

FILED
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SUPREME COURT

No. 2023AP001399-OA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

REBECCA CLARKE, RUBEN ANTHONY, TERRY DAWSON, DANA GLASSTEIN, ANN GROVES-LLOYD, CARL HUJET, JERRY IVERSON, TIA JOHNSON, ANGIE KIRST, SELIKA LAWTON, FABIAN MALDONADO, ANNEMARIE MCCLELLAN, JAMES MCNETT, BRITTANY MURIELLO, ELA JOOSTEN (PARI) SCHILS, NATHANIEL SLACK, MARY SMITH-JOHNSON, DENISE SWEET, AND GABRIELLE YOUNG,

Petitioners,

GOVERNOR TONY EVERS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, NATHAN ATKINSON, STEPHEN JOSEPH WRIGHT, GARY KRENZ, SARAH J. HAMILTON, JEAN-LUC THIFFEAULT, SOMESH JHA, JOANNE KANE, AND LEAH DUDLEY,

Intervenors-Petitioners,

v.

WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION, DON MILLIS, ROBERT F. SPINDELL, JR., MARK L. THOMSEN, ANN S. JACOBS, MARGE BOSTELMANN, CARRIE RIEPL, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION; MEAGAN WOLFE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION; ANDRE JACQUE, TIM CARPENTER, ROB HUTTON, CHRIS LARSON, DEVIN LEMAHIEU, STEPHEN L. NASS, JOHN JAGLER, MARK SPREITZER, HOWARD MARKLEIN, RACHAEL CABRAL-GUEVARA, VAN H. WANGGAARD, JESSE L. JAMES, ROMAINE ROBERT QUINN, DIANNE H. HESSELBEIN, CORY TOMCZYK, JEFF SMITH AND CHRIS KAPENGA IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE WISCONSIN SENATE,

Respondents,

WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE, BILLIE JOHNSON, CHRIS GOEBEL, ED PERKINS, ERIC O'KEEFE, JOE SANFELIPPO, TERRY MOULTON, ROBERT JENSEN, RON ZAHN, RUTH ELMER, AND RUTH STRECK,

Intervenors-Respondents.

APPENDIX TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY INTERVENORS-RESPONDENTS WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE, JOHNSON, GOEBEL, PERKINS, O'KEEFE, SANFELIPPO, MOULTON, JENSEN, ZAHN, ELMER, AND STRECK AND RESPONDENTS SENATORS CABRAL-GUEVARA, HUTTON, JACQUE, JAGLER, JAMES, KAPENGA, LEMAHIEU, MARKLEIN, NASS, QUINN, TOMCZYK, AND WANGGAARD

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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin.

William WHITFORD, Roger Anclam, Emily Bunting, Mary Lynne Donohue, Helen Harris, Wayne Jensen, Wendy Sue Johnson, Janet Mitchell, Allison Seaton, [James Seaton](#), Jerome Wallace and Donald Winter, Plaintiffs,

v.

Beverly R. GILL, Julie M. Glancey, Ann S. Jacobs, Steve King, Don Millis, and Mark L. Thomsen, Defendants.

15-cv-421-bbc

I

Signed 01/27/2017

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OPINION and ORDER

[KENNETH F. RIPPLE](#), Circuit Judge, [BARBARA B. CRABB](#) and [WILLIAM C. GRIESBACH](#), District Judge

*1 On November 21, 2016, we issued our opinion and order holding that the redistricting plan embodied in Act 43 constituted an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. We also solicited the views of the parties as to the appropriate remedy. Having received and considered the parties' submissions, we now address the issue of remedy.

OPINION

The parties agree that the appropriate remedy in this case is to enter an injunction prohibiting the use of Act 43's districting plan in future elections.¹ The parties dispute, however, who should draft a remedial map, how that map should be drafted, and when it should be implemented.

It is the prerogative of the State to determine the contours of a new map setting forth the electoral districts of the Assembly. The Supreme Court has made it clear that “[w]hen a federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme unconstitutional, it is ... appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise and order into effect its own plan.” *Wise v. Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).² The plaintiffs nevertheless urge that providing the Legislature an opportunity to enact a remedial plan is impracticable here because Wisconsin's elected branches have compiled an “objectionable” record of defending its unconstitutional plan.³ In some cases, such an exception to the general rule may be appropriate.⁴ The record in our case, however, contains no evidence of the malice or intransigence that would justify our abrogating such a fundamental principle. Although the state actors in this case certainly intended the partisan effect that they in fact produced, the record does not permit us to ascribe to them an unwillingness to adhere to an order of this Court or to conform the allocation of seats in the state legislature to constitutional requirements.

The plaintiffs further submit that, if we permit the Wisconsin legislature to redistrict, we should give it “[d]etailed [i]nstructions.”⁵ Several considerations militate against such a course. Consistent with our approach to remedying other constitutional violations, our only interest in the redistricting of the State is to “correct ... the condition that offends the Constitution.” *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.*, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). “[A] state's freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an apportionment plan found unconstitutional, either as a whole or in part, should not be restricted beyond the clear commands of the Equal Protection Clause.” *Wise*, 437 U.S. at 540 (alteration in original) (quoting *Burns v. Richardson*, 384 U.S. 73, 85 (1966)). This very basic principle is grounded not only on the constitutional limitations of federal authority but also on the practical reality that it is the state legislature, not the federal court, that is “the best institution ‘to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality.’ ” *Gorin v. Karpan*, 775

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F. Supp. 1430, 1445–46 (D. Wyo. 1991) (quoting *Connor v. Finch*, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977)). The record in this case makes abundantly clear that the drafters of the 2010 reapportionment labored intensely over their project. Although, in the end, they produced what we have found to be an unconstitutional result, they wrestled along the way with many legitimate political considerations. Indeed, the record reveals that they produced many alternate maps, some of which may conform to constitutional standards. In any event, with the benefit of our ruling, state officials should be able to produce a map that, while conforming to the Constitution, will allow them to attain their legitimate political objectives. In our ruling on the merits, we set forth, at length, the nature of the constitutional violation at issue and the basis for our determination.⁶ Within this framework, it is the prerogative of the State to reapportion as it sees fit. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to embroil the Court in the Wisconsin Legislature’s deliberations.

*2 Whether we should set a deadline for the State to enact a remedial plan is a question for which there are only imperfect answers. The plaintiffs ask us to set a “[s]trict [d]eadline” of April 1, 2017.⁷ They invite our attention to examples of courts giving state legislatures little time within which to pass remedial plans. See, e.g., *Larios v. Cox*, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2004). All of those situations occurred during election years when “time [wa]s of the essence.” *Johnson v. Mortham*, 926 F. Supp. 1460, 1494 (N.D. Fla. 1996). For their part, the defendants maintain that, given “the uncertain nature of the law on partisan gerrymandering,” we should not require the Legislature to act until after the Supreme Court has ruled on this case.⁸

In a perfect world, the defendants’ suggestion would make sense and would permit us to remove ourselves even further from the State’s deliberative process. But there are several countervailing considerations that we must consider. Members of the Wisconsin Assembly are elected for a term of two years. Under the prevailing view in this Court, the people of Wisconsin already have endured several elections under an unconstitutional reapportionment scheme. If they are to be spared another such event, a new map must be drawn in time for the preparatory steps leading up to the election, such as candidate petition circulations in mid-Spring 2018. At the same time, the defendants’ right of appeal must be protected. We also must take into consideration the drain on legislative resources and energy in enacting a new plan and be cognizant that the Supreme Court has many other important issues on

its docket and may well need a significant amount of time to finish its work on this case.

We think that all of these competing considerations can best be accommodated by requiring that the Legislature enact, and the Governor approve, a new redistricting map by November 1, 2017. This deadline affords the Legislature ample time to enact a plan contingent on the Supreme Court’s affirmance of our judgment. While it allows the defendants and the candidates to make plans for the November 2018 election only on a contingent basis, at least they will be able to prepare for that contingency in the context of a concrete alternate map.

The considerations that we just have discussed make it clear that we do not believe that we ought to stay our judgment pending appeal, as the defendants request. In assessing the probability of success on the merits, while the majority of the Court remains firm in its belief of the correctness of the decision, “the absence of a well-trodden path”⁹ is no doubt of some relevance in considering the appropriateness of a stay. See, e.g., *Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative*, 240 F. Supp. 2d 21, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2003) (considering, among other factors, that “this case presents an issue of first impression”). We also must take into respectful consideration the dissent of our number on the merits. Nevertheless, the defendants also must establish irreparable injury absent a stay. See, e.g., *Larios*, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1336–37. Here, we must balance the harm to the defendants against the harm to the plaintiffs. Much of our earlier discussion is pertinent here. In setting a November 1, 2017 deadline for the enactment of at least a contingent replacement map, we considered the State’s burden in enacting even a contingent remedial plan and have concluded that the State’s thorough earlier work may significantly assuage the task now before them. Additionally, by choosing to enact a plan *contingent* on the Supreme Court’s affirming our judgment, the defendants will retain easily the present map if the Supreme Court does not agree with our disposition.

ORDER

*3 IT IS ORDERED that the defendants are enjoined from using the districting plan embodied in Act 43 in all future elections.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants have a remedial redistricting plan for the November 2018 election,

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enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature and signed by the Governor, in place no later than November 1, 2017. This plan must comply with our November 21, 2016 order but may be contingent upon the Supreme Court's affirmance of our November 21, 2016 order.

The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

All Citations

Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2017 WL 383360

Footnotes

- 1 See R.169 (Defendants' Brief on Remedies) at 5 ("The proper remedy is for the Court to enter an injunction directing the Legislature to draft a new map consistent with its opinion."); R.170 (Plaintiffs' Brief on Remedies) at 2 ("To begin with, as soon as possible, the Court should enter an injunction barring any further use of the Current Plan.").
- 2 See also R.170 at 5 (citing same).
- 3 *Id.* at 7.
- 4 See *Hays v. Louisiana*, 936 F. Supp. 360, 372 (W.D. La. 1996) (refusing to give the Louisiana legislature an opportunity to pass a *third* remedial plan); *Terrazas v. Slagle*, 789 F. Supp. 828, 838–39 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (noting the "unusually lethargic" pace of the state legislature's actions).
- 5 R.170 at 10.
- 6 See R.166.
- 7 R.170 at 10.
- 8 R.169 at 1.
- 9 R.166 at 31.

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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court, N.D.
Alabama, Southern Division.

Bobby SINGLETON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

Wes ALLEN, in his official capacity as
Alabama Secretary of State, et al., Defendants.

Evan Milligan, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

Wes Allen, in his official capacity as Alabama
Secretary of State, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 2:21-cv-1291-AMM,

Case No.: 2:21-cv-1530-AMM

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Signed September 5, 2023

Synopsis

Background: Black registered voters and civil rights organizations brought actions against Alabama Secretary of State and numerous state legislators, challenging Alabama's congressional redistricting plan, for which only one of seven districts had a Black majority, as violating equal protection and diluting votes in violation of § 2 of Voting Rights Act (VRA). Two actions were consolidated for preliminary injunction proceedings, and a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, [582 F.Supp.3d 924](#), granted preliminary injunctions, with clarification, [2022 WL 272637](#), and denied a stay pending appeal, [2022 WL 272636](#). In third action, which involved vote dilution claim under VRA, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, [Anna M. Manasco, J., 2022 WL 264819](#), granted preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court, [142 S.Ct. 879](#), noted its probable jurisdiction in first two actions, granted certiorari before judgment in third action, stayed the preliminary injunctions and then, [143 S.Ct. 1487](#), affirmed. Case was then returned to District Court for remedial proceedings, and Court allowed Legislature approximately five weeks to enact new plan. After plan was enacted, plaintiffs filed objections and sought another preliminary injunction.

Holdings: The District Court held that:

plaintiffs were not required in remedial proceedings to reprove, under [Gingles](#), Alabama's liability under VRA for voter dilution in connection with Alabama's 2023 approval of congressional redistricting plan;

Alabama's 2023 redistricting plan failed to completely remedy voter dilution violation of VRA through its failure to include a second Black-opportunity district, as required to enjoin plan and to direct special master and his team to draw remedial maps as part of new redistricting plan;

Black Alabamian registered voters were sufficiently large as a group to constitute majority in a reasonably configured, second majority-Black legislative district in Alabama, as required for likelihood of success on merits of claim that 2023 plan improperly diluted votes of Black Alabamians in violation of VRA, and for entry of preliminary injunction;

report provided by State of Alabama's "race predominance" expert witness was inadmissible;

Black Alabamian registered voters were "reasonably compact" as a group to constitute majority in a reasonably configured, second majority-Black legislative district in Alabama, as required for likelihood of success on merits of claim that 2023 plan improperly diluted votes of Black Alabamians in violation of VRA, and for entry of preliminary injunction;

significant lack of responsiveness of elected officials in Alabama to particularized needs of Black Alabamian registered voters weighed in favor of determination that 2023 plan improperly diluted votes of Black Alabamians in violation of VRA, as required for entry of preliminary injunction;

voters and organizations would suffer irreparable harm absent entry of preliminary injunction;

public interest weighed in favor of entry of immediate preliminary injunction; and

it was appropriate to direct special master and his team to draw remedial map or maps for court to order Alabama Secretary of State to use in Alabama's 2024 congressional elections.

Ordered accordingly.

Procedural Posture(s): Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

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Before MARCUS, Circuit Judge, [MANASCO](#) and [MOORER](#), District Judges.

INJUNCTION, OPINION, AND ORDER

PER CURIAM:

*1 These congressional redistricting cases have returned to this Court after the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed in all respects a preliminary injunction this Court entered on January 24, 2022. *See Allen v. Milligan*, — U.S. —, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 1498, 1502, 216 L.Ed.2d 60 (2023).

These cases allege that Alabama's congressional electoral map is racially gerrymandered in violation of the United States Constitution and/or dilutes the votes of Black Alabamians in violation of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (“Section Two”). *See Singleton v. Allen*, No. 2:21-cv-1291-AMM (asserting only constitutional challenges); *Milligan v. Allen*, No. 2:21-cv-1530-AMM (asserting both constitutional and statutory challenges); *Caster v. Allen*, No. 2:21-cv-1536-AMM (asserting only statutory challenges).

Milligan is now before this three-judge Court, and *Caster* is before Judge Manasco alone, for remedial proceedings.¹ The map this Court enjoined (“the 2021 Plan”) included one majority-Black district: District 7. District 7 became a majority-Black district in 1992 when a federal court drew it that way in a ruling that was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. *Wesch v. Hunt*, 785 F. Supp. 1491, 1497–1500 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (three-judge court), *aff'd sub nom. Camp v. Wesch*, 504 U.S. 902, 112 S.Ct. 1926, 118 L.Ed.2d 535 (1992), and *aff'd sub nom. Figures v. Hunt*, 507 U.S. 901, 113 S.Ct. 1233, 122 L.Ed.2d 640 (1993).

After an extensive seven-day hearing, this Court concluded that the 2021 Plan likely violated Section Two and thus enjoined the State from using that plan in the 2022 election. *See Milligan* Doc. 107; *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502.²

Based on controlling precedent, we held that “the appropriate remedy is a congressional redistricting plan that includes either an additional majority-Black congressional district, or an additional district in which Black voters otherwise have an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 5.³ We observed that “[a]s the Legislature consider[ed remedial] plans, it should be mindful of the practical reality, based on the ample evidence of intensely racially polarized voting adduced during the preliminary injunction proceedings, that any remedial plan will need to include two districts in which Black voters either comprise a voting-age majority or something quite close to it.” *Id.* at 6.

Because federal law dictates that the Alabama Legislature should have the first opportunity to draw a remedial plan, we gave the Legislature that opportunity. *See id.* The Secretary of State and legislative defendants (“the Legislators” and collectively, “the State”) appealed. *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502.

*2 On June 8, 2023, the Supreme Court affirmed the preliminary injunction. *See id.* The Supreme Court “s[aw] no reason to disturb th[is] Court's careful factual findings, which are subject to clear error review and have gone unchallenged by Alabama in any event.” *Id.* at 1506. Likewise, the Supreme Court concluded there was no “basis to upset th[is] Court's legal conclusions” because we “faithfully applied [Supreme Court] precedents and correctly determined that, under existing law, [the 2021 Plan] violated” Section Two. *Id.*

The State then requested that this Court allow the Legislature approximately five weeks — until July 21, 2023 — to enact a new plan. *Milligan* Doc. 166. All parties understood the urgency of remedial proceedings: the State previously advised this Court that because of pressing state-law deadlines, Secretary Allen needs a final congressional districting map by “early October” for the 2024 election. *Milligan* Doc. 147 at 3.⁴ In the light of that urgency, and to balance the deference given to the Legislature to reapportion the state with the limitations set by *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4–8, 127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006), we delayed remedial proceedings to accommodate the Legislature's efforts, entered a scheduling order, and alerted the parties that any remedial

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hearing would commence on the date they proposed: August 14, 2023. *Milligan* Doc. 168.

On July 21, 2023, the Legislature enacted and Governor Ivey signed into law a new congressional map (“the 2023 Plan”). Just like the 2021 Plan enjoined by this Court, the 2023 Plan includes only one majority-Black district: District 7. *Milligan* Doc. 186-1 at 2.

All Plaintiffs timely objected to the 2023 Plan and requested another injunction. See *Singleton* Doc. 147; *Milligan* Doc. 200; *Caster* Doc. 179. The *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs argue that the 2023 Plan did not cure the unlawful vote dilution we found because it did not create a second district in which Black voters have an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice (an “opportunity district”). *Milligan* Doc. 200 at 16–23; *Caster* Doc. 179 at 8–11. Separately, the *Milligan* and *Singleton* Plaintiffs argue that the 2023 Plan runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs contend that the State intentionally discriminated against Black Alabamians in drawing the 2023 Plan, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Milligan* Doc. 200 at 23–26. And the *Singleton* Plaintiffs argue that the 2023 Plan is an impermissible racial gerrymander — indeed, just the latest in a string of racially gerrymandered plans the State has enacted, dating back to 1992. *Singleton* Doc. 147 at 13–27.

The record before us thus includes not only the evidentiary materials submitted during the preliminary injunction proceedings, but also expert reports, deposition transcripts, and other evidence submitted during this remedial phase. See *Singleton* Docs. 147, 162, 165; *Milligan* Docs. 200, 220, 225; *Caster* Docs. 179, 191, 195; Aug. 14 Tr. 92–93; Aug. 15 Tr. 24–25. We also have the benefit of the parties’ briefs, a hearing, three *amicus* briefs, and a statement of interest filed by the Attorney General of the United States. *Milligan* Docs. 199, 234, 236, 260.

The State concedes that the 2023 Plan does not include an additional opportunity district. Indeed, the State has explained that its position is that notwithstanding our order and the Supreme Court’s affirmance, the Legislature was not required to include an additional opportunity district in the 2023 Plan. Aug. 14 Tr. 159–64.

*3 That concession controls this case. Because the 2023 Plan does not include an additional opportunity district, we conclude that the 2023 Plan does not remedy the likely Section Two violation that we found and the Supreme

Court affirmed. We also conclude that under the controlling Supreme Court test, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs are substantially likely to establish that the 2023 Plan violates Section Two. As we explain below, our conclusions rest on facts the State does not dispute.

Because the record establishes the other requirements for relief — that the Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction does not issue, the threatened injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs the damage an injunction may cause the State, and an injunction is not adverse to the public interest — under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65\(d\)](#) we **PRELIMINARILY ENJOIN** Secretary Allen from conducting any elections with the 2023 Plan.

Under the Voting Rights Act, the statutory framework, and binding precedent, the appropriate remedy is, as we already said, a congressional districting plan that includes either an additional majority-Black district, or an additional district in which Black voters otherwise have an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice. See, e.g., *Bartlett v. Strickland*, 556 U.S. 1, 24, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009) (plurality opinion); *Cooper v. Harris*, 581 U.S. 285, 306, 137 S.Ct. 1455, 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017). We discern no basis in federal law to accept a map the State admits falls short of this required remedy.

“Redistricting is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State,” *Abbott v. Perez*, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324, 201 L.Ed.2d 714 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), but this Court “ha[s] its own duty to cure” districts drawn in violation of federal law, *North Carolina v. Covington*, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 201 L.Ed.2d 993 (2018). We are three years into a ten-year redistricting cycle, and the Legislature has had ample opportunity to draw a lawful map.

Based on the evidence before us, including testimony from the Legislators, we have no reason to believe that allowing the Legislature still another opportunity to draw yet another map will yield a map that includes an additional opportunity district. Moreover, counsel for the State has informed the Court that, even if the Court were to grant the Legislature yet another opportunity to draw a map, it would be practically impossible for the Legislature to reconvene and do so in advance of the 2024 election cycle. Accordingly, the Special Master and cartographer are **DIRECTED** to commence work forthwith on a remedial map. Instructions shall follow by separate order.

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Because we grant relief on statutory grounds, and “[a] fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that [we] avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them,” *Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n*, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988); see also *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry*, 548 U.S. 399, 442, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (“LULAC”); *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 38, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), we again **RESERVE RULING** on the constitutional issues raised by the *Singleton* and the *Milligan* Plaintiffs, including the *Singleton* Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

We have reached these conclusions only after conducting an exhaustive analysis of an extensive record under well-developed legal standards, as Supreme Court precedent instructs. We do not take lightly federal intrusion into a process ordinarily reserved for the State Legislature. But we have now said twice that this Voting Rights Act case is not close. And we are deeply troubled that the State enacted a map that the State readily admits does not provide the remedy we said federal law requires.

*4 We are disturbed by the evidence that the State delayed remedial proceedings but ultimately did not even nurture the ambition to provide the required remedy. And we are struck by the extraordinary circumstance we face. We are not aware of any other case in which a state legislature — faced with a federal court order declaring that its electoral plan unlawfully dilutes minority votes and requiring a plan that provides an additional opportunity district — responded with a plan that the state concedes does not provide that district. The law requires the creation of an additional district that affords Black Alabamians, like everyone else, a fair and reasonable opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. The 2023 Plan plainly fails to do so.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Posture

1. Liability Proceedings

On September 27, 2021, after the results of the 2020 census were released, the *Singleton* Plaintiffs filed a complaint against John Merrill, the former Secretary of State of Alabama.⁵ *Singleton* Doc. 1. The *Singleton* Plaintiffs asserted that holding the 2022 election under Alabama's old congressional map (“the 2011 Plan”) would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the districts were malapportioned and racially gerrymandered. *Id.* The Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit convened a three-judge court to adjudicate *Singleton*. *Singleton* Doc. 13.

*5 On November 3, 2021, the Legislature passed the 2021 Plan. The next day, Governor Ivey signed the 2021 Plan into law, and the *Singleton* Plaintiffs amended their complaint to stake their claims on the 2021 Plan, asserting a racial gerrymandering claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and an intentional discrimination claim under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. *Singleton* Doc. 15 at 38–48. “The *Singleton* plaintiffs are registered voters in Alabama's Second, Sixth, and Seventh Congressional Districts under the [2021] Plan; the lead plaintiff, Bobby Singleton, is a Black Senator in the Legislature.” *Singleton* Doc. 88 at 10.

On the same day the *Singleton* Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, the *Caster* Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against

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Secretary Merrill. *Caster* Doc. 3. *Caster* is pending before Judge Manasco sitting alone. The *Caster* Plaintiffs challenged the 2021 Plan only under Section Two and asserted a single claim of vote dilution. *Id.* at 29–31. “The *Caster* plaintiffs are citizens of Alabama’s First, Second, and Seventh Congressional Districts under the [2021] Plan.” *Caster* Doc. 101 at 20.

On November 16, 2021, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs filed suit against Secretary Merrill and the Legislators, who serve as co-chairs of the Legislature’s Committee on Reapportionment (“the Committee”).⁶ *Milligan* Doc. 1. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs asserted a vote dilution claim under Section Two, a racial gerrymandering claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and an intentional discrimination claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. *Id.* at 48–52. “The *Milligan* plaintiffs are Black registered voters in Alabama’s First, Second, and Seventh Congressional Districts and two organizational plaintiffs — Greater Birmingham Ministries and the Alabama State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. (‘NAACP’) — with members who are registered voters in those Congressional districts and the Third Congressional District.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 12–13. The Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit convened a three-judge court to hear *Milligan* that includes the same three judges who comprise the *Singleton* Court. *Milligan* Doc. 23.

The Legislators intervened as defendants in *Singleton* and *Caster*. See *Singleton* Doc. 32; *Caster* Doc. 69.

Each set of Plaintiffs requested that this Court enjoin Alabama from using the 2021 Plan for the 2022 election. *Singleton* Doc. 15 at 47; *Milligan* Doc. 1 at 52; *Caster* Doc. 3 at 30–31; see also *Singleton* Doc. 57; *Milligan* Doc. 69; *Caster* Doc. 56. The *Singleton* Court consolidated *Singleton* and *Milligan* “for the limited purposes” of preliminary injunction proceedings; set a hearing for January 4, 2022; and set prehearing deadlines. *Milligan* Doc. 40. The *Caster* Court then set a preliminary injunction hearing for January 4, 2022 and set the same prehearing deadlines that were set in *Singleton* and *Milligan*. *Caster* Doc. 40. All parties agreed to a consolidated preliminary injunction proceeding which permitted consideration of evidence in a combined fashion.

A preliminary injunction hearing commenced on January 4 and concluded on January 12, 2022. *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502. During the hearing, this Court “received live testimony from 17 witnesses, reviewed more than 1000 pages of briefing and

upwards of 350 exhibits, and considered arguments from the 43 different lawyers who had appeared in the litigation.” *Id.*

*6 We evaluated the *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs’ statutory claims using the three-part test developed by the Supreme Court in *Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25. And we preliminarily enjoined Alabama from using the 2021 Plan. *Milligan* Doc. 107. We held that under controlling precedent, “the appropriate remedy is a congressional redistricting plan that includes either an additional majority-Black congressional district, or an additional district in which Black voters otherwise have an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice.” *Id.* at 5. Because we issued an injunction on statutory grounds, we declined to decide the constitutional claims of the *Singleton* and *Milligan* Plaintiffs. *Id.* at 214–17.

Because “redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt,” we gave the Legislature the first opportunity to draw a new map. *Wise v. Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535, 539, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978) (White, J.); *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 6. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court stayed the injunction. *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502; *Merrill v. Milligan*, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 879, — L.Ed.2d — (2022).

On February 8, 2022, the *Singleton* Plaintiffs moved this Court for an expedited ruling on their constitutional claims. *Singleton* Doc. 104. All other parties opposed that motion, see *Singleton* Doc. 109; *Milligan* Doc. 135; *Caster* Doc. 127, and we denied it on the ground that we should not decide any constitutional claims prematurely, *Singleton* Doc. 114.

On April 14, 2022, we held a status conference. See *Milligan* Doc. 143. Mindful that under Alabama law, the last date candidates may qualify with major political parties to participate in the 2024 primary election is November 10, 2023, see Ala. Code § 17-13-5(a), we directed the State to identify the latest date by which the Secretary of State must have a final congressional districting map to hold the 2024 election, *Milligan* Doc. 145. The State advised us that the Secretary needs the map “by early October.” *Milligan* Doc. 147 at 3.

On November 21, 2022, this Court ordered the parties to meet and confer and file a joint report of their positions on discovery, scheduling, and next steps. *Milligan* Doc. 153. The

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parties timely filed a joint report and proposed a scheduling order, which we entered. *Milligan* Docs. 156, 157.

On February 8, 2023, we held another status conference. *See Milligan* Doc. 153. We again directed the State to identify the latest date by which the Secretary required a map to hold the 2024 election. *Milligan* Doc. 161. The State responded that a new plan would need to be approved by October 1, 2023, to provide time for the Secretary to reassign voters, print and distribute ballots, and otherwise conduct the election. *Milligan* Doc. 162 at 7.

On June 8, 2023, the Supreme Court affirmed the preliminary injunction in all respects. *See generally Allen*, 143 S. Ct. 1487. The Supreme Court then vacated its stay. *Allen v. Milligan*, — U.S. —, 143 S. Ct. 2607, — L.Ed.2d — (2023).

2. Remedial Proceedings

After the Supreme Court's ruling, this Court immediately set a status conference. *Milligan* Doc. 165. Before the conference, the State advised us that “the ... Legislature intend[ed] to enact a new congressional redistricting plan that will repeal and replace the 2021 Plan” and requested that we delay remedial proceedings until July 21, 2023. *Milligan* Doc. 166 at 2.

During the conference, the parties indicated substantial agreement on the appropriate next steps. *Milligan* Doc. 168 at 4. We delayed remedial proceedings until July 21, 2023 to accommodate the Legislature's efforts; entered a briefing schedule for any objections if the Legislature enacted a new map; and alerted the parties that if a remedial hearing became necessary, it would commence on the date they suggested: August 14, 2023. *Id.* at 4–7.

*7 On June 27, 2023, Governor Ivey issued a proclamation that a special session of the Legislature would convene to consider the congressional districting map. *Milligan* Doc. 173-1. That same day, the Committee met, elected its co-chairs, and held its first public hearing to receive comments on potential plans. *Milligan* Doc. 173 ¶ 2.


On July 13, 2023, the Committee met and re-adopted its previous redistricting guidelines (“the guidelines”). *Milligan* Doc. 180 ¶ 1; *Milligan* Doc. 107 app. A; *Milligan* Doc. 88-23. That day, the Committee held a second public hearing to receive comments on proposed remedial plans. *Milligan* Doc. 180 ¶ 1.

The special session of the Legislature commenced on July 17, 2023. *See Milligan* Doc. 173-1. On July 20, 2023, the Alabama House of Representatives passed a congressional districting plan titled the “Community of Interest Plan.” *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶¶ 16, 22. That same day, the Alabama Senate passed a different plan, titled the “Opportunity Plan.” *Id.* ¶¶ 19, 22. The next day, a six-person bicameral Conference Committee passed the 2023 Plan, which was a modified version of the Opportunity Plan. *Id.* ¶ 23. Later that day, the Legislature enacted the 2023 Plan. *Milligan* Doc. 186.

Although neither the 2021 Plan, nor the Community of Interest Plan, nor the Opportunity Plan was accompanied by any legislative findings, when the Legislature enacted the 2023 Plan, it was accompanied by eight pages of legislative findings. We append the legislative findings to this order as Appendix A.

Governor Ivey signed the 2023 Plan into law the same day. *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 26; [Ala. Code § 17-14-70](#). It appears below. The 2023 Plan keeps Mobile and Baldwin counties together in District 1 and combines much of the Black Belt in Districts 2 and 7.⁷

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Milligan Doc. 186-1 at 1.

The 2023 Plan, like the 2021 Plan enjoined by this Court, has only one majority-Black district. *Compare* *Milligan* Doc. 186-1 at 2, with *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 2–3. In the 2023 Plan, the Black share of the voting-age population (“BVAP”) in District 7 is 50.65% (it was 55.3% in the 2021 Plan). *Compare* *Milligan* Doc. 186-1 at 2, with *Milligan* Doc. 53 ¶ 57. The district with the next largest BVAP is District 2. *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 3. In District 2, Black Alabamians account for 39.93% of the voting age population (it was 30.6% in the 2021 Plan). *Compare* *Milligan* Doc. 186-1 at 2, with *Milligan* Doc. 53 ¶ 128.

On July 26, 2023, the parties jointly proposed a scheduling order for remedial proceedings. *Milligan* Doc. 193. We adopted it. *Milligan* Doc. 194.

*8 On July 27, 2023, the *Singleton* Plaintiffs objected to the 2023 Plan. *Singleton* Doc. 147. The *Singleton* Plaintiffs assert that the 2023 Plan violates the Fourteenth Amendment because the districts are racially gerrymandered. *Id.* at 16–22. The *Singleton* Plaintiffs request that the Court enjoin

Secretary Allen from using the 2023 Plan and order a remedy, such as their own plan, which plan they say is race-neutral, honors traditional districting principles, and gives Black voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in two districts. *Id.* at 27–28.

