v. Breitzman*, 2017 WI 100, ¶49, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93; *State v. Jackson*, 2011 WI App 63, ¶10, 333 Wis. 2d 665, 799 N.W.2d 461 (“When the law is unsettled, the failure to raise an issue is objectively reasonable and therefore not deficient performance.”).

C. Schmidt Has Not Shown That His Trial Counsel’s Performance Was Deficient

¶35 Significantly, Schmidt’s argument with respect to jury unanimity is not that the circuit court’s jury instruction was error in the first instance; rather, it is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the purportedly erroneous jury instruction. This is an important distinction because, as stated, in order to prove deficient performance, Schmidt must show that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” *Beauchamp*, 324 Wis. 2d 162, ¶15 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 690). Moreover, counsel will not be deemed deficient for failing to make an argument based on unsettled law, *Breitzman*, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶49, a circumstance which occurs “[w]hen case law can be reasonably analyzed in two different ways,” *Jackson*, 333 Wis. 2d 665, ¶10, or

when “Wisconsin law was not clear at the time of [the alleged deficient performance],” *Morales-Pedrosa*, 2016 WI App 38, ¶26, 369 Wis. 2d 75, 879 N.W.2d 772.

¶36 We conclude that, at best, the law is unsettled with respect to the jury unanimity argument that Schmidt raises here. As Schmidt himself acknowledges, “The question as to whether it violated the unanimity requirement to fail to have the jury specify whom they were finding as the victim may be a case of first impression in Wisconsin.” Moreover, Schmidt cites no Wisconsin authority that addresses whether the assault-by-prisoner statute requires that the jury be unanimous as to the intended target of the bodily substances expelled by prisoner; nor does he point to any Wisconsin authority that addresses a unanimity issue similar to that argued here. Instead, Schmidt relies on two cases from other jurisdictions, which do not address a similar statute or circumstance and are not on point.⁷ The State likewise asserts that “as far as the State is aware, no such case exists,” and this court’s independent research has not revealed any case law directly on point.

⁷ Schmidt relies on *Saenz v. State*, 451 S.W.3d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and *United States v. Gonzalez*, 786 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2015). However, in both *Saenz* and *Gonzalez*, the prosecution alleged that the defendant engaged in more than one specific act. *Saenz*, 451 S.W.3d at 389 (prosecution alleged that nurse killed five different dialysis patients by injecting each of them with bleach); *Gonzalez*, 786 F.3d at 716 (prosecution alleged that multiple wiretapped telephone conversations took place on different dates, relating to various members of different rival gangs). By contrast, in this case, the State alleged that Schmidt engaged in a single specific act: one expulsion of spit during the December 22, 2014 escort. Thus, while the presentation of multiple specific actions in both *Saenz* and *Gonzalez* raised the concern that a failure to agree on a victim could mean a failure to agree on the commission of a specific act, the sole allegation in this case—a single instance of spitting—poses no danger that the jury did not agree on the specific criminal act Schmidt committed. Moreover, Schmidt’s reliance on *Gonzalez* is also inapt because the court in that case only “assume[d], without deciding” that the facts of that case required that a specific unanimity instruction be given. *Gonzalez*, 786 F.3d at 717.

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¶37 To the extent that our research reveals any case law instructive to the unanimity issue here, such case law appears to undercut Schmidt's unanimity argument. For example, in *State v. Hammer*, we considered whether, to support a conviction for burglary, the jury had to be unanimous as to the predicate felony that the defendant intended to commit when entering a dwelling. *Hammer*, 216 Wis. 2d 214, 218-19, 576 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997). The circuit court had instructed the jury that three different acts (first-degree sexual assault, armed robbery, and battery causing substantial bodily harm) were felonies but declined to instruct the jury that the verdict had to be unanimous as to the predicate felony that the defendant intended to commit. *Id.* at 217-18. We affirmed the circuit court, concluding that the burglary statute did not require jury unanimity as to the intent to commit a particular felony. *See id.* at 222. We reasoned:

It is clear from the statute that the legislature focused on the intent to commit a felony, not any particular felony. Therefore, all the felonies are conceptually similar for the purposes of unanimity because each and every felony provides the predicate intent element. There is no difference in penalty irrespective of which underlying felony or combination of felonies was intended. Rather, it is [the defendant's] single entry into the dwelling with the requisite intent that constitutes the crime.

