

# WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT

## TABLE OF PENDING CASES

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The following table describes pending cases the Supreme Court has accepted on petition for review, bypass, certification, and original jurisdiction.

The cases included for the first time (that is, the most recently accepted cases) are marked with an asterisk (\*) next to the case number. After the Supreme Court decides a case, the date of oral argument or date of submission on briefs will be replaced with the date of the Supreme Court decision and an abbreviated mandate. That mandate will generally be displayed in the table for two months, after which the case will be removed.

The information in the table, from left to right, is as follows:

- **Case No.:** Case number this includes hyperlinks to online case access;
- **Case Caption:** the abbreviated caption of the case (case name);
- **Issue(s):** a summary of the issues, with hyperlinks to relevant statutes and cases where applicable;
- **SC Accepted:** the date the Supreme Court accepted the case including how the case reached the Supreme Court. Abbreviations used are:

BYPA = Petition to bypass      CERT = Certification  
ORIG = Original Action      REWV = Petition for review

- **Oral Arg./Brief Subm. Date:** the date of oral argument or submission on briefs; or the date of the Supreme Court decision along with an abbreviated mandate;
- **CA Dist./Cty Information:** the Court of Appeals district from which the case came, if applicable, as well as the county of origin;
- **CA Decision:** the date of the Court of Appeals decision, if applicable;
- **Decision Publication Status:** Indication of whether the Court of Appeals decision is published or unpublished. If published, citations to the public domain and the official reports are provided, along with hyperlinks where available.

The issues presented in this table are intended to be concise and do not aim to provide a comprehensive or detailed description of the specific case. Readers who want to understand the specifics of these issues should refer to the records and briefs filed with the Supreme Court.

The following table covers cases accepted and decisions issued through **April 21, 2025**. Please direct any comments regarding this table to the Clerk of Supreme Court via email to [Clerk@WICourts.gov](mailto:Clerk@WICourts.gov).

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Case No.	Caption/Issue(s)	SC Accepted/ Oral Arg. or Brief Subm.	CA Dist./ Cty.	CA Decision
<a href="#">2021AP001346</a>	<u>State v. Jobert L. Molde</u>  What is the proper place for statistical evidence of the prevalence of false reports of abuse in sexual assault cases, and did the court of appeals wrongly conclude in <i>Mader</i> and now in this case in holding that statistical testimony putting the incidence of false reporting at or below 8 percent amounts to Haseltine testimony that the victim in the case is telling the truth?  Even if <i>Mader</i> correctly determined that such statistical testimony violates <i>Haseltine</i> , was this proposition settled law at the time of Mader's and Molde's 2019 trials, as <i>Mader</i> and the court here held below, so that trial counsel should have known to object to the testimony?	11/12/2024 REVW Oral Arg.: 03/12/2025	3 Dunn	05/21/2024 Unpub.
<a href="#">2021AP001525</a>	<u>Hayden Halter v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association</u>  Is the WIAA a state actor? Are the Halters entitled to judicial review of the WIAA's decision to suspend Hayden Halter from the 2019 varsity wrestling regional event and to deny him an internal appeal to the body's Board of Control? Are the Halters entitled to certiorari relief? Are the Halters entitled to declaratory relief reinstating Hayden Halter's 2019 state title and points? Are the Halters entitled to a permanent injunction?	08/02/2022 REVW <b>REVERSED</b> <b>04/08/2025</b> <a href="#">2025 WI 10</a>	2 Racine	02/28/2023 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 12</a>
<a href="#">2022AP000182</a>	<u>Koble Investments v. Elicia Marquardt</u>  Do the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1) apply to a landlord attempting to enforce a residential lease?  If a residential lease incorporates the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 704.05(3), does the lease violate Wis. Stat. § 704.44(10) and Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08(10) by failing to include the notice of domestic abuse protections required by Wis. Stat. § 704.14?  When a residential tenant does not prove that he or she suffered any pecuniary loss because of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 704.44 or Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08(1), are damages recoverable under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5)?  Can an attorney, who has withdrawn from representing a residential tenant, directly pursue and recover his or her own attorney fees—including those incurred on appeal—under Wis. Stat. §§ 100.25(1) or 425.308(1) based upon a landlord's alleged violation of Wisconsin landlord-tenant law?	02/12/2025 REVW	3 Marathon	04/23/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 26</a>