Also on July 27, 2023, the United States filed a Statement of Interest “to assist th[is] Court in evaluating whether the 2023 Plan fully cures the likely Section 2 violation in the 2021 Plan.” *Milligan* Doc. 199 at 20. “The United States expresses no view on any factual disputes,” “nor on any legal questions other than those related to applying Section 2 to the proposed remedy in this case.” *Id.* at 5. The United States asserts that if this Court “conclude[s] that the 2023 Plan fails to completely remedy the likely Section 2 violation in the 2021 Plan, it must assume the responsibility of devising and implementing a legally acceptable plan.” *Id.* at 19.

The *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs also timely objected to the 2023 Plan. *Milligan* Doc. 200; *Caster* Doc. 179. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs assert that the 2023 Plan offers no greater opportunity for Black Alabamians to elect a candidate of their choice than the 2021 Plan offered. *Milligan* Doc. 200 at 16–23. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs further say that the events giving rise to the 2023 Plan raise constitutional concerns because evidence suggests that the 2023 Plan was drawn to discriminate against Black Alabamians. *Id.* at 23–26. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs also ask us to enjoin Secretary Allen from conducting the 2024 election based on the 2023 Plan and order the Court-appointed Special Master to devise a new plan. *Id.* at 26.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs likewise assert that the 2023 Plan does not remedy the Section Two violation because it fails to create an additional district in which Black voters have an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. *Caster* Doc. 179 at 7–11. The *Caster* Plaintiffs also request that the Court enjoin the 2023 Plan and proceed to a court-driven remedial process to ensure relief for the 2024 election. *Id.* at 3, 11.

The Court held a status conference on July 31, 2023. *See* *Milligan* Doc. 194 at 3. Before that conference, the parties indicated substantial disagreement about the nature of remedial proceedings. *See* *Milligan* Docs. 188, 195, 196, 201. During the conference, the Court and the parties discussed (1) a motion filed by the *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs to clarify the role of the *Singleton* Plaintiffs, *Milligan* Doc. 188; *see also* *Milligan* Docs. 195, 196, 201; (2) the *Singleton* Plaintiffs’

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motion for a preliminary injunction, *Singleton* Doc. 147; and (3) next steps.

After that conference, the Court clarified that remedial proceedings would be limited to whether the 2023 Plan complies with the order of this Court, affirmed by the Supreme Court, and Section Two. *Milligan* Doc. 203 at 4. The Court further clarified that because the scope of the remedial hearing would be limited, the constitutional claims of the *Singleton* Plaintiffs would not be at issue. *Id.* at 5. The Court then set a remedial hearing in *Milligan* and *Caster* for August 14, 2023, *id.* at 3, and a preliminary injunction hearing in *Singleton* to commence immediately after the remedial hearing, *id.* at 6.

*9 On August 3, 2023, the State moved for clarification of the scope of remedial proceedings. *Milligan* Doc. 205. All Plaintiffs responded. *Milligan* Doc. 210; *Caster* Doc. 190; *Singleton* Doc. 160. Also on August 3, 2023, Congresswoman Terri Sewell (who represents District 7) and members of the Congressional Black Caucus of the United States Congress sought leave to file an *amici curiae* brief in support of the Plaintiffs, which we granted, *Milligan* Docs. 208, 232, 236. Congresswoman Sewell and members of the Congressional Black Caucus assert that the 2023 Plan is an insufficient remedy for the likely Section Two violation found by this Court. *Milligan* Doc. 236 at 5. They too assert that this Court “should enjoin [the 2023 Plan] and direct the Special Master to redraw a map that complies with the Voting Rights Act.” *Id.* at 10.

On August 4, 2023, the State responded to the Plaintiffs’ objections to the 2023 Plan. *See Milligan* Doc. 220. The State defends the 2023 Plan as prioritizing “to the fullest extent possible” three communities of interest: the Black Belt, the Gulf Coast, and the Wiregrass.⁸ *Id.* at 9. The State further asserts that the 2023 Plan fairly applies traditional districting “principles of compactness, county lines, and communities of interest,” and because the *Caster* and *Milligan* Plaintiffs’ “alternative plans would violate the traditional redistricting principles given effect in the 2023 Plan, [their] § 2 claims fail.” *Id.* at 9–10.

On August 6, 2023, we again clarified the scope of the remedial proceedings in *Milligan* and *Caster*. *Milligan* Doc. 222. We explained that the purpose of those remedial proceedings would be to determine whether the 2023 Plan remedies the likely Section Two violation found by this Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court. *Id.* at 8–9. We reiterated

that the remedial proceedings would not relitigate the findings made in connection with the previous liability determination. *Id.* at 11.

On August 7, 2023, all Plaintiffs replied in support of their objections to the 2023 Plan. *See Milligan* Doc. 225; *Caster* Doc. 195. The replies share a common premise: that any alleged reliance by the Legislature on traditional districting principles does not absolve the Legislature of its obligation to cure the Section Two violation found by this Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court. *See Milligan* Doc. 225 at 12; *Caster* Doc. 195 at 7–8.

On August 9, 2023, the National Republican Redistricting Trust (“the Trust”) moved for leave to file an *amicus curiae* brief in support of the 2023 Plan, which the Court granted. *See Milligan* Docs. 230, 232, 234. The Trust asserts that the “2023 Plan adheres to traditional districting principles better than any of the Plaintiffs’ plans, maintaining communities of interest that the 2021 Plan did not.” *Milligan* Doc. 234 at 7. The Trust urges this Court to reject the Plaintiffs’ remedial plans. *Id.* at 25.

Later that day, the *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs moved *in limine* to exclude testimony from certain experts and “any and all evidence, references to evidence, testimony, or argument relating to the 2023 Plan’s maintenance of communities of interest.” *Milligan* Doc. 233 at 1. The State responded. *Milligan* Doc. 245.

On August 11, 2023, certain state and local elected officials in Alabama moved for leave to file an *amici curiae* brief in support of the Plaintiffs, which the Court granted. *See Milligan* Docs. 255, 258, 260. The elected officials join in full the *Milligan* Plaintiffs’ objections and assert that this Court should enjoin Secretary Allen from using the 2023 Plan on the same grounds that we enjoined the 2021 Plan. *Milligan* Doc. 260 at 5, 14–15.

*10 We held a remedial hearing in *Milligan* and *Caster* on August 14, 2023. *See Milligan* Doc. 203. Based on the agreement of all parties, the Court considered all evidence admitted in either *Milligan* or *Caster*, including evidence admitted during the preliminary injunction hearing, in both cases unless counsel raised a specific objection. *Id.* at 4; *Caster* Doc. 182; Aug. 14 Tr. 61. After the hearing, we directed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on August 19, 2023, and they did so. *See Milligan* Docs. 267, 268; *Caster* Docs. 220, 221.

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B. Factual and Legal Background

1. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions for Race In Redistricting

Article I, § 2, of the United States Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives “be apportioned among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers” and “chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Each state’s population is counted every ten years in a national census, and state legislatures rely on census data to apportion each state’s congressional seats into districts.

Redistricting must comply with federal law. *Bartlett*, 556 U.S. at 7, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (plurality opinion); *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 554–60, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). At present, these cases concern a federal statutory requirement — Section Two, which provides:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: *Provided*, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

52 U.S.C. § 10301.

A state violates Section Two “if its districting plan provides ‘less opportunity’ for racial minorities [than for other members of the electorate] ‘to elect representatives of their

choice.’” *Abbott*, 138 S. Ct. at 2315 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 425, 126 S.Ct. 2594).

“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752. “Such a risk is greatest where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates and where minority voters are submerged in a majority voting population that regularly defeats their choices.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1503 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted).

“[A] plaintiff may allege a § 2 violation in a single-member district if the manipulation of districting lines fragments [or cracks] politically cohesive minority voters among several districts or packs them into one district or a small number of districts, and thereby dilutes the voting strength of members of the minority population.” *Shaw v. Hunt*, 517 U.S. 899, 914, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (“*Shaw II*”).

*11 “For the past forty years,” federal courts “have evaluated claims brought under § 2 using the three-part framework developed in [*Gingles*].” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502–03. To prove a Section Two violation under *Gingles*, “plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions.” *Id.* at 1503 (internal quotation marks omitted). “First, the minority group must be sufficiently large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district will be reasonably configured ... if it comports with traditional districting criteria, such as being contiguous and reasonably compact.” *Id.* “Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). “And third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Finally, a plaintiff who demonstrates the three preconditions must also show, under the totality of circumstances, that the political process is not equally open to minority voters.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts use factors drawn from a report of the Senate Judiciary Committee accompanying the 1982 amendments to the [Voting Rights Act] (the Senate [F]actors) to make the totality-of-the-circumstances determination.” *Georgia State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette County Bd. of Comm’rs*, 775 F.3d

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1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015); accord *Johnson v. De Grandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1010 n.9, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994); *infra* at Part IV.B.4.

The Senate Factors include:

(1) the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; (4) the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; (5) the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and (7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1010 n.9, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 44–45, 106 S.Ct. 2752) (numerals added). Further, the Senate Factors include (8) “evidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group and (9) that the policy underlying the State’s or the political subdivision’s use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous may have probative value.” *Id.* (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. 2752) (numeral added).

The Senate Factors are not exhaustive. “Another relevant consideration is whether the number of districts in which the minority group forms an effective majority is roughly proportional to its share of the population in the relevant

area.” *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 426, 126 S.Ct. 2594; accord *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1000, 114 S.Ct. 2647. When a plaintiff alleges vote dilution “based on a statewide plan,” the proportionality analysis ordinarily is statewide. *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 437–38, 126 S.Ct. 2594. Although proportionality may be a “relevant consideration” under the controlling Supreme Court test, it cannot be dispositive. Section Two does not “establish[] a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population,” 52 U.S.C. § 10301, and the Supreme Court has described at length the legislative history of that proportionality disclaimer. See *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1500–01.

*12 Because “the Equal Protection Clause restricts consideration of race and the [Voting Rights Act] demands consideration of race, a legislature attempting to produce a lawful districting plan is vulnerable to competing hazards of liability.” *Abbott*, 138 S. Ct. at 2315 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In an effort to harmonize these conflicting demands, [the Supreme Court has] assumed that compliance with the [Voting Rights Act] may justify the consideration of race in a way that would not otherwise be allowed.” *Id.*; accord *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 292, 137 S.Ct. 1455.

2. Congressional Redistricting in Alabama

Since 1973, Alabama has been apportioned seven seats in the United States House of Representatives. *Milligan* Doc. 53 ¶ 28. In all House elections held after the 1970 census and the 1980 census, Alabama elected all-white delegations. *Id.* ¶ 44. After the 1990 census, the Legislature failed to enact a congressional redistricting plan. See *Wesch*, 785 F. Supp. at 1494–95. Litigation ensued, and a federal court ultimately ordered elections held according to a plan that created one majority-Black district (District 7). *Wesch v. Folsom*, 6 F.3d 1465, 1467–68 (11th Cir. 1993); *Wesch*, 785 F. Supp. at 1498, 1581 app. A. In the 1992 election held using the court-ordered map, District 7 elected Alabama’s first Black Congressman in over 90 years. *Milligan* Doc. 53 ¶ 44. District 7 remains majority-Black and in every election since 1992 has elected a Black Democrat. *Id.* ¶¶ 44, 47, 49, 58. After 2020 census data was released, Mr. Randy Hinaman prepared the 2021 Plan:

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Milligan Doc. 70-2 at 40; *Milligan* Doc. 88-19.

3. These Lawsuits

Three groups of plaintiffs sued to stop the State from conducting the 2022 elections with the 2021 Plan. *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502. As relevant here, we discuss the Section Two cases:

a. *Milligan*

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs alleged that Section Two now requires two majority-Black or Black-opportunity congressional districts in Alabama.⁹ The *Milligan* Plaintiffs asserted that the 2021 Plan reflected the Legislature's "desire to use ... race to maintain power by packing one-third of Black Alabamians into [District 7] and cracking the remaining Black community." *Milligan* Doc. 1 ¶ 4.

To satisfy the first *Gingles* requirement, that Black voters as a group are "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in some reasonably configured legislative district." *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 301, 137 S.Ct. 1455 (internal quotation marks omitted). The *Milligan* Plaintiffs relied on the testimony of expert witness Dr. Moon Duchin.

We found Dr. Duchin highly credible. *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 148–50.

Dr. Duchin opined in her report that because 27.16% of Alabama residents identified as Black on the 2020 Decennial Census, Black Alabamians are sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority in more than one congressional district. *Milligan* Doc. 68-5 at 5. Dr. Duchin testified that the 2021 Plan "pack[ed] Black population into District 7 at an elevated level of over 55% BVAP, then crack[ed] Black population in Mobile, Montgomery, and the rural Black Belt across Districts 1, 2, and 3, so that none of them has more than about 30% BVAP." *Id.* at 6 fig.1; Tr. 564.¹⁰

*13 As for compactness, Dr. Duchin included in her report a map that reflects the geographic dispersion of Black residents across Alabama. *Milligan* Doc. 68-5 at 12 fig.3. She opined that it is possible to draw two contiguous and reasonably compact majority-Black congressional districts; and she offered four illustrative plans ("the Duchin plans"). *Id.* at 7 fig.2. Dr. Duchin offered extensive analysis in her report and testimony during the preliminary injunction hearing about how her plans satisfied the one-person-one-vote rule, included contiguous districts, respected existing political subdivisions, and attempted to minimize county splits. *Id.* at 8; Tr. 586–90, 599, 626; *Milligan* Doc. 92-1.

Dr. Duchin also offered exhaustive analysis and testimony about the compactness of the districts in her plans. She described how she computed compactness scores using three metrics that are commonly cited in professional redistricting analyses: the Polsby-Popper score, the Reock score, and the cut-edges score. *Milligan* Doc. 68-5 at 9; Tr. 590–94.¹¹ Dr. Duchin provided average compactness scores for each of her plans on each of these metrics, *Milligan* Doc. 68-5 at 9, and testified, among other things, that all four of her plans were "superior to" and "significantly more compact than" the 2021 Plan using an average Polsby-Popper metric, *id.*; Tr. 593.

Dr. Duchin also testified that her plans respected the Black Belt as a community of interest as defined in the Legislature's 2021 redistricting guidelines. *See Milligan* Doc. 68-5 at 13; *Milligan* Doc. 88-23 at 2–3. Dr. Duchin observed that in the 2021 Plan, eight of the eighteen core Black Belt counties are "partially or fully excluded from majority-Black districts," while "[e]ach of the 18 Black Belt counties is contained in majority-Black districts in at least some" of her alternative plans. *Milligan* Doc. 68-5 at 13; *see also* Tr. 666–

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68. Ultimately, Dr. Duchin opined that the districts in her plans were “reasonably” compact. Tr. 594.

To satisfy the second and third *Gingles* requirements, that Black voters are “politically cohesive,” and that each challenged district’s white majority votes “sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat [Black voters’] preferred candidate,” *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 302, 137 S.Ct. 1455 (internal quotation marks omitted), the *Milligan* Plaintiffs relied on a racial polarization analysis conducted by expert witness Dr. Baodong Liu. We found Dr. Liu credible. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 174–175.

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs asked Dr. Liu to opine (1) whether racially polarized voting occurs in Alabama, and (2) whether such voting has resulted in the defeat of Black-preferred candidates in Alabama congressional elections. *Milligan* Doc. 68-1 at 1. Dr. Liu studied thirteen elections and opined that he observed racially polarized voting in all of them, which resulted in the defeat of Black-preferred candidates in all of them except those in District 7. *Milligan* Doc. 68-1 at 9, 11, 18. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Dr. Liu emphasized the clarity and starkness of the pattern of racially polarized voting that he observed. *See* Tr. 1271–76. He testified that racially polarized voting in Alabama is “very clear.” Tr. 1293.

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs next argued that the Senate Factors “confirm[ed]” the Section Two violation. *Milligan* Doc. 69 at 16. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs emphasized Senate Factors 2 and 7 — racially polarized voting and a lack of Black electoral success — because in *Gingles* the Supreme Court flagged them as the “most important” factors, and because the parties’ stipulations of fact established that they were not in dispute. *See id.* (citing *Milligan* Doc. 53 ¶¶ 44, 121, 167–69). The *Milligan* Plaintiffs asserted that Factors 1, 3, and 5 also are present because “Alabama has an undisputed and ongoing history of discrimination against Black people in voting, education, employment, health, and other areas.” *Id.* at 17–18. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs relied on numerous fact stipulations, which we laid out at length in the preliminary injunction. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 73–78 (quoting *Milligan* Doc. 53 ¶¶ 130–54, 157–65).

*14 In addition to the stipulated facts, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Joseph Bagley, whom we found credible. *See Milligan* Doc. 69 at 17–18; *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 185–187. Dr. Bagley opined about Senate Factors 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and he considered Factor 3 in connection with his discussion of Factor 1. *Milligan* Doc. 68-2 at 3–31. He

opined that those Factors are present in Alabama and together mean that the 2021 Plan would “result in impairment of black voters’ ability to participate fully and equitably in the political process of electing candidates of their choice.” Tr. 1177.

For all these reasons, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs asserted that they were likely to prevail on their claim of vote dilution under the totality of circumstances.

b. *Caster*

The *Caster* Plaintiffs likewise alleged that the 2021 Plan violated Section Two because it “strategically cracks and packs Alabama’s Black communities.” *Caster* Doc. 3 ¶ 1. The *Caster* Plaintiffs also requested a remedy that includes two majority-Black or Black-opportunity districts. *Id.* at 31; *Caster* Doc. 97 ¶¶ 494–505.

To satisfy the first *Gingles* requirement, the *Caster* Plaintiffs relied on the expert testimony of Mr. Bill Cooper. *Caster* Docs. 48, 56, 65. We found Mr. Cooper highly credible. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 150–52. Mr. Cooper first opined that Black Alabamians are sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority in more than one congressional district; Mr. Cooper explained that according to 2020 census data, Alabama’s Black population increased by 83,618 residents, which constitutes a 6.53% increase in Alabama’s Black population since 2010, which is 34% of the state’s entire population increase since then. *Caster* Doc. 48 at 6–7. Mr. Cooper explained that there was a loss of 33,051 white persons during this time frame, a 1.03% decrease. *Id.* at 6 fig.1.

Mr. Cooper also opined that it is possible to draw two contiguous and reasonably compact majority-Black congressional districts; and he offered seven illustrative plans (“the Cooper plans”). *Caster* Doc. 48 at 20–36; *Caster* Doc. 65 at 2–6. Mr. Cooper testified that when he began his work, he expected to be able to draw illustrative plans with two reasonably compact majority-Black congressional districts because, at the same time the Legislature enacted the 2021 Plan, the Legislature also enacted a redistricting plan for the State Board of Education, which plan included two majority-Black districts. *Caster* Doc. 48 at 15–20; Tr. 433–37. Mr. Cooper testified that the Board of Education plan has included two Black-opportunity districts since 1996, and that continuously for those twenty-five years, more than half of Black voters in Alabama have lived in one of those two districts. *Caster* Doc. 48 at 16; Tr. 435. Mr. Cooper explained

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that the Board of Education plan splits Mobile County into two districts (with one district connecting Mobile County to Montgomery County, and another connecting Mobile County to Baldwin County). Tr. 435–36; *Caster* Doc. 48 at 17 fig.8.

Like Dr. Duchin, Mr. Cooper offered extensive analysis and testimony about how his plans satisfied the one-person-one-vote rule, included contiguous districts, respected existing political subdivisions, and attempted to minimize county splits. Tr. 441–44, 446–47; *Caster* Doc. 48 at 22; *Caster* Doc. 65 at 5–6.

Also like Dr. Duchin, Mr. Cooper offered exhaustive analysis and testimony about the compactness of the districts in his plans. Mr. Cooper testified that he considered geographic compactness by “eyeballing” as he drew his plans, obtaining readouts of the Reock and Polsby-Popper compactness scores from the software program he was using as he drew, and trying to “make sure that [his] score was sort of in the ballpark of” the score for the 2021 Plan, which he used as a “possible yardstick.” Tr. 444–46. He testified that all his plans either were at least as compact as the 2021 Plan, or they scored “slightly lower” than the 2021 Plan; he opined that all of his plans are “certainly within the normal range if you look at districts around the country.” Tr. 446, 458; *accord Caster* Doc. 48 at 35–37.

*15 Mr. Cooper further testified that he considered communities of interest in two ways: first, he considered “political subdivisions like counties and towns and cities,” and second, he has “some knowledge of historical boundaries” and the Black Belt, so he considered the Black Belt. Tr. 447.

To satisfy the second and third *Gingles* requirements, that Black voters are “politically cohesive,” and that each challenged district’s white majority votes “sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat [Black voters’] preferred candidate.” *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 302, 137 S.Ct. 1455 (internal quotation marks omitted), the *Caster* Plaintiffs relied on a racial polarization analysis conducted by Dr. Maxwell Palmer, whom we found credible. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 174–176.

Dr. Palmer analyzed the extent to which voting is racially polarized in Congressional Districts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 because he was told that the proposed Black-opportunity districts would include voters from those districts. *Caster* Doc. 49 ¶ 9; Tr. 704. He examined how voters in those districts voted in the 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020 general elections, as well

as the 2017 special election for the United States Senate, and statewide elections for President, the United States Senate, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, and several other offices. *Caster* Doc. 49 ¶¶ 6–7, 10; *see also* Tr. 707–13 (explaining how he used precinct-level data and analyzed the results on a district-by-district basis).

Dr. Palmer opined that “Black voters are extremely cohesive,” *Caster* Doc. 49 ¶ 16, “[w]hite voters are highly cohesive,” *id.* ¶ 17, and “[i]n every election, Black voters have a clear candidate of choice, and [w]hite voters are strongly opposed to this candidate,” *id.* ¶ 18. He concluded that “[o]n average, Black voters supported their candidates of choice with 92.3% of the vote[,]” and “[o]n average, [w]hite voters supported Black-preferred candidates with 15.4% of the vote, and in no election did this estimate exceed 26%.” *Id.* ¶¶ 16–17. In his testimony, he characterized this evidence of racially polarized voting as “very strong.” Tr. 701.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs then analyzed the Senate Factors, and they relied on judicial authorities, stipulated facts, and the testimony of Dr. Bridgett King, whom we found credible, *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 185–87. *Caster* Doc. 56 at 19–38. Dr. King opined that racially polarized voting in Alabama is “severe and ongoing,” and “significantly and adversely impact[s] the ability of Black Alabamians to participate equally in the state’s political process.” *Caster* Doc. 50 at 4.

For all these reasons, the *Caster* Plaintiffs asserted that they were likely to prevail on their claim of vote dilution under the totality of circumstances.

c. The State

The State, in turn argued that the Committee properly started with the prior map and adjusted boundaries only as necessary to comply with the one-person, one-vote rule and serve traditional districting criteria. *See Milligan* Doc. 78 at 16. The State asserted that “nothing” in the Voting Rights Act “requires Alabama to draw two majority-black districts with slim black majorities as opposed to one majority-black district with a slightly larger majority.” *Id.* at 17. We first discuss the State’s position in *Milligan* during the preliminary injunction proceedings, and we then discuss the State’s position in *Caster*:

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i. The State's Arguments in *Milligan*

*16 The State argued in *Milligan* that “[n]othing in Section 2 supports Plaintiffs’ extraordinary request that this Court impose districts with Plaintiffs’ surgically targeted racial compositions while jettisoning numerous traditional districting criteria.” *Id.* at 18. The State relied on the expert testimony of Mr. Thomas M. Bryan. After an exhaustive credibility determination, we assigned “very little weight” to Mr. Bryan’s testimony and found it “unreliable.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 152–156; *see also infra* at Part IV.B.2.a.

The State argued that the Duchin plans did not respect the communities of interest in Alabama’s Gulf Coast and the Wiregrass region. *Milligan* Doc. 78 at 82–84. The State objected to the Duchin plans on the ground that they “break up the Gulf Coast and scramble it with the Wiregrass,” “separate Mobile and Baldwin Counties for the first time in half a century,” and “split Mobile County for the first time in the State’s history.” *Id.* at 85. The State asserted that the Duchin plans did not respect the Black Belt because they split it between two districts. *Id.* at 85–86 n.15.

Mr. Bryan opined about compactness. He first opined that in each Duchin plan “compactness [wa]s sacrificed.” *Milligan* Doc. 74-1 at 3. He later acknowledged and opined, however, that “Dr. Duchin’s plans perform generally better *on average* than the [2021 Plan], although some districts are significantly less compact than Alabama’s.” *Id.* at 19 (emphasis in original). And Mr. Bryan testified that he has “no opinion on what is reasonable and what is not reasonable” compactness. Tr. 979.

As for communities of interest, Mr. Bryan opined that Mobile and Baldwin counties are “inseparable.” Tr. 1006. And he testified that the Black Belt is a community of interest and ultimately conceded that the Duchin plans had fewer splits than the 2021 Plan in the Black Belt. Tr. 1063–65.

Mr. Bryan explained his overall opinion that Dr. Duchin was able to “achieve a black majority population in two districts” only by “sacrific[ing]” traditional districting criteria. Tr. 874. He explained further his concern about “cracking and packing of incumbents.” Tr. 874.

The State also offered testimony about the Gulf Coast community of interest from former Congressman Bradley Byrne, who testified that he did not want Mobile County to

be split because he worried it would “lose[] its influence” politically. Tr. 1744.

The State briefly asserted that the *Milligan* Plaintiffs could not establish *Gingles* II and III because their racial polarization analysis was selective. *See Milligan* Doc. 78 at 97. But at the preliminary injunction hearing, the State offered the testimony of Dr. M.V. Hood, whom we found credible, *see Milligan* Doc. 107 at 176–77, and Dr. Hood testified that he and Dr. Liu “both found evidence of” racially polarized voting in Alabama. Tr. 1421.

The State then asserted that the “balance” of the Senate Factors favors the State because things in Alabama have “changed dramatically.” *Milligan* Doc. 78 at 101–02 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Shelby County v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529, 547, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013)). As for Factor 1, the State acknowledged Alabama’s “sordid history” and assert that it “should never be forgotten,” but said that Alabama has “[o]vercome [i]ts [h]istory.” *Id.* at 102. As for Factor 5, the State disputed that Black Alabamians still “bear the effects of discrimination,” and that those effects “hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process.” *Id.* at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. 2752). As for Factor 6, the State argued that historical evidence of racial appeals in campaigns is not probative of current conditions. *Id.* at 113–14. As for Factor 7, the State argued that minorities “have achieved a great deal of electoral success in Alabama’s districted races for State offices.” *Id.* at 116. As for Factor 8, the State vehemently disputed that elected officials in Alabama are not responsive to the needs of the Black community. *Id.* at 117–19. And as for Factor 9, the State urged that a procedure is tenuous only if it “markedly departs from past practices” and argued that the 2021 Plan was not tenuous because it did not meaningfully depart from the 2011 Plan. *Id.* at 119–20 (quoting *S. Rep. 97-417 at 29 n.117*).

*17 The State did not offer any expert testimony about the Senate Factors.

ii. The State's Arguments in *Caster*

The State took much the same position in *Caster* that it took in *Milligan*, and Mr. Bryan attacked the Cooper plans for many of the same reasons he attacked the Duchin plans. We recite only a few relevant points.

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First, with respect to *Gingles* I. On cross examination, Mr. Bryan conceded that he did not evaluate and had no opinion about whether the Cooper plans respected contiguity, or “the extent to which Mr. Cooper’s plan[s] split political subdivisions.” Tr. 931–32. When Mr. Bryan testified about compactness, he explained that he relied on compactness scores alone and did not “analyze any of the specific contours of the districts.” Tr. 971.

After Mr. Bryan offered that testimony, the *Caster* Plaintiffs recalled his earlier testimony about how the Cooper plans “draw lines that appear to [him] to be based on race” and asked him where he offered any analysis “of the way in which specific districts in Mr. Cooper’s illustrative plans are configured outside of their objective compactness scores.” Tr. 972–73. Mr. Bryan testified that it “appears [he] may not have written text about that.” Tr. 973.

When Mr. Bryan was asked about his opinions about communities of interest, he acknowledged that he did not analyze the Cooper plans based on communities of interest. Tr. 979–80.

As for *Gingles* II and III, Dr. Hood testified at the hearing that he had not identified any errors in Dr. Palmer’s work that would affect his analyses or conclusions. See *Caster* Doc. 66-2 at 2–34; Tr. 1407–11, 1449–50, 1456, 1459–61. Dr. Hood also testified that he did not dispute Dr. Palmer’s conclusions that (1) “black voters in the areas he examined vote for the same candidates cohesively,” (2) “black Alabamians and white Alabamians in the areas he examined consistently preferred different candidates,” and (3) “the candidates preferred by white voters in the areas that he looked at regularly defeat the candidates preferred by black voters.” Tr. 1445. Dr. Hood testified that he and Dr. Palmer both found a “substantive pattern” of racially polarized voting. Tr. 1448.

4. Our Findings and Conclusions on Liability

“After reviewing th[e] extensive record,” we “concluded in a 227-page opinion that the question whether [the 2021 Plan] likely violated § 2 was not a close one.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 195; *Caster* Doc. 101 at 204. “It did.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502; accord *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 195; *Caster* Doc. 101 at 204.

The parties developed such an extensive record and offered such fulsome legal arguments that it took us nearly ninety pages to describe their evidence and arguments. See *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 52–139. Our findings of fact and conclusions of law consumed eighty more pages. See *id.* at 139–210. They were exhaustive, and we do not repeat them here in full. We highlight those findings and conclusions that are particularly relevant to our remedial task.

In our *Gingles* I analysis, we first found that the Plaintiffs “established that Black voters as a group are sufficiently large ... to constitute a majority in a second majority-minority legislative district.” *Id.* at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted). We then found that the Plaintiffs established that Black voters as a group are sufficiently geographically compact to constitute a majority in a second reasonably configured district. *Id.* at 147–74.

*18 We began our compactness analysis with credibility determinations about the parties’ expert witnesses. We found the testimony of Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper “highly credible,” *id.* at 148–51, and we “assign[ed] very little weight to Mr. Bryan’s testimony,” *id.* at 152–56. We did not take lightly the decision not to credit Mr. Bryan. We based that decision on two evaluations — one that examined his credibility relative to that of Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper, and one that was not relative. See *id.* We expressed concern about instances in which Mr. Bryan “offered an opinion without a sufficient basis (or in some instances any basis),” enumerated seven examples, reviewed other “internal inconsistencies and vacillations,” and described a demeanor that “reflected a lack of concern for whether [his] opinion was well-founded.” *Id.* at 153–56.

We then reviewed “compactness scores” to assess whether the majority-Black congressional districts in the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans were “reasonably” compact. *Id.* at 157–59. We determined that regardless of whether we relied strictly on the opinions of Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper about the reasonableness of the scores, or compared the scores for the illustrative plans to the scores for the 2021 Plan, the result was the same: the Plaintiffs’ plans established that Black voters in Alabama could comprise a second reasonably configured majority-Black congressional district. *Id.* at 159.

Next, we considered the “eyeball” test for compactness. See *id.* at 159–62. Based on information in Dr. Duchin’s report that the State did not dispute, we found that “there are areas of the state where much of Alabama’s Black population

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is concentrated, and that many of these areas are in close proximity to each other.” *Id.* at 161. We then found that the majority-Black districts in the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans appeared reasonably compact because we did not see “tentacles, appendages, bizarre shapes, or any other obvious irregularities that would make it difficult to find that any District 2 could be considered reasonably compact.” *Id.* at 162.

Next, we discussed whether the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans “reflect reasonable compactness when our inquiry takes into account, as it must, traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted); *accord id.* at 162–74. We found that the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans respected existing political subdivisions “at least as well as the [2021] Plan,” and in some instances better than the 2021 Plan. *See id.* at 163–64.

We then turned to communities of interest. Before making findings, we reiterated the rule “that a Section Two district that is **reasonably** compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles, need not also defeat a rival compact district in a beauty contest.” *Id.* at 165 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted) (quoting *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952, 977, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996) (plurality opinion)). We were “careful to avoid the beauty contest that a great deal of testimony and argument seemed designed to try to win.” *Id.*

We found that the Black Belt is an important community of interest, and that it was split among four congressional districts in the 2021 Plan: “Districts 1, 2, and 3, where the *Milligan* plaintiffs assert that their votes are diluted, and District 7, which the *Milligan* plaintiffs assert is packed.” *Id.* at 167. In the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans, the “overwhelming majority of the Black Belt” was in “just two districts.” *Id.* at 168. We noted that Mr. Bryan conceded that the Duchin plans and Cooper plans performed better than the 2021 Plan for the Black Belt. *Id.*

We then found that “[t]ogether with our finding that the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans respect existing political subdivisions, our finding that [they] respect the Black Belt supports a conclusion that [they] establish reasonable compactness.” *Id.* at 169.