Under these circumstances, [the defendant] was not entitled to a unanimity instruction regarding the felonies that formed the basis of his intent to enter the dwelling. The jury merely needed to conclude that [the defendant] unlawfully entered the dwelling with an intent to commit a felony. The trial court did not erroneously instruct the jury.

Id.

¶38 Similarly, here, the language of WIS. STAT. 946.43(2m)(a) indicates that the legislature was concerned with preventing assaults against correctional officers and other classes of persons frequently present at correctional facilities. It

does not indicate that the legislature was concerned with which particular person the inmate intended to hit with that inmate's bodily fluid. As was the case with the burglary statute in *Hammer*, the statutory language here undermines Schmidt's argument that the jury was required to be unanimous as to which "officer" was the intended target of Schmidt's assault.

¶39 That said, however, this case does not require us to definitively conclude whether WIS. STAT. § 946.43(2m)(a) requires jury unanimity as to the identity of the target of the assault. Rather, we need only address whether trial counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions on unanimity grounds was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance" so as to constitute deficient performance. See *Beauchamp*, 324 Wis. 2d 162, ¶15 (quoted source omitted). Because the law is, at best, unsettled, counsel's performance was not deficient and Schmidt's ineffective-assistance claim must fail.⁸

CONCLUSION

¶40 For the reasons stated above, we reject Schmidt's arguments and affirm.

⁸ Because we decide that trial counsel's failure to challenge the jury instruction on unanimity grounds did not constitute deficient performance, we need not consider the State's argument that Schmidt cannot show prejudice because his defense was that he did not spit at all. See *State v. Morales-Pedrosa*, 2016 WI App 38, ¶15, 369 Wis. 2d 75, 879 N.W.2d 772 (if the defendant fails to prove one prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, we need not address the other).

STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT BRANCH 2 GRANT COUNTY

For Official Use Only

State of Wisconsin vs. Travanti D. Schmidt

Judgment of ConvictionSentence to Wisconsin State
Prisons and Extended
SupervisionFILED
03-09-2016
Clerk of Circuit Court
Grant County, WI

Date of Birth: 09-08-1985

Case No. 2015CF000010

The defendant was found guilty of the following crime(s):

Ct.	Description	Violation	Plea	Severity	Date(s) Committed	Trial To	Date(s) Convicted
1	[939.62(1)(b) Repeater] Prisoner Throw/Expel Bodily Substances	946.43(2m)(a)	Not Guilty	Felony I	12-22-2014	Jury	03-04-2016

IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as convicted and sentenced as follows:

Ct.	Sent. Date	Sentence	Length	Agency	Comments
1	03-04-2016	State Prison w/ Ext. Supervision	2 YR	Department of Corrections	

Total Bifurcated Sentence Time

Ct.	Confinement Period			Comments	Extended Supervision			Total Length of Sentence		
	Years	Months	Days		Years	Months	Days	Years	Months	Days
1	1	6	0		0	6	0	2	0	0

Sentence Concurrent With/Consecutive Information:

Ct.	Sentence	Type	Concurrent with/Consecutive To	Comments
1	State prison	Consecutive	sentences now serving	
1	Extended Supervision	Consecutive	sentences now serving	

Conditions of Extended Supervision:

Ct.	Condition	Agency/Program	Comments
1	Other		Defendant shall submit DNA sample.
1	Costs		Costs remitted by the court.

Pursuant to §973.01(3g) and (3m) Wisconsin Statutes, the court determines the following:The Defendant is is not eligible for the Challenge Incarceration Program.The Defendant is is not eligible for the Substance Abuse Program.

IT IS ADJUDGED that 0 days sentence credit are due pursuant to §973.155, Wisconsin Statutes

IT IS ORDERED that the Sheriff shall deliver the defendant into the custody of the Department.

BY THE COURT:**Distribution:**Craig R Day, Judge
Anthony Joseph Pozorski Sr., District Attorney
Roseann Therese Oliveto, Defense AttorneyElectronically signed by Craig R. Day
Circuit Court Judge/Clerk/Deputy Clerk

March 9, 2016

Date

App. 2

State of Wisconsin

CIRCUIT COURT

Grant County

STATE OF WISCONSIN

-VS-

Plaintiff,

DA Case No.: 2015GT000068

Assigned DA/ADA: Anthony J. Pozorski Sr.