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<a href="#">2022AP000718</a>	<u>Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources</u>	09/11/2022 REVW Oral Arg.: 01/14/2025	2 Waukesha	03/06/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 18</a>
	<p>The Spills Law broadly defines “hazardous substance” to include “any substance” whose quantity or concentration in a particular setting presents a hazard to human health or the environment. Those who are responsible for hazardous substances discharged to the environment must take action to restore the environment to the extent practicable and minimize the harmful effects. May responsible parties avoid investigating and remediating discharges of hazardous substances like PFAS (and potentially others) unless and until the Department promulgates rules designating those substances as “hazardous” and the concentrations at which they qualify as such?</p>			
	<p>The Voluntary Party Liability Exemption (VPLE) program under Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 292.15</a> grants the Department discretion to grant different types of liability exemptions to those who have cleaned up their property. The broadest type exempts all contaminants covered by the Spills Law, not just those the participant addressed. For a time, the Department paused granting this broad type of liability exemption due to statewide uncertainty over the scope and severity of PFAS contamination. Did the Department have to promulgate an administrative rule before it exercised its discretion to pause granting the broadest liability exemption?</p>			
	<p>Does Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 227.10(2m)</a> independently prevent the Department from administering the Spills Law until it promulgates administrative rules listing all substances it considers to be “hazardous” and at what concentration they qualify as such?</p>			

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<a href="#">2022AP000723</a>	<u>Carol Lorbiecki v. Pabst Brewing Company</u>  Wisconsin's safe place statute generally requires an owner of a place of employment or a public building to "construct, repair or maintain such a place of employment or public building as to render the same safe," Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 101.11</a> , for employees and frequenters. Is Pabst liable under Wisconsin's safe place statute for Mr. Lorbiecki's injuries?  To award punitive damages, Wisconsin law requires "evidence ... showing that the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 895.85(3)</a> . Should the jury be allowed to consider punitive damages for every alleged negligent violation of Wisconsin's safe place statute?  Wisconsin limits punitive damages to the greater of \$200,000 or "twice the amount of any compensatory damages recovered by the plaintiff." Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 895.043(6)</a> (emphasis added). "The rule of joint and several liability does not apply to punitive damages." Id. <a href="#">§ 895.043(5)</a> . Does the statutory phrase "compensatory damages recovered" in Wisconsin Statute <a href="#">§ 895.043(6)</a> include damages that a plaintiff cannot recover?	12/10/2024 REVW	1 Milwaukee	05/07/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 33</a>
<a href="#">2022AP000790</a>	<u>Josh Kaul v. Wisconsin State Legislature</u>  Does Wisconsin Stat. <a href="#">§ 165.08(1)</a> violate the Wisconsin Constitution's separation of powers as applied to the categories of: (1) civil enforcement actions; and (2) civil actions prosecuted on behalf of executive agencies regarding the administration of programs the agencies are charged with executing?	01/16/2025 REVW Oral Arg.: 04/02/2025	2 Dane	12/02/2024 Unpub.
<a href="#">2022AP000937</a>	<u>Legend Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Guy Keshena</u>  Whether Congress abrogated the Menominee Indian Tribe's sovereign immunity through the Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770 (1973)("MRA");  Whether there is an "in rem" exception or an "immovable property" exception to tribal sovereign immunity;  Whether the Tribe waived its sovereign immunity when it purchased properties that were subject to restrictive covenants, including one that specifically provided that any purchaser waived sovereign immunity; and  Whether the MRA preempts the enforcement of restrictive covenants on property under state law.	03/13/2025 CERT	3 Menominee	--