*19 Although “we need not consider how ... Districts 2 and 7 might perform in a beauty contest against other plans that also

respect communities of interest,” we nevertheless discussed the State’s argument that the Duchin plans and Cooper plans ignored the Gulf Coast community of interest. *Id.* at 169–71. We found the “record about the Gulf Coast community of interest ... less compelling,” and that the State “overstate[d] the point.” *Id.* at 169–70. Only two witnesses testified about the Gulf Coast. We discounted Mr. Bryan, and we found that the other witness did not support the State’s “overdrawn argument that there can be no legitimate reason to split Mobile and Baldwin Counties consistent with traditional redistricting criteria.” *Id.* at 170. We noted that the Legislature split Mobile and Baldwin Counties in its districting plan for the State Board of Education. *Id.* at 171.

We found that the State “d[id] not give either the *Milligan* Plaintiffs or the *Caster* Plaintiffs enough credit for the attention Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper paid to traditional redistricting criteria.” *Id.* at 173. We found that their illustrative plans satisfied the reasonable compactness requirement for *Gingles* I.

Our findings about *Gingles* II and III were comparatively brief because the underlying facts were not in dispute. *See id.* at 174–78. We credited the testimony of Doctors Liu (the *Milligan* Plaintiffs’ expert), Palmer (the *Caster* Plaintiffs’ expert), and Hood (the State’s expert). *See id.* All three experts found evidence of racially polarized voting in Alabama. Based on their testimony, we found that Black voters in Alabama “are politically cohesive,” that the challenged districts’ “white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate,” *id.* at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted), and that “voting in Alabama, and in the districts at issue in this litigation, is racially polarized” for purposes of *Gingles* II and III, *id.* at 177–78.

We then discussed the Senate Factors. We found that Senate **Factors 2** (racially polarized voting) and 7 (the extent to which Black Alabamians have been elected to public office) “weigh[] heavily in favor of” the Plaintiffs. *Id.* at 178–81. We found that **Factors 1, 3, and 5** (all of which relate to Alabama’s history of official discrimination against Black Alabamians) “weigh against” the State. *Id.* at 182–88. And we found that Factor 6 (racial appeals in political campaigns) “weighs in favor of” the Plaintiffs but “to a lesser degree” than Senate **Factors 2, 7, 1, 3, and 5.** *Id.* at 188–92. We made no findings about Factors 8 and 9, *id.* at 192–93, and we found that no Factor weighed in favor of the State. *Id.* at 195.

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Finally, we discussed proportionality. We explained our understanding that under the Voting Rights Act and binding Supreme Court precedent, it is relevant, but not dispositive. *Id.* at 193. We rejected the State's argument that the Plaintiffs' arguments were "naked attempts to extract from [Section 2](#) a non-existent right to proportional ... racial representation in Congress." *Id.* at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we stated that we did not resolve the motion for preliminary injunctive relief "solely (or even in the main) by conducting a proportionality analysis" because, consistent with precedent, we conducted a thorough *Gingles* analysis and considered proportionality only as "part and parcel of the totality of the circumstances." *Id.*

Ultimately, we explained five reasons why we did not regard the liability question as "a close one":

(1) We have considered a record that is extensive by any measure, and particularly extensive for a preliminary injunction proceeding, and the *Milligan* plaintiffs have adduced substantial evidence in support of their claim. (2) There is no serious dispute that the plaintiffs have established numerosity for purposes of *Gingles* I, nor that they have established sharply racially polarized voting for purposes of *Gingles* II and III, leaving only conclusions about reasonable compactness and the totality of the circumstances dependent upon our findings. (3) In our analysis of compactness, we have credited the *Milligan* plaintiffs' principal expert witness, Dr. Duchin, after a careful review of her reports and observation of her live testimony (which included the first cross-examination of her that occurred in this case). (4) Separately, we have discounted the testimony of Defendants' principal expert witness, Mr. Bryan, after a careful review of his reports and observation of his live testimony (which included the first cross-examination of him that occurred in this case). (5) If

the *Milligan* record were insufficient on any issue (and it is not), the *Caster* record, which is equally fulsome, would fill in the gaps: the *Caster* record (which by the parties' agreement also is admitted in *Milligan*), compels the same conclusion that we have reached in *Milligan*, both to this three-judge court and to Judge Manasco sitting alone.

*20 *Id.* at 195–96. "Put differently," we said, "because of the posture of these consolidated cases, the record before us has not only once, but twice, established that the [2021] Plan substantially likely violates Section Two." *Id.* at 196.

5. Supreme Court Affirmance

The Supreme Court affirmed the preliminary injunction in a 5-4 decision. We discuss that decision in three parts. We first discuss the part of the opinion that is binding precedent because it was joined by a majority of the Justices ("the Opinion of the Supreme Court"); we then discuss the portion of the Chief Justice's opinion that is the opinion of four Justices; we then discuss Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence.

a. Controlling Precedent

The Supreme Court began by directly stating the ruling:

In January 2022, a three-judge District Court sitting in Alabama preliminarily enjoined the State from using the districting plan it had recently adopted for the 2022 congressional elections, finding that the plan likely violated [Section 2](#) of the Voting Rights Act. This Court stayed the District Court's order pending further review. After conducting that review, we now affirm.

Allen, 143 S. Ct. at 1498 (internal citations omitted). Next, the Supreme Court recited relevant portions of the history of

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the Voting Rights Act, redistricting in Alabama, and these cases. *Id.* at 1498–1502. The Supreme Court then reiterated its ruling: “The District Court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim that [the 2021 Plan] violates § 2. We affirm that determination.” *Id.* at 1502.

Next, the Supreme Court restated the controlling legal standards, as set forth in *Gingles* and applied by federal courts “[f]or the past forty years.” *Id.* at 1502–04. The majority opinion then again restated the ruling: “[a]s noted, the District Court concluded that plaintiffs’ § 2 claim was likely to succeed under *Gingles*. Based on our review of the record, we agree.” *Id.* at 1504 (internal citations omitted).

The Supreme Court then reviewed our analysis of each *Gingles* requirement. *Id.* at 1504–06. The Supreme Court agreed with our analysis as to each requirement. It did not hold, suggest, or even hint that any aspect of our *Gingles* analysis was erroneous. *See id.*

“With respect to the first *Gingles* precondition,” the Supreme Court held that we “correctly found that black voters could constitute a majority in a second district that was reasonably configured.” *Id.* at 1504 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court ruled that “[t]he plaintiffs adduced eleven illustrative maps—that is, example districting maps that Alabama could enact—each of which contained two majority-black districts that comported with traditional districting criteria.” *Id.*

The Supreme Court then considered the Duchin plans. It observed that we “explained that the maps submitted by [Dr. Duchin] performed generally better on average than did [the 2021 Plan].” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). Likewise, the Supreme Court considered the Cooper plans. The Supreme Court observed that Mr. Cooper “produced districts roughly as compact as the existing plan.” *Id.* And that “none of plaintiffs’ maps contained any tentacles, appendages, bizarre shapes, or any other obvious irregularities that would make it difficult to find them sufficiently compact.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

*21 Next, the Supreme Court held that the “Plaintiffs’ maps also satisfied other traditional districting criteria. They contained equal populations, were contiguous, and respected existing political subdivisions Indeed, some of plaintiffs’ proposed maps split the same number of county lines as

(or even *fewer* county lines than) the State’s map.” *Id.* (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Supreme Court “agree[d] with” us that “plaintiffs’ illustrative maps strongly suggested that Black voters in Alabama could constitute a majority in a second, reasonably configured, district.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted).

Next, the Supreme Court turned to the State’s argument “that plaintiffs’ maps were not reasonably configured because they failed to keep together a traditional community of interest within Alabama.” *Id.* The Supreme Court recited the State’s definition of “community of interest,” as well as its argument that “the Gulf Coast region ... is such a community of interest, and that plaintiffs’ maps erred by separating it into two different districts.” *Id.*

The Supreme Court “d[id] not find the State’s argument persuasive.” *Id.* at 1505. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[o]nly two witnesses testified that the Gulf Coast was a community of interest,” that “testimony provided by one of those witnesses was partial, selectively informed, and poorly supported,” and that “[t]he other witness, meanwhile, justified keeping the Gulf Coast together simply to preserve political advantage.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). The Supreme Court concluded that we “understandably found this testimony insufficient to sustain Alabama’s overdrawn argument that there can be no legitimate reason to split the Gulf Coast region.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

Next, the Supreme Court considered an alternative basis for its agreement with our *Gingles* I analysis: that “[e]ven if the Gulf Coast did constitute a community of interest ... [we] found that plaintiffs’ maps would still be reasonably configured because they joined together a different community of interest called the Black Belt.” *Id.* The Supreme Court then described the reasons why the Black Belt is a community of interest — its “high proportion of black voters, who share a rural geography, concentrated poverty, unequal access to government services, ... lack of adequate healthcare, and a lineal connection to the many enslaved people brought there to work in the antebellum period.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court agreed with us again, ruling that we “concluded—correctly, under [Supreme Court] precedent—that [we] did not have to conduct a beauty contest between plaintiffs’ maps and the State’s. There would be a split community of interest in both.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks

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omitted) (alterations accepted) (quoting *Vera*, 517 U.S. at 977, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (plurality opinion)).

The Supreme Court then rejected the State's argument that the 2021 Plan satisfied Section Two because it performed better than Plaintiffs' illustrative plans on a core retention metric — “a term that refers to the proportion of districts that remain when a State transitions from one districting plan to another.” *Id.* The Supreme Court rejected that metric on the ground that the Supreme Court “has never held that a State's adherence to a previously used districting plan can defeat a § 2 claim” because “[i]f that were the rule, a State could immunize from challenge a new racially discriminatory redistricting plan simply by claiming that it resembled an old racially discriminatory plan.” *Id.* “That is not the law,” the Supreme Court made clear: Section Two “does not permit a State to provide some voters less opportunity ... to participate in the political process just because the State has done it before.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

*22 The Supreme Court next discussed the second and third *Gingles* requirements. The Supreme Court accepted our determination that “there was no serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts' white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters' preferred candidate.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court recited the relevant racial polarization statistics and noted that the State's expert “conceded that the candidates preferred by white voters in the areas that he looked at regularly defeat the candidates preferred by Black voters.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the last step of its review of our analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that the Plaintiffs “had carried their burden at the totality of circumstances stage.” *Id.* at 1505–06. The Supreme Court upheld our findings that “elections in Alabama were racially polarized; that Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero success in statewide elections; that political campaigns in Alabama had been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and that Alabama's extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related discrimination is undeniable and well documented.” *Id.* at 1506 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court concluded its review of our analysis by again stating its ruling: “We see no reason to disturb the District Court's careful factual findings, which are subject to clear error review and have gone unchallenged by Alabama

in any event. Nor is there a basis to upset the District Court's legal conclusions. The Court faithfully applied our precedents and correctly determined that, under existing law, [the 2021 Plan] violated § 2.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We have carefully reviewed the Opinion of the Supreme Court and discern no basis to conclude that any aspect of our Section Two analysis was erroneous.

Next, the Supreme Court turned to arguments by the State urging the Supreme Court to “remake [its] § 2 jurisprudence anew,” which the Supreme Court described as “[t]he heart of these cases.” *Id.* The Supreme Court explained that the “centerpiece of the State's effort is what it calls the ‘race-neutral benchmark.’ ” *Id.* The Supreme Court then described the benchmark, found the argument “compelling neither in theory nor in practice,” and discussed problems with the argument. *Id.* at 1507–10.

Of special importance to these remedial proceedings, the Supreme Court rejected the State's assertion that “existing § 2 jurisprudence inevitably demands racial proportionality in districting, contrary to” Section Two. *Id.* at 1508. “[P]roperly applied,” the Supreme Court explained, “the *Gingles* framework itself imposes meaningful constraints on proportionality, as [Supreme Court] decisions have frequently demonstrated.” *Id.* The Supreme Court then discussed three cases to illustrate how *Gingles* constrains rather than requires proportionality: *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 633–34, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993); *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 906, 910–11, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); and *Vera*, 517 U.S. at 957, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (plurality opinion). *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1508–09.

“Forcing proportional representation is unlawful,” the Supreme Court reiterated, and Section Two “never requires adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles.” *Id.* at 1509–10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). Rather, its “exacting requirements ... limit judicial intervention to those instances of intensive racial politics where the excessive role of race in the electoral process ... denies minority voters equal opportunity to participate.” *Id.* at 1510 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted).

*23 In Part III-B-1 of the opinion, the Supreme Court then discussed “how the race-neutral benchmark would operate in practice.” *Id.* Justice Kavanaugh did not join Part III-B-1.

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See *id.* at 1497. Part III-B-1 is the only part of the Chief Justice's opinion that Justice Kavanaugh did not join. See *id.* We discuss it separately in the next segment of our analysis. See *infra* at Part I.B.5.b.

Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the State's arguments that the Supreme Court “should outright stop applying § 2 in cases like these” because it does not apply to single-member redistricting and is unconstitutional as we applied it. *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1514. The Supreme Court observed that it has “applied § 2 to States’ districting maps in an unbroken line of decisions stretching four decades” and has “unanimously held that § 2 and *Gingles* certainly ... apply to claims challenging single-member districts.” *Id.* at 1515 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted) (quoting *Grove v. Emison*, 507 U.S. 25, 40, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993)). The Supreme Court reasoned that adopting the State's approach would require it to abandon this precedent. The Supreme Court explained its refusal to do so: “Congress is undoubtedly aware of our construing § 2 to apply to districting challenges. It can change that if it likes. But until and unless it does, statutory *stare decisis* counsels our staying the course.” *Id.*

The Supreme Court then rejected as foreclosed by longstanding precedent the State's argument that Section Two is unconstitutional as we applied it. *Id.* at 1516–17. The Court affirmed our judgments in *Caster* and *Milligan*. *Id.* at 1517.

b. Part III-B-1 of the Chief Justice's Opinion

In Part III-B-1, the Chief Justice, in an opinion joined by three other Justices, explained why the State's race-neutral benchmark approach would “fare[] poorly” in practice. ¹² *Id.* at 1510 (Roberts, C.J.). The four justices explained that Alabama's benchmark would “change existing law” by “prohibiting the illustrative maps that plaintiffs submit to satisfy the first *Gingles* precondition from being based on race.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The four justices then explained why they saw “no reason to impose such a new rule.” *Id.* The four justices acknowledged that the “line between racial predominance and racial consciousness can be difficult to discern,” and explained their view that “it was not breached here.” *Id.* at 1510–11.

We have considered Part III-B-1 carefully, and we do not discern anything about it that undermines our conclusion that

the 2023 Plan does not remedy the Section Two violation that we found and the Supreme Court affirmed.

c. Justice Kavanaugh's Concurrence

Justice Kavanaugh “agree[d] with the [Supreme] Court that Alabama's redistricting plan violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1517 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). He “wr[ote] separately to emphasize four points.” *Id.* (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). First, Justice Kavanaugh emphasized that “the upshot of Alabama's argument is that the Court should overrule *Gingles*,” “[b]ut the *stare decisis* standard for this Court to overrule a statutory precedent, as distinct from a constitutional precedent, is comparatively strict.” *Id.* (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Justice Kavanaugh observed that “[i]n the past 37 years ... Congress and the President have not disturbed *Gingles*, even as they have made other changes to the Voting Rights Act.” *Id.* (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

*24 “Second,” Justice Kavanaugh emphasized, “Alabama contends that *Gingles* inevitably requires a proportional number of majority-minority districts, which in turn contravenes the proportionality disclaimer” in Section Two, but “Alabama's premise is wrong.” *Id.* at 1517–18 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). “*Gingles* does not mandate a proportional number of majority-minority districts.” *Id.* at 1518 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Rather, “*Gingles* requires the creation of a majority-minority district only when, among other things, (i) a State's redistricting map cracks or packs a large and ‘geographically compact’ minority population and (ii) a plaintiff's proposed alternative map and proposed majority-minority district are ‘reasonably configured’—namely, by respecting compactness principles and other traditional districting criteria such as county, city, and town lines.” *Id.* (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Justice Kavanaugh explained further that if “*Gingles* demanded a proportional number of majority-minority districts, States would be forced to group together geographically dispersed minority voters into unusually shaped districts, without concern for traditional districting criteria such as county, city, and town lines,” but “*Gingles* and [the Supreme] Court's later decisions have flatly rejected that approach.” *Id.* (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

“Third,” Justice Kavanaugh explained, “Alabama argues that courts should rely on race-blind computer simulations of

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redistricting maps to assess whether a State's plan abridges the right to vote on account of race," but as the Supreme Court "has long recognized—and as all Members of [the Supreme] Court ... agree[d in *Allen*—the text of § 2 establishes an effects test, not an intent test." *Id.* (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

"*Fourth*," Justice Kavanaugh emphasized, "Alabama asserts that § 2, as construed by *Gingles* to require race-based redistricting in certain circumstances, exceeds Congress's remedial or preventive authority," but "the constitutional argument presented by Alabama is not persuasive in light of the Court's precedents." *Id.* at 1519 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Justice Kavanaugh reiterated that he "vote[d] to affirm" and "concur[red] in all but Part III–B–1 of the Court's opinion." *Id.* (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

The State argues that Part III-B-1 tells us that only a plurality of Justices "concluded that at least some of the plans drawn by Bill Cooper did not breach the line between racial consciousness and racial predominance." *Milligan* Doc. 267 ¶ 39 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). The State overreads Part III-B-1 as leaving open for relitigation the question whether the Plaintiffs submitted at least one illustrative remedial plan in which race did not play an improper role.

The affirmance tells us that a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the Plaintiffs satisfied their burden under *Gingles* I. This necessarily reflects a conclusion that the Plaintiffs submitted at least one illustrative map in which race did not play an improper role. Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence is to the same effect — Justice Kavanaugh did not suggest, let alone say, that he "vote[d] to affirm" despite finding that the Plaintiffs submitted no illustrative map that properly considered race. What Part III-B-1 tells us — and no more — is that only four Justices agreed with every statement in that Part.

C. Remedial Proceedings

We first discuss the Plaintiffs' objections to the 2023 Plan and the State's defense. We then discuss the parties' stipulations of fact and the remedial hearing.

1. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs' Objections

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs object to the 2023 Plan on the ground that it "ignores this Court's preliminary injunction order and instead perpetuates the Voting Rights Act violation that was the very reason that the Legislature redrew the map." *Milligan* Doc. 200 at 6. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs assert that the 2023 Plan does not remedy the Section Two violation we found because it does not include an additional opportunity district. *Id.* They argue that District 2 is not an opportunity district because the performance analyses prepared by Dr. Liu and the State indicate that "Black-preferred candidates in the new CD2 will continue to lose 100% of biracial elections ... by 10%-points on average." *Id.* at 6–7 (citing *Milligan* Doc. 200-2 at 4 tbl.2).

*25 The *Milligan* Plaintiffs make three arguments to support their objection. *First*, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs argue that the 2023 Plan fails to remedy the Section Two violation we found because the 2023 Plan itself violates Section Two and dilutes Black votes. *Id.* at 16–19. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs contend that the 2023 Plan "fails th[e] § 2 remedial analysis for the same reasons its 2021 Plan did," because it "permit[s] the white majority voting as a bloc in the new CD2 to easily and consistently defeat Black-preferred candidates." *Id.* at 17.

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs first rely on the State's evidence to make their point. The Alabama Performance Analysis "found that *not once* in seven elections from 2018 to 2020 would Black voters' candidates overcome white bloc voting to win in CD2." *Id.* at 18. And Dr. Liu's¹³ analysis of 11 biracial elections in District 2 between 2014 and 2022 "shows zero Black electoral successes, with an average margin of defeat of over 10 percentage points," *id.*, because "voting is highly racially polarized," *Milligan* Doc. 200-2 at 1. Thus, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs say, "the new CD2 offers no more opportunity than did the old CD2." *Milligan* Doc. 200 at 19.

Second, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs argue that the legislative findings that accompany the 2023 Plan perpetuate the Section Two violation and contradict conclusions that we and the Supreme Court drew based on the evidence. *See id.* at 20–23. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs offer evidence to rebut the State's suggestion that there can be no legitimate reason to split Mobile and Baldwin counties: (1) a declaration by Alabama Representative Sam Jones, the first Black Mayor of Mobile, who "explains the many economic, cultural, religious, and social ties between much of Mobile and the Black Belt, in contrast to Baldwin County, which shares 'little of these

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cultural or community ties’ with Mobile,” *id.* at 22 (quoting *Milligan* Doc. 200-9 ¶ 15); and (2) an expert report prepared by Dr. Bagley,¹⁴ who contrasts the “ ‘intimate historical and socioeconomic ties’ that the ‘City of Mobile and the northern portion of Mobile County, including Prichard, have ... with the Black Belt,’ ” with the “ ‘ahistorical’ effort to treat the Wiregrass or ‘Mobile and Baldwin Counties as an inviolable’ ” community of interest, *id.* (quoting *Milligan* Doc. 200-15 at 1).

Further, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs urge that under binding precedent, we cannot defer to a redistricting policy of a state if it perpetuates vote dilution. *See id.* at 20 (citing *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1505, and *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 440–41, 126 S.Ct. 2594).

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs assail the legislative findings on the grounds that they “contradict the Committee’s own recently readopted guidelines, were never the subject of debate or public scrutiny, ignored input from Black Alabamians and legislators, and simply parroted attorney arguments already rejected by this Court and the Supreme Court.” *Id.* at 20. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs observe that although the legislative findings prioritize as “non-negotiable” rules that there cannot be “more than six splits of county lines” and that the Black Belt, Gulf Coast, and Wiregrass be kept together “to the fullest extent possible,” the guidelines prioritize compliance with Section Two over those rules. *Id.* at 20–21 (citing *Milligan* Doc. 200-4, Section 1, Findings 3(d), 3(e), 3(g)(4)(d), and *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 31) (internal quotation marks omitted). The *Milligan* Plaintiffs also observe that the guidelines did not set an “arbitrary ceiling” on the number of county splits and that the legislative findings “redefine[] ‘community of interest.’ ” *Id.* at 21.

*26 The *Milligan* Plaintiffs argue that the State ignores the Supreme Court’s finding that the Duchin and Cooper plans “comported with traditional districting criteria” even though they split Mobile and Baldwin counties. *Id.* at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the *Milligan* Plaintiffs argue that in any event, the 2023 Plan does not satisfy the legislative finding that the specified communities must be kept together “to the fullest extent possible” because only the Gulf Coast is kept together, while the Black Belt remains split in a way that dilutes Black votes in District 2. *Id.* at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs argue that the 2023 Plan raises constitutional concerns because it “may be” the product of intentional discrimination. *Id.* at 23–26. The

Milligan Plaintiffs rest this argument on the “deliberate failure to remedy the identified [Section Two] violations”; white legislators’ efforts to “cut out Black members on the Reapportionment Committee” from meaningful deliberation on the Committee’s maps; public statements by legislators about their efforts to draw the 2023 Plan to maintain the Republican majority in the United States House of Representatives and convince one Supreme Court Justice to “see something different”; and the established availability of “less discriminatory alternative maps.” *Id.* at 24–25 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs ask that the Court enjoin Secretary Allen from using the 2023 Plan and direct the Special Master to draw a remedial map. *Id.* at 26.

2. The *Caster* Plaintiffs’ Objections

The *Caster* Plaintiffs assert that “Alabama is in open defiance of the federal courts.” *Caster* Doc. 179 at 2. They argue that the 2023 Plan “does not even come close to giving Black voters an additional opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice” because, like the 2021 Plan, it contains just one majority-Black district and “fails to provide an opportunity for Black voters to elect their preferred candidates in a second congressional district.” *Id.* at 2, 8–9.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs rely on a performance analysis Dr. Palmer¹⁵ prepared to examine District 2 in the 2023 Plan. *See id.* at 9–10; *Caster* Doc. 179-2. Dr. Palmer analyzed 17 statewide elections between 2016 and 2022 to evaluate the performance of Black-preferred candidates in District 2; he found “strong evidence of racially polarized voting” and concluded that Black-preferred candidates would have been defeated in 16 out of 17 races (approximately 94% of the time) in the new District 2. *Caster* Doc. 179-2 at 3, 6.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs urge us to ignore as irrelevant the discussion in the legislative findings about communities of interest. They contend that we and the Supreme Court already have found the State’s arguments about communities of interest “ ‘insufficient to sustain’ Alabama’s failure to provide an additional minority opportunity district.” *Caster* Doc. 179 at 10 (quoting *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1504–05).

If we consider the legislative findings, the *Caster* Plaintiffs identify a “glaringly absent” omission: “any discussion of the extent to which [the 2023 Plan] provides Black voters an

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opportunity to elect in a second congressional district.” *Id.* at 11 (emphasis in original). According to the *Caster* Plaintiffs, the failure of the Legislature to explain how the 2023 Plan “actually complies with” Section Two is telling. *Id.* (emphasis in original).

*27 The *Caster* Plaintiffs, like the *Milligan* Plaintiffs, ask us to enjoin Secretary Allen from using the 2023 Plan and “proceed to a judicial remedial process to ensure ... relief in time for the 2024 election.” *Id.*

3. The State's Defense of the 2023 Plan

At its core, the State's position is that even though the 2023 Plan does not contain an additional opportunity district, the Plaintiffs' objections fail under *Allen* because the 2023 Plan “cures the purported discrimination identified by Plaintiffs” by “prioritiz[ing] the Black Belt to the fullest extent possible ... while still managing to preserve long-recognized communities of interest in the Gulf and Wiregrass.” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 9. The State contends that the “2023 Plan improves on the 2021 Plan and all of Plaintiffs' alternative plans by unifying the Black Belt while also respecting the Gulf and Wiregrass communities of interest.” *Id.* at 27.

According to the State, “Plaintiffs cannot produce an alternative map with a second majority-Black district without splitting at least two of those communities of interest,” so their Section Two challenge fails. *Id.* at 9. The State leans heavily on the statement in *Allen* that Section Two “never require[s] adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles.” 143 S. Ct. at 1510 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The State argues that it is not in “defiance” of a court order because “[t]here are many ways for a State to satisfy § 2's demand of ‘equally open’ districts.” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 9. The State contends that the Plaintiffs “now argue that § 2 requires this Court to adopt a plan that divides communities of interest in the Gulf and Wiregrass to advance racial quotas in districting, but *Allen* forecloses that position.” *Id.* at 10.

The State makes four arguments in defense of the 2023 Plan. *First*, the State argues that the 2023 Plan remedies the Section Two violation we found because the 2023 Plan complies with Section Two. *Id.* at 29. The State begins with the premise that it “completely remedies a Section 2 violation ... by enacting any new redistricting legislation that complies with Section

2.” *Id.* (emphasis in original). The State then reasons that the Plaintiffs must prove that the 2023 Plan is not “equally open.” *Id.* at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). The State argues that our “assessment,” *id.* at 32, that “any remedial plan will need to include two districts in which Black voters either comprise a voting-age majority or something quite close to it,” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 6, was “‘based on the [2021] Legislature's redistricting guidelines’ ” and “‘choices that the [2021] Plan made,’ all of which came *before*” the 2023 Plan, *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 32 (emphasis in original) (quoting *Milligan* Doc. 7 at 149, 151).

The States cites *Dillard v. Crenshaw County*, 831 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1987), to say that we cannot focus exclusively on evidence about the 2021 Plan to evaluate whether the 2023 Plan is a sufficient remedy. *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 34–35 (“The evidence showing a violation in an *existing* election scheme may not be completely coextensive with a *proposed* alternative.” (emphasis in original)).

The State contends that the 2023 Plan remedied the discriminatory effects of the 2021 Plan by applying traditional redistricting principles “as fairly” to majority-Black communities in the Black Belt and Montgomery “as to the Gulf and the Wiregrass.” *Id.* at 33. The State claims that the 2023 Plan is “entitled to the presumption of legality” and “the presumption of good faith,” and is governing law unless it is found to violate federal law. *Id.* at 36–37.

*28 *Second*, the State asserts that the 2023 Plan complies with Section Two, and Plaintiffs cannot produce a reasonably configured alternative map. *See id.* at 37–60. The State urges that neither we nor the Supreme Court “ever said that § 2 requires the State to subordinate ‘nonracial communities of interest’ in the Gulf and Wiregrass to Plaintiffs' racial goals.” *Id.* at 38. The State contends that the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy *Gingles* I because they did not offer a plan that “meet[s] or beat[s]” the 2023 Plan “on the traditional principles of compactness, maintaining communities of interest, and maintaining political subdivisions that are adhered to in the State's plan.” *Id.* at 38–39 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The focus now is on the 2023 Plan,” the State says, and the Plaintiffs cannot lawfully surpass it. *Id.* at 40–41.

As for communities of interest, the State asserts that the 2023 Plan “resolves the concerns about communities of interest that Plaintiffs said was ‘the heart’ of their challenge to the 2021 Plan.” *Id.* at 41. The State says that the Supreme Court's ruling that it was “not persuaded that the Gulf was a community of

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interest” would “surprise Alabamians and has been answered by the legislative record for the 2023 Plan.” *Id.* at 41–42. The State claims that its argument on this issue is beyond dispute because the 2023 Plan “answers Plaintiffs’ call to unify the Black Belt into two districts, without sacrificing indisputable communities of interest in the Gulf and Wiregrass regions.” *Id.* at 42. The State contends that “[t]here can be no dispute that the 2023 Plan’s stated goal of keeping the Gulf Coast together and the Wiregrass region together is a legitimate one, and § 2 does not (and cannot) require the State to disregard that legitimate race-neutral purpose in redistricting.” *Id.* at 43. And the State contends, quoting the principal dissent in *Allen*, that the Gulf Coast is “indisputably a community of interest.” *Id.* at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted).

The State offers two bodies of evidence to support its assertions about communities of interest: (1) the legislative findings that accompanied the 2023 Plan, and (2) evidence about the Gulf Coast and the Wiregrass that the Legislature considered in 2023. *Id.* at 44–50. Based on this evidence, the State concludes that this is “no longer a case in which there would be a split community of interest in both the State’s plan and Plaintiffs’ alternatives,” and “Plaintiffs will not be able to show that there is a plan on par with the 2023 Plan that also creates an additional reasonably configured majority-Black district.” *Id.* at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted).

As for compactness and county splits, the State asserts that “each of Plaintiffs’ alternative maps fails to match the 2023 Plan on compactness, county splits, or both.” *Id.* at 56. The State argues that “a Plaintiff cannot advocate for a less compact plan for exclusively racial reasons.” *Id.* at 57. The State urges us to disregard our previous finding that the Plaintiffs adduced maps that respected the guidelines because “evidence about the 2021 Plan based on its 2021 principles does not shine light on whether the 2023 Plan has discriminatory effects.” *Id.*

The State relies on the expert report of Mr. Sean Trende, who “assessed the 2023 Plan and each of Plaintiffs’ alternative plans based on the three compactness measures Dr. Duchin used in her earlier report.” *Id.* Mr. Trende concluded that “the 2023 Plan measures as more compact” on all three scores “than Duchin Plans A, C, and D” and all the Cooper plans. *Id.*; see also *Milligan* Doc. 220-12 at 6–11. Mr. Trende concedes that on two of the measures (Polsby-Popper and Cut Edges), the Duchin Plan B ties or beats the 2023 Plan, and on one

of the measures (Cut Edges), a map that the *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs submitted to the Committee during the 2023 legislative process (“the VRA Plan”) ¹⁶ ties the 2023 Plan. See *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 57. The State argues that Duchin Plan B and the VRA Plan “still fail under *Allen* because they have more county splits” (seven) than the 2023 Plan has (six). *Id.* at 58.

*29 The State claims that if “Plaintiffs’ underperforming plans could be used to replace a 2023 Plan that more fully and fairly applies legitimate principles across the State, the result will be ... affirmative action in redistricting,” which would be unconstitutional. *Id.* at 59–60.