Agency Case No.: 14-1147

Court Case No.: 2015CF000010

Travanti D. Schmidt
 Wisconsin Secure Program Facility
 1101 Morrison Dr.
 Boscobel, WI 53805
 DOB: 09/08/1985
 Sex/Race: M/B
 Eye Color: Brown
 Hair Color: Black
 Height: 6 ft 4 in
 Weight: 200 lbs
 Alias:

ATN:

INFORMATION

Defendant,

Count 1: ASSAULT BY PRISONERS, REPEATER

The above-named defendant on or about Monday, December 22, 2014, in the City of Boscobel, Grant County, Wisconsin, being a prisoner confined to the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility did throw or expel saliva at or toward Victim1, an officer of the prison with the intent that the saliva come into contact with and abuse Victim1 without his/her consent, contrary to sec. 946.43(2m)(a), 939.62(1)(b) Wis. Stats., a Class I Felony, and upon conviction may be fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000), or imprisoned not more than three (3) years and six (6) months, or both.

And further, invoking the provisions of sec. 939.62(1)(b) Wis. Stats., because the defendant is a repeater, having been convicted of a prior felony, which conviction(s) remain of record and unreversed, the maximum term of imprisonment for the underlying crime may be increased by not more than 2 years if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors and by not more than 4 years if the prior conviction was for a felony.

/s/ Anthony J. Pozorski, Sr.

Date: March 27, 2015

Anthony J. Pozorski Sr.
 Assistant District Attorney

State Bar No. 1014070

bb

App. 3

**1779A ASSAULT BY A PRISONER: THROWING OR EXPELLING A BODILY
SUBSTANCE AT AN OFFICER, EMPLOYEE, VISITOR, OR INMATE —
§ 946.43(2m)**

Statutory Definition of the Crime

Assault by a prisoner, as defined in § 946.43(2m) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is committed by one who is a prisoner confined to a state prison and who throws or expels a bodily substance at or toward an officer of the prison or facility under the following circumstances: the prisoner intend to abuse the other person, and the other person does not consent to the substance being thrown or expelled.

State's Burden of Proof

Before you may find the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following five elements were present.

Elements of the Crime That the State Must Prove

1. That the defendant was a prisoner confined to a state prison.

This requires that the defendant was confined in a prison as a result of a violation of law.

The Wisconsin Secure Program Facility is a state prison.

2. That S [REDACTED] and C [REDACTED] were officers of the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility.
3. That the defendant threw or expelled a bodily substance at or toward a correctional officer with intent that the bodily substance come into contact with a correctional officer.

Saliva is a bodily substance.

4. That defendant intended to abuse a correctional officer.
5. The correctional officer did not consent to the substance being thrown or expelled at or toward the correctional officer.

Deciding About Intent

You cannot look into a person's mind to find intent. Intent must be found, if found at all, from the defendant's acts, words, and statements, if any, and from all the facts and circumstances in this case bearing upon intent.

Jury's Decision

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all five elements of this offense have been proved, you should find the defendant guilty.

If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty.

1 must base your verdict on the law I give you in these
2 instructions. Apply that law to the facts which have
3 been properly proven by the evidence. Consider only the
4 evidence received during this trial and the law as
5 given to you by these instructions and from these alone,
6 guided by your soundest reason and your best judgment
7 reach your verdict.

8 If any member of the jury has an impression of my opinion
9 as to whether Mr. Schmidt is guilty or not guilty disregard
10 that impression entirely and decide the issues of fact
11 solely as you view the evidence. You the jury are the sole
12 judges of the facts and the Court is the judge of the law
13 only.

14 Assault by a prisoner is committed by one who is a
15 prisoner confined to a State Prison and who throw or
16 expels a bodily substance at or toward an officer of the
17 prison or facility where the prisoner intends to abuse
18 the other person and the other person does not consent
19 to the substance being expelled. Before you may find Mr.
20 Schmidt guilty of this offense the State must prove
21 by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt
22 that the following five elements were present. One, that
23 Mr. Schmidt was a prisoner confined to a State Prison.
24 This requires that Mr. Schmidt was confined in a prison as
25 a result of a violation of the law. The Wisconsin Secure Program

Facility is a State Prison. Two, that S█████ P█████y and
2 C█████ F█████ were officers of the Wisconsin Secure
3 Program facility. Three, that Mr. Schmidt threw
4 or expelled a bodily substance at or toward a correctional
5 officer with intent that the bodily substance come into
6 contact with a correctional officer. Saliva is a bodily
7 substance. Four, that Mr. Schmidt intended to abuse
8 a correctional officer. Five, the correctional officer
9 did not consent to the substance being expelled at
10 or toward the correctional officer.