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<a href="#">2022AP000959</a>	<p><u>State v. Luis A. Ramirez</u></p> <p>Did the court of appeals create a new requirement departing from Barker and other precedent?</p> <p>a) How should a reviewing court weigh a defendant's pro se requests, particularly where counsel never renews them and counsel never objects to adjournments?</p> <p>b) How should a reviewing court treat a circuit court's findings that a defendant did not want a speedy trial when those findings are based in part on credibility determinations?</p> <p>Did the court of appeals correctly hold that the State showed a "cavalier disregard" for Ramirez's constitutional speedy trial rights where the State offered explanations for every adjournment, the court and parties were actively preparing for trial, Ramirez never made a speedy trial demand through counsel, he was in prison on another conviction while the case was pending, and the circuit court determined that Ramirez never wanted a speedy trial and was not prejudiced?</p>	<p>10/07/2024 REVW Oral Arg.: 02/11/2025</p>	<p>4 Columbia</p>	<p>04/25/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 28</a></p>
<a href="#">2022AP001158</a>	<p><u>Oconomowoc Area School District v. Gregory L. Cota</u></p> <p>Does information indicating that an individual has been questioned, apprehended, taken into custody or detention, held for investigation, arrested, charged with, indicted or tried pursuant to law enforcement authority, for a municipal offense punishable by a forfeiture, constitute an "arrest record" within the meaning of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act ("the WFEA") and does the WFEA therefore provide protection against terminations that are based upon this information?</p> <p>If the Court agrees on the first issue presented, a secondary issue is presented as to whether substantial evidence in the record supports the factual finding of the LIRC that the decision of the Oconomowoc Area School District to terminate the employment of Jeffrey Cota and Gregory Cota was made on the basis of their arrest records in violation of the WFEA.</p> <p>Did the LIRC and the trial court correctly determine that a municipal citation was an arrest record as defined by Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 111.32(1)</a>, and therefore firing the Cotas because of information indicating the Cotas had been issued a municipal citation was arrest record discrimination?</p>	<p>06/17/2024 REVW <b>REVERSED</b> <b>04/10/2025</b> <b><a href="#">2025 WI 11</a></b></p>	<p>2 Waukesha</p>	<p>01/10/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 8</a></p>

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<a href="#">2022AP001728</a>	<u>Heather Gudex v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc.</u>  Whether a rejected offer of complete individual relief, together with universal injunctive relief, for an alleged violation the Wisconsin Consumer Act, Chapter 427, made by “the person against whom [the] alleged cause of action is asserted” to the allegedly aggrieved “party” pursuant to Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 426.110(4)(c)</a> , both moots such aggrieved party’s individual claim and precludes such party from maintaining a class action for damages and injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 426.110</a> .  Whether a plaintiff who suffers no actual damages or other concrete injury, and who claims only “confusion” resulting from an alleged technical violation of Wis. Stat. <a href="#">Ch. 427</a> , is “a person injured” within the meaning of Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 427.105(1)</a> so as to have standing to bring an action for actual damages and the statutory penalty under Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 425.304</a> .	03/13/2025 REVW	1 Milwaukee	12/03/2024 Unpub.
<a href="#">2022AP001759</a>	<u>Nicole McDaniel v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections</u>  Did the Wisconsin Court of Appeals err by applying an unprecedented and excessively demanding pleading standard when deciding a motion for class certification, effectively treating it as a motion for summary judgment?  Did the Wisconsin Court of Appeals err when it ruled, contrary to many state and federal courts around the country, that the corrections officers cannot be compensated for pre-shift and post-shift activities such as security screenings?	11/12/2024 REVW Oral Arg: 03/14/2025	1 Milwaukee	05/15/2024 Unpub.
<a href="#">2023AP000070</a>	<u>Scot Van Oudenhoven v. Wisconsin Department of Justice</u>  Whether an expungement under Wisconsin law qualifies as an “expungement” as that term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).	11/12/2024 REVW Oral Arg.: 02/13/2025	2 Winnebago	06/04/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 38</a>
<a href="#">2023AP000255</a>	<u>Melissa A. Hubbard v. Carol J. Neuman, MD</u>  Does a treating physician who refers a patient to another physician have a duty under Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 448.30</a> to inform the patient about her conversations with that other physician, including her thoughts and alleged recommendations to the other physician, where the referring physician does not provide the treatment out of which the claim arises?	10/07/2024 REVW Oral Arg.: 01/14/2025	4 Rock	03/21/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 22</a>