Third, the State urges us to reject the Plaintiffs’ understanding of an opportunity district on constitutional avoidance grounds. See *id.* at 60–68. The State begins with the undisputed premise that under Section Two, a remedial district need not be majority-Black. *Id.* at 60. The State then argues that nothing in *Allen* could “justify ... replacing the 2023 Plan with Plaintiffs’ preferred alternatives that elevate the Black Belt’s demographics over its historical boundaries.” *Id.* at 61. The State then argues that “all race-based government action must satisfy strict scrutiny,” that “[f]orcing proportional representation is not a compelling governmental interest,” and that “sacrificing neutral [redistricting] principles to race is unlawful.” *Id.* at 63 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The State argues that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Section Two contravenes “two equal protection principles: the principle that race can never be used as a negative or operate as a stereotype and the principle that race-based action can’t extend indefinitely into the future.” *Id.* at 64–67. The State says that the Plaintiffs’ position “depends on stereotypes about how minority citizens vote as groups ... and not on identified instances of past discrimination.” *Id.* at 68.

In their *fourth* argument, the State contends that we should reject the *Milligan* Plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination argument as cursory and because there is an “obvious alternative explanation for the 2023 Plan: respect for communities of interest.” *Id.* at 68–71 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the State says the *Milligan* Plaintiffs “rely on the complaints of Democrats in the Legislature.” *Id.* at 70.

The State submitted with its brief numerous exhibits, including the 2023 Plan, transcripts of the Committee’s public

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hearings, a supplemental report prepared by Mr. Bryan, Mr. Trende's report, and materials from the legislative process about two of the three communities of interest they urge us to consider: the Gulf Coast and the Wiregrass. *See Milligan Docs.* 220-1–220-19.

The State cites Mr. Bryan's 2023 report four times, and three of those are in reference to the VRA Plan. *See Milligan Doc.* 220 at 21 (in the “Background” section of the brief, to describe how the VRA Plan treats Houston County); *id.* (also in the “Background” section of the brief, to say that in the VRA Plan, the BVAP for District 2 is 50%, and the BVAP for District 7 is 54%); *id.* at 58 (in the constitutional avoidance argument, to assert that the VRA Plan splits counties “along racial lines, in service of hitting a racial target”). The fourth citation was as evidence that District 2 in the 2023 Plan has a BVAP of 39.93%, which is a stipulated fact. *See id.* at 28; *Milligan Doc.* 251 ¶ 4.

Nowhere does the State argue (or even suggest) that District 2 in the 2023 Plan is (or could be) an opportunity district.

4. The Plaintiffs’ Replies

a. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs reply that it is “undisputed and dispositive” that the 2023 Plan “offers no new opportunity district.” *Milligan Doc.* 225 at 2. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs accuse the State of ignoring the finding by us and the Supreme Court that they already have satisfied *Gingles* I, and of “try[ing] to justify the 2023 Plan through newly contrived [legislative] ‘findings’ that perpetuate the [Section Two] violation and contradict their own guidelines.” *Id.*

*30 The *Milligan* Plaintiffs assert that the State “cannot ... cite a single case in which a court has ruled that a remedial plan that fails to meaningfully increase the effective opportunity of minority voters to elect their preferred representatives is a valid [Section Two] remedy.” *Id.* at 2–3.

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs distinguish their claim of vote dilution, for which they say the remedy is an additional opportunity district, from a racial gerrymandering claim, for which the remedy is “merely to undo a specific, identified racial split regardless of electoral outcomes.” *Id.* at 4. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs say that the State's arguments about unifying the Black Belt fail to appreciate this distinction. *Id.*

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs resist the State's reliance on *Dillard* to reset the *Gingles* analysis. *Id.* at 5. They say the State misreads *Dillard*, which involved a complete reconfiguration of the electoral mechanism from an at-large system to a single-member system with an at-large chair. *See id.* (citing *Dillard*, 831 F.2d at 250). In that context, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs say, it “makes sense” for a court to “compare the differences between the new and old” maps with the understanding that “evidence showing a violation in an existing [at-large] election scheme may not be completely coextensive with a proposed alternative election system.” *Id.* at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the *Milligan* Plaintiffs, that understanding does not foreclose, in a vote dilution case without an entirely new electoral mechanism, focusing the question on “whether the new map continues to dilute Black votes as the old map did or whether the new map creates an ‘opportunity in the real sense of that term.’ ” *Id.* (quoting *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 429, 126 S.Ct. 2594).

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs urge that if we reset the *Gingles* analysis, we will necessarily allow “infinite bites at the apple[.]” Alabama would be permitted to simply designate new ‘significant’ communities of interest and anoint them *post hoc*, point to them as evidence of newfound compliance, and relitigate the merits again and again—all while refusing to remedy persistent vote dilution.” *Id.*

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs argue that the State's defense of the 2023 Plan invites the very beauty contest that we must avoid, and that federal law does not require a Section Two plaintiff to “meet or beat each and every one of [a State's] selected and curated districting principles” on remedy. *Id.* at 8. If that were the rule, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs say they would be required to “play a continuous game of whack-a-mole that would delay or prevent meaningful relief.” *Id.*

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs point out that the guidelines the Legislature used in 2023 were the exact same guidelines the Legislature used in 2021. *Id.* at 9. And the *Milligan* Plaintiffs say that if we pay as much attention to the legislative findings that accompanied the 2023 Plan as the State urges us to, we will run afoul of the rule that legislative intent is not relevant in a Section Two analysis. *Id.*

Finally, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs say that the State badly misreads *Allen* as “authoriz[ing] states to reverse engineer redistricting factors that entrench vote dilution.” *Id.* at 11. The

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Milligan Plaintiffs argue that *Allen* “specifically rejected this theory when it held that a state may not deploy purportedly neutral redistricting criteria to provide some voters less opportunity ... to participate in the political process.” *Id.* (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

b. The *Caster* Plaintiffs

*31 The *Caster* Plaintiffs reply that “Alabama is fighting a battle it has already lost[]” and that “[s]o committed is the State to maintaining a racially dilutive map that it turns a deaf ear to the express rulings of this Court and the Supreme Court.” *Caster* Doc. 195 at 2. The *Caster* Plaintiffs urge us “not [to] countenance Alabama’s repeated contravention” of our instructions. *Id.*

The *Caster* Plaintiffs make three arguments on reply. *First*, they argue that Section Two liability can be remedied “only by a plan that cures the established vote dilution.” *Id.* at 3. They urge that the liability and remedy inquiries are inextricably intertwined, such that whether a map “is a Section 2 remedy is ... a measure of whether it addresses the State’s Section 2 liability.” *Id.* (emphasis in original).

The *Caster* Plaintiffs attack the State’s attempt to “completely reset[] the State’s liability such that Plaintiffs must run the *Gingles* gauntlet anew” as unprecedented. *Id.* at 4. The *Caster* Plaintiffs assert that *Covington*, 138 S. Ct. at 2553, forecloses the State’s position, and they make the same argument about *Dillard* that the *Milligan* Plaintiffs make. *See Caster* Doc. 195 at 4–6.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs criticize the State’s argument about legislative deference to the 2023 Plan as overdrawn, arguing that “deference does not mean that the Court abdicates its responsibility to determine whether the remedial plan in fact remedies the violation.” *Id.* at 8.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs expressly disclaim a beauty contest: “Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to reject the 2023 Plan in favor of a plan it finds preferable. They ask the Court to strike down the 2023 Plan because they have provided unrefuted evidence that it fails to provide the appropriate remedy this Court found was necessary to cure the Section 2 violation.” *Id.* at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, the *Caster* Plaintiffs assert that the State misreads the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the preliminary injunction. *Id.*

at 10–12. The *Caster* Plaintiffs argue that *Allen* did not require a “‘meet or beat’ standard for illustrative maps” and did not adopt a standard that “would allow the remedial process to continue ad infinitum—so long as one party could produce a new map that improved compactness scores or county splits.” *Id.* at 10–11.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs reply to the State’s argument about affirmative action in redistricting by directing us to the statement in *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College*, — U.S. —, 143 S. Ct. 2141, 2162, 216 L.Ed.2d 857 (2023), that “remediating specific, identified instances of past discrimination that violated the Constitution or a statute” is a “compelling interest[] that permit[s] resort to race-based government action”; and the holding in *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1516–17, that for the last forty years, “[the Supreme] Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied” Section Two “and, under certain circumstances, have authorized race-based redistricting as a remedy” for discriminatory redistricting maps. *Caster* Doc. 195 at 12.

Third, the *Caster* Plaintiffs argue that the State concedes that the 2023 Plan does not provide Black voters an additional opportunity district. *Caster* Doc. 195 at 13–14. The *Caster* Plaintiffs urge us that this fact is dispositive. *See id.*

Ultimately, the *Caster* Plaintiffs contend that “[i]f there were any doubt that Section 2 remains essential to the protection of voting rights in America, Alabama’s brazen refusal to provide an equal opportunity for Black voters in opposition to multiple federal court opinions—six decades after the passage of the Voting Rights Act—silences it, resoundingly.” *Id.* at 15.

5. The Parties’ Motions for Clarification

*32 While the parties were preparing their briefs, the *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs, as well as the State, each filed motions for clarification regarding the upcoming hearing. *See Milligan* Docs. 188, 205. The *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs sought to clarify the role of the *Singleton* Plaintiffs, *Milligan* Doc. 188 at 2, while the State asked for a ruling on whether the Court would “foreclose consideration” of evidence it intended to offer in support of their *Gingles* I argument, *Milligan* Doc. 205 at 4–5. The State advised us that it would offer evidence “on whether race would now predominate in Plaintiffs’ alternative approaches, as illuminated by new arguments in Plaintiffs’ objections and their plan presented to

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the 2023 Reapportionment Committee.” *Id.* at 5. And the State alerted us that it would not offer any evidence “challenging the demographic or election numbers in the performance reports” offered by the Plaintiffs (*i.e.*, the Palmer and Liu Reports). *Id.* at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In response, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs asserted that “the sole objective of this remedial hearing is answering whether Alabama’s new map remedies the likely [Section Two] violation.” *Milligan* Doc. 210 at 1. “As such,” the *Milligan* Plaintiffs continued, the State is “bar[red] ... from relitigating factual and legal issues that this Court and the Supreme Court resolved at the preliminary injunction liability stage—including whether Mobile-Baldwin is an inviolable community of interest that may never be split, whether the legislature’s prioritizing particular communities of interest immunizes the 2021 Plan from Section 2 liability, and whether Plaintiffs’ illustrative maps are reasonably configured.” *Id.* at 2. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs asserted that “the undisputed evidence proves that [the 2023 Plan] does not satisfy the preliminary injunction.” *Id.* at 2–3.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs responded similarly. The *Caster* Plaintiffs argued that “the question of Alabama’s liability is not an open one for purposes of these preliminary injunction proceedings,” because “[t]hat is precisely what the Supreme Court decided when it affirmed this Court’s preliminary injunction just a few months ago.” *Caster* Doc. 190 at 2 & Part I. “Rather,” the *Caster* Plaintiffs argued, “the question before the Court is whether the 2023 Plan actually remedies the State’s likely violation.” *Id.* at 2, 7–8. The *Caster* Plaintiffs asserted that to answer that question, we needed only to determine “whether the 2023 Plan remedies the vote dilution identified during the liability phase by providing Black Alabamians with an additional opportunity district.” *Id.* at 8. Likewise, the *Caster* Plaintiffs asserted that we should exclude as irrelevant the State’s evidence that the 2023 Plan respects communities of interest. *Id.* at 12–13. The *Caster* Plaintiffs argued that on remedy, Section Two is not “a counting exercise of how many communities of interest can be kept whole.” *Id.* at 12. They urged that the Gulf Coast evidence was merely an attempt to relitigate our findings about that community, which should occur only during a trial on the merits, not during the remedial phase of preliminary injunction proceedings. *Id.* at 13–14.

We issued orders clarifying that the scope of the remedial hearing would be limited to “the essential question whether the 2023 Plan complies with the order of this Court, affirmed

by the Supreme Court, and with Section Two.” *Milligan* Doc. 203 at 4; *see also* *Milligan* Doc. 222 at 9. We cited the rules that “any proposal to remedy a Section Two violation must itself conform with Section Two,” and that “[t]o find a violation of Section 2, there must be evidence that the remedial plan denies equal access to the political process.” *Milligan* Doc. 222 at 10 (alterations accepted) (quoting *Dillard*, 831 F.2d at 249–50).

Accordingly, we ruled that “[a]lthough the parties may rely on evidence adduced in the original preliminary injunction proceedings conducted in January 2022 to establish their assertions that the 2023 Plan is or is not a sufficient remedy for the Section Two violation found by this Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, th[e] remedial hearing w[ould] not relitigate the issue of that likely Section Two violation.” *Milligan* Doc. 203 at 4. We reasoned that this limitation “follow[ed] applicable binding Supreme Court precedent and [wa]s consistent with the nature of remedial proceedings in other redistricting cases.” *Id.* (citing *Covington*, 138 S. Ct. at 2550; and *Jacksonville Branch of the NAACP v. City of Jacksonville*, No. 3:22-cv-493-MMM-LLL, 2022 WL 17751416, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227920 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2022)). We specifically noted that “[i]f the Defendants seek to answer the Plaintiffs’ objections that the 2023 Plan does not fully remediate the likely Section Two violation by offering evidence about ‘communities of interest,’ ‘compactness,’ and ‘county splits,’ they may do so.” *Milligan* Doc. 222 at 10. But we reserved ruling on the admissibility of any particular exhibits that the parties intended to offer at the hearing. *Id.* at 10–11.

*33 We explained that “it would be unprecedented for this Court to relitigate the likely Section Two violation during these remedial proceedings,” and that we “w[ould] not do so” because “[w]e are not at square one in these cases.” *Milligan* Doc. 203 at 4. We observed that “this manner of proceeding [wa]s consistent with the [State’s] request that the Court conduct remedial proceedings at this time and delay any final trial on the merits ... until after the 2024 election.” *Id.* at 5. And we explained why we would not require Plaintiffs to amend or supplement complaints, as the State suggested. *See id.* at 6–7.

6. The Plaintiffs’ Motion *in Limine*

The *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs also jointly filed a motion *in limine* in advance of the remedial hearing to exclude

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“the expert testimony of Mr. Thomas Bryan and Mr. Sean Trende, as well as any and all evidence, references to evidence, testimony, or argument relating to the 2023 Plan’s maintenance of communities of interest.” *Milligan* Doc. 233 at 1. The Plaintiffs asserted that because of the limited scope of the hearing, this evidence was irrelevant and immaterial. *See id.* at 3–12.

As for Mr. Trende, the Plaintiffs asserted that his “analysis—which compares Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans, a plan Plaintiffs proposed to the Legislature, and the State’s 2021 and 2023 Plans under compactness metrics, county splits, and the degree to which they split three identified communities of interest—sheds no light on whether the 2023 Plan remedies this Court’s finding of vote dilution.” *Id.* at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Plaintiffs asserted that “Mr. Bryan’s analysis of a smaller subset of the same plans concerning the number of county splits and ... the size and type of population that were impacted by them to offer opinions about whether there is evidence that race predominated in the design of the plans, similarly tilts at windmills.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Plaintiffs further asserted that those experts’ “statistics regarding the 2023 Plan” are irrelevant in light of the State’s “conce[ssion] that the Black-preferred candidates would have lost” in District 2 in “every single election studied by their own expert.” *Id.* They urged us that “[t]he topics on which Mr. Trende and Mr. Bryan seek to testify have already been decided by this Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court.” *Id.*

Similarly, the Plaintiffs asserted that the State’s evidence about communities of interest is irrelevant. *Id.* at 7–12. The Plaintiffs argued that this evidence does not tend to make any fact of consequence more or less probable because it does not tell us anything about whether the State remedied the vote dilution we found. Put differently, the Plaintiffs say this evidence tells us nothing about whether the 2023 Plan includes an additional opportunity district. *Id.* And because the State concedes that District 2 is not an opportunity district, the Plaintiffs assert the evidence about communities of interest is not relevant at all. *Id.* at 11–12.

Separately, the Plaintiffs attacked the reliability of Mr. Bryan’s testimony. *Id.* at 5–7.

In response to the motion, the State argued that its evidence is relevant to the question whether the 2023 Plan violates Section Two. *Milligan* Doc. 245 at 2–7. More particularly,

the State argued that the evidence is relevant to the question whether the Plaintiffs can establish that the 2023 Plan violates Section Two “under the same *Gingles* standard applied at the merits stage.” *Id.* at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). The State reasoned that “[n]o findings have been made (nor could have been made) regarding the 2023 Plan’s compliance with § 2.” *Id.* at 6. The State defended the reliability of Mr. Bryan’s analysis. *Id.* at 7–9.

D. Stipulated Facts

*34 After they filed their briefs, the parties stipulated to the following facts for the remedial hearing. *See Milligan* Doc. 251; *Caster* Doc. 213. We recite their stipulations verbatim.

I. Demographics of 2023 Plan

1. The 2023 Plan contains one district that exceeds 50% Black Voting Age Population (“BVAP”).
2. According to 2020 Census data, CD 7 in the 2023 Plan has a BVAP of 50.65% Any-Part Black.
3. Under the 2023 Plan, the district with the next-highest BVAP is CD 2.
4. According to 2020 Census data, CD 2 in the 2023 Plan has a BVAP of 39.93% Any-Part Black.

Population Summary								
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District	Population	Deviation	% Devn.	[% White]	[% Black]	[% AP_Wh]	[% AP_Bl]	[% 18+ AP_Bl]
1	717,754	0	0.00%	55.36%	25.07%	70.31%	20.46%	24.62%
2	717,756	1	0.00%	50.66%	30.93%	54.97%	41.63%	39.39%
3	717,754	0	0.00%	70.79%	23.39%	75.18%	21.76%	19.09%
4	717,754	0	0.00%	81.53%	6.81%	86.55%	7.9%	7.22%
5	717,754	0	0.00%	59.02%	17.59%	75.72%	19.29%	17.82%
6	717,754	0	0.00%	30.2%	39.36%	75.03%	30.51%	18.36%
7	717,754	0	0.00%	40.89%	51.32%	44.15%	52.59%	49.68%

II. General Election Voting Patterns in the 2023 Plan

5. Under the 2023 Plan, Black Alabamians in CD 2 and CD 7 have consistently preferred Democratic candidates in the general election contests Plaintiffs’ experts analyzed for the 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022 general elections, as well as the 2017 special election for U.S. Senate. In those same elections, white Alabamians in CD 2 and CD 7 consistently preferred Republican candidates over (Black-preferred) Democratic candidates. In CD 2, white-preferred candidates (who are Republicans) almost always defeated Black-preferred candidates (who are Democrats). In CD 2, white candidates (who were Republicans) always defeated Black candidates (who were Democrats).

III. Performance of CD 2 in the 2023 Plan

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6. The *Caster* Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Maxwell Palmer analyzed the 2023 Plan using 17 contested statewide elections between 2016 and 2022. That analysis showed:

b. Under the 2023 Plan, the Black-preferred candidate in CD 2 would have been elected in 1 out of the 17 contests analyzed.

a. Under the 2023 Plan, the average two-party vote-share for Black-preferred candidates in CD 2 is 44.5%.

Table 4: Vote Share of Black-Preferred Candidates — SB 5 Plan

		CD 2	CD 7
2022	U.S. Senator*	38.6%	
	Governor*	37.5%	
	Attorney General*	39.1%	
	Sec. of State*	39.2%	
	Supreme Ct., Place 5*	39.7%	
2020	U.S. President	45.4%	61.4%
	U.S. Senator	47.7%	63.2%
2018	Governor	45.1%	63.7%
	Lt. Governor*	45.7%	62.7%
	Attorney General	48.3%	64.5%
	Sec. of State	45.8%	62.6%
	State Auditor*	46.6%	62.9%
	Supreme Ct., Chief	48.1%	65.5%
	Supreme Ct., Place 4	46.1%	63.2%
2017	U.S. Senator	55.8%	72.0%
2016	U.S. President	44.2%	60.3%
	U.S. Senator	43.9%	59.1%

* Indicates that the Black candidate of choice was Black.

b. Under the 2023 Plan, the Black-preferred candidate in CD 2 would have been elected in 0 out of the 11 contests analyzed.

7. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Baodong Liu completed a performance analysis of the 2023 Plan using 11 statewide biracial elections between 2014 and 2022. That analysis showed:

a. Under the 2023 Plan, the average two-party vote-share for Black-preferred candidates in CD 2 is 42.2%.

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Table 1: RPV in the 11 Biracial Elections based on the Livingston Plan, CD2

Election	Black Pref. Cand	White Pref. Cand	% vote cast for BPC in Livingston Plan	Black Support for Black Cand (95% CI)	White Support for Black Cand (95% CI)	BPC Won in Livingston Plan?	RPV?
2022 Governor	Yolanda Flowers	Kay Ivey	37.8%	94.0% (90-96)	4.9% (4-6)	No	Yes
2022 US Senate	Will Boyd	Katie Britt	38.8%	93.5% (89-96)	6.0% (4-9)	No	Yes
2022 Attorney General	Wendell Major	Steve Marshall	39.3%	94.3% (91-97)	6.3% (5-8)	No	Yes
2022 Secretary of State	Pamela Laffitte	Wes Allen	39.4%	94.2% (90-97)	6.0% (4-9)	No	Yes
2022 Supreme Court, Place 5	Amia Kelly	Bradley Byrne	39.9%	94.2% (91-97)	6.6% (5-10)	No	Yes
2018 Lt Governor	Will Boyd	Will Ainsworth	46.0%	93.6% (91-96)	6.3% (5-10)	No	Yes
2018 State Auditor	Miranda Joseph	Jim Zigler	46.9%	94.2% (90-97)	8.2 (6-13)	No	Yes
2018 Public Service Commission, Place 1	Cara McClure	Jeremy Oden	46.9%	93.7% (93-97)	6.5% (5-10)	No	Yes
2014 Secretary of State	Luis Albert-Kaigler	John Merrill	43.6%	91.5% (88-94)	6.2% (5-8)	No	Yes
2014 Lt Governor	James Fields	Kay Ivey	43.4%	91.3% (88-93)	6.3% (4-9)	No	Yes
2014 State Auditor	Miranda Joseph	Jim Zigler	41.7%	88.0% (81-91)	9.1% (6-14)	No	Yes

Democrat CD	2018 AG	2018 GOV	2018 LTGOV	2018 AUD	2018 SOS	2020 PRES	2020 SEN	Average
1	39.2%	38.5%	36.7%	37.6%	36.9%	34.8%	38.2%	37.4%
2	48.5%	45.3%	46.0%	46.8%	46.0%	45.6%	48.0%	46.6%
3	33.3%	32.6%	31.2%	31.8%	31.5%	29.3%	31.9%	31.6%
4	24.8%	24.8%	21.7%	22.6%	21.7%	18.6%	21.9%	22.3%
5	39.2%	38.6%	36.8%	38.0%	37.4%	36.2%	39.5%	37.9%
6	35.6%	36.2%	32.8%	33.7%	33.2%	33.4%	35.9%	34.4%
7	64.7%	64.0%	62.9%	63.2%	62.9%	61.6%	63.4%	63.2%

Republican CD	2018 AG	2018 GOV	2018 LTGOV	2018 AUD	2018 SOS	2020 PRES	2020 SEN	Average
1	60.8%	61.5%	63.3%	62.4%	63.1%	65.2%	61.8%	62.6%
2	51.5%	54.7%	54.0%	53.2%	54.0%	54.4%	52.0%	53.4%
3	66.7%	67.4%	68.8%	68.2%	68.5%	70.7%	68.1%	68.4%
4	75.2%	75.2%	78.3%	77.4%	78.3%	81.4%	78.1%	77.7%
5	60.8%	61.4%	63.2%	62.0%	62.6%	63.8%	60.5%	62.1%
6	64.4%	63.8%	67.2%	66.3%	66.8%	66.6%	64.1%	65.6%
7	35.3%	36.0%	37.1%	36.8%	37.1%	38.4%	36.6%	36.8%

IV. The 2023 Special Session

10. On June 27, 2023, Governor Kay Ivey called a special legislative session to begin on July 17, 2023 at 2:00 p.m. Her proclamation limited the Legislature to addressing: **“Redistricting:** The Legislature may consider legislation pertaining to the reapportionment of the State, based on the 2020 federal census, into districts for electing members of the United States House of Representatives.”

11. For the special session, Representative Chris Pringle and Senator Steve Livingston were the Co-Chairs of the Permanent Legislative Committee on Reapportionment (“the Committee”). The Committee had 22 members, including 7 Black legislators, who are all Democrats, and 15 white legislators, who are all Republicans.

12. Before the Special Session, the Committee held pre-session hearings on June 27 and July 13 to receive input from the public on redistricting plans.

13. At the Committee public hearing on July 13, Representative Pringle moved to re-adopt the 2021 Legislative Redistricting Guidelines (“Guidelines”).

14. The Committee voted to re-adopt the 2021 Guidelines.

15. The only plans proposed or available for public comment during the two pre-session hearings were the “VRA Plaintiffs’ Remedial Plan” from the *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs and the plans put forward by Senator Singleton and, Senator Hatcher.

16. On July 17, the first day of the Special Session, Representative Pringle introduced a plan he designated as the “Community of Interest” (“COI”) plan.

8. Dr. Liu also analyzed the 2020 presidential election between Biden-Harris and Trump-Pence. His analysis of both the 2020 presidential election and the 11 biracial elections between 2014 and 2022 showed:

a. Under the 2023 Plan, the average two-party vote-share for Black-preferred candidates in CD 2 is 42.3%.

b. Under the 2023 Plan, the Black-preferred candidate in CD 2 would have been elected in 0 out of the 12 contests analyzed.

9. The Alabama Legislature analyzed the 2023 Plan in seven election contests: 2018 Attorney General, 2018 Governor, 2018 Lieutenant Governor, 2018 Auditor, 2018 Secretary of State, 2020 Presidential, and 2020 Senate. That analysis showed:

a. Under the 2023 Plan, the average two-party vote-share for Black-preferred candidates in CD 2 is 46.6%.

*35 b. Under the 2023 Plan, the Black-preferred candidate in CD 2 would have been elected in 0 out of the 7 contests analyzed.

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17. The COI plan had a BVAP of 42.45% in Congressional District 2 (“CD2”), and Representative Pringle said it maintained the core of existing congressional districts.

18. The COI plan passed out of the Committee on July 17 along party and racial lines, with all Democratic and all Black members voting against it. Under the COI plan, the Committee's performance analysis showed that Black-preferred candidates would have won two of the four analyzed-statewide races from 2020 and 2022.

COMMUNITY OF INTEREST PLAN

Year	Race	CD2		CD7	
		% Dem.	% Rep.	% Dem.	% Rep.
2020	Pres.	47.53	51.56	61.94	37.28
2020	U.S. Senate	50.23	49.77	64.19	35.81
2018	Gov.	47.77	52.23	63.89	36.11
2018	A.G.	50.97	49.03	64.34	35.66

19. The “Opportunity Plan” (or “Livingston 1”) was also introduced on July 17. Senator Livingston was the sponsor of the Opportunity Plan.

20. The Opportunity Plan had a BVAP of 38.31% in CD2.

21. Neither the COI Plan nor Opportunity Plan were presented at the public hearings on June 27 or July 13.

22. On July 20, the House passed the Representative Pringle sponsored COI Plan, and the Senate passed the Opportunity Plan. The votes were along party lines with all Democratic house members voting against the COI plan. The house vote was also almost entirely along racial lines, with all Black house members, except one, voting against the COI plan. All Democratic and all Black senators voted against the Opportunity Plan.

23. Afterwards, on Friday, July 21, a six-person bicameral Conference Committee passed Senate Bill 5 (“SB5”), which [is] a modified-version of the Livingston plan (“Livingston 3” plan or the “2023 Plan”).

*36 24. The 2023 Plan was approved along party and racial lines, with the two Democratic and Black Conference Committee members (Representative England and Representative Smitherman) voting against it, out of six total members including Representative Pringle and Senator Livingston.

25. Representative England, one of the two Democratic and Black legislators on the Conference Committee, stated that the 2023 Plan was noncompliant with the Court's preliminary-injunction order and that the Court would reject it.

26. On July 21, SB5 was passed by both houses of the legislature and signed by Governor Ivey.

27. In the 2023 Plan enacted in SB5, the Black voting-age population (“BVAP”) is 39.9%.

28. The map contains one district, District 7, in which the BVAP exceeds 50%.

29. SB5 passed along party lines and almost entirely along racial lines. Out of all Black legislators, one Republican Black House member voted for SB5, and the remaining Black House members voted against.

30. SB5 includes findings regarding the 2023 Plan. The findings purport to identify three specific communities of interest (the Black Belt, the Wiregrass, and the Gulf Coast).

V. Communities of Interest

31. The Black Belt is a community of interest.

32. The Black Belt includes the 18 core counties of Barbour, Bullock, Butler, Choctaw, Crenshaw, Dallas, Greene, Hale, Lowndes, Macon, Marengo, Montgomery, Perry, Pickens, Pike, Russell, Sumter, and Wilcox. In addition, Clarke, Conecuh, Escambia, Monroe, and Washington counties are sometimes but not always included within the definition of the Black Belt.

33. The 2023 Plan divides the 18 core Black Belt counties into two congressional districts (CD-2 and CD-7) and does not split any Black Belt counties.

34. The 2023 Plan keeps Montgomery County whole in District 2.

35. The 2023 Plan places Baldwin and Mobile Counties together in one congressional district.

36. Baldwin and Mobile Counties have been together in one congressional district since redistricting in 1972.

37. Alabama splits Mobile and Baldwin Counties in its current State Board of Education districts, as well as those in the 2011 redistricting cycle.

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E. The Remedial Hearing

Before the remedial hearing, the *Milligan* and *Caster* parties agreed to present their evidence on paper, rather than calling witnesses to testify live. *See, e.g., Milligan* Doc. 233 at 1; Aug. 14 Tr. 92. Accordingly, no witnesses testified live at the hearing on August 14. Three events at the hearing further developed the record before us: (1) the attorneys made arguments and answered our questions; (2) we received exhibits into evidence and reserved ruling on some objections (see *infra* at Part VII), and (3) the parties presented for the first time certain deposition transcripts that were filed the night before the hearing, *see Milligan* Doc. 261.¹⁷ We first discuss the deposition transcripts, and we then discuss the attorney arguments.

1. The Deposition Testimony

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs filed transcripts reflecting deposition testimony of seven witnesses: (1) Randy Hinaman, the State's longstanding cartographer, *Milligan* Doc. 261-1; (2) Brad Kimbro, a past Chairman of the Dothan Area Chamber of Commerce, *Milligan* Doc. 261-2, who also prepared a declaration the State submitted, *Milligan* Doc. 220-18; (3) Lee Lawson, current President & CEO of the Baldwin County Economic Development Alliance, *Milligan* Doc. 261-3, who also prepared a declaration, *Milligan* Doc. 220-13; (4) Senator Livingston, *Milligan* Doc. 261-4; (5) Representative Pringle, *Milligan* Doc. 261-5; (6) Mike Schmitz, a former mayor of Dothan, *Milligan* Doc. 261-6, who also prepared a declaration, *Milligan* Doc. 220-17; and (7) Jeff Williams, a banker in Dothan, *Milligan* Doc. 261-7, who also prepared a declaration, *Milligan* Doc. 227-1.

*37 During the remedial hearing, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs played video clips from the depositions of Mr. Hinaman, Senator Livingston, and Representative Pringle. (The Court later reviewed all seven depositions in their entirety.)

Mr. Hinaman testified that his understanding of the preliminary injunction was that the Legislature “needed to draw two districts that would give African Americans an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice.” *Milligan* Doc. 261-1 at 20, 22.¹⁸ Mr. Hinaman testified that he drew the Community of Interest Plan that the Alabama House of Representatives passed. *Id.* at 23. He testified that of the maps that were sponsored by a member of either the Alabama

House or the Alabama Senate, the Community of Interest Plan is the only one he drew. *Id.* at 24.