11 You can not look into a person's mind to find intent.
12 Intent must be found, if found at all, from Mr. Schmidt's
13 acts, words and statements, if any, and from all the
14 facts and circumstances in this case bearing upon intent.
15 If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
16 Schmidt is guilty by committing all five elements of this
17 offense you should find Mr. Schmidt guilty. If you are
18 not so satisfied you must find Mr. Schmidt not guilty.

19 In reaching your verdict examine the evidence with
20 care and caution. Act with judgment, reason and prudence.

21 Defendants are not required to prove their innocence.
22 The law presumes every person charged with the commission
23 of an offense to be innocent. This presumption requires
24 a finding of not guilty, unless in your deliberations you find
25 it is overcome by evidence which satisfies you beyond a

FILED
10-16-2018
Clerk of Circuit Court
Grant County, WI
2015CF000010

BY THE COURT:

DATE SIGNED: October 16, 2018

Electronically signed by Craig R. Day
Circuit Court Judge

STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT GRANT COUNTY

STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 15-CF-10

TRAVANTI D. SCHMIDT,
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING POST-CONVICTION MOTION WITHOUT HEARING

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Defendant filed a Post-Conviction Motion asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The motion asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the substantive jury instruction given to the jury regarding Assault By Prisoner. Specifically, the motion asserts that the jury instruction as given did not ensure a unanimous verdict of the jury.

STANDARD TO APPLY

To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Deficient performance is specific acts or omissions by counsel that are "outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance.” *Id* at 690. The defendant is prejudiced if there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” *Id* at 694. To prevail on a motion, defendant must satisfy both prongs of the *Strickland* standard. *Id* at 697.

The post-conviction court has discretion to deny defendant’s motion without a hearing if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief. *State v. Allen*, 2004 WI 106, ¶ 9, 274 Wis.2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. Whether the defendant’s motion meets the standard is a question of law. *Id*.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendant’s brief cites to *State v. Gustafson*, 112 Wis.2d 369, 332 N.W.2d 848 (Ct. App. 1983), to support his argument that the jury was improperly instructed and that the improper instruction deprived Mr. Gustafson of a unanimous verdict. The court has analyzed *Gustafson*. Several observations ensue.

First, the Court of Appeals decision in *Gustafson* was reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. *State v. Gustafson*, 119 Wis.2d 676, 350 N.W.2d 653 (1984). However, the Supreme Court then granted reconsideration and modified its earlier decision reversing the Court of Appeals decision based upon the lack of mandate in the varying opinions of the Justices in the original Supreme Court decision. *State v. Gustafson*, 121 Wis.2d 459, 359 N.W.2d 920 (1985). The *Gustafson* Court of Appeals’ recitation of the law regarding unanimity thus appears to be the final ruling of the court. The Supreme Court initially reversed based on a conclusion that the sexual assault

conduct in that case was one continuing transaction and therefore one crime, but did not disagree with the Court of Appeals as to the applicable law.

Second, both the Court of Appeals decision and the Supreme Court decision in *Gustafson*, citing to *State v. Baldwin*, 101 Wis.2d 441, 304 N.W.2d 742 (1981) contend that a failure to request instructions which assure a unanimous jury verdict cannot result in a waiver of appeal rights, due to the constitutional ramifications of jury unanimity. However, that rule was modified by *State v. Schumacher*, 144 Wis.2d 388, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) to give only the Supreme Court the authority to address unobjected-to unanimity instruction errors. Waiver is therefore possible, raising the specter of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Third, the ultimate decision in *Gustafson*, both in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, appears to support a conclusion in this case of harmless error. Clearly, the better practice when unanimity issues arise in the facts is to give a clarifying instruction. However, the failure to give the instruction is subject to a harmless error analysis.

Was the Instruction Erroneous?

The statute under which Mr. Schmidt is charged is sec. 946.43(2m)(a), Stats. The statute defines the crime in a number of alternate ways as follows:

(2m)

(a) Any prisoner confined to a state prison or other state, county or municipal detention facility who throws or expels blood, semen, vomit, saliva, urine, feces or other bodily substance at or toward an officer, employee or visitor of the prison or facility or another prisoner of the prison

or facility under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class I felony:

1. The prisoner throws or expels the blood, semen, vomit, saliva, urine, feces or other bodily substance with the intent that it come into contact with the officer, employee, visitor or other prisoner.