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<a href="#">2023AP000645</a>	<p><u>State v. Carl Lee McAdory</u></p> <p>Does Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 346.63(1)(c)</a> grant circuit courts the post-remittitur authority to reopen judgments of conviction, vacate post-jeopardy orders dismissing <a href="#">§ 346.63(1)</a> counts at the State's request, and reinstate and convict defendants on those counts?</p> <p>When a defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, seeking to have his conviction on a count reversed, the State becomes a respondent on appeal. If, in the event the defendant's appeal succeeded, the State wished to have an order dismissing a different count vacated and further wished to have the judgment of conviction reopened and modified to have the defendant convicted on the previously-dismissed count, must the State have filed a notice of cross appeal under Wis. Stat. Rule <a href="#">809.10(2)(b)</a>? Alternatively, must the State have raised this request as an alternate ground for relief in its briefing on the defendant's appeal, as provided in <i>State v. Alles</i>, 106 Wis. 2d 368, 390-91, 316 N.W.2d 378 (1982)?</p> <p>Can a circuit court reinstate a count on which the defendant was found guilty but which the State moved to have dismissed after jeopardy attached, consistent with the defendant's protections against double jeopardy and his interest in the finality of judgments?</p>	<p>10/07/2024 REVW Oral Arg.: 02/11/2025</p>	<p>2 Rock</p>	<p>04-11-2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 29</a></p>
<a href="#">2023AP000715</a>	<p><u>State v. J.D.B.</u></p> <p><i>Sell</i> sets forth the standard for the government to obtain an involuntary medication order to restore trial competency. To comport with due process, a court must find that (1) an important governmental interest is at stake, (2) involuntary medication will significantly further that interest, (3) involuntary medication is necessary, and (4) involuntary medication is medically appropriate. On top of the <i>Sell</i> factors, to obtain a medication order, the State must establish that the defendant is incompetent to refuse medication.</p> <p>Did the State prove the <i>Sell</i> factors by clear and convincing evidence?</p> <p>Did the State prove the defendant incompetent to refuse treatment?</p>	<p>02/12/2025 REVW</p>	<p>1 Milwaukee</p>	<p>09/10/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 61</a></p>