Mr. Hinaman testified that he did not know who drew the Opportunity Plan, which the Alabama Senate passed. *Id.* at 31–32. He testified that he “believe[d] it was given to Donna Loftin, who is ... supervisor of the reapportionment office, on a thumb drive.” *Id.* at 32. Mr. Hinaman testified that he had no understanding of how the Opportunity Plan was drawn or why he did not draw it. *Id.* 32–34.

Mr. Hinaman testified that he had “numerous discussions with members of congress” and their staff during the special session. *Id.* at 45. Mr. Hinaman testified about the performance analyses he considered and that he was “more interested in performance than the raw BVAP number” because “not all 42 or 43 or 41 or 39 percent districts perform the same.” *Id.* at 65–66.

When Mr. Hinaman was asked about the legislative findings, he testified that he had not seen them before his deposition, that no one told him about them, and that he was not instructed about them as he was preparing maps. *Id.* at 94.

Senator Livingston testified that he was “familiar” that the preliminary injunction ruled that a remedial map should include “two districts in which Black voters either comprise a voting-age majority or something quite close to it,” but that his deposition was the first time he had read that part of the injunction. *Milligan* Doc. 261-4 at 51–52. Senator Livingston testified that he was “personally not paying attention to race” as maps were drawn or shown to him. *Id.* at 56.

When Senator Livingston was asked why he changed his focus from the Community of Interest Plan to other plans, he said it was because “[t]he Committee moved, and [he] was going to be left behind.” *Id.* at 66. He testified that the Committee members “had received some additional information they thought they should go in the direction of compactness, communities of interest, and making sure that ... congressmen or women are not paired against each other,” but he did not know the source of that information. *Id.* at 67–68.

Senator Livingston testified that a political consultant drew the Opportunity Plan, and Senator Roberts delivered it to the reapportionment office. *Id.* at 70. Senator Livingston testified that he did not have “any belief one way or another about where [the Opportunity Plan] would provide a fair opportunity to black voters to elect a preferred candidate in

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the second district.” *Id.* at 71. Senator Livingston testified that Black-preferred candidates “have an opportunity to win” in District 2 even if they actually won zero elections. *Id.* at 96–97.

*38 When Senator Livingston was asked who prepared the legislative findings, he identified the Alabama Solicitor General and testified that he did not “have any understanding of why those findings were included in the bill.” *Id.* at 101–02.

Representative Pringle testified that he was familiar with the guidance from the Court about the required remedy for the Section Two violation. *Milligan* Doc. 261-5 at 17–18. Representative Pringle testified that he understood “opportunity to elect” to mean “a district which they have the ability to elect or defeat somebody of their choosing,” although he “ha[d] no magic number on that.” *Id.* at 19–20. Representative Pringle twice testified that his “overriding principle” is “what the United States Supreme Court told us to do.” *Id.* at 22–23.

Representative Pringle testified that during the special session, he spoke with the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Mr. Kevin McCarthy. *Id.* He testified that Speaker McCarthy “was not asking us to do anything other than just keep in mind that he has a very tight majority.” *Id.* at 22. Representative Pringle testified that like Mr. Hinaman, he had conversations with members of Alabama’s congressional delegation and their staff. *Id.* at 23–24.

Representative Pringle testified that the only map drawer that he retained in connection with the special session was Mr. Hinaman. *Id.* at 25. Representative Pringle also testified that the Alabama Solicitor General “worked as a map drawer at some point in time.” *Id.* at 26–28. Like Senator Livingston, Representative Pringle testified that the Opportunity Plan was drawn by a political consultant and brought to the Committee by Senator Roberts. *Id.* at 72.

Unlike Senator Livingston, Representative Pringle testified that he did not know who drafted the legislative findings. *Id.* at 90. He testified that he did not know they would be in the bill; the Committee did not solicit anyone to draft them; he did not know why they were included; he had never seen a redistricting bill contain such findings; and he had not analyzed them. *Id.* at 91–94.

Representative Pringle testified repeatedly that he thought that his plan (the Community of Interest Plan) was a better

plan because it complied with court orders, but that he could not get it passed in the Senate. *See, e.g., id.* at 99–102.

In heated testimony, Representative Pringle recounted that when he learned his plan would not pass the Senate, he told Senator Livingston that the plan that passed could not have a House bill number or Representative Pringle’s name on it. *Id.* at 101–02. When asked why he did not want his name on the plan that passed, Representative Pringle answered that his plan “was a better plan” “[i]n terms of its compliance with the Voting Rights Act.” *Id.* at 102.

Representative Pringle was asked about a newspaper article that he read that reported one of his colleagues’ public comments about the 2023 Plan. *See id.* at 109–10. Neither he nor his counsel objected to the question, nor to him being shown the article that he testified he had seen before. *Id.* The article reported that the Alabama Speaker of the House had commented: “If you think about where we were, the Supreme Court ruling was five to four. So there’s just one judge that needed to see something different. And I think the movement that we have and what we’ve come to compromise on today gives us a good shot” *Id.* at 109.

*39 When Representative Pringle was asked whether he “agree[d] that the legislature is attempting to get a justice to see something differently,” he answered that he was not, that he was “trying to comply with what the Supreme Court ruled,” but that he did not “want to speak on behalf of 140 members of the legislature.” *Id.* at 109–10. Representative Pringle also testified that his colleague had never expressed that sentiment to him privately. *Id.* at 110.

2. Arguments and Concessions

During the opening statements at the remedial hearing, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs emphasized that there is “only one” question now before us: whether the 2023 Plan “remed[ies] the prior vote dilution, and does it provide black voters with an additional opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice.” Aug. 14 Tr. 10. Nevertheless, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs walked us through their *Gingles* analysis, in case we perform one. *See* Aug. 14 Tr. 10–23. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs asserted that we previously found and the Supreme Court affirmed that they satisfied *Gingles* I. Aug. 14 Tr. 10–11. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs said that we can rely on that finding even though the Legislature enacted the 2023 Plan because *Gingles* I does not “look at the compactness of plaintiffs’ map,” but “looks at the

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compactness of the minority community,” which we found and the Supreme Court affirmed. Aug. 14 Tr. 10–11. And the *Milligan* Plaintiffs assert that it is undisputed that they satisfy *Gingles* II and III because “there is serious racially polarized voting” in Alabama. Aug. 14 Tr. 11.

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs further urged that the key elements of the performance analysis are undisputed: “there is no dispute that the 2023 plan does not lead to the election of a ... second African-American candidate of choice,” Aug. 14 Tr. 11, and that the 2023 Plan, “like the old plan, also results in vote dilution” because “black candidates would lose every election” in District 2, Aug. 14 Tr. 12.

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs accused the State of “rehash[ing] the arguments that both this Court and the Supreme Court have already rejected,” mainly that “there could be no legitimate reason to split Mobile and Baldwin counties,” “the Court should compare its allegedly neutral treatment of various communities in the 2023 plan to the treatment of the same alleged communities in” the illustrative plans, and “the use of race in devising a remedy is improper.” Aug. 14 Tr. 12–13.

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs said that if we reexamine any aspect of our *Gingles* analysis, we should come out differently than we did previously on Senate Factor 9 (which asks whether the State's justification for its redistricting plan is tenuous). Aug. 14 Tr. 14–22. We made no finding about Factor 9 when we issued the preliminary injunction, but the *Milligan* Plaintiffs said that the depositions of Mr. Hinaman, Senator Livingston, and Representative Pringle support a finding now. *See* Aug. 14 Tr. 14–22.

During their opening statement, the *Caster* Plaintiffs argued that the State was in “defiance of the Court's clear instructions,” because “[t]here is no dispute that the 2023 Plan ... once again limits the state's black citizens to a single opportunity district.” Aug. 14 Tr. 27–28. Based on stipulated facts alone, the *Caster* Plaintiffs urged this Court to enjoin the 2023 Plan because it “perpetuat[es] the same [Section 2](#) violation as the map struck down by this Court last year.” Aug. 14 Tr. 28.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs argued that we should understand the State's argument that we are back at square one in these cases as part and parcel of their continued defiance of federal court orders. Aug. 14 Tr. 29. The *Caster* Plaintiffs further argued that we should reject the State's argument that the 2023 Plan remedies the “cracking” of the Black Belt because

the 2023 Plan merely “reshuffled Black Belt counties to give the illusion of a remedy.” Aug. 14 Tr. 29–30. The *Caster* Plaintiffs reasoned that “Alabama gets no brownie points for uniting black voters and the Black Belt community of interest in a district in which they have no electoral power and in a map that continues to dilute the black vote.” Aug. 14 Tr. 30. Finally, the *Caster* Plaintiffs urged us to ignore all the new evidence about communities of interest, because “[Section 2](#) is not a claim for better respect for communities of interest. It is a claim regarding minority vote dilution.” Aug. 14 Tr. 30.

*40 In the State's opening statement, it asserted that if the Plaintiffs cannot establish that the 2023 Plan violates federal law, then the 2023 Plan is “governing law.” Aug. 14 Tr. 33. The State assailed the Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the question is limited to the issue of whether the 2023 Plan includes an additional opportunity district as a “tool for demanding proportionality,” which is unlawful. Aug. 14 Tr. 36.

The State asserted that the Plaintiffs must come forward with new *Gingles* I evidence because under *Allen*, it “simply cannot be the case” that the Duchin plans and Cooper plans are “up to the task.” Aug. 14 Tr. 36. The State's principal argument was that those plans were configured to compete with the 2021 Plan on traditional districting principles such as compactness and respect for communities of interest, and they cannot outdo the 2023 Plan on those metrics. Aug. 14 Tr. 36–39. According to the State, the 2023 Plan “answers the plaintiffs’ challenge” with respect to the Black Belt because it “take[s] out ... those purportedly discriminatory components of the 2021 plan.” Aug. 14 Tr. 39–41. Because “[t]hat cracking is gone,” the State said, “the 2023 plan does not produce discriminatory effects.” Aug. 14 Tr. 41.

Much of the State's opening statement cautioned against an additional opportunity district on proportionality grounds and against “abandon[ing]” legitimate traditional districting principles. *See* Aug. 14 Tr. 39–47. According to the State, “now proportionality is all that you are hearing about.” Aug. 14 Tr. 47–48.

After opening statements, we took up the Plaintiffs’ motion *in limine*. The Plaintiffs emphasized that even if they are required to reprove compactness for *Gingles* I, they could rely on evidence from the preliminary injunction proceeding (and our findings) to do so, because all the law requires is a determination that the minority population is reasonably compact and that an additional opportunity district can be reasonably configured. The Plaintiffs emphasized that under

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this reasonableness standard, they need not outperform the 2023 Plan in a beauty contest by submitting yet another illustrative plan. Aug. 14 Tr. 50–51, 58–59. According to the Plaintiffs, “nothing can change the fact that” Black voters in Alabama “as a community are reasonably compact, and you can draw a reasonably configured district around them.” Aug. 14 Tr. 54. Indeed, the Plaintiffs say, “[t]he only thing that can substantially change” where Black voters are in Alabama for purposes of *Gingles* I “would be a new census.” Aug. 14 Tr. 55.

The Plaintiffs suggested that the State confused the compactness standards for a Section Two case, which focus on the compactness of the minority population, with the compactness standards for a racial gerrymandering case, which focus on the compactness of the challenged district. Aug. 14 Tr. 55, 57.

The State based its response to the motion *in limine* on arguments about the appropriate exercise of judicial power. See Aug. 14 Tr. 63. On the State’s reasoning, the Plaintiffs “have to relitigate and prove” the *Gingles* analysis because the Court cannot “just transcribe the findings from an old law onto a new law.” Aug. 14 Tr. 61, 63. Significantly, the State conceded that the Plaintiffs have met their burden in these remedial proceedings on the second and third *Gingles* requirements and the Senate Factors. Aug. 14 Tr. 64–65. So, according to the State, the only question the Court need answer is whether the Plaintiffs are required to reprove *Gingles* I. See Aug. 14 Tr. 64–66. The State said they must, because “it is [the State’s] reading of *Allen* that reasonably configured is not determined based on whatever a hired expert map drawer comes in and says, like, this is reasonable enough. It has to be tethered ... to objective factors to a standard or rule that a Legislature can look at *ex ante*” Aug. 14 Tr. 67.

*41 The State answered several questions about whether the Plaintiffs now must offer a new illustrative map that outperforms the 2023 Plan with respect to compactness and communities of interest. In one such exchange, we asked whether the State was “essentially arguing [that] whatever the state does, we can just say they shot a bullet, and we have now drawn a bull’s eye where that bullet hit, and so it’s good?” Aug. 14 Tr. 72. We followed up: “It’s just some veneer to justify whatever the state wanted to do that was short of the [Voting Rights Act?]” Aug. 14 Tr. 72. The State responded that precedent “makes clear that the state does have a legitimate interest in promoting these three principles of

compactness, counties, and communities of interest.” Aug. 14 Tr. 72.

Again, we asked the State whether the Duchin plans and Cooper plans were subject to attack now even though we found (and the Supreme Court affirmed) that the additional opportunity districts they illustrated were reasonably configured. Aug. 14 Tr. 67. The State answered that because the comparator is now the 2023 Plan, the Duchin plans and Cooper plans could be attacked once again, this time for failing to outperform the 2023 Plan even though we found they outperformed the 2021 Plan. Aug. 14 Tr. 67–70.

We further asked the State whether “our statement that the appropriate remedy for the ... likely violation that we found would be an additional opportunity district ha[s] any relevance to what we’re doing now?” Aug. 14 Tr. 75. “I don’t think so,” the State said. Aug. 14 Tr. 75. We pressed the point: “it is the state’s position that the Legislature could ... enact a new map that was consistent with those findings and conclusions [by this Court and the Supreme Court] without adding a second opportunity district?” Aug. 14 Tr. 75. “Yes,” the State replied. Aug. 14 Tr. 75.

Moreover, the *Caster* Plaintiffs argued (in connection with the State’s isolation of the dispute to *Gingles* I) that under applicable law, the *Gingles* I inquiry already has occurred. According to the *Caster* Plaintiffs, “[n]either the size of the black population nor its location throughout the state is a moving target[]” between 2021 and 2023. Aug. 14 Tr. 88. Likewise, they say, “[n]othing about the 2023 map, nothing about the evidence that the defendants can now present ... can go back in time” to undermine maps drawn “two years ago.” Aug. 14 Tr. 88. They add that “[n]othing about the tradition of Alabama’s redistricting criteria has changed[]” since 2021, and that “[i]f anything, it is Alabama that has broken with its own tradition ... in creating these brand new findings out of nowhere, unbeknownst to the actual committee chairs who were in charge of the process.” Aug. 14 Tr. 89.

We carried the motion *in limine* with the case and received exhibits into evidence (we rule on remaining objections *infra* at Part VII).

We then asked for the State’s position if we were to order (again) that an additional opportunity district is required, and the State replied that such an order would be unlawful under *Allen* because it would require the State to adopt a map that violates traditional principles. Aug. 14 Tr. 157. When

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asked “at what point the federal court ... ha[s] the ability to comment on whether the appropriate remedy includes an additional opportunity district” — “[o]n liability,” “[o]n remedy,” “[b]oth,” “or [n]ever” — the State said there is not “any prohibition on the Court commenting on what it thinks an appropriate remedy would be.” Aug. 14 Tr. 157–58.

The State then answered questions regarding its argument about traditional districting principles and the 2023 Plan. The Court asked the State whether it “acknowledge[d] any point during the ten-year [census] cycle where the [Legislature’s] ability to redefine the principles cuts off and the Court’s ability to order an additional opportunity district attaches.” Aug. 14 Tr. 159. The State responded that that “sounds a lot like a preclearance regime.” Aug. 14 Tr. 159.

*42 Ultimately, the State offered a practical limitation on the Legislature’s ability to redefine traditional districting principles: if the Court rules that “there is a problem with this map,” then the State’s “time has run out,” and “we will have a court drawn map for the 2024 election barring appellate review.” Aug. 14 Tr. 159–60.

We continued to try to understand how, in the State’s view, a court making a liability finding has any remedial authority. We asked: “[W]hen we made the liability finding, is it the state’s position that at that time this Court had no authority to comment on what the appropriate remedy would be because at that time the Legislature was free to redefine traditional districting principles?” Aug. 14 Tr. 160. “Of course, the Court could comment on it[.]” the State responded. Aug. 14 Tr. 160.

Next, we queried the State whether Representative Pringle’s testimony about the legislative findings should affect the weight we assign the findings. Aug. 14 Tr. 161–62. The State said no, because Representative Pringle is only one legislator out of 140, there is a presumption of regularity that attaches to the 2023 Plan, and the findings simply describe what we could see for ourselves by looking at the map. Aug. 14 Tr. 162. The State admonished us that “it’s somewhat troubling for a federal court to say that they know Alabama’s communities of interest better than Alabama’s representatives know them.” Aug. 14 Tr. 163.

Ultimately, we asked the State whether it “deliberately chose to disregard [the Court’s] instructions to draw two majority-black districts or one where minority candidates could be chosen.” Aug. 14 Tr. 163. The State reiterated that District 2 is “as close as you are going to get to a second majority-

black district without violating *Allen*” and the Constitution. Aug. 14 Tr. 164. Finally, we pressed the question this way: “Can you draw a map that maintains three communities of interest, splits six or fewer counties, but that most likely if not almost certainly fails to create an opportunity district and still comply with Section 2?” Aug. 14 Tr. 164. “Yes. Absolutely,” the State said. Aug. 14 Tr. 164; *see also* Aug. 14 Tr. 76.

F. The Preliminary Injunction Hearing

The next day, the Court heard argument on the *Singleton* Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The *Singleton* Plaintiffs walked the Court through the claim that the 2023 Plan “preserves” and “carries forward” a racial gerrymander that has persisted in Alabama’s congressional districting plan since 1992, when the State enacted a plan guaranteeing Black voters a majority in District 7 pursuant to a stipulated injunction entered to resolve claims that Alabama had violated Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, *see Wesch*, 785 F. Supp. at 1493, *aff’d sub nom. Camp*, 504 U.S. 902, 112 S.Ct. 1926, and *aff’d sub nom. Figures*, 507 U.S. 901, 113 S.Ct. 1233. August 15 Tr. 8, 10–15. The State disputed that race predominated in the drawing of the 2023 Plan, but made clear that, if the Court disagreed, the State did not contest the *Singleton* Plaintiffs’ argument that the 2023 Plan could not satisfy strict scrutiny. Aug. 15 Tr. 82. The Court received some exhibits into evidence and reserved ruling on some objections. Aug. 15 Tr. 25–31, 59–60. We heard live testimony from one of the Plaintiffs, Senator Singleton; the State had the opportunity to cross-examine him. Aug. 15 Tr. 32–58. And we took closing arguments. Aug. 15 Tr. 61–85.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

*43 As the foregoing discussion previewed, the parties dispute the standard of review that applies to the Plaintiffs’ objections. We first discuss the standard that applies to requests for preliminary injunctive relief. We then discuss the parties’ disagreement over the standard that applies in remedial proceedings, the proper standard we must apply, and the alternative.

A. Preliminary Injunctive Relief

“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” *Benisek v. Lamone*, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943, 201 L.Ed.2d 398 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless

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the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” *Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri*, 23 F.4th 1282, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. The Limited Scope of the Parties’ Disagreement

The Plaintiffs’ position is that the liability phase of this litigation has concluded, and we are now in the remedial phase. On the Plaintiffs’ logic, the enactment of the 2023 Plan does not require us to revisit any aspect of our liability findings underlying the preliminary injunction. The question now, they say, is only whether the 2023 Plan provides Black voters an additional opportunity district.

The State’s position is that the enactment of the 2023 Plan reset this litigation to square one, and the Plaintiffs must prove a new Section Two violation. “Only if the Legislature failed to enact a new plan,” the State says, “would we move to a purely remedial process, rather than a preliminary injunction hearing related to a new law.” *Milligan* Doc. 205 at 3; *Milligan* Doc. 172 at 45–46. On the State’s logic, the Plaintiffs must reprove their entitlement to injunctive relief under *Gingles*, and some (but not all) of the evidence developed during the preliminary injunction proceedings may be relevant for this purpose.

As a practical matter, the parties’ dispute is limited in scope: it concerns whether the Plaintiffs must submit additional illustrative maps to establish the compactness part of *Gingles* I, and the related question whether any such maps must “meet or beat” the 2023 Plan on traditional districting principles. This limitation necessarily follows from the fact that the State concedes for purposes of these proceedings that the Plaintiffs have established the numerosity component of *Gingles* I, all of *Gingles* II and III, and the Senate Factors. Aug. 14 Tr. 64–65.

The parties agree that in any event, the Plaintiffs carry the burden of proof and persuasion. *Milligan* Doc. 203 at 4.

C. The Remedial Standard We Apply

When, as here, a district court finds itself in a remedial posture, tasked with designing and implementing equitable relief, “the scope of a district court’s equitable powers ... is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” *Brown v. Plata*, 563 U.S. 493, 538, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But this power is not unlimited. The Supreme Court has long instructed that the “essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.” *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed.*, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (quoting *Hecht Co. v. Bowles*, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944)). The court “must tailor the scope of injunctive relief to fit the nature and extent of the ... violation established.” *Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith*, 676 F.2d 1023, 1041 (5th Cir. 1982). In other words, the nature and scope of the review at the remedial phase is bound up with the nature of the violation the district court sets out to remedy. *See id.*; *Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. Of Elections & Registration*, 979 F.3d 1282, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court’s remedial proceedings bear directly on and are inextricably bound up in its liability findings.”).

*44 The Voting Rights Act context is no exception. Following a finding of liability under Section Two, the “[r]emedial posture impacts the nature of [a court’s] review.” *Covington v. North Carolina*, 283 F. Supp. 3d 410, 431 (M.D.N.C.), *aff’d in relevant part, rev’d in part*, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 201 L.Ed.2d 993 (2018). “In the remedial posture, courts must ensure that a proposed^[19] remedial districting plan completely corrects—rather than perpetuates—the defects that rendered the original districts unconstitutional or unlawful.” *Id.* Accordingly, the “issue before this Court is whether” the 2023 Plan, “in combination with the racial facts and history” of Alabama, completely corrects, or “fails to correct the original violation” of Section Two. *Dillard*, 831 F.2d at 248 (Johnson, J.).

When, as here, a jurisdiction enacts a remedial plan after a liability finding, “it [i]s correct for the court to ask whether the replacement system ... would remedy the violation.” *Harper v. City of Chicago Heights*, 223 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing *Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. # 5*, 71 F.3d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir. 1995)). In a Section Two case such as this, that challenges the State’s drawing of single-member district lines in congressional reapportionment, the injury that gives rise to the violation is vote dilution — “that members of a protected class ‘have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.’ ” *Shaw II*, 517 U.S. at 914, 116 S.Ct. 1894. At the remedy phase, the district court therefore properly asks whether the remedial plan “completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.”

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United States v. Dall. Cnty. Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1988).

Evidence drawn from the liability phase and the Court's prior findings "form[] the 'backdrop' for the Court's determination of whether the Remedial Plan 'so far as possible eliminate[d] the discriminatory effects' " of the original plan. Cf. *Jacksonville Branch of NAACP*, 2022 WL 17751416, at *13, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227920 (rejecting city's invitation to conduct analysis of its remedial plan "on a clean slate" because "the remedial posture impacts the nature of the review" (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted) (quoting *Covington*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 431). "[T]here [i]s no need for the court to view [the remedial plan] as if it had emerged from thin air." *Harper*, 223 F.3d at 599; accord *Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 4 F.3d 1103, 1115–16 (3d Cir. 1993)).

That said, a federal court cannot accept an unlawful map on the ground that it corrects a Section Two violation in an earlier plan. "[A]ny proposal to remedy a Section 2 violation must itself conform with Section 2." *Dillard*, 831 F.2d at 249. So if the 2023 Plan corrects the original violation of Section Two we found, but violates Section Two in a new way or otherwise is unlawful, we may not accept it.

Accordingly, we limit our analysis in the first instance to the question whether the 2023 Plan corrects the likely Section Two violation that we found and the Supreme Court affirmed: the dilution of Black votes in Alabama congressional districts. Because we find that the 2023 Plan perpetuates rather than corrects that violation, see *infra* at Part IV.A, we enjoin it on that ground. If we had found that the 2023 Plan corrected that violation, we then would have considered any claims the Plaintiffs raised that the 2023 Plan violates federal law anew.

*45 For seven separate and independent reasons, we reject the assertion that the Plaintiffs must reprove Section Two liability under *Gingles*.

First, the State has identified no controlling precedent, and we have found none, that instructs us to proceed in that manner. We said in one of our clarification orders that it would be unprecedented for us to relitigate the Section Two violation during remedial proceedings, see *Milligan* Doc. 203 at 4, and the State has not since identified any precedent that provides otherwise.

Second, the main precedent the State cites, *Dillard*, aligns with our approach. See 831 F.2d at 247–48. In *Dillard*, Calhoun County stipulated that its at-large system of electing commissioners diluted Black votes in violation of Section Two. *Id.* The County prepared a remedial plan that altered the electoral mechanism to elect commissioners using single-member districts and retained the position of an at-large chair. *Id.* at 248. The plaintiffs objected on the ground that the remedial plan did not correct the Section Two violation. *Id.* The district court agreed that under the totality of the circumstances, the use of at-large elections for the chairperson would dilute Black voting strength. *Id.* at 249.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the district court failed to conduct a fact-specific inquiry into the proposed remedy. *Id.* at 249–50. The appeals court ruled that when the district court simply "transferred the historical record" from the liability phase of proceedings to the remedial phase, it "incompletely assessed the differences between the new and old proposals." *Id.* at 250. The appeals court observed that in the light of the new structure of the commission, the nature of the chairperson's duties and responsibilities, powers, and authority would necessarily differ from those of the commissioners in the old, unlawful system. See *id.* at 250–52. Accordingly, the appeals court held that the district court could not simply rely on the old evidence to establish a continuing violation. *Id.* at 250.

The State overreads *Dillard*. The reason that new factual findings were necessary in *Dillard* was because, as the Eleventh Circuit observed, "procedures that are discriminatory in the context of one election scheme are not necessarily discriminatory under another scheme." *Id.* at 250. If the new system diluted votes, the method by which that could or would occur might be different, so the court needed to assess it. See *id.* at 250–52. Those concerns are not salient here: there is no difference in electoral mechanism. In 2023, the State just placed district lines in different locations than it did in 2021.

Accordingly, we do not read *Dillard* to support the *Gingles* reset that the State requests. When the entire electoral mechanism changes, it makes little sense not to examine the new system. But this reality does not establish an inviolable requirement that every court faced with a remedial task in a redistricting case must begin its review of a remedial map with a blank slate.

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Even if we are wrong that this case is unlike *Dillard*, what the State urges us to do is not what the Eleventh Circuit said or did in *Dillard*. After the appeals court held that the “transcription [of old evidence] does not end the evaluation,” it said that it “must evaluate the new system in part measured by the historical record, in part measured by difference from the old system, and in part measured by prediction,” and it faulted the district court for “incompletely assess[ing] the differences between the new and old proposals.” *Id.* at 249–50.

*46 We discern no dispute among the parties that a proper performance analysis of the 2023 Plan evaluates it “in part measured by the historical record, in part measured by difference from the old system, and in part measured by prediction.” *Id.* at 250; see *Milligan* Doc. 251 at 2–6. Indeed, every performance analysis that we have — the State’s, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs’, and the *Caster* Plaintiffs’ — does just that. *Milligan* Doc. 251 at 2–6. This understanding of a performance analysis is consistent with the analytical approach that the United States urges us to take in its Statement of Interest. *Milligan* Doc. 199 at 9–15.

Accordingly, we understand *Dillard* as guiding us to determine whether District 2 in the 2023 Plan performs as an additional opportunity district, not as directing us to reset the *Gingles* liability determination to ground zero.

Third, *Covington*, cited by both the State and the Plaintiffs, aligns with our approach. In *Covington*, the North Carolina General Assembly redrew its state legislative electoral maps after a three-judge court enjoined the previous maps as unconstitutional in a ruling that the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. 283 F. Supp. 3d at 413–14, 419. The plaintiffs objected to the remedial map, and the legislative defendants raised jurisdictional objections, including that “the enactment of the [remedial p]lans rendered th[e] action moot.” *Id.* at 419, 423–24.

The district court rejected the mootness challenge on the ground that after finding a map unlawful, a district court “has a duty to ensure that any remedy so far as possible eliminate[s] the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar[s] like discrimination in the future.” *Id.* at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Louisiana v. United States*, 380 U.S. 145, 154, 85 S.Ct. 817, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965)). The district court cited circuit precedent for the proposition that “federal courts *must* review a state’s proposed remedial districting plan to ensure it completely remedies the identified constitutional violation and is not otherwise legally unacceptable.” *Id.*

(emphasis in original) (collecting cases, including Section Two cases).

Further, the district court emphasized that its injunction was the only reason the General Assembly redrew the districts that it did. *Id.* at 425. (In *Covington*, the State itself was a party to the case.) The court reasoned that “[i]t is axiomatic that this Court has the inherent authority to enforce its own orders,” so the case could not be moot. *Id.* (also describing the court’s “strong interest in ensuring that the legislature complied with, but did not exceed, the authority conferred by” the injunction). The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling by the district court. *Covington*, 138 S. Ct. at 2553 (concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims “did not become moot simply because the General Assembly drew new district lines around them”).

We do not decide the constitutional issues before us and the State has not formally raised a mootness challenge, but those distinctions do not make *Covington* irrelevant.²⁰ Both parties have cited it, see *Caster* Docs. 191, 195; *Milligan* Docs. 220, 225, and we understand it to mean that on remedy, we must (1) ensure that any remedial plan corrects the violation that we found, and (2) reject any proposed remedy that is otherwise unlawful. We do not discern anything in *Covington* to suggest that if we do those two things, we fall short of our remedial task.

*47 None of the other cases the State has cited compel a different conclusion. For instance, in *McGhee v. Granville County*, the County responded to a Section Two liability determination by drawing a remedial plan that switched the underlying electoral mechanism from an at-large method to single-member districts in which Black voters would have an increased opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 860 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1988). The district court rejected the remedial plan as failing to completely remedy the violation, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court was bound to accept this remedial plan because once “a vote dilution violation is established, the appropriate remedy is to restructure the districting system to eradicate, to the maximum extent possible *by that means*, the dilution proximately caused by that system.” *Id.* at 118 (emphasis in original). The district court was not free to try to eradicate the dilution by altering other “electoral laws, practices, and structures” not actually challenged by the claim; instead, the district court had to evaluate the extent to which the remedial plan eradicated the dilution in the light of the electoral mechanism utilized by the State. *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

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The Fourth Circuit in *McGhee* did not hold that *Gingles* I compels a district court to accept a remedial map that provides *less* than a genuine opportunity for minority voters to elect a candidate of their choice. *See id.* To the contrary, the court emphasized that the “appropriate remedy” for a vote dilution claim is to “restructure the districting system to eradicate ... the dilution proximately caused by that system” “to the maximum extent possible,” within the bounds of “the size, compactness, and cohesion elements of the dilution concept.” *Id.*

Fourth, consistent with the foregoing discussion and our understanding of our task, district courts regularly isolate the initial remedial determination to the question whether a replacement map corrects a violation found in an earlier map. *See, e.g., United States v. Osceola County*, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2006); *GRACE, Inc. v. City of Miami*, — F. Supp. 3d —, —, No. 1:22-CV-24066, 2023 WL 4853635, at *7, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134162 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2023).

One three-judge court — in a ruling affirmed by the Supreme Court — has gone so far as to describe its task as “determining the meaning of the Voting Rights Act at the remedial stage of a case in which defendants are proven violators of the law.” *Jeffers v. Clinton*, 756 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (E.D. Ark. 1990), *aff'd*, 498 U.S. 1019, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991). We do not go that far: no part of our ruling rests on assigning lawbreaker status to the State. *Id.* We are ever mindful that we “must be sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a legislature's redistricting calculus,” and we generally presume the good faith of the Legislature. *Abbott*, 138 S. Ct. at 2324 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Supreme Court has specifically held that the “allocation of the burden of proof [to the plaintiffs] and the presumption of legislative good faith are not changed by a finding of past discrimination.” *Id.* This is because “past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. 55, 75, 100 S.Ct. 1519, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion)).