2. The prisoner throws or expels the blood, semen, vomit, saliva, urine, feces or other bodily substance with the intent either to cause bodily harm to the officer, employee, visitor or other prisoner or to abuse, harass, offend, intimidate or frighten the officer, employee, visitor or other prisoner.

3. The officer, employee, visitor or other prisoner does not consent to the blood, semen, vomit, saliva, urine, feces or other bodily substance being thrown or expelled at or toward him or her.

Notably, the statute has as an element that saliva is expelled "at or **toward** an officer." It is a violation not only to direct the saliva at an officer but also toward an officer. The expulsion of saliva must be with intent that it come into contact with an officer, without consent, and with intent to abuse or offend, as pertinent here. The statute does not require that the saliva actually contact any officer. Logically, it likewise does not require that the saliva contact the officer at which it is directed.

The unanimity question in this case thus relates to Mr. Schmidt's intent upon expelling the saliva. What did he intend the saliva to contact? Must his intent be directed to a specified, identifiable officer?

The court concludes that the fairest reading of the statute does not require unanimity as to the specific target of the saliva, only that the jury unanimously agree that an officer was the target. Prison inmates are often accompanied in close physical proximity by one or more correctional officers. The physical proximity of one or more officers can make it impossible to prove the specific target of the expulsion. Spitting at one officer is often also toward one or more other officers. How does the State or the

jury identify the target? Why does it matter which officer is subjectively in the inmate's mind?

Obviously, the fact that a crime is difficult to prove is not an excuse to abandon the constitutional requirement for a unanimous jury. However, in light of the language and purpose of the statute, requiring unanimity as to the target neither unduly prejudices those accused nor undermines the purpose of the law. The purpose of the law is to discourage offensive conduct by inmates upon correctional officers and others. The fact that the legislature did not require the bodily substance to make contact with any particular officer renders the result of the inmate's expulsion unimportant. What must be shown is that the inmate expelled the saliva with intent that it come into contact with an officer. The jury must unanimously agree the saliva was directed at or toward an officer and not at some other object or into thin air.

This construction of the statute is consistent with the law of transferred intent. Wisconsin criminal law recognizes the doctrine of transferred intent. *State v. Gould*, 56 Wis.2d 808, 810, 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973). If a person intends to assault one person, but actually assaults a second person, the person may be convicted of intending to cause harm to the second person as a natural and probable consequence of his subjective intent to harm the first.

The assault by prisoner statute does not explicitly incorporate the concept of transferred intent. Confusingly, the statute for assault by prisoner employs a different article in the first element than in the second, third and fourth. In the first, the statute uses the article "an," whereas in the second, third, and fourth elements, the statute

employs the article “the.” However, as in *Gould*, the concept of transferred intent may be inferred from the purpose of the statute.

Where there are conflicting provisions of the statute, they are to be construed so as to harmonize, thereby giving effect to the leading idea behind the statute. Absurd results or interpretations are to be avoided. The Court may insert or reject words necessary or reasonably inferable.

Gould, 56 Wis.2d at 808 (internal citations omitted).

The leading idea of the Assault by Prisoner statute is particularly evident when the statute does not require the expelled substance to make contact with anyone. Expelled saliva does not travel upon a reliably precise path. The offense is in the expulsion of saliva at or toward a correctional officer, with intent to contact an officer and with intent to harass or abuse an officer. Specifying which officer was the target is unnecessary and does nothing to advance the leading idea behind the statute. “The jury should not be instructed to draw a line finer than that which the human conduct sought to be defined will realistically permit.” *Manson v. State*, 101 Wis.2d 413, 430, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981).

Jury unanimity requires the jury to agree on the factual theory or concept underlying criminal liability. *Holland v. State*, 91 Wis.2d 134, 139, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979). Requiring unanimity as to the precise officer targeted would run afoul of these unanimity principles. Although in hindsight the instructions could have been worded with more care regarding unanimity, the court concludes that the instruction is not an incorrect statement of the applicable law.

Harmless Error

Moreover, even if the instruction was not appropriate to the charge generally, the evidence in this case renders any error in the instruction harmless. Mr. Schmidt's defense was not related to any assertion that he was not intending to contact a specific officer by expelling saliva. The defense was that he did not expel any saliva. Mr. Schmidt testified. He repeatedly denied directing any spit. The following excerpts of the trial transcript reveal the defense position at trial:

I want to let them know that I did not spit towards anyone that day and I had a pain in my foot and that's all. Trial Trans. p. 126, l. 14-16.