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<a href="#">2023AP000722</a>	<u>State v. N.K.B.</u>  Under Wisconsin’s Mental Health Act, “patients” have the right to refuse medication except under certain circumstances, including where they pose a danger to themselves or others at the institution charged with their care. Chapter 971.14 committees, like Chapter 980 committees, are “patients” within the meaning of the Act. The Court previously held that the Act authorized a Chapter 980 committing court to order involuntary medication to address a committee’s dangerousness at an institution. Does the Act also authorize a Chapter 971.14 committing court to order forced medication to address dangerousness at an institution?	02/12/2015 REVW	1 Milwaukee	10/01/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 63</a>
<a href="#">2023AP000874</a>	<u>State v. Joan L. Stetzer</u>  Does Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 939.46(1)</a> permit a trial court to artificially and temporally subdivide a single “act” that is entitled to the privilege at its inception and determine whether each subdivided portion of the single “act” would be entitled to the privilege if viewed in isolation before the coercion defense will be applied?  Did the trial court fail to apply the correct legal standard by failing to consider the reasonableness of Stetzer’s decision not to stop and report her husband’s assault to the police from the perspective of a reasonable person with Stetzer’s particular characteristics and personal history?	12/10/2024 REVW Oral Arg: 03/12/2025	2 Waukesha	03/27/2024 Unpub.
<a href="#">2023AP001140</a>	<u>Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Division of Community Corrections v. Brian Hayes</u>  Even if a sexual assault victim’s out-of-court statements are found inadmissible, must the agency in a revocation proceeding still consider whether other unobjected-to, non-hearsay evidence supports a finding of the probation violations?  Does a probationer’s conditional right to confront the victim under <i>Morrissey v. Brewer</i> , 408 U.S. 471, 487, 489–90 (1972), allow an agency to consider out-of-court statements by a sexual assault victim?  Where an agency commits an error of law about its ability to consider certain evidence and thus fails to consider it, does a reviewing court properly ignore that error and simply consider the remaining evidence under certiorari review?	11/12/2024 REVW Oral Arg: 03/14/2025	1 Milwaukee	05/14/2024 Unpub.

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<a href="#">2023AP001464</a>	<p><u>State v. Kordell L. Grady</u></p> <p>The circuit court chose to conduct a contested restitution hearing as a “hybrid” procedure: Mr. Grady appeared via Zoom from prison. His lawyer, the assistant district attorney, and the judge all appeared in-person. During the hearing, Mr. Grady asked to speak to his lawyer. The court went “off the record” to facilitate that request, but made no attempt to ensure a confidential line of communication. The State, after listening in on Mr. Grady’s conversation with his attorney, used his comments to support its restitution argument. Does this procedure necessitate a remand for a new restitution hearing?</p> <p>May an insurance company be awarded restitution equivalent to the deductible paid by an insured when that insured has not filed a request for restitution?</p>	<p>01/16/2025 REVW Oral Arg.: 04/02/2025</p>	<p>2 Waukesha</p>	<p>07/17/2024 Unpub.</p>
<a href="#">2023AP001950</a>	<p><u>State v. H.C.</u></p> <p>Is the statutory scheme controlling the disposition phase in a termination of parental rights proceeding unconstitutional on its face because it violates procedural due process by not requiring the petitioner to prove that termination is in the best interest of the child by a certain level of proof?</p> <p>If the statutory scheme controlling the disposition phase in a termination of parental rights proceeding is unconstitutional because it does not require the petitioner to prove that termination is in the best interest of the child by a certain level of proof, is a parent whose rights were terminated under the unconstitutional statute entitled to a new disposition hearing?</p> <p>Even if the court were to conclude that the constitution does not require it, is there nonetheless a burden of proof at the dispositional phase? And, if so, what is the burden of proof?</p>	<p>09/11/2024 REVW Oral Arg.: 12/09/2024</p>	<p>1 Milwaukee</p>	<p>03/05/2024 Unpub.</p>