As we explain below, *see infra* at Part IV, we have afforded the 2023 Plan the deference to which it is entitled, we have applied the presumption of good faith, and we have measured it against the evidentiary record by performing the legal analysis that we understand binding precedent to require. Put

simply, the 2023 Plan has received a fair shot. (Indeed, we have substantially relaxed the Federal Rules of Evidence to allow the State to submit, and we have admitted, virtually all of the materials that it believes support its defense of the 2023 Plan. *Infra* at Part VII; Aug. 14 Tr. 91–142.)

*48 *Fifth*, resetting the *Gingles* analysis to ground zero following the enactment of the 2023 Plan is inconsistent with our understanding of this Court's judicial power. At the remedial hearing, we queried the State about the relevance for these remedial proceedings of our statement in the preliminary injunction that the appropriate remedy was an additional opportunity district. *See supra* at Part I.E.2. According to the State, the statement has no legal force, Aug. 14 Tr. 74 — there is not any “prohibition on the Court commenting on what it thinks an appropriate remedy would be,” Aug. 14 Tr. 158, but such comments are limited to the context of the 2021 Plan, meaningless when the Legislature undertakes to enact a remedial map, and irrelevant when a court assesses that map. The State did not use the word “advisory,” but in substance its argument was that the “comment” had no force or field of application and was merely our (erroneous) advice to the Legislature.

The State's view cannot be squared with this Court's judicial power in at least two ways. As an initial matter, it artificially divorces remedial proceedings in equity from liability proceedings in equity. As we already observed, federal courts must tailor injunctions to the specific violation that the injunction is meant to remedy; the idea is that the equitable powers of a federal court are among its broadest and must be exercised with great restraint, care, and particularity. *See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr.*, 676 F.2d at 1041 (“Although a federal court has broad equitable powers to remedy constitutional violations, it must tailor the scope of injunctive relief to fit the nature and extent of the constitutional violation established.”).

In this way, a liability determination shapes the evaluation of potential remedies, and the determination of an appropriate remedy necessarily is informed by the nature of the conduct enjoined. *Id.*; *see also Covington*, 581 U.S. at 488, 137 S.Ct. 1624 (citing *NAACP v. Hampton Cnty. Election Comm'n*, 470 U.S. 166, 183 n.36, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 84 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985)). Again, redistricting cases are no exception. *See, e.g., Dillard*, 831 F.2d at 248. We cannot reconcile these basic principles with the State's suggestion that after an exhaustive liability determination, we cannot make a relevant or meaningful statement about the proper remedy.

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Separately, the State's view is inconsistent with the Article III judicial power because it allows the State to constrain (indeed, to manipulate) the Court's authority to grant equitable relief. The State agrees that if the Legislature had passed no map, it would have fallen to us to draw a map. But the State argues that because the Legislature enacted a map, we have no authority to enjoin it on the ground that it does not provide what we said is the legally required remedy. Rather, the State says, we must perform a new liability analysis from ground zero. The State acknowledges that if we find liability, Alabama's 2024 congressional elections will occur according to a court-ordered map, but that's only because time will have run out for the Legislature to enact another remedial map before that election. Aug. 14 Tr. 159–60.

Put differently, the State's view is that so long as the Legislature enacts a remedial map, we have no authority to craft a remedy without first repeating the entire liability analysis. But at the end of each liability determination, the argument goes, we have no authority to order a remedy if the Legislature plans and has time to enact a new map. In essence, the State creates an endless paradox that only it can break, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of the ability to effectively challenge and the courts of the ability to remedy. It cannot be that the equitable authority of a federal district court to order full relief for violations of federal law is always entirely at the mercy of a State electoral and legislative calendar.

Sixth, we discern no limiting principle to the State's argument that we should reset the liability analysis to ground zero, and this causes us grave concern that accepting the argument would frustrate the purpose of Section Two. As the Plaintiffs have rightly pointed out and we have described, the State's view of remedial proceedings puts redistricting litigation in an infinity loop restricted only by the State's electoral calendar and terminated only by a new census. *See Milligan* Doc. 210 at 6. These are practical limitations, not principled ones. The State has not identified, and we cannot identify, any limiting principle to a rule whereby redistricting litigation is reset to ground zero every time a legislature enacts a remedial plan following a liability determination. This is a significant reason not to accept such a rule; it would make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for a district court ever to effectuate relief under Section Two.

*49 It is as though we are three years into a ten-year baseball series. We've played the first game. The Plaintiffs won game one. The State had the opportunity to challenge some of the

calls that the umpires made, and the replay officials affirmed those calls. Now, instead of playing game two, the State says that it has changed some circumstances that were important in game one, so we need to replay game one. If we agree, we will only ever play game one; we will play it over and over again, until the ten years end, with the State changing the circumstances every time to try to win a replay. We will never proceed to game two unless, after one of the replays, there is simply no time for the State to change the circumstances. Nothing about this litigation is a game, but to us the analogy otherwise illustrates how poorly the State's position fits with any reasonable effort to timely and finally dispose of redistricting litigation.

Seventh, the State's argument that we must reset the *Gingles* analysis to ground zero ignores the simple truth that the 2023 Plan exists only because this Court held — and the Supreme Court affirmed — that the 2021 Plan likely violated Section Two. If the State originally had enacted the 2023 Plan instead of the 2021 Plan, we would have analyzed the Plaintiffs' attacks on the 2023 Plan under *Gingles*. But that's not what happened, so we won't proceed as though it did.

Further, we reject the State's argument that by limiting our initial remedial determination to the question of whether the 2023 Plan provides an additional opportunity district, we violate the proportionality disclaimer in Section Two. The State argues that we have staked the fate of the 2023 Plan on whether it provides proportional representation, which is unlawful. *See Milligan* Doc. 220 at 60–68.

The State is swinging at a straw man: the Plaintiffs' analysis did not and does not rest on proportionality grounds, and neither does ours. As an initial matter, we did not enjoin the 2021 Plan on the ground that it failed to provide proportional representation. We performed a thorough *Gingles* analysis and expressly acknowledged a limited, non-dispositive role for evidence and arguments about proportionality. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 193–95. The Supreme Court affirmed our analysis, which we presume it would not have done were the analysis infected with a proportionality error. *See Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1502. Our remedial analysis cannot go back in time and taint our earlier ruling.

Likewise, the Plaintiffs do not urge us to enjoin the 2023 Plan on the ground that it fails to provide proportional representation. They urge us to enjoin it on the ground that it fails to provide the required remedy because District 2 is not an opportunity district. *See Milligan* Doc. 200 at 6–7; *Caster*

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Doc. 179 at 2–3. Federal law does not equate the provision of an additional opportunity district as a remedy for vote dilution with an entitlement to proportional representation; decades of jurisprudence so ensures. *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1508–10. Any suggestion that the Plaintiffs urge us to reject the 2023 Plan because it fails to provide proportional representation blinks reality.

And as we explain below, we do not enjoin the 2023 Plan on the ground that it fails to provide proportional representation. We enjoin it on two separate, independent, and alternative grounds, neither of which raises a proportionality problem. *See infra* at Parts IV.A & IV.B.

For all these reasons, it is not a proportionality fault that we limit our initial determination to whether the 2023 Plan provides the remedy the law requires.

D. In the Alternative

Out of an abundance of caution, we have carefully considered the possibility that the foregoing analysis on the standard of review is wrong. We have concluded that even if it is, after a fresh and new *Gingles* analysis the 2023 Plan still meets the same fate. As we explain in Part IV.B below, even if we reexamine *Gingles* I, II, and III, and all the Senate Factors, relying only on (1) relevant evidence from the preliminary injunction proceedings, (2) relevant and admissible evidence from the remedial proceedings, and (3) stipulations and concessions, we reach the same conclusion with respect to the 2023 Plan that we reached for the 2021 Plan: it likely violates Section Two by diluting Black votes.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

*50 “This Court cannot authorize an element of an election proposal that will not with certitude *completely* remedy the Section 2 violation.” *Dillard*, 831 F.2d at 252 (emphasis in original); *accord, e.g., Covington*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 431. The requirement of a complete remedy means that we cannot accept a remedial plan that (1) perpetuates the vote dilution we found, *see, e.g., Covington*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 431; or (2) only partially remedies it, *see, e.g., White v. Alabama*, 74 F.3d 1058, 1069–70 (11th Cir. 1996).

The law does not require that a remedial district guarantee Black voters’ electoral success. “The circumstance that a group does not win elections does not resolve the issue of vote dilution.” *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 428, 126 S.Ct. 2594. Rather, the law requires that a remedial district guarantee Black voters

an equal opportunity to achieve electoral success. “[T]he ultimate right of § 2 is equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever race.” *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1014 n.11, 114 S.Ct. 2647.

Thus, as we said in the preliminary injunction, controlling precedent makes clear that the appropriate remedy for the vote dilution we found is an additional district in which Black voters either comprise a voting-age majority or otherwise have an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice. And as the Supreme Court explained in *Abbott*, this requirement is not new: “In a series of cases tracing back to [*Gingles*], [the Supreme Court has] interpreted [the Section Two] standard to mean that, under certain circumstance, States **must draw** ‘opportunity’ districts in which minority groups form ‘effective majorit[ies].’ ” 138 S. Ct. at 2315 (emphasis added) (quoting *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 426, 126 S.Ct. 2594).

Our ruling was consistent with others in which district courts required additional opportunity districts to remedy a vote-dilution violation of Section Two. *See, e.g., Perez v. Texas*, No. 11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR, 2012 WL 13124275, at *5, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190609 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012) (on remand from the Supreme Court, ordering the “creation of a new Latino district” to satisfy Section Two); *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry*, 457 F. Supp. 2d 716, 719 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (ordering, on remand from the Supreme Court, a remedial plan that restored an effective opportunity district); *accord, e.g., Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd.*, 862 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (rejecting a state’s remedial plan and adopting a Section Two plaintiff’s remedial proposal that increased a remedial district’s minority population to ensure an “effective majority-minority” district).

We have reviewed the relevant jurisprudence for guidance about how to determine whether the 2023 Plan includes an additional opportunity district. The State appears to have charted new waters: we found no other Section Two case in which a State conceded on remedy that a plan enacted after a liability finding did not include the additional opportunity district that the court said was required.

In any event, we discern from the case law two rules that guide our determination whether the 2023 Plan in fact includes an additional opportunity district. *First*, we need a performance analysis (sometimes called a functional

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analysis) to tell us whether a purportedly remedial district completely remedies the vote dilution found in the prior plan. A performance analysis predicts how a district will function based on statistical information about, among other things, demographics of the voting-age population in the district, patterns of racially polarized voting and bloc voting, and the interaction of those factors. *See generally Milligan Doc. 199.*

*51 Appellate courts commonly rely on performance analyses to review district court decisions about remedial plans. *See, e.g., LULAC, 548 U.S. at 427, 126 S.Ct. 2594* (reviewing a district court's evaluation of a proposed remedial district on the basis of a performance analysis that included evidence of the minority share of the population, racially polarized voting in past elections, and projected election results in the new district); *Dall. Cnty. Comm'n, 850 F.2d at 1440* (rejecting a remedial plan because a performance analysis demonstrated that racially polarized voting would prevent the election of Black-preferred candidates in the proposed remedial district).

District courts also commonly rely on performance analyses to evaluate remedial plans in the first instance. *See, e.g., Osceola County, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1256* (rejecting a remedial proposal that, “given the high degree of historically polarized voting,” failed to remedy the VRA violation); *League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 721* (ordering remedial plan with three new “effective Latino opportunity districts” and basing determination that districts would “perform” on population demographics and statewide election data).

Second, the Supreme Court has not dictated a baseline level at which a district must perform to be considered an “opportunity” district. Nor has other precedent set algorithmic criteria for us to use to determine whether an alleged opportunity district will perform. But precedent does clearly tell us what criteria establish that a putative opportunity district will not perform. When a performance analysis shows that a cohesive majority will “often, if not always, prevent” minority voters from electing the candidate of their choice in the purportedly remedial district, there is a “denial of opportunity in the real sense of that term.” *LULAC, 548 U.S. at 427, 429, 126 S.Ct. 2594.* And when voting is racially polarized to such a “high degree” that electoral success in the alleged opportunity district is “completely out of the reach” of a minority community, the district is not an opportunity district. *Osceola County, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1256.*

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Our findings and conclusions proceed in two parts. We first consider whether, under the precedent we just described, the 2023 Plan completely remedies the likely Section Two violation that we found and the Supreme Court affirmed. We then consider whether, starting from square one, the Plaintiffs have established that the 2023 Plan likely violates Section Two.

A. The 2023 Plan Does Not Completely Remedy the Likely Section Two Violation We Found and the Supreme Court Affirmed.

The record establishes quite clearly that the 2023 Plan does not completely remedy the likely Section Two violation that we found and the Supreme Court affirmed. The 2021 Plan included one majority-Black congressional district, District 7. This Court concluded that the Plaintiffs were substantially likely to establish that the 2021 Plan violated Section Two by diluting Black votes. *See Milligan Doc. 107.* We determined that under binding precedent, the necessary remedy was either an additional majority-Black district or an additional Black-opportunity district. *Id.* at 5–6. We observed that as a “practical reality,” because voting in Alabama is intensely racially polarized, any such district would need to include a Black “voting-age majority or something quite close to it.” *Id.* at 6.

We explicitly explained that the need for two opportunity districts hinged on the evidence of racially polarized voting in Alabama — which the State concedes at this stage — and that our *Gingles* I analysis served only to determine whether it was reasonably practicable, based on the size and geography of the minority population, to create a reasonably configured map with two majority-minority districts.

*52 The Supreme Court affirmed that order in all respects; it neither “disturb[ed]” our fact findings nor “upset” our legal conclusions. *Allen, 143 S. Ct. at 1502, 1506.* The Supreme Court did not issue any instructions for us to follow when the cases returned to our Court or warn us that we misstated the appropriate remedy. We discern nothing in the majority opinion to hold (or even to suggest) that we misunderstood what Section Two requires. We have carefully reviewed the portion of the Chief Justice's opinion that received only four votes, as well as Justice Kavanaugh's concurrence, and we discern nothing in either of those writings that adjusts our understanding of what Section Two requires in these cases.

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We do not understand either of those writings as undermining any aspect of the Supreme Court's affirmance; if they did, the Court would not have affirmed the injunction. We simply see no indication in *Allen* that we misapplied Section Two.

Because there is no dispute that the 2023 Plan does not have two majority-Black districts, *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 1, the dispositive question is whether the 2023 Plan contains an additional Black-opportunity district. We find that it does not, for two separate and independent reasons.

First, we find that the 2023 Plan does not include an additional opportunity district because the State itself concedes that the 2023 Plan does not include an additional opportunity district. *See id.* ¶¶ 5–9; Aug. 14 Tr. 163–64. Indeed, the State's position is that the Legislature was not required to include an additional opportunity district in the 2023 Plan. Aug. 14 Tr. 157–61, 163–64.

Second, we find that the 2023 Plan does not include an additional opportunity district because stipulated evidence establishes that fact. District 2 has the second-highest Black voting-age population after District 7, and District 2 is the district the Plaintiffs challenge. *See Milligan* Doc. 200 at 6–7; *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 3. District 2 (with a Black voting-age population of 39.93%) is, according to the State, “as close as you are going to get” to a second majority-Black district. Aug. 14 Tr. 164.

Based on (1) expert opinions offered by the *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs and (2) the Legislature's own performance analysis, the parties stipulated that in District 2 in the 2023 Plan, white-preferred candidates have “almost always defeated Black-preferred candidates.” *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 5; *see also Milligan* Docs. 200-2, 200-3; *Caster* Doc. 179-2.

Standing alone, this stipulation supports a finding that the new District 2 is not an opportunity district. Because voting is so intensely racially polarized in District 2, a Black-voting age population of 39.93% is insufficient to give Black voters a fair and reasonable opportunity to elect a representative of their choice: it will either never happen, or it will happen so very rarely that it cannot fairly be described as realistic, let alone reasonable.

The evidence fully supports the parties' stipulation. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Liu, examined the effectiveness of Districts 2 and 7 of the 2023 Plan in eleven biracial elections between 2014 and 2022. *Milligan* Doc.

200-2 at 1. Dr. Liu opined that in District 2, “[a]ll Black-preferred-candidates ... in the 11 biracial elections were defeated.” *Id.* at 2. Dr. Liu further opined that the District 2 races were not close: the average two-party vote share for the Black preferred candidates in District 2 was approximately 42%. *Id.* at 3; *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 7. Accordingly, Dr. Liu concluded that “voting is highly racially polarized in [Districts 2] and [7] in the [2023] Plan,” and the new District 2 “produces the same results for Black Preferred Candidates” that the 2021 Plan produced. *Milligan* Doc. 200-2 at 1.

The *Caster* Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Palmer, reached the same conclusion using a different analysis. Dr. Palmer analyzed the 2023 Plan using seventeen contested statewide elections between 2016 and 2022. *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 6; *Caster* Doc. 179-2. Dr. Palmer opined that “Black voters have a clear candidate of choice in each contest, and White voters are strongly opposed to this candidate.” *Caster* Doc. 179-2 ¶¶ 8, 11–12. Dr. Palmer further opined that “Black-preferred candidates are almost never able to win elections in” District 2 because “[t]he Black-preferred candidate was defeated in 16 of the 17 elections [he] analyzed.” *Id.* ¶¶ 8, 11–12, 18, 20; *accord Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 6. Dr. Palmer observed that Black preferred candidates regularly lost by a substantial margin: the two-party vote share for the Black preferred candidates in District 2 was 44.5%. *Caster* Doc. 179-2 ¶ 18; *see also Milligan* Doc. 213 ¶ 6. Accordingly, Dr. Palmer opined that the new District 2 does not allow Black voters to elect a candidate of their choice. *Caster* Doc. 179-2 ¶ 20.

*53 We credited both Dr. Liu and Dr. Palmer in the preliminary injunction proceedings, *see Milligan* Doc. 107 at 174–76, and we credit them now for the same reasons we credited them then. Both experts used the same methodology to develop their opinions for these remedial proceedings that they used to develop their opinions on liability. *See Milligan* Doc. 200-2 at 2; *Caster* Doc. 179-2 ¶ 9 & n.1. And the State has not suggested that we should discredit either expert, or that we should discount their opinions for any reason.

Indeed, the Legislature's analysis of the 2023 Plan materially matches Dr. Liu's and Dr. Palmer's. The Legislature analyzed the 2023 Plan in seven election contests. *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 9. The Legislature's analysis found that “[u]nder the 2023 Plan, the Black-preferred candidate in [District] 2 would have been elected in 0 out of the 7 contests analyzed.” *Id.* And it showed that the losses were by a substantial margin: “Under the 2023 Plan,” the Legislature's analysis found, “the

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average two-party vote-share for Black preferred candidates in [District] 2 is 46.6%.” *Id.*

All the performance analyses support the same conclusion: the 2023 Plan provides no greater opportunity for Black Alabamians to elect a candidate of their choice than the 2021 Plan provided. District 2 is the closest the 2023 Plan comes to a second Black-opportunity district, and District 2 is not a Black-opportunity district. Accordingly, the 2023 Plan perpetuates, rather than completely remedies, the likely Section Two violation found by this Court.

B. Alternatively: Even If the Plaintiffs Must Re-Establish Every Element of *Gingles* Anew, They Have Carried that Burden and Established that the 2023 Plan Likely Violates Section Two.

Even if we reset the *Gingles* analysis to ground zero, the result is the same because the Plaintiffs have established that the 2023 Plan likely violates Section Two. We discuss each step of the *Gingles* analysis in turn.

1. *Gingles* I - Numerosity

The numerosity part of *Gingles* I considers whether Black voters as a group are “sufficiently large ... to constitute a majority” in a second majority-Black congressional district in Alabama. *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 301, 137 S.Ct. 1455 (internal quotation marks omitted). This issue was undisputed during the preliminary injunction proceedings, *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 146, and the State offers no evidence to challenge our previous finding. Accordingly, we again find that Black voters, as a group, are “sufficiently large ... to constitute a majority” in a second majority-Black congressional district in Alabama. *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 301, 137 S.Ct. 1455 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. *Gingles* I - Compactness

We next consider whether the *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs have established that Black voters as a group are sufficiently geographically compact to constitute a majority in a second reasonably configured congressional district. We proceed in three steps: *first*, we explain our credibility determinations about the parties’ expert witnesses; *second*, we explain why the State’s premise that reasonable compactness necessarily requires the Plaintiffs’ proposed plans to “meet or beat” the

2023 Plan on all available compactness metrics is wrong; and *third*, we consider the parties’ arguments about geographic compactness on the State’s own terms.

a. Credibility Determinations

In the preliminary injunction, we found Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper “highly credible.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 148–52. The State has not adduced any evidence or made any argument during remedial proceedings to disturb those findings. We also found credible Dr. Bagley, who earlier testified about the Senate Factors and now opines about communities of interest. *Id.* at 185–87. Likewise, the State has not adduced any evidence or made any argument during remedial proceedings to disturb our original credibility determination about Dr. Bagley. Accordingly, we find credible each of Plaintiffs’ *Gingles* I experts.

*54 Although we “assign[ed] very little weight to Mr. Bryan’s testimony” in the preliminary injunction and explained at great length why we found it unreliable, *id.* at 152–56, the State again relies on Mr. Bryan as an expert on “race predominance,” this time through an unsworn report where he “assessed how county ‘splits differ by demographic characteristics when it comes to the division of counties’ in Plaintiffs’ alternative[]” plans. *See Milligan* Doc. 267 ¶ 156 (quoting *Milligan* Doc. 220-10 at 22). When we read the State’s defense of the 2023 Plan, it is as though our credibility determination never occurred: the State repeatedly cites Mr. Bryan’s opinions but makes no effort to rehabilitate his credibility. *See generally Milligan* Doc. 220.

Likewise, when we read Mr. Bryan’s 2023 report, it is as though our credibility determination never occurred. Mr. Bryan makes no attempt to rehabilitate his own credibility or engage any of the many reasons we assigned little weight to his testimony and found it unreliable. *See generally Milligan* Doc. 220-10. Mr. Bryan even cites this case as one of two cases in which he has testified, without mentioning that we did not credit his testimony. *See id.* at 4. The district court in the other case found “his methodology to be poorly supported” and that his “conclusions carried little, if any, probative value on the question of racial predominance.” *Robinson v. Ardoin*, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 824 (M.D. La. 2022).

When we read the State’s response to the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Mr. Bryan’s 2023 report as unreliable, it is again as though our credibility determination never occurred. The

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State does not acknowledge it or suggest that any of the problems we identified have been remedied (or at least not repeated). See generally *Milligan* Doc. 245.

Against this backdrop, it is especially remarkable that (1) the State did not call Mr. Bryan to testify live at the remedial hearing, and (2) Mr. Bryan's report is not sworn. See *Milligan* Doc. 220-10. “[C]ross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” *Kentucky v. Stincer*, 482 U.S. 730, 736, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, *Evidence* § 1367 at 29 (3d ed. 1940)). Cross-examination strikes us as especially important because this Court already has found this expert witness’ testimony incredible and unreliable. It strikes us as even more valuable when, as here, a witness has not reduced his opinions to sworn testimony.

Standing alone, these circumstances preclude us from assigning any weight to Mr. Bryan's 2023 opinion. But these circumstances don't stand alone: even if we were to evaluate Mr. Bryan's 2023 opinion without reference to our earlier credibility determination, we would not admit it or assign any weight to it.

As the Supreme Court made clear in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires this Court to “perform the critical ‘gatekeeping’ function concerning the admissibility” of expert evidence. *United States v. Frazier*, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (*en banc*) (quoting *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 589 n.7, 113 S.Ct. 2786). That gatekeeping function involves a “rigorous three-part inquiry” into whether:

- (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address;
- (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in *Daubert*; and
- (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Id. (quoting *City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc.*, 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). “The burden of establishing qualification, reliability, and helpfulness rests on the proponent of the expert opinion.” *Id.*

*55 The State has not met its burden on at least two of these three requirements. *First*, as explained above, this Court ruled that Mr. Bryan was not a credible witness in January 2021. *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 152. *Second*, Mr. Bryan's report is not reliable. For that, the Court “assess[es] ‘whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.’ ” *Frazier*, 387 F.3d at 1261–62 (quoting *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 592–93, 113 S.Ct. 2786). There are two parts to the methodology question: relevance and reliability. See *Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp.*, 184 F.3d 1300, 1310–12 (11th Cir. 1999). Under the relevance part, “the court must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is relevant to the task at hand, ... i.e., that it logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party's case.” *Id.* at 1312 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he evidence must have a valid scientific connection to the disputed facts in the case.” *Id.*

Under the reliability part, courts consider “four noninclusive factors,” namely “(1) whether the theory or technique can be tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether the technique has a high known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general acceptance within the scientific community.” *Id.* The “primary focus” should “be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate,” so “the proponent of the testimony does not have the burden of proving that it is scientifically correct, but that by a preponderance of the evidence, it is reliable.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained below, Mr. Bryan's report is neither relevant nor reliable.

Mr. Bryan's 2023 opinion is that “race predominated in the drawing of both the [Districts 2] and [7] in the [VRA Plan] and the Cooper Plans.” *Milligan* Doc. 220-10 ¶ 7. That opinion rests on what Mr. Bryan calls a “[g]eographic [s]plits [a]nalysis of [c]ounties.” *Id.* at 22. *First*, as to reliability, “nothing in either *Daubert* or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the *ipse dixit* of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”

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Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997).

The Plaintiffs attack Mr. Bryan's 2023 opinion as *ipse dixit*, and we agree. Mr. Bryan's report does not explain how his opinion about race predominance is connected to the geographic splits methodology that he used, or even why an evaluation of race predominance ordinarily might be based on geographic splits analysis. See *Milligan* Doc. 220-10 at 22–26. Mr. Bryan simply presents the results of his geographic splits analysis and then states in one sentence a cursory conclusion about race predominance. *Id.* The State's response does nothing to solve this problem. See *Milligan* Doc. 245 at 7–10.

Second, as to helpfulness, the Plaintiffs have not offered the VRA Plan as an illustrative plan for *Gingles* I, so we have no need for Mr. Bryan's opinion about that plan. The Plaintiffs did offer the Cooper plans, but we also have no need for his opinion about those: we presume the preliminary injunction would not have been affirmed if there were an open question whether race played an improper role in the preparation of all of them, given that the State squarely presented this argument to the Supreme Court. And even if we were to accept Mr. Bryan's opinion about the Cooper plans (which we don't), the State stakes no part of its defense of the 2023 Plan on arguments about that opinion: the State cites Mr. Bryan's opinion only once in the argument section of its brief, and that is to make an argument about the VRA Plan. *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 58. Accordingly, nothing in Mr. Bryan's report is helpful to this Court's decision whether the Plaintiffs have established that the 2023 Plan likely violates Section Two.

*56 Because we again do not credit Mr. Bryan and we find his 2023 opinion unreliable and unhelpful, we **GRANT IN PART** the Plaintiffs' motion *in limine* and **EXCLUDE** his opinion from our analysis. See *Fed. R. Evid. 702*; *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 589–92, 113 S.Ct. 2786. For those same reasons, even if we were to receive Mr. Bryan's opinion into evidence, we would assign it no weight.

We turn next to Mr. Trende's opinion. See *Milligan* Doc. 220-12. The State relies on Mr. Trende to “assess[] the 2023 Plan and each of Plaintiffs’ alternative plans based on the three compactness measures Dr. Duchin used in her earlier report.” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 57–58. Mr. Trende is a Senior Elections Analyst at Real Clear Politics, he is a doctoral candidate at Ohio State University, and he has a master's degree in applied statistics. *Milligan* Doc. 220-12 at 2–4.

The Plaintiffs do not contest Mr. Trende's qualifications to testify as an expert. And because he uses the same common statistical measures of compactness that Dr. Duchin used, the Plaintiffs do not contest the reliability of his methods. Accordingly, we admit Mr. Trende's report for the limited and alternative purpose of conducting a new *Gingles* analysis. We explain the weight we assign it in that analysis below.

b. The “Meet or Beat” Requirement

We now pause to correct a fundamental misunderstanding in the State's view of step one of the *Gingles* analysis. Our task is not, as the State repeatedly suggests, to compare the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans with the 2023 Plan to determine which plan would prevail in a “beauty contest.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1505 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). As the Supreme Court affirmed in this very case, “[t]he District Court ... did not have to conduct a beauty contest between plaintiffs’ maps and the State's.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted); see also *Vera*, 517 U.S. at 977, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (plurality opinion) (“A § 2 district that is *reasonably* compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries” is not required “to defeat rival compact districts designed by [the State] in endless ‘beauty contests.’ ” (emphasis in original)).

Nevertheless, the State frames the “focus” of these proceedings as “whether Plaintiffs can produce an alternative map that equals the 2023 Plan on the traditional principles that *Allen* reaffirmed were the basis of the § 2 analysis.” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 33. But neither *Allen* nor any other case law stands for that proposition. Our preliminary injunction order — affirmed by the Supreme Court — explained that “[c]ritically, our task is not to decide whether the majority-Black districts in the Duchin plans and Cooper plans are ‘better than’ or ‘preferable’ to a majority-Black district drawn a different way. Rather, the rule is that ‘[a] § 2 district that is **reasonably** compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles,’ need not also ‘defeat [a] rival compact district[]’ in a ‘beauty contest[].’ ” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 165 (emphasis in original) (quoting *Vera*, 517 U.S. at 977–78, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (plurality opinion)).

Instead of the “meet-or-beat” requirement the State propounds, the essential question under *Gingles* I is and has always been whether the minority group is “sufficiently

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large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in some reasonably configured legislative district.” *Cooper*, 581 U.S. at 301, 137 S.Ct. 1455 (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard does not require that an illustrative plan outperform the 2023 Plan by a prescribed distance on a prescribed number of prescribed metrics. An illustrative plan may be reasonably configured even if it does not outperform the 2023 Plan on every (or any particular) metric. The standard does not require the Plaintiffs to offer the *best* map; it requires them to offer a reasonable one. Indeed, requiring a plaintiff to meet or beat an enacted plan on every redistricting principle a State selects would allow the State to immunize from challenge a racially discriminatory redistricting plan simply by claiming that it best satisfied a particular principle the State defined as non-negotiable.

*57 Accordingly, that the 2023 Plan preserves communities of interest differently from the Plaintiffs’ illustrative maps, or splits counties differently from the illustrative maps, does not automatically make the illustrative maps unreasonable. As Mr. Cooper testified, different maps will necessarily prioritize traditional districting criteria in different ways. This is why the maps offered by a Section Two plaintiff are only ever *illustrative*; states are free to prioritize the districting criteria as they wish when they enact a remedial map, so long as they satisfy Section Two. The State has essentially conceded that it failed to do so here, maintaining that it can skirt Section Two by excelling at whatever traditional districting criteria the Legislature deems most pertinent in a redistricting cycle.

The bottom line is that the Plaintiffs’ illustrative maps can still be “reasonably configured” even if they do not outperform the 2023 Plan on every (or any particular) metric. The premise that forms the backbone of the State’s defense of the 2023 Plan therefore fails.

More fundamentally, even if we were to find that the 2023 Plan respects communities of interest better or is more compact than the 2021 Plan — that the 2023 Plan “beats” the 2021 Plan — that would not cure the likely violation we found because the violation was not that the 2021 Plan did not respect communities of interest, or that it was not compact enough. We found that the 2021 Plan likely diluted Black votes. The State cannot avoid the mandate of Section Two by improving its map on metrics **other than compliance with Section Two**. Otherwise, it could forever escape remediating a Section Two violation by making each remedial map slightly more compact, or slightly better for communities of interest, than the predecessor map. That is not the law: a Section Two

remedy must be tailored to the specific finding of Section Two liability.

In any event, we do not find that the 2023 Plan respects communities of interest or county lines better than the Plaintiffs’ illustrative maps. *See infra* at Part IV.B.2.d.

c. Geographic Compactness Scores

We next turn, as we did in the preliminary injunction, to the question whether the compactness scores for the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans indicate that the majority-Black congressional districts in those plans are reasonably compact. In the preliminary injunction, we based our reasonableness finding about the scores on (1) the testimony of “eminently qualified experts in redistricting,” and (2) “the relative compactness of the districts in the [illustrative] plans compared to that of the districts in the [2021] Plan.” *See Milligan Doc. 107 at 157*.