...

Q. Did you spit toward any of the officers?

A. No, ma'am.

Q. And you saw the video?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And that was not spit in the video?

A. No. That was like from the light from the top of the ceiling.

Trial Trans. p. 134, l. 8-13.

...

A. So as I'm walking and I turned my head towards the right position and it looks as if I'm spitting but it was a facial expression that I made as I made my way past going towards that little gap in the hallway you see on the video like. Trial Trans. p. 134, l. 19-23.

...

A. But I'm saying that I did not spit towards or to anyone in this courtroom today.

Q. You didn't spit at all?

A. No, ma'am. Trial Trans. p. 135, l. 5-9.

...

Q. But you're saying today that you did not spit on anyone at that point?

A. No, ma'am. Trial Trans. p. 137, l. 3-5

Mr. Schmidt's case is conceptually similar to the *Gustafson* case. In *Gustafson*, the defendant testified he had no sexual contact with the victim. The victim alleged multiple sexual contacts. Similarly, Mr. Schmidt's defense was that he didn't spit at anyone. As in *Gustafson*, the jury was faced with a question not of who Mr. Schmidt spit at, who the spit connected with, or Mr. Schmidt's intent in spitting. Rather, the jury was faced with determining whether Mr. Schmidt spit at all. In this case, the jury accepted the testimony of correctional officers as corroborated by video footage and not Mr. Schmidt's version.

Any instruction error did not prejudice Mr. Schmidt. Thus, if there is error in the instruction, it is not the appropriate subject for challenges to the ineffective assistance of counsel or to the instruction itself under the circumstances. The motion for post-conviction relief is denied. The hearing scheduled for October 26, 2018 is cancelled.

This is a final order for purposes of appeal.

cc: Attorney Anthony J. Pozorski, Sr.
Attorney David Karpe
Defendant Travanti D. Schmidt

State of Wisconsin

Circuit Court

Grant County

STATE OF WISCONSIN

Plaintiff,

DA Case No.: 2015GT000068
Assigned DA/ADA: Anthony J. Pozorski Sr.
Agency Case No.: 14-1147
Court Case No.:
ATN:

-VS-

Travanti D. Schmidt
Wisconsin Secure Program Facility
1101 Morrison Dr.
Boscobel, WI 53805
DOB: 09/08/1985
Sex/Race: M/B
Eye Color: Brown
Hair Color: Black
Height: 6 ft 4 in
Weight: 200 lbs
Alias:

Criminal Complaint

15CF 010

CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT
FILED

JAN 26 2015

TINA McDONALD, Clerk
GRANT COUNTY, WIS.

Defendant,

Travis D. Klaas, of the Grant County Sheriff's Department, being first duly sworn, states that:

Count 1: ASSAULT BY PRISONERS, REPEATER

The above-named defendant on or about Monday, December 22, 2014, in the City of Boscobel, Grant County, Wisconsin, being a prisoner confined to the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility did throw or expel saliva at or toward Victim1, an officer of the prison with the intent that the saliva come into contact with and abuse Victim1 without his/her consent, contrary to sec. 946.43(2m)(a), 939.62(1)(b) Wis. Stats., a Class I Felony, and upon conviction may be fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000), or imprisoned not more than three (3) years and six (6) months, or both.

And further, invoking the provisions of sec. 939.62(1)(b) Wis. Stats., because the defendant is a repeater, having been convicted of a prior felony, which conviction(s) remain of record and unreversed, the maximum term of imprisonment for the underlying crime may be increased by not more than 2 years if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors and by not more than 4 years if the prior conviction was for a felony.

PROBABLE CAUSE:

Complainant is a sergeant for the Grant County Sheriff's Department.

Complainant states that on December 23, 2014, he received an email from a captain at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, which is located in the City of Boscobel, Grant County, Wisconsin. Complainant states that there was an attachment to the email which was an incident report completed by Victim 1. Complainant is informed by Victim 1's report that on December 22, 2014, at approximately 5:40 pm he was working on the Alpha Unit. Complainant is informed by Victim 1's report that Victim 1 was escorting inmate Schmidt

01/21/2015

STATE OF WISCONSIN - VS - Travanti D. Schmidt

from the holding cell to Cell 404. Complainant is informed by the incident report that during the escort, inmate Schmidt was shouting at a sergeant. Complainant is informed by the incident report that inmate Schmidt also began shouting at a CO. Complainant is informed by the incident report that inmate Schmidt turned his head during the escort, at which time Victim 1 gave him a direct order to face forward. Complainant is informed by the incident report that as he was giving this order, he could hear inmate Schmidt clearing his throat. Complainant is informed by the incident report that Victim 1 stated he brought his hand up turning his head slightly to prevent the spit from flying in the faces of his fellow correctional officers. Complainant is informed by the incident report that inmate Schmidt spit on his right shoulder, arm, and chest area. Complainant is informed by the incident report that inmate Schmidt was decentralized to the ground and eventually escorted to Alpha 404.