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<a href="#">2023AP002020</a>	<u>Tony Evers v. Howard Marklein</u>  Under various provisions of Wis. Stat. <a href="#">ch. 101</a> , [the Department of Safety and Professional Services (DSPS)] is charged with promulgating rules relating to commercial building safety, accessibility, and energy efficiency. Under Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 457.03(2)</a> , the Marriage and Family Therapy, Professional Counseling, and Social Work Examining Board is responsible for developing ethics standards for social workers, marriage and family therapists, and professional counselors. Courts have broadly recognized that blocking executive branch agencies' rules violates bicameralism and presentment procedures and infringes on executive and judicial authority. Wisconsin Stat. <a href="#">§§ 227.19(5)(c), (d), (dm)</a> , and <a href="#">227.26(2)(d) and (im)</a> authorize the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules, a 10-member legislative committee, to veto administrative rules. Do these veto provisions violate the separation of powers by allowing this committee to block executive agency rulemaking or, at minimum, DSPS's and the Board's rulemaking authority over commercial building standards and ethics standards for social workers, marriage and family therapists, and professional counselors?	10/07/2024 ORIG Oral Arg.: 01/16/2025	--	--
<a href="#">2023AP002102</a>	<u>State v. K.R.C.</u>  One day while at school, twelve-year-old Kevin (pseudonym used) was called out of class to the principal's office. The principal directed Kevin to the "school resource" officer's office. Inside the office were two police officers. While one officer interrogated Kevin, the other stood in front of the door. Kevin was never given <i>Miranda</i> warnings. The issues presented are: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Whether Kevin was "in custody" under the <i>Miranda</i> standard and should have been provided <i>Miranda</i> warnings.</li> <li>Whether Kevin's inculpatory statements were involuntarily procured by coercive police tactics.</li> </ol>	03/13/2025 REVW	2 Manitowoc	10/30/2024 Unpub.
<a href="#">2023AP002319</a>	<u>State v. Michael Joseph Gasper</u>  Whether Gasper was entitled to a "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" in data uploaded to his Snapchat Account from his cellphone.  Whether the March 3, 2023 warrantless viewing by Law Enforcement of the Snapchat Cybertip satisfies the "Private Search" exception to the Fourth Amendment.  Whether the "Good Faith Exception" to the exclusionary rule applies to obviate the constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment Warrant requirement in this case.  Case to be heard with State v. Rausch Sharak, <a href="#">2024AP469</a> .	03/13/2025 REVW	2 Waukesha	10/30/2024 Pub. <a href="#">2024 WI App 72</a>

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<a href="#">2023AP002362</a>	<p><u>Josh Kaul v. Joel Urmanski</u></p> <p>Does <a href="#">§ 940.04</a>, and § 940.04(1), (5), and (6) specifically, prohibit performing consensual abortions, subject to the exception in § 940.04(5)?</p> <p>If <a href="#">§ 940.04</a>, and § 940.04(1), (5), and (6) in particular, otherwise would apply to and prohibit performing consensual abortions, subject to § 940.04(5), has that prohibition been impliedly repealed or superseded by subsequent legislation such that it can no longer be applied to consensual abortions?</p> <p>If <a href="#">§ 940.04</a>, and § 940.04(1), (5), and (6) in particular, otherwise would apply to and prohibit performing consensual abortions, subject to § 940.04(5), is that prohibition unenforceable as to abortions under the Due Process Clause because it is unconstitutionally vague on its face or compliance is impossible?</p> <p>If <a href="#">§ 940.04</a>, and § 940.04(1), (5), and (6) in particular, otherwise would apply to and prohibit performing consensual abortions, subject to § 940.04(5), is that prohibition unenforceable because of alleged disuse and reliance on <i>Roe v. Wade</i> and its progeny?</p> <p>Do the State Agencies have standing to bring their own claims in this action and, if not, can they rely on the standing of an intervenor to remain in the action and benefit from a judgment obtained by an intervenor?</p>	<p>07/02/2024 BYPA Oral Arg.: 11/11/2024</p>	<p>4 Dane</p>	<p>--</p>

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<a href="#">2024AP000330</a>	<u>Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin vs. Joel Urmanski</u>	07/02/2024 ORIG	--	--
	<p>Whether Wisconsin Statute <a href="#">§ 940.04</a>, if interpreted to prevent a person from obtaining an abortion in all circumstances except “to save the life of the mother,” violates the person’s inherent right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, by unconstitutionally interfering with the person’s right to bodily integrity, autonomy, and self-determination—including the decision of whether and when to have a child.</p>			
	<p>Whether Wisconsin Statute <a href="#">§ 940.04</a>, if interpreted to prevent a person from obtaining an abortion in all circumstances except “to save the life of the mother,” violates the person’s right to equal protection guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, by treating people, including those who seek abortion services, differently than people who seek comparable healthcare services, without an adequate state interest.</p>			
	<p>Whether Wisconsin Statute <a href="#">§ 940.04</a>, if interpreted to prevent physicians from performing an abortion in all circumstances except “to save the life of the mother,” violates the physicians’ rights to equal protection guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, by treating physicians providing abortion services differently than those providing comparable healthcare services, without an adequate state interest.</p>			
	<p>Whether Wisconsin Statute <a href="#">§ 940.04</a>, if interpreted to prevent physicians from performing an abortion in all circumstances except “to save the life of the mother,” infringes on the physicians’ fundamental right to liberty guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, by preventing them from practicing their chosen profession and treating their patients to the full extent of the physicians’ education, training, and ability, consistent with the patients’ needs.</p>			