The enactment of the 2023 Plan has not changed any aspect of Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper’s testimony that the compactness scores of the districts in their plans are reasonable. *See id.* (citing such testimony at Tr. 446, 471, 492–493, 590, 594). Because that testimony was not relative — it opined about the Duchin plans and Cooper plans standing alone, not compared to any other plan — the enactment of a new plan did not affect it.

Neither does Dr. Trende’s opinion affect the testimony of Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper about reasonableness. When we originally analyzed that testimony, we concluded that because Mr. Bryan “offered no opinion on what is reasonable and what is not reasonable in terms of compactness,” “the corollary of our decision to credit Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper is a finding that the Black population in the majority-Black districts in the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans is reasonably compact.” *Id.* at 157–58 (internal quotation marks omitted). Like Mr. Bryan then, Mr. Trende now offers no opinion on what is reasonable or what is not reasonable in terms of compactness. *See Milligan Doc. 220-12 at 6–11* (“Analysis of Maps”). Accordingly, the State still has adduced no evidence to question, let alone disprove, the Plaintiffs’ evidence that the Black population in the majority-Black districts in the illustrative plans is reasonably compact.

*58 When we examine the relative compactness of the districts in the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans compared

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to that of the districts in the 2023 Plan, the result remains the same. Mr. Trende acknowledges that on an average Polsby-Popper metric, Duchin plan 2 is “marginally more compact” than the 2023 Plan, and that on a cut edges metric, Duchin plan 2 outperforms the 2023 Plan. *Id.* at 10. (Nevertheless, Mr. Trende opines that the 2023 Plan outperforms all illustrative plans when all three metrics are taken in account. *Id.*) And Mr. Trende does not opine that any of the Duchin plans or Cooper plans that received lower statistical scores received unreasonably lower scores or unreasonable scores. *See id.* at 8–10.

“[A]s far as compactness scores go, all the indicators [again] point in the same direction. Regardless how we study this question, the answer is the same each time. We find that based on statistical scores of geographic compactness, each set of Section Two plaintiffs has submitted remedial plans that strongly suggest that Black voters in Alabama are sufficiently numerous and reasonably compact to comprise a second majority-Black congressional district.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 159.

d. Reasonable Compactness and Traditional Redistricting Principles

As we said in the preliminary injunction, “[c]ompactness is about more than geography.” *Id.* If it is not possible to draw an additional opportunity district that is reasonably configured, Section Two does not require such a district. In the preliminary injunction, we began our analysis on this issue with two visual assessments: one of the Black population in Alabama, and one of the majority-Black districts in the Duchin and Cooper plans. *See id.* at 160–62.

Our first visual assessment led us to conclude that “[j]ust by looking at the population map [of the Black population in Alabama], we can see why Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper expected that they could easily draw two reasonably configured majority-Black districts.” *Id.* at 161. The State suggests no reason why we should reconsider that finding now. And the enactment of the 2023 Plan does not change the map we visually assessed, or the conclusion that we drew from it.

Our second visual assessment led us to conclude that we “d[id] not see tentacles, appendages, bizarre shapes, or any other obvious irregularities [in the Duchin or Cooper plans] that would make it difficult to find that any District 2 could be

considered reasonably compact.” *Id.* at 162. The enactment of the 2023 Plan does not change the maps that we visually assessed, nor the conclusion that we drew from them.

In the preliminary injunction, “we next turn[ed] to the question whether the Duchin plans and the Cooper plans reflect reasonable compactness when our inquiry takes into account, as it must, ‘traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries.’” *Id.* (quoting *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 433, 126 S.Ct. 2594). We follow the same analytic path now.

This step of the analysis is at the heart of the State's assertion that the 2023 Plan moved the needle on *Gingles* I. The State argues that “the lesson from *Allen* is that Section 2 requires Alabama to avoid discriminatory effects in how it treats communities of interest, even if that means sacrificing core retention,” and that neither we nor the Supreme Court have “ever said that [Section Two] requires the State to subordinate ‘nonracial communities of interest’ in the Gulf and Wiregrass to Plaintiffs’ racial goals.” *Milligan* Doc. 267 ¶¶ 215–16 (quoting *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 433, 126 S.Ct. 2594). The State contends that the Plaintiffs cannot “show that there is a reasonably configured alternative remedy that would also maintain communities of interest in the Black Belt, Gulf, and Wiregrass, on par with the 2023 Plan.” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).

*59 At its core, the State's position is that no Duchin plan or Cooper plan can “meet or beat” the 2023 Plan with respect to these three communities of interest and county splits. The State leans heavily on additional evidence about these communities of interest, the rule that Section Two “never require[s] adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles,” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1510 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the legislative findings that accompany the 2023 Plan.

The State contends that “this is no longer a case in which there would be a split community of interest” in both the Plaintiffs’ plans and the enacted plan, because in the 2023 Plan, the “Black Belt, Gulf, and Wiregrass communities are maintained to the maximum extent possible.” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). The State asserts that the 2023 Plan “rectifies what Plaintiffs said was wrong with the 2021 Plan” because it “puts all 18 counties that make up the Black Belt entirely within Districts 2 and 7” and keeps Montgomery whole in District 2. *Id.* at 42–43.

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For their part, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs say that the 2023 Plan changed nothing. They attack the legislative findings about traditional districting principles — more particularly, the legislative findings about communities of interest, county splits, and protection of incumbents — as perpetuating the vote dilution we found because these findings were “tailored to disqualify” the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans. *Milligan* Doc. 200 at 20. The *Milligan* Plaintiffs accuse the State of “ignor[ing] that the Supreme Court recognized” that the Duchin plans and Cooper plans “comported with traditional districting criteria, even though they split Mobile and Baldwin counties”; they say that the record continues to support that conclusion; and they cite a declaration from the first Black Mayor of Mobile and a supplemental report prepared by Dr. Bagley. *Id.* at 21–22 (internal quotation marks omitted). The *Milligan* Plaintiffs assert that the 2023 Plan keeps together only the Gulf Coast while perpetuating vote dilution in the Black Belt and splitting the Wiregrass between Districts 1 and 2. *Id.* at 22–23.

Before we explain our findings and conclusions on these issues, we repeat the foundational observations that we made in the preliminary injunction: (1) these issues were “fervently disputed,” (2) the State continues to insist that “there is no legitimate reason to separate Mobile County and Baldwin County,” (3) our task is not to decide whether the majority-Black districts in the Duchin plans and Cooper plans are “better than” any other possible majority-Black district, and (4) “we are careful to avoid the beauty contest that a great deal of testimony and argument seemed designed to try to win.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 164–65.

i. Communities of Interest

As we previously found and the Supreme Court affirmed, the Black Belt “stands out to us as quite clearly a community of interest of substantial significance,” but the State “overstate[s] the point” about the Gulf Coast. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 165–71; accord *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1505. The evidence about the Gulf Coast is now more substantial than it was before, but it is still considerably weaker than the record on the Black Belt, which rests on extensive stipulated facts and includes extensive expert testimony, and which spanned a range of demographic, cultural, historical, and political issues. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 165–67.

*60 As the Supreme Court recognized, in the preliminary injunction we found that, “[n]amed for its fertile soil, the Black Belt contains a high proportion of black voters, who share a rural geography, concentrated poverty, unequal access to government services, ... lack of adequate healthcare, and a lineal connection to the many enslaved people brought there to work in the antebellum period.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1505 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We now have the additional benefit of Dr. Bagley's testimony about the Black Belt, Gulf Coast, and Wiregrass. *See Milligan* Doc. 200-15. We credit his testimony and find his opinions helpful, particularly (1) his opinion further describing the shared experience of Black Alabamians in the Black Belt; and (2) his opinion that “treating Mobile and Baldwin Counties as an inviolable” community of interest is “ahistorical” in light of the connections between Mobile and the Black Belt. *See id.* at 1.

Dr. Bagley's testimony further describes the shared experiences of Alabamians in the Black Belt, which are “not only related to the fertility of the soil and the current poverty” there, but “are also characterized by” many shared racial experiences, including “Indian Removal, chattel slavery, cotton production, Reconstruction and Redemption, sharecropping, convict leasing, white supremacy, lynching, disenfranchisement, the birth of Historically Black Colleges and Universities ..., struggles for civil and voting rights, Black political and economic organization, backlash in the form of violence and economic reprisal, repressive forms of taxation, [and] white flight,” to name a few. *Id.* at 2.

Dr. Bagley opines that “many of these characteristics” also apply to “metropolitan Mobile,” which Dr. Bagley describes as “Black Mobile.” *Id.* at 2–3. Dr. Bagley explains that the Port of Mobile (a cornerstone of the State's arguments about the Gulf Coast community of interest) “historically saw the importation and exportation of human chattel, up to the illegal importation of enslaved individuals by the crew of the *Clotilda* in 1860,” as well as “the export of the cotton grown by the enslaved people in the Black Belt.” *Id.* at 2. And Dr. Bagley explains that Black Alabamians living in modern Mobile share experiences of “concentrated poverty” and a “lack of access to healthcare” with Alabamians in the Black Belt, such that Black Alabamians in Mobile have more in common with people in the Black Belt than they do with people in whiter Baldwin County. *Id.* at 3–4.

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Further, Dr. Bagley opines that treating Mobile and Baldwin Counties as an inseparable community of interest is “ahistorical.” *Id.* at 1, 4–7. His testimony is that the State overstates the evidence of “alleged connections” between Mobile and Baldwin Counties and fails to acknowledge the reality that “Black Mobile is geographically compact and impacted by poverty relative to Baldwin County, which is, by contrast, affluent and white.” *Id.* at 4.

The State does little to diminish Dr. Bagley's testimony. *See Milligan* Doc. 220 at 44–49. *First*, the State disputes only a few of the many details he discusses, none of which undermines his substantive point. *See id.* *Second*, without engaging Dr. Bagley's testimony about the connections between the Black Belt and Mobile, or his testimony that treating the Gulf Coast as “inviolable” is “ahistorical,” the State reiterates its previous argument that the Gulf Coast is “indisputably” a community of interest that Plaintiffs would split along racial lines. *Id.* at 39–40. *Third*, without engaging Dr. Bagley's point about the shared racial experiences of Alabamians living in the Black Belt (or the stipulated facts), the State asserts that the 2023 Plan successfully unites the Black Belt as a “nonracial community of interest.” *Id.* at 38. And *fourth*, the State urges us to assign Dr. Bagley's opinion little weight because a “paid expert cannot supersede legislative findings, especially where, as here, the expert's opinions are based on a selective retelling of facts.” *Id.* at 48–49. We discuss each argument in turn.

*61 *First*, the State's effort to refute specific details of Dr. Bagley's testimony about the Black Belt is unpersuasive. Dr. Bagley's report is well-supported and factually dense. *See Milligan* Doc. 200-15. Even if we accept *arguendo* the State's isolated factual attacks, *see Milligan* Doc. 220 at 44–49, neither the basis for nor the force of the report is materially diminished.

Second, the State continues to insist that the Gulf Coast is “indisputably” a community of interest that cannot be separated, especially “along racial lines,” but the record does not bear this out, particularly in the light of the State's failure to acknowledge, let alone rebut, much of Dr. Bagley's testimony. The State says nothing about Dr. Bagley's testimony that treating Mobile and Baldwin Counties as inseparable is ahistorical because those Counties were in separate congressional districts for almost all the period between 1876 and the 1970s. *Milligan* Doc. 200-15 at 7. The State ignores his testimony that Black Alabamians living in poverty in Mobile don't have very much in common with

white, affluent Alabamians living in Baldwin County. The State ignores his testimony that those Black Alabamians have more in common (both historically and to the present day) with Black Alabamians living in the Black Belt. Put simply, even if we accept all the new evidence about the Gulf Coast, it fails to establish that the Gulf Coast cannot be separated under any circumstance, let alone to avoid or remedy vote dilution.

Third, Dr. Bagley's report further disproves what the parties' fact stipulations already had precluded: the State's assertion that the Black Belt is merely one of three “nonracial” communities of interest that the 2023 Plan keeps together as much as possible. *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 38. The Plaintiffs have supported their claims with arguments and evidence about the cracking of Black voting strength in the Black Belt. *See, e.g., Milligan* Doc. 69 at 19, 29–30; *Caster* Doc. 56 at 7, 9–10. Extensive stipulations of fact and extensive expert testimony have described a wide range of demographic, cultural, historical, and political characteristics of the Black Belt, many of which relate to race. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 165–67.

On remedy, the Plaintiffs argue that the new District 2 perpetuates rather than remedies the dilution we found in the Black Belt. *Milligan* Doc. 200 at 19. And Dr. Bagley's testimony is that many of the shared experiences of Alabamians living in the Black Belt are steeped in race. *Milligan* Doc. 200-15 at 1–4. The State's failure to rebut Dr. Bagley's testimony undermines its insistence that the Black Belt is no longer at the heart of this case and is merely one of three nonracial communities of interest maintained in the 2023 Plan.

We already faulted the State once for pressing an overly simplistic view of the Black Belt. In the preliminary injunction, we relied on the substantial body of evidence about the Black Belt (much of it undisputed) to reject the State's assertion that the Plaintiffs' “attempt to unite much of the Black Belt as a community of interest in a remedial District 2 is ‘merely a blunt proxy for skin color.’” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 168 (quoting *Milligan* Doc. 78 at 86). As we explained, “[t]he Black Belt is overwhelmingly Black, but it blinks reality to say that it is a ‘blunt proxy’ for race – on the record before us, the reasons why it is a community of interest have many, many more dimensions than skin color.” *Id.* at 169. The State's assertion that the Black Belt is a “nonracial” community of interest now swings the pendulum to the opposite, equally inaccurate, end of the spectrum.

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*62 *Fourth*, the State argues that as between Dr. Bagley's testimony about communities of interest and the legislative findings about communities of interest, we are required by law to defer to the legislative findings. *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 48–49. But the State ignores the Plaintiffs' argument that no deference is owed to a legislature's redistricting policies that perpetuate rather than remedy vote dilution. *Compare Milligan* Doc. 200 at 20 (*Milligan* Plaintiffs' objection to deference, citing discussions of core retention in *Allen* and incumbency protection and partisan political goals in *LULAC*), with *Milligan* Doc. 220 (State's filing, making no response).

We regard it as beyond question that if we conclude that the 2023 Plan perpetuates vote dilution, we may not defer to the legislative findings in that Plan. Ordinarily, that rule would not matter for our present task: because the point of a *Gingles* I analysis is to determine whether a challenged plan dilutes votes, we would not refuse deference to legislative findings for *Gingles* I purposes on the ground that the findings perpetuate vote dilution. It would be circular reasoning for us to assume the truth of our conclusion as a premise of our analysis.

This is not the ordinary case: we found that the Plaintiffs established that the 2021 Plan likely violated Section Two by diluting Black votes, and the State has conceded that District 2 in the 2023 Plan is not a Black-opportunity district. In this circumstance, we discern no basis in federal law for us to defer to the legislative findings.

The *Milligan* Plaintiffs impugn the findings on numerous other grounds — namely, that they were “after the fact ‘findings’ tailored to disqualify” the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans; “contradict” the guidelines; “were never the subject of debate or public scrutiny”; “ignored input from Black Alabamians and legislators”; and “simply parroted attorney arguments already rejected by this Court and the Supreme Court.” *Milligan* Doc. 200 at 20. And the *Milligan* Plaintiffs urge us to reject the findings’ attempt to “enshrine as ‘non-negotiable’ certain supposed ‘traditional redistricting principles’ ” about communities of interest and county splits. *Id.* Ultimately, the *Milligan* Plaintiffs suggest that the legislative findings are not what they purport to be: the result of the deliberative legislative process. The testimony and evidence were that the findings were drafted by the Alabama Solicitor General, were adopted without review or debate by the Legislature or even really knowing why they were placed there, and included only at counsel's instigation.

We have reviewed the legislative findings carefully and make three observations about them for present purposes. *First*, although the northern half of Alabama is home to numerous universities, a substantial military installation, various engines of economic growth, and two significant metropolitan areas (Huntsville and Birmingham), the legislative findings identify no communities of interest in that half of the state. *See* App. A. *Second*, the legislative findings, unlike the guidelines, give no indication that the Legislature considered whether the 2023 Plan dilutes minority voting strength. The guidelines set that as a priority consideration, but the legislative findings do not mention it and set other items as “non-negotiable” priorities (*i.e.*, keeping together communities of interest and not pairing incumbents).²¹ The only reason why the 2023 Plan exists is because we enjoined the 2021 Plan on the ground that it likely diluted minority voting strength. And *third*, there is a substantial difference between the definition of “community of interest” in the legislative findings and that definition in the guidelines: the legislative findings stripped race out of the list of “similarities” that are included in the guidelines definition. *Compare* App. A at 4, with App. B. In a case involving extensive expert testimony about a racial minority's shared experience of a long and sordid history of race discrimination, this deletion caught our eye. We further observe that the legislative findings explicitly invoke the “French and Spanish colonial heritage” of the Gulf Coast region while remaining silent on the heritage of the Black Belt. App. A at 6.

*63 In any event, we do not decline to defer to the legislative findings on the grounds the *Milligan* Plaintiffs suggest. We decline to defer to them because the State (1) concedes that District 2 in the 2023 Plan is not an opportunity district, and (2) fails to respond to the Plaintiffs’ (valid) point that we cannot readily defer to the legislative findings if we find that they perpetuate vote dilution.

Ultimately, we find that the new evidence about the Gulf Coast does not establish that the Gulf Coast is the community of interest of primary importance, nor that the Gulf Coast is more important than the Black Belt, nor that there can be no legitimate reason to separate Mobile and Baldwin Counties.

And we repeat our earlier finding that the Legislature has repeatedly split Mobile and Baldwin Counties in creating maps for the State Board of Education districts in Alabama, and the Legislature did so at the same time it drew the 2021

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Plan. *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 171 (citing *Caster* Doc. 48 ¶¶ 32–41).

We further find that the new evidence about the Gulf Coast does not establish that separating the Gulf Coast to avoid diluting Black votes in the Black Belt violates traditional districting principles. At most, while the State has developed evidence that better substantiates its argument that the Gulf Coast is or could be a community of interest, the State has not adduced evidence that the Gulf Coast is an inseparable one.

We specifically reject the State's argument that the 2023 Plan “rectifies what Plaintiffs said was wrong with the 2021 Plan” by “unifying the Black Belt while also respecting the Gulf and Wiregrass communities of interest.” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 27, 42; *accord* Aug. 14 Tr. 39 (arguing that the 2023 Plan “cures the cracking” of the Black Belt); July 31, 2023 Tr. 32 (arguing that “now there are three communities of interest that are at issue,” the State “cracked none of them,” and the Plaintiffs “cracked two of them”). On this reasoning, the State says that “there is no longer any need to split the Gulf” to respect the Black Belt, because the 2023 Plan keeps the Gulf Coast together and splits the Black Belt into only two districts. *Milligan* Doc. 267 at ¶ 225.

The problem with this argument is the faulty premise that splitting the Black Belt into only two districts remedies the cracking problem found in the 2021 Plan. “Cracking” does not mean “divided,” and the finding of vote dilution in the 2021 Plan rested on a thorough analysis, not the bare fact that the 2021 Plan divided the Black Belt into three districts. *See, e.g., Milligan* Doc. 107 at 55, 147–74. As the Supreme Court has explained, “cracking” refers to “the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters.” *Bartlett*, 556 U.S. at 14, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (plurality opinion) (quoting *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 46 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 2752).

The Plaintiffs have established — and the State concedes — that in the new District 2, Black voters remain an ineffective minority of voters. *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶¶ 5–9. This evidence — and concession — undermines the State's assertion that the 2023 Plan remedies the cracking of Black voting strength in the Black Belt simply by splitting the Black Belt into fewer districts. In turn, it explains the reason why there remains a need to split the Gulf Coast: splitting the Black Belt as the 2023 Plan does dilutes Black voting strength, while splitting the Gulf Coast precipitates no such racially discriminatory harm.

*64 The long and the short of it is that the new evidence the State has offered on the Gulf Coast at most may show that the Black Belt and the Gulf Coast are geographically overlapping communities of interest that tend to pull in different directions. These communities of interest are not airtight. At best, the Defendants have established that there are two relevant communities of interest and the Plaintiffs’ illustrative maps and the 2023 Plan each preserve a different community, suggesting a wash when measured against this metric. In other words, “[t]here would be a split community of interest in both.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1505. Thus, positing that there are two communities of interest does not undermine in any way the determination we already made that the eleven illustrative maps presented in the preliminary injunction are reasonably configured and are altogether consonant with traditional redistricting criteria.

In our view, the evidence about the community of interest in the Wiregrass is sparse in comparison to the extensive evidence about the Black Belt and the somewhat new evidence about the Gulf Coast. The basis for a community of interest in the Wiregrass — essentially in the southeastern corner of the State — is rural geography, a university (Troy), and a military installation (Fort Novosel). These few commonalities do not remotely approach the hundreds of years of shared and very similar demographic, cultural, historical, and political experiences of Alabamians living in the Black Belt. And they are considerably weaker than the common coastal influence and historical traditions for Alabamians living in the Gulf Coast. Not to mention that these commonalities could apply to other regions in Alabama that the State fails to mention as possible communities of interest.

Further, there is substantial overlap between the Black Belt and the Wiregrass. Three of the nine Wiregrass Counties (Barbour, Crenshaw, and Pike) are also in the Black Belt. Accordingly, any districting plan must make tradeoffs with these communities to meet equal population and contiguity requirements.

Finally, a careful review of the testimony about the Wiregrass reveals that the State makes the same error with its Wiregrass argument that we (and the Supreme Court) previously identified in its Gulf Coast argument. To support its assertions about the community of interest in the Wiregrass, the State relies on three witnesses: a former Mayor of Dothan, a past Chairman of the Dothan Area Chamber of Commerce, and a commercial banker in Dothan. *See Milligan* Doc.

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261-2 (Kimbrow deposition); *Milligan* Doc. 220-18 (Kimbrow declaration); *Milligan* Doc. 261-6 (Schmitz deposition); *Milligan* Doc. 220-17 (Schmitz declaration); *Milligan* Doc. 261-7 (Williams deposition); *Milligan* Doc. 227-1 (Williams declaration). Much of their testimony focuses on the loss of political influence and efficacy that may occur if the Wiregrass region is not mostly kept together in a single congressional district. See *Milligan* Docs. 220-17 ¶¶ 3–5, 7, 9 (Schmitz Declaration); 220-18 ¶¶ 5–9 (Kimbrow Declaration); 224-1 ¶¶ 11–13 (Williams Declaration). But as we earlier found with respect to the Gulf Coast, testimony about keeping a community of interest together “simply to preserve political advantage” cannot support an argument that the community is inseparable. See *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1505 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). Accordingly, we assign very little weight to the argument and evidence about a community of interest in the Wiregrass.

We do not reject only the State's **factual** argument — that the Plaintiffs' illustrative plans are not reasonably compact because they violate traditional redistricting principles related to communities of interest. More broadly, we also reject the State's legal argument that communities of interest somehow are a dispositive factor in our analysis such that we must accept a remedial map that purports to respect communities of interest, but does not cure the vote dilution we found in the 2021 Plan.

*65 Throughout remedial proceedings, the State has used arguments about communities of interest as the foundation of its defense of the 2023 Plan. The State starts with the premise that “[t]here are many ways for a plan to comply with” Section Two, *Milligan* Doc. 267 ¶ 179, see also Aug. 14 Tr. 46; cites the rule that Section Two “never require[s] adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles,” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 8, 10, 14, 34, 39, 60 (internal quotation marks omitted); says that the Legislature knows Alabama's communities of interest better than federal courts, Aug. 14 Tr. 163; and extrapolates from these truths that any illustrative plan that splits an area the State defines as a community of interest does not satisfy *Gingles* because it “violates” communities of interest, *Milligan* Doc. 267 ¶¶ 158, 208; see also *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 40, 59. The State's position is that if it can prove that the 2023 Plan serves communities of interest better than the Plaintiffs' illustrative plans, the 2023 Plan survives a Section Two challenge on that ground regardless of whether it includes one or two Black-opportunity districts.

Indeed, on the State's reasoning, because the 2023 Plan better serves communities of interest than do the Plaintiffs' illustrative plans, an order requiring an additional Black-opportunity district to cure vote dilution is unlawful. Aug. 14 Tr. 157. The State maintains that this is true even if we find (as we do) that the 2023 Plan perpetuates rather than remedies the vote dilution that we and the Supreme Court found in the 2021 Plan. Aug. 14 Tr. 157–60. Put differently, the State asserts that communities of interest are the ultimate trump card: because the 2023 Plan best serves communities of interest in southern Alabama, we must not enjoin it even if we find that it perpetuates vote dilution. See Aug. 14 Tr. 157–60.

We cannot reconcile the State's position with any of the authorities that control our analysis. We cannot reconcile it with the text or purpose of Section Two, nor with the Supreme Court's ruling in this case, nor with other controlling Supreme Court precedents. We discuss each authority in turn.

First, we cannot reconcile the State's position that communities of interest work as a trump card with the text or purpose of Section Two. As the Supreme Court explained in this case, the Voting Rights Act “‘create[d] stringent new remedies for voting discrimination,’ attempting to forever ‘banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting.’” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1499 (quoting *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966)). To that end, for more than forty years, Section Two has expressly provided that a violation is established based on the “totality of circumstances.” *Id.* at 1507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)). Subsection (b) of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act provides, in pertinent part:

A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

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52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).

Section Two does not mention, let alone elevate or emphasize, communities of interest as a particular circumstance. *See id.* If communities of interest really are (or even could be) **the** dispositive circumstance in a Section Two analysis (liability or remedy), the statute would not direct a reviewing court's attention to the totality of circumstances without saying a word about communities of interest.

Second, we cannot reconcile the State's position that communities of interest work as a trump card with the Supreme Court's ruling in this case. The Supreme Court “d[id] not find the State's argument persuasive” on communities of interest for two reasons: the evidence did not support the “overdrawn” assertion that “there can be no legitimate reason to split” the Gulf Coast, and even if the Gulf Coast is a community of interest, splitting it is not a fatal flaw in the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans because those plans better respect a different community of interest, the Black Belt. *See Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1505 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court then continued its analysis of the “totality of circumstances” and affirmed our preliminary injunction on the ground that the 2021 Plan likely violated Section Two. *Id.* at 1506.

*66 Nothing in the Court's ruling says, let alone suggests, that a remedial plan would cure vote dilution if only the evidence were better on the Gulf Coast and the Black Belt were not split quite so much. The Supreme Court specifically ruled that we “did not have to conduct a beauty contest between plaintiffs’ maps and the State's,” and the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of considering the “totality” of circumstances. *Id.* at 1505–07 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected the State's proposed “race-neutral benchmark” in part because that approach “suggest[ed] there is only one circumstance that matters,” and “[t]hat single-minded view of § 2 cannot be squared with the [statute's] demand that courts employ a more refined approach.” *Id.* at 1506–08 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted).

Third, we cannot reconcile the State's position with other Supreme Court precedents. Our research has produced no Section Two precedent that rises and falls on how well a plan respects any particular community of interest.

Further, as Section Two precedents have tested the idea that one circumstance is particularly important in the *Gingles*

analysis, the Supreme Court has time and again rejected the idea that any circumstance can be the circumstance that allows a plan to dilute votes. *See, e.g., id.* at 1505 (rejecting argument that core retention metric is dispositive and reasoning that Section Two “does not permit a State to provide some voters less opportunity ... to participate in the political process just because the State has done it before” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm'n*, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 1245, 1250, 212 L.Ed.2d 251 (2022) (per curiam) (faulting district court for “focus[ing] exclusively on proportionality” instead of “totality of circumstances analysis”); *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 440–41, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (rejecting argument that incumbency protection can justify exclusion of voters from a district when exclusion has racially discriminatory effects). Indeed, we have been unable to locate any case where the Supreme Court has prioritized one traditional districting criterion above all others.

For each and all these reasons, we reject the State's argument that because the 2023 Plan best serves communities of interest in southern Alabama, we cannot enjoin it even if we find that it perpetuates racially discriminatory vote dilution.

ii. County Splits

In the preliminary injunction, we found that the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans “reflect reasonable compactness” because they respected county lines. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 162–63. When it affirmed this finding, the Supreme Court observed that “some of plaintiffs’ proposed maps split the same number of county lines as (or even fewer county lines than) the State's map.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1504 (emphasis in original).

By way of reference: the only applicable guideline when the 2021 Plan was passed was that “the Legislature shall try to minimize the number of counties in each district”; the 2021 Plan split six counties; and no illustrative plan splits more than nine counties. *See Milligan* Doc. 107 at 32, 61, 88–89.

When the Legislature passed the 2023 Plan, it enacted a “finding” that “the congressional districting plan shall contain no more than six splits of county lines, which is the minimum necessary to achieve minimal population deviation among the districts. Two splits within one county is considered two splits of county lines.” App. A at 3. Like the 2021 Plan, the 2023 Plan splits six counties.

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The State now argues that because of the Legislature's finding, we must discard any illustrative map that contains more than six county splits. *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 58–59. Based on the report of the State's expert, Mr. Trende, this ceiling would disqualify five of the Plaintiffs' illustrative maps: Cooper Plans 2 and 6, which split seven counties; Duchin Plan B, which splits seven counties; and Duchin Plans A and C, which split nine counties. *See Caster* Doc. 48 at 22; *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 58; *Milligan* Doc. 220-12 at 12. Most notably, this

Number of County Splits, by Map

Map	County Splits
Illustrative 7	5
Duchin 4	6
Illustrative 1	6
Illustrative 3	6
Illustrative 4	6
Illustrative 5	6
2021 Map	6
2023 Map	6
Duchin 2	7
Illustrative 2	7
Illustrative 6	7
Ps Remedial	7
Duchin 1	9
Duchin 3	9

*67 *Milligan* Doc. 220-12 at 12.

But the State would not have us look at the county splits metric alone. As we understand the State's argument about the legislative finding capping county splits at the stated minimum, the finding operates like the ace of spades: after ten of the eleven illustrative plans lose in a compactness beauty contest, the finding trumps the last illustrative plan left (Duchin Plan B). On the State's reasoning, the Plaintiffs have no plays left because the Legislature has decreed that the cap on county splits is “non-negotiable.” App. A at 3.

ceiling would disqualify Duchin Plan B, which is the only illustrative plan that the State concedes ties or beats the 2023 Plan on statistical measures of compactness (Polsby-Popper and Cut Edges). *See Milligan* Doc. 220 at 57–58. So when looking at the county splits metric alone, even on the State's analysis, six of the Plaintiffs' illustrative maps satisfy the ceiling the Legislature imposed: Cooper Plans 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7, and Duchin Plan D. Mr. Trende's chart shows this clearly:

But we already have refused to conduct the compactness beauty contest, so the legislative finding cannot work that way. If it guides our analysis, it must function differently. For all the same reasons we refused to conduct a compactness beauty contest, this legislative finding cannot demand that we conduct a county-split beauty contest. *See supra* at Part IV.B.2.b.

Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, we measure all the illustrative maps against the legislative finding. As explained

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above, if we limit our analysis to the illustrative plans that comply with the finding, we consider six plans: Duchin Plan D and Cooper Plans 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7. *See Milligan* Doc. 220-12 at 12.

We first discuss Cooper Plan 7, because it is the only illustrative plan that outperforms the 2023 Plan on county splits. (Duchin Plan D and Cooper Plans 1, 3, 4, and 5 tie the 2023 Plan. *See id.*) Even if we were to indulge the idea that the legislative finding capping county splits works as an ace, it could not trump Cooper Plan 7. The State attacks Cooper Plan 7 on the ground that it does not minimize population deviation. *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 58 n.13.

The State's argument about Cooper Plan 7 is an unwelcome surprise. We found in the preliminary injunction that all the illustrative maps “equalize population across districts.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 162–63. We based that finding on the agreement of the parties and the evidence. *See id.* (citing *Milligan* Doc. 68-5 at 8, 13; *Caster* Doc. 48 at 21–34; *Caster* Doc. 65 at 2–6; Tr. 930). And the Supreme Court affirmed that finding. *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1504 (finding that the Plaintiffs’ maps “contained equal populations, were contiguous, and respected existing political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, and towns”).