Complainant states that on January 12, 2015, he met with Victim 1. Complainant is informed by Victim 1 that some of the spit did come in contact with his hand. Complainant is informed by Victim 1 that he did have a glove on at the time. Complainant is informed by Victim 1 that based off of the incident, even if he did not put his hand up, inmate Schmidt still would have spit in his direction and possibly onto other correctional staff. Complainant is informed by Victim 1 that he could clearly hear the inmate clear his throat in a spitting manner. Complainant is informed by Victim 1 that he went to the Boscobel Area Health Care Center for significant exposure of foreign bodily substance.

Complainant states that on January 12, 2015, he made contact with inmate Travanti Schmidt at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility.

Complainant states that he observed documentation which indicates Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, State of Wisconsin vs. Travanti D Schmidt, which indicates with respect to Count No. 3, which indicates with respect to Description Armed Robbery with Threat of Force, which indicates with respect to Severity Felony C, which indicates with respect to Offense Date 01-04-2011, which indicates that on 07-06-2011, there was a Finding of, which indicates with respect to Action Guilty Due to Guilty Plea, which indicates State Prison 15 years.

Based on the foregoing, the complainant believes this complaint to be true and correct.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, and approved for filing on:

This 26th day of January, 2015,

Anthony J. Pozorski Sr.
Assistant District Attorney


Travis Klaas, Complainant

State Bar No. 1014070
pp



OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS

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DISTRICT IV

March 8, 2018

To:

David R. Karpe
Karpe Law Office
448 W. Washington Ave.
Madison, WI 53703

Anthony J. Pozorski
Asst. District Attorney
130 W. Maple St.
Lancaster, WI 53813

Anne Christenson Murphy
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53707-7857

You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following order:

2017AP1-CR

State of Wisconsin v. Travanti D. Schmidt

Before Lundsten, P.J., Sherman and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Travanti Schmidt appeals a judgment of conviction. After reviewing the parties' arguments, we provide Schmidt with an opportunity to decide whether to pursue a jury unanimity claim that may be implied within his existing arguments.

After a jury trial, Schmidt was convicted of one count of assault by prisoner, contrary to Wis. STAT. § 946.43(2m)(a). Stated briefly, and as applicable to this case, that subsection makes it a felony for a prison inmate to expel saliva at or toward a correctional officer without the officer's consent, with the intent that it contact the officer, and with intent to abuse the officer.

Schmidt argues that the evidence was insufficient. His argument is based on his view that even though the evidence may show that Schmidt expelled saliva at or toward correctional officer S.P., with intent that it contact her, and with intent to abuse her, his saliva actually struck

No. 2017AP1-CR

correctional officer C.F. instead. He asserts: “When a prisoner intends to abuse and spit at guard A, and guard B got in the way ... there is no accomplished assault.” Schmidt argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that he intended his saliva to contact the officer who was actually struck by his saliva, or that Schmidt intended to abuse that officer.

Schmidt appears to be assuming that the actual landing place of the spittle is relevant to this offense. However, as far as we can see, it is not relevant. Under the elements of the charged statute, it is irrelevant which officer was struck, or whether any officer was struck at all. No element of this charge requires the jury to consider where the saliva landed.

The jury instructions appear to allow the jury to regard either S.P. or C.F. as a victim. The second element is that the State must prove that S.P. “and” C.F. were correctional officers. Thereafter, for the remaining elements, no names are used, and instead the elements are written with reference to a single officer. For example, the third element is that the defendant intended the saliva to come into contact “with a correctional officer,” and the fourth element is that the defendant “intended to abuse a correctional officer.” The instructions, as a whole, might arguably be read as allowing those elements to be met as to either S.P. or C.F.