**NOTE: The issues outlined here are meant to be concise and do not provide a detailed overview of the specific matters in each case. Readers seeking specific case details are encouraged to refer to the records and briefs filed with the Supreme Court.**

TABLE OF PENDING CASES  
**WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT**  
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Case No.	Caption/Issue(s)	SC Accepted/ Oral Arg. or Brief Subm.	CA Dist./ Cty.	CA Decision
<a href="#">2024AP000469</a>	<p><u>State v. Andreas W. Rauch Sharak</u></p> <p>Whether a person who holds an electronic account with an electronic service provider (ESP) retains a reasonable expectation of privacy, as to the government, in files that the ESP obtains from the account, despite terms of service that provide that the ESP will scan the account for illegal content and may report such content to law enforcement.</p> <p>Whether an ESP's scan and review of files in a person's electronic account constitute a private search or a government search under <b><i>State v. Payano-Roman</i></b>, <a href="#">2006 WI 47</a>, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548.</p> <p>Whether a law enforcement officer is required to obtain a warrant before opening and viewing any files that the ESP sent to National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which then sent the files to law enforcement.</p> <p>Case to be heard with State v. Gasper, <a href="#">2023AP2319</a>, <a href="#">2024 WI App 72</a>.</p>	03/13/2025 CERT	4 Jefferson	--
<a href="#">2024AP000717</a>	<p><u>Service Employees International Union Healthcare Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission</u></p> <p>Does the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 111.02</a> et seq., apply to the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority, a political corporation and "body corporate and politic," and its employees and their chosen representatives?</p>	12/10/2024 BYPA Oral Arg.: 02/12/2025	1 Dane	--
<a href="#">2024AP000729</a>	<p><u>Jeffrey A. LeMieux v. Tony Evers</u></p> <p>Does <a href="#">Article V, § 10(1)(c)</a> of the Wisconsin Constitution forbid a governor from deleting digits in an enrolled bill to create a new year?</p> <p>Does a governor exceed his or her partial-veto authority under <a href="#">Article V, § 10(1)(b)</a> of the Wisconsin Constitution by deleting language in an enrolled bill to create a longer duration than the one that the legislature approved?</p>	06/17/2024 ORIG <b>RELIEF DENIED</b> 04/18/2025 <a href="#">2025 WI 12</a>	--	--

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<a href="#">2024AP001713</a>	<p><u>Wisconsin State Legislature v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction</u></p> <p>Was 2023 Senate Bill 971, the bill that became 2023 Wis. Act 100, an “appropriation bill” under <a href="#">article V, § 10(1)(b)</a>, such that the Governor validly partially vetoed it?</p> <p>Did the Governor’s partial veto otherwise comply with article V, § 10(1)(b)?</p> <p>Can the Joint Committee on Finance (JCF), consistent with <a href="#">article VIII, § 2</a>, and Wis. Stat. <a href="#">§ 13.101</a>, withhold from the Dept. of Public Instruction (DPI) the \$50 million the budget bill set aside for DPI’s literacy programs and credited to JCF’s “emergency” appropriation?</p>	<p>01/24/2025 BYPA Oral Arg.: 04/03/2025</p>	<p>1 Dane</p>	<p>--</p>

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