Therefore, combining the irrelevancy of the saliva’s landing point with the presence of S.P. in the instructions, it appears that the jury could properly have found Schmidt guilty with S.P. as the victim. It could do so if the jury found that Schmidt expelled saliva at S.P. with intent that it contact her, and with intent to abuse her. That verdict would be proper regardless of the fact that the saliva actually struck a different officer. The crime was complete or, to use Schmidt’s term, accomplished, when the saliva left Schmidt’s mouth.

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At the same time, as the State has argued, the evidence may also support an inference that Schmidt was properly found guilty as to officer C.F., under the specific physical situation of this case. As far as we can see, the fact that the evidence supports a guilty verdict as to S.P. does not mean that it cannot also support a guilty verdict as to C.F.

In addition to sufficiency of the evidence, on appeal Schmidt has argued that the charge was duplicitous because it charged two crimes within a single count. However, as to the complaint and information at least, this argument appears to fail because the complaint clearly identified only one victim. Although named only as "Victim 1," that person is a male who was struck by the saliva. Thus, it appears that the charge unambiguously identifies only one victim, C.F.

The potential problem of two crimes within one count does not appear to have arisen until the jury instruction stage, when S.P. was added to the instructions. Schmidt's duplicity argument notes this aspect of the jury instructions. However, he acknowledges that he did not object to the instructions at the time, and therefore the issue may be considered forfeited. He argues that we should not consider it forfeited, and in doing so he asserts that "because there was no focus on who the victim was supposed to be, the jury verdict is murky at best." In his reply brief, he asserts that the "jury's decision did not reflect who the victim was," and that the "verdict could mean either or both guards were the victim(s)."

Schmidt's arguments may imply a unanimity problem. If the evidence permitted a finding of guilt as to both victims named in the instructions, it is not clear how it can be determined from outside which victim the conviction is for. And, therefore, it may also mean that it cannot be known whether the jurors agreed on one victim. It may be that some jurors

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found Schmidt guilty as to S.P., while others found him guilty as to C.F. In other words, there may be a jury unanimity problem, if it is necessary for the jury to be unanimous as to a specific victim.

Schmidt has not expressly argued a unanimity issue. However, it is possible that such an argument would be available to him in postconviction proceedings, regardless of his potential forfeiture of issues relating to the instruction. We have not attempted to develop or research such an argument beyond recognizing that it may be implied within Schmidt's existing arguments. If a persuasive unanimity argument is available, but has gone unmade due to oversight by counsel, there would be a potential for a later ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Rather than leave that possibility lurking in the record, we conclude that we should permit Schmidt to decide now whether to develop a jury unanimity claim.

Accordingly, we provide a period of time for Schmidt to consider whether to raise that issue. Because the issue has not previously been raised in postconviction proceedings, a postconviction motion may be necessary to do that. *See* WIS. STAT. § 974.02(2). If Schmidt informs us that he wants to pursue this issue, we provide an opportunity for the State to argue against having further proceedings on that issue.

IT IS ORDERED that within thirty days of the date of this order the appellant shall advise us whether he wants to pursue a jury unanimity claim.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within twenty-one days after a statement by the appellant that he wants to pursue a unanimity claim, the respondent may file a response.

Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Court of Appeals



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DISTRICT IV

May 18, 2018

To:

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Circuit Court Judge
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You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:

2017AP1-CR

State of Wisconsin v. Travanti D. Schmidt (L.C. # 2015CF10)

Before Lundsten, P.J., Sherman and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

In our order of March 8, 2018, we directed appellant Travanti Schmidt to advise us whether he wants to pursue a jury unanimity issue. Schmidt has informed us that he wants to raise that issue. The State objects to us allowing that opportunity on the ground that the unanimity argument is meritless. We conclude that the merits of the argument are better addressed through the usual postconviction process. Although we could retain jurisdiction of the

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appeal and order a remand under WIS. STAT. § 808.075, ordering dismissal of the appeal and extension of the time to file a postconviction motion is often easier to administer.

IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the time to file a postconviction motion is extended to forty-five days from the date of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.

Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Court of Appeals

CERTIFICATE

I certify that this petition meets the criteria under Rules 809.19(8)(b), and 809.62(4), Stats., for a petition produced with a proportional serif font. The petition is 2,528 words long.

Signed,




David R. Karpe

**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
WITH RULE 809.19(12)**

I hereby certify that I have submitted an electronic copy of this petition which complies with the requirements of s. 809.62(4)(b). I further certify that this electronic petition is identical in content and format to the printed form of the petition filed as of this date. A copy of this certificate has been served with the paper copies of this petition filed with the court and served on all opposing parties.

Signed,



David R. Karpe