We returned to Cooper Plan 7 to confirm that it minimizes population deviation. *See Caster* Doc. 65 at 5 fig.2. The least populated congressional district in Cooper Plan 7 includes 717,752 people; the most populated congressional district in Cooper Plan 7 includes 717,755 people. *Id.* We summarily reject the State's cursory, unsupported suggestion in a footnote that a deviation of three humans (or 0.00000418%) precludes a finding that Cooper Plan 7 equalizes population across districts and disqualifies Cooper Plan 7 as a reasonably configured illustrative map under *Gingles* I.

Thus, even if we were to conduct the “meet or beat” beauty contest that the State asks us to, the undisputed evidence shows that the Plaintiffs have submitted at least one illustrative map that beats the 2023 Plan with respect to county splits. We also find that the Plaintiffs have submitted at least five illustrative maps (Duchin Plan D and Cooper Plans 1, 3, 4, and 5) that meet the 2023 Plan on this metric by splitting the same number of counties — six.

*68 Accordingly, we again find that the Plaintiffs have established that an additional Black-opportunity district can be reasonably configured without violating traditional districting principles relating to communities of interest and county splits. This finding does not run afoul of the Supreme Court's caution that Section Two never requires the adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles. It simply rejects as unsupported the State's assertion that the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans violate traditional redistricting principles relating to communities of interest and county splits.

3. *Gingles* II & III – Racially Polarized Voting

During the preliminary injunction proceedings, “there [wa]s no serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive nor that the challenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted); *accord Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1505.

At the remedial hearing, the State stipulated that *Gingles* II and III are again satisfied. Aug. 14 Tr. 64–65 (“We will have no problem stipulating for these proceedings solely that they have met II and III.”).

The evidence fully supports the State's stipulation: Dr. Liu opined “that voting is highly racially polarized in” District 2 and District 7 of the 2023 Plan “and that this racial polarization ... produces the same results for Black Preferred Candidates in both [Districts 2] and [7] as the results in the 2021” Plan. *Milligan* Doc. 200-2 at 1. Dr. Palmer's opinion is materially identical. *Caster* Doc. 179-2 ¶¶ 11–14, 16–20.

4. The Senate Factors

During the preliminary injunction proceedings, we found that Senate Factors 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 weighed in favor of the Plaintiffs. *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 178–92. We adopt those findings here. We made no finding about Senate Factors 8 and 9. *Id.* at 192–93.

During the remedial hearing, the State conceded that it has put forth no new evidence about the Senate Factors and the Plaintiffs have “met their burden” on the Factors for purposes of remedial proceedings. Aug. 14 Tr. 65.

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The *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs now urge us, if we reset the *Gingles* analysis, to consider evidence adduced since we issued the preliminary injunction that bears on Factors 8 and 9. Aug. 14 Tr. 147–48. The State concedes that the evidence relevant to an analysis of these Factors is “exceedingly broad.” Aug. 15 Tr. 79. We consider each remaining Senate Factor in turn, and we limit our discussion to new evidence.

a. Senate Factor 8

Senate Factor 8: “[W]hether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. 2752.

Senate Factor 8 considers “the political responsiveness of” elected officials. *United States v. Marengo County Comm'n*, 731 F.2d 1546, 1573 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted). The Plaintiffs’ argument is that the political responsiveness of elected officials to this litigation — more particularly, to the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the preliminary injunction — weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs. Based on our review of undisputed evidence, we cannot help but find that the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the 2023 Plan reflect “a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs” of Black voters in Alabama. *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Our finding rests on three undisputed facts.

First, the process by which the Legislature considered potential remedies for the vote dilution that Black Alabamians experienced precludes a finding of responsiveness. The 2023 Plan was neither proposed nor available for comment during the two public hearings held by the Committee. *Milligan* Doc. 251 ¶ 15. Likewise, neither of the plans that originally passed the Alabama House (Representative Pringle’s plan, the Community of Interest Plan), and the Alabama Senate (Senator Livingston’s plan), was proposed or available for comment during the Committee’s public hearings. *See id.* ¶¶ 15–21.

*69 The 2023 Plan was passed by the Conference Committee on the last day of the Special Session. *Id.* ¶ 23. Representative Pringle did not see the bill that became the 2023 Plan, including its legislative findings and the State’s performance analysis showing that Black voters would consistently lose in the new District 2, until that morning. *See Milligan* Doc. 261-5 at 92, 97. He first saw those documents that morning, and the 2023 Plan was Alabama law

by that evening. As Representative Pringle testified, “[i]t all happened so fast.” *Id.* at 105.

The availability of the 2023 Plan is noteworthy not only because of its late timing, but also because of its apparently mysterious provenance: its original source and cartographer were unknown to one of the Committee chairs, Senator Livingston, when he voted on it. *See Milligan* Doc. 238-2 at 3. To this day, the record before us does not make clear who prepared the 2023 Plan.

Representative Pringle testified about his frustration that his plan did not carry the day, and his reason is important: he thought his plan was the better plan for compliance with Section Two (based in part on a performance analysis that he considered), his plan was initially expected to pass both the House and the Senate, and he either did not understand or did not agree with the reason why support for it unraveled in the Senate the day it passed the House. *See Milligan* Doc. 261-5 at 22–23, 31–32, 41–42, 69–70, 75–76, 80–81, 98–102.

Representative Pringle testified that he was not a part of the discussions that led his Senate colleagues to reject his plan because those occurred behind closed doors. *Id.* at 28, 101. Although Representative Pringle ultimately voted for the 2023 Plan, he testified (testily) that he told Senator Livingston that he did not want his name or an Alabama House bill number on it. *Id.* at 101–02. When asked why the Alabama Senate insisted on leaving District 2 at a 39.93% Black voting-age population in the 2023 Plan, Representative Pringle directed the question to Senator Livingston or the Alabama Solicitor General. *Id.* When asked specifically about a media comment from Representative Ledbetter (the Speaker of the Alabama House) that the 2023 Plan gives the State “a good shot” at getting “just one judge” on the Supreme Court “to see something different,” Representative Pringle testified that he was not “attempting to get a justice to see something differently,” but he did not “want to speak on behalf of 140” Legislators. *Id.* at 109–10.

For his part, Senator Livingston testified that his focus shifted from Representative Pringle’s plan to a new plan after other senators “received some additional information” which caused them to “go in [a different] direction” focused on “compactness, communities of interest, and making sure that” incumbents are not paired. *Milligan* Doc. 261–4 at 67–68. According to Senator Livingston, this “information” was a “large hiccup” — it was the reason why “the committee moved” and “changed focus” away from Representative

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Pringle's plan. *Id.* at 65–68. But Senator Livingston testified that he did not know what this “information” was, where it had come from, or even who received it. *Id.* Senator Livingston recalled that he first learned of the “information” in a “committee conversation,” but he did not recall who told him about it and had no “idea at all” of its source. *Id.* at 68.

Second, the unprecedented legislative findings that accompany the 2023 Plan preclude a finding of responsiveness. *See* App. A. This is for two reasons. As an initial matter, as we have already previewed, a careful side-by-side review of the legislative findings and the guidelines (which were the same in 2021 and 2023) reveal that the findings excluded the statement in the guidelines that “[a] redistricting plan shall have neither the purpose nor the effect of diluting minority voting strength.” *Compare* App. B at 1, *with* App. A at 2. Although the findings eliminated the requirement of nondilution, they prioritized as “non-negotiable” the principles that the 2023 Plan would “keep together communities of interest” and “not pair incumbent[s].” App. A at 3. Under this circumstance, we cannot find that the legislative findings support an inference that when the Legislature passed the 2023 Plan, it was trying to respond to the need that we identified for Black Alabamians not to have their voting strength diluted.

*70 Separately, the undisputed testimony of members of the Legislature counsels against an inference in favor of the State based on the findings. Representative Pringle and Senator Livingston both testified that the Alabama Solicitor General drafted the findings, and they did not know why the findings were included in the 2023 Plan. *Milligan* Doc. 261-4 at 102 (Senator Livingston); *Milligan* Doc. 261-5 at 91 (Representative Pringle); *Milligan* Doc. 238-2 at 6 (joint interrogatory responses). Representative Pringle testified that he had not seen another redistricting bill contain similar (or any) findings. *Milligan* Doc. 261-5 at 91. And of the three members of the Legislature who testified during remedial proceedings, none had a role in drafting the findings. *Milligan* Doc. 261-4 at 101–03 (Senator Livingston); *Milligan* Doc. 261-5 at 90–91 (Representative Pringle); Aug. 15 Tr. 58 (Senator Singleton). In the light of this testimony, which we reiterate is not disputed (or even questioned), we cannot conclude that the findings weigh in favor of the 2023 Plan.

If we had any lingering doubt about whether the 2023 Plan reflects an attempt to respond to the needs of Black Alabamians that have been established in this litigation, that doubt was eliminated at the remedial hearing when the State

explained that in its view, the Legislature could remedy the vote dilution we found without providing the remedy we said was required: an additional opportunity district. *See* Aug. 14 Tr. 163–64. For purposes of Factor 8, we are focused not on the tenuousness of the policy underlying that position, but on how clearly it illustrates the lack of political will to respond to the needs of Black voters in Alabama in the way that we ordered. We infer from the Legislature's decision not to create an additional opportunity district that the Legislature was unwilling to respond to the well-documented needs of Black Alabamians in that way.

Lest a straw man arise on appeal: we say clearly that in our analysis, we did not deprive the Legislature of the presumption of good faith. *See, e.g., Abbott*, 138 S. Ct. at 2324. We simply find that on the undisputed evidence, Factor 8, like the other Factors, weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs.

b. Senate Factor 9

Senate Factor 9: Whether the policy underlying the 2023 Plan “is tenuous.” *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. 2752.

We again make no finding about Senate Factor 9.

C. We Reject the State's Remaining Argument that Including an Additional Opportunity District in a Remedial Plan To Satisfy Section Two Is Unconstitutional Affirmative Action in Redistricting.

The State asserts that the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans “sacrifice communities of interest, compactness, and county splits to hit predetermined racial targets”; that if those “underperforming plans could be used to replace a 2023 Plan that more fully and fairly applies legitimate principles across the State, the result will be court-ordered enforcement of a map that violates the 2023 Plan's traditional redistricting principles in favor of race”; and that this would be “affirmative action in redistricting” that would be unconstitutional. *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 59–60; *see also id.* at 60–68.

As an initial matter, it is premature (and entirely unfounded) for the State to assail any plan we might order as a remedy as “violat[ing] the 2023 Plan's traditional redistricting principles in favor of race.” *Milligan* Doc. 220 at 59. Moreover, we have rejected based on the evidence before us every premise of the State's argument: that the Plaintiffs’ plans “sacrifice”

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traditional redistricting principles, that their illustrative plans are “underperforming,” and that the 2023 Plan “more fully and fairly applies legitimate principles across the State.” *See supra* Parts IV.A & IV.B. We also have rejected the faulty premise that by accepting the Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans for *Gingles* purposes, we improperly held that the Plaintiffs are entitled to “proportional ... racial representation in Congress.” *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).

*71 This mistaken premise explains why affirmative action cases, like the principal case on which the State relies, *Harvard*, 143 S. Ct. 2141, are fundamentally unlike this case. In the *Harvard* case, the Supreme Court held that Harvard and the University of North Carolina’s use of race in their admissions programs violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. *Id.* at 2175. Based on the record before it, the Supreme Court found that the admissions programs were impermissibly aimed at achieving “proportional representation” of minority students among the overall student-body population, and that the universities had “promis[ed] to terminate their use of race only when some rough percentage of various racial groups is admitted.” *Id.* at 2172. Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the admissions programs lacked any “logical end point” because they “‘effectively assure that race will always be relevant and that the ultimate goal of eliminating’ race as a criterion ‘will never be achieved.’” *Id.* (quoting *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469, 495, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989)).

In contrast, the Voting Rights Act and the *Gingles* analysis developed to guide application of the statute “do[] not mandate a proportional number of majority-minority districts.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1518 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Section Two expressly disclaims any “right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). And “properly applied, the *Gingles* framework itself imposes meaningful constraints on proportionality, as [Supreme Court] decisions have frequently demonstrated.” *Id.* at 1508 (majority opinion). So unlike affirmative action in the admissions programs the Supreme Court analyzed in *Harvard*, which was expressly aimed at achieving balanced racial *outcomes* in the makeup of the universities’ student bodies, the Voting Rights Act guarantees only “equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever race.” *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1014 n.11, 114 S.Ct. 2647. The Voting Rights Act does not provide a leg up for Black voters — it merely prevents them

from being kept down with regard to what is arguably the most “fundamental political right,” in that it is “preservative of all rights” — the right to vote. *See Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee*, 915 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2019).

But a faulty premise and prematurity are not the only problems with the State’s argument: it would fly in the face of forty years of Supreme Court precedent — including precedent *in this case* — for us to hold that it is unconstitutional to order a remedial districting plan to include an additional minority-opportunity district to satisfy Section Two. In the Supreme Court, the State argued that the Fifteenth Amendment “does not authorize race-based redistricting as a remedy for § 2 violations.” *Allen*, 143 S. Ct. at 1516. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in two sentences: “But for the last four decades, this Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied the effects test of § 2 as interpreted in *Gingles* and, under certain circumstances, have authorized race-based redistricting as a remedy for state districting maps that violate § 2. In light of that precedent ... we are not persuaded by Alabama’s arguments that § 2 as interpreted in *Gingles* exceeds the remedial authority of Congress.” *Id.* at 1516–17 (internal citations omitted).

D. The Record Establishes the Elements of Preliminary Injunctive Relief

We find that the Plaintiffs have established the elements of their request for preliminary injunctive relief. We discuss each element in turn.

For the reasons we have discussed, *see supra* Parts IV.A & IV.B, we find that the Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that (1) the 2023 Plan does not completely remedy the likely Section Two violation that we found and the Supreme Court affirmed in the 2021 Plan; and (2) the 2023 Plan likely violates Section Two as well because it continues to dilute the votes of Black Alabamians.

*72 We further find that the Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if they must vote in the 2024 congressional elections based on a likely unlawful redistricting plan. “Courts routinely deem restrictions on fundamental voting rights irreparable injury. And discriminatory voting procedures in particular are the kind of serious violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act for which courts have granted immediate relief.” *League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina*, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing *Obama for Am. v. Husted*, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012); *Alternative Political*

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Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876 (3d Cir. 1997); and *Williams v. Salerno*, 792 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1986)) (quoting *United States v. City of Cambridge*, 799 F.2d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 1986)).

“Voting is the beating heart of democracy,” and a “fundamental political right, because it is preservative of all rights.” *Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla.*, 915 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations accepted). And “once the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress” for voters whose rights were violated and votes were diluted. *League of Women Voters of N.C.*, 769 F.3d at 247.

The Plaintiffs already suffered this irreparable injury once in this census cycle, when they voted under the unlawful 2021 Plan. The State has made no argument that if the Plaintiffs were again required to cast votes under an unlawful districting plan, that injury would not be irreparable. Accordingly, we find that the Plaintiffs will suffer an irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.

We observe that absent relief now, the Plaintiffs will suffer this irreparable injury until 2026, which is more than halfway through this census cycle. Weighed against the harm that the State will suffer — having to conduct elections according to a court-ordered districting plan — the irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs’ voting rights unquestionably is greater.

We next find that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. The State makes no argument that if we find that the 2023 Plan perpetuates the vote dilution we found, or that the 2023 Plan likely violates Section Two anew, we should decline to enjoin it. Nevertheless, we examine applicable precedent.

The principal Supreme Court precedent is older than the Voting Rights Act. In *Reynolds*, which involved a constitutional challenge to an apportionment plan, the Court explained “once a State’s legislative apportionment scheme has been found to be unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a court would be justified in not taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid plan.” 377 U.S. at 585, 84 S.Ct. 1362. “However,” the Court acknowledged, “under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and a State’s election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief in a legislative apportionment case, even though the existing

apportionment scheme was found invalid.” *Id.* The Court explained that “[i]n awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles.” *Id.*

More recently, the Supreme Court has held that district courts should apply a necessity standard when deciding whether to award or withhold immediate relief. In *Upham v. Seamon*, the Court explained: “[W]e have authorized District Courts to order or to permit elections to be held pursuant to apportionment plans that do not in all respects measure up to the legal requirements, even constitutional requirements. Necessity has been the motivating factor in these situations.” 456 U.S. 37, 44, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted).

*73 We conclude that under these precedents, we should not withhold relief. Alabama’s congressional elections are not close, let alone imminent. The general election is more than fourteen months away. The qualifying deadline to participate in the primary elections for the major political parties is more than two months away. Ala. Code § 17-13-5(a). And this Order issues well ahead of the “early October” deadline by which the Secretary has twice told us he needs a final congressional electoral map. See Milligan Doc. 147 at 3; Milligan Doc. 162 at 7.

V. REMEDY

Having found that the 2023 Plan perpetuates rather than corrects the Section Two violation we found, we look to Section Two and controlling precedent for instructions about how to proceed. In the Senate Report that accompanied the 1982 amendments to Section Two that added the proportionality disclaimer, the Senate Judiciary Committee explained that it did not “prescribe[e] in the statute mechanistic rules for formulating remedies in cases which necessarily depend upon widely varied proof and local circumstances.” S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 31, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 177, 208.

Rather, that committee relied on “[t]he basic principle of equity that the remedy fashioned must be commensurate with the right that has been violated,” and explained its expectation that courts would “exercise [our] traditional equitable powers to fashion ... relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal

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opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.” *Id.*

That committee cited the seminal Supreme Court decision about racially discriminatory voting laws, *Louisiana*, 380 U.S. at 154, 85 S.Ct. 817. S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 31 n.121. In *Louisiana*, the Supreme Court explained that upon finding such discrimination, federal courts have “not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.” 380 U.S. at 154, 85 S.Ct. 817.

The Supreme Court has since held that a district court does not abuse its discretion by ordering a Special Master to draw a remedial map to ensure that a plan can be implemented as part of an orderly process in advance of elections, where the State was given an opportunity to enact a compliant map but failed to do so. *See Covington*, 138 S. Ct. at 2553–54 (rejecting State’s argument that district court needed to “giv[e] the General Assembly—which ‘stood ready and willing to promptly carry out its sovereign duty’—another chance at a remedial map,” and affirming appointment of Special Master because the district court had “determined that ‘providing the General Assembly with a second bite at the apple’ risked ‘further draw[ing] out these proceedings and potentially interfer[ing] with the 2018 election cycle’ ” (internal citations omitted)).

Because we enjoin the use of the 2023 Plan, a new congressional districting plan must be devised and implemented in advance of Alabama’s upcoming congressional elections. The State has conceded that it would be practically impossible for the Legislature to reconvene in time to enact a new plan for use in the upcoming election. Aug. 14 Tr. 167. Accordingly, we find that there is no need to “provid[e] the [Legislature] with a second bite at the apple” or other good cause to further delay remedial proceedings. *See Covington*, 138 S. Ct. at 2554.

We will therefore undertake our “duty to cure” violative districts “through an orderly process in advance of elections” by directing the Special Master and his team to draw remedial maps. *Id.* (citing *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4–5, 127 S.Ct. 5). We have previously appointed Mr. Richard Allen as a Special Master and provided him a team, including a cartographer, David R. Ely, and Michael Scodro and his law firm, Mayer Brown LLP to prepare and recommend to the Court a remedial map or maps for the Court to order Secretary of State

Allen to use in Alabama’s upcoming congressional elections. *See Milligan* Docs. 102, 166, 183. The procedural history preceding these appointments has already been catalogued at length in our prior orders. *See Milligan* Docs. 166, 183. Specific instructions for the Special Master and his team will follow by separate order.

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE 2023 PLAN

*74 In the light of our decision to enjoin the use of the 2023 Plan on statutory grounds, and because Alabama’s upcoming congressional elections will not occur on the basis of the map that is allegedly unconstitutional, we decline to decide any constitutional issues at this time. More particularly, we **RESERVE RULING** on (1) the constitutional objections to the 2023 Plan raised by the *Singleton* and the *Milligan* Plaintiffs, and (2) the motion of the *Singleton* Plaintiffs for preliminary injunctive relief on constitutional grounds, *Singleton* Doc. 147.

This restraint is consistent with our prior practice, *see Milligan* Doc. 107, and the longstanding canon of constitutional avoidance, *see Lyng*, 485 U.S. at 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (collecting cases dating back to *Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.*, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). Where, as here, a decision on the constitutional issue would not entitle a plaintiff “to relief beyond that to which they [are] entitled on their statutory claims,” a “constitutional decision would [be] unnecessary and therefore inappropriate.” *Id.* at 446, 108 S.Ct. 1319. This principle has particular salience when a court considers (as we do here) a request for equitable relief, *see id.*, and is commonly applied by three-judge courts in redistricting cases, *see, e.g., LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 442, 126 S.Ct. 2594; *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 38, 106 S.Ct. 2752.

VII. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

During the remedial hearing, the Court accepted into evidence many exhibits. *See generally* Aug. 14 Tr. 91–142. Most were stipulated, although some were stipulated only for a limited purpose. *Id.* We have since excluded one exhibit: the State’s Exhibit J, Mr. Bryan’s 2023 Report. *See supra* at Part IV.B.2.a.

At the hearing we reserved ruling on the motion *in limine* and on some objections to certain of the State’s exhibits. *See* Aug. 14 Tr. 91, 105–142. Most of the objections we reserved on were relevance objections raised in connection with the motion *in limine*. *See id.* at 108–30 (discussing such

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objections to State Exhibits C2, D, E, F2, G, H, I, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, and S).

As we discussed in Parts II.B and II.C, we conclude that our remedial task is confined to a determination whether the 2023 Plan completely remedies the vote dilution we found in the 2021 Plan and is not otherwise unlawful, but we consider in the alternative whether under *Gingles* and the totality of the circumstances the Plaintiffs have established that the 2023 Plan likely violates Section Two. *See supra* at Parts II.B, II.C, IV.A & IV.B.

Accordingly, the motion *in limine* is **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**, and all of the Plaintiffs' relevance objections raised in connection with the motion *in limine* are **OVERRULED** to the extent that we consider the evidence as appropriate in our alternative holding.

After considerable deliberation, we dispose of the remaining objections this way:

- Objections to State Exhibits A, B2, B3, C2, D, N, and P are **OVERRULED**. These exhibits are admitted to establish what was said at public hearings held by the Committee and what materials were considered by the Committee, but not for the truth of any matter asserted therein.
- Objections to State Exhibits E, F2, G, H, I, L, M, O, Q, R, and S are **OVERRULED**. These exhibits are admitted.
- Objections to the *Milligan* Plaintiffs' Exhibits M13, M32, M38, and M47 are **SUSTAINED**. These exhibits are excluded.

***75 DONE and ORDERED** this 5th day of September, 2023.

APPENDIX A

SBS ENROLLED



ACT #2023-563

- 1 XBT977-3
- 2 By Senator Livingston
- 3 RFD: Conference Committee on SBS
- 4 First Read: 17-Jul-23
- 5 2023 Second Special Session



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SBS Enrolled



1 Enrolled, An Act,

2
3

4 To amend Section 17-14-70, Code of Alabama 1975, to
5 provide for the reapportionment and redistricting of the
6 state's United States Congressional districts for the purpose
7 of electing members at the General Election in 2024 and
8 thereafter, until the release of the next federal census; and
9 to add Section 17-48-70.1 to the Code of Alabama 1975, to
10 provide legislative findings.

11 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF ALABAMA:

12 Section 1. Section 17-14-70.1 is added to the Code of
13 Alabama 1975, to read as follows.
14 §17-14-70.1

15 The Legislature finds and declares the following:

16 (1) The Legislature adheres to traditional
17 redistricting principles when adopting congressional
18 districts. Such principles are the product of history,
19 tradition, bipartisan consensus, and legal precedent. The
20 Supreme Court of the United States recently clarified that
21 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act "never requires adoption of
22 districts that violate traditional redistricting principles."

23 (2) The Legislature's intent in adopting the
24 congressional plan in this act described in Section 17-14-70.1
25 is to comply with federal law, including the U.S. Constitution
26 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.

27 (3) The Legislature's intent is also to promote the
28 following traditional redistricting principles, which are

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29 given effect in the plan created by this act:

30 a. Districts shall be based on total population as

31 reported by the federal decennial census and shall have

32 minimal population deviation.

33 b. Districts shall be composed of contiguous geography,

34 meaning that every part of every district is contiguous with

35 every other part of the same district.

36 c. Districts shall be composed of reasonably compact

37 geography.

38 d. The congressional districting plan shall contain no

39 more than six splits of county lines, which is the minimum

40 number necessary to achieve minimal population deviation among

41 the districts. Two splits within one county is considered two

42 splits of county lines.

43 e. The congressional districting plan shall keep

44 together communities of interest, as further provided for in

45 subdivision (4).

46 f. The congressional districting plan shall not pair

47 incumbent members of Congress within the same district.

48 g. The principles described in this subdivision are

49 non-negotiable for the Legislature. To the extent the

50 following principles can be given effect consistent with the

51 principles above, the congressional districting plan shall

52 also do all of the following:

53 1. Preserve the cores of existing districts.

54 2. Minimize the number of counties in each district.

55 3. Minimize splits of neighborhoods and other political

56 subdivisions in addition to minimizing the splits of counties

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57 and communities of interest.

58 (4)a. A community of interest is a defined area of the

59 state that may be characterized by, among other commonalities,

60 shared economic interests, geographic features, transportation

61 infrastructure, broadcast and print media, educational

62 institutions, and historical or cultural factors.

63 b. The discernment, weighing, and balancing of the

64 varied factors that contribute to communities of interest is

65 an intensely political process best carried out by elected

66 representatives of the people.

67 c. If it is necessary to divide a community of interest

68 between congressional districts to promote other traditional

69 districting principles like compactness, contiguity, or equal

70 population, division into two districts is preferable to

71 division into three or more districts. Because each community

72 of interest is different, the division of one community among

73 multiple districts may be more or less significant to the

74 community than the division of another community.

75 d. The Legislature declares that at least the three

76 following regions are communities of interest that shall be

77 kept together to the fullest extent possible in this

78 congressional redistricting plan: the Black Belt, the Gulf

79 Coast, and the Wiregrass.

80 e.i. Alabama's Black Belt region is a community of

81 interest composed of the following 18 core counties: Barbour,

82 Bullock, Butler, Choctaw, Crenshaw, Dallas, Greene, Hale,

83 Lowndes, Macon, Marengo, Montgomery, Perry, Pickens, Pike,

84 Russell, Sumter, and Wilcox. Moreover, the following five

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85 counties are sometimes considered part of the Black Belt:

86 Clarke, Conecuh, Escambia, Monroe, and Washington.

87 2. The Black Belt is characterized by its rural

88 geography, fertile soil, and relative poverty, which have

89 shaped its unique history and culture.

90 3. The Black Belt region spans the width of Alabama

91 from the Mississippi boarder to the Georgia border.

92 4. Because the Black Belt counties cannot be combined

93 within one district without causing other districts to violate

94 the principle of equal population among districts, the 18 core

95 Black Belt counties shall be placed into two reasonably

96 compact districts, the fewest number of districts in which

97 this community of interest can be placed. Moreover, of the

98 five other counties sometimes considered part of the Black

99 Belt, four of those counties are included within the two Black

100 Belt districts - Districts 2 and 7.

101 f.i. Alabama's Gulf Coast region is a community of

102 interest composed of Mobile and Baldwin Counties.

103 2. Owing to Mobile Bay and the Gulf of Mexico

104 coastline, these counties also comprise a well-known and

105 well-defined community with a long history and unique

106 interests. Over the past half-century, Baldwin and Mobile

107 Counties have grown even more alike as the tourism industry

108 has grown and the development of highways and bay-crossing

109 bridges have made it easier to commute between the two

110 counties.

111 3. The Gulf Coast community has a shared interest in

112 tourism, which is a multi-billion-dollar industry and a

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113 significant and unique economic driver for the region.

114 4. Unlike other regions in the state, the Gulf Coast

115 community is home to major fishing, port, and ship-building

116 industries. Mobile has a Navy shipyard and the only deep-water

117 port in the state. The port is essential for the international

118 export of goods produced in Alabama.

119 5. The Port of Mobile is the economic hub for the Gulf

120 counties. Its maintenance and further development are critical

121 for the Gulf counties in particular but also for many other

122 parts of the state. The Port of Mobile handles over 55 million

123 tons of international and domestic cargo for exporters and

124 importers, delivering eighty-five billion dollars

125 (\$85,000,000,000) in economic value to the state each year.

126 Activity at the port's public and private terminals directly

127 and indirectly generates nearly 313,000 jobs each year.

128 6. Among the over 21,000 direct jobs generated by the

129 Port of Mobile, about 42% of the direct jobholders reside in

130 the City of Mobile, another 39% reside in Mobile County but

131 outside of the City of Mobile, and another 13% reside in

132 Baldwin County.

133 7. The University of South Alabama serves the Gulf

134 Coast community of interest both through its flagship campus

135 in Mobile and its campus in Baldwin County.

136 8. Federal appropriations have been critical to

137 ensuring the port's continued growth and maintenance. In 2020,

138 the Army Corps of Engineers allocated over two hundred

139 seventy-four million dollars (\$274,000,000) for the Port of

140 Mobile to allow the dredging and expansion of the port.

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141 Federal appropriations have also been critical for expanding
 142 bridge projects to further benefit the shared interests of the
 143 region.

144 9. The Gulf Coast community has a distinct culture
 145 stemming from its French and Spanish colonial heritage. That
 146 heritage is reflected in the celebration of shared social
 147 occasions, such as Mardi Gras, which began in Mobile. This
 148 shared culture is reflected in Section 3-3-8(c), Code of
 149 Alabama 1975, which provides that "Mardi Gras shall be deemed
 150 a holiday in Mobile and Baldwin Counties and all state offices
 151 shall be closed in those counties on Mardi Gras." Mardi Gras
 152 is observed as a state holiday only in Mobile and Baldwin
 153 Counties.

154 10. Mobile and Baldwin Counties also work together as
 155 part of the South Alabama Regional Planning Commission, a
 156 regional planning commission recognized by the state for more
 157 than 50 years. The local governments of Mobile, Baldwin, and
 158 Escambia Counties, as well as 29 municipalities within those
 159 counties, work together through the commission with the
 160 Congressional Representative from District 1 to carry out
 161 comprehensive economic development planning for the region in
 162 conjunction with the U.S. Economic Development Administration.
 163 Under Section 11-85-51(b), factors the Governor considers when
 164 creating such a regional planning commission include
 165 "community of interest and homogeneity; geographic features
 166 and natural boundaries; patterns of communication and
 167 transportation; patterns of urban development; total
 168 population and population density; [and] similarity of social

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169 and economic problems."

170 g.1. Alabama's Wiregrass region is a community of
 171 interest composed of the following nine counties: Barbour,
 172 Coffee, Covington, Crenshaw, Dale, Geneva, Henry, Houston, and
 173 Pike.

174 2. The Wiregrass region is characterized by rural
 175 geography, agriculture, and a major military base. The
 176 Wiregrass region is home to Troy University's flagship campus
 177 in Troy and its campus in Dothan.

178 3. All of the Wiregrass counties are included in
 179 District 2, with the exception of Covington County, which is
 180 placed in District 1 so that the maximum number of Black Belt
 181 counties can be included within just two districts.

182 Section 2, Section 17-14-70, Code of Alabama 1975, is
 183 amended to read as follows:

184 *§17-14-70

185 (a) The State of Alabama is divided into seven
 186 congressional districts as provided in subsection (b);

187 (b) The numbers and boundaries of the districts are
 188 designated and established by the map prepared by the
 189 Permanent Legislative Committee on Reapportionment and
 190 identified and labeled as ~~Single Congressional Plan 1~~
 191 Livingston Congressional Plan 3-2023, including the
 192 corresponding boundary description provided by the census
 193 tracts, blocks, and counties, and are incorporated by
 194 reference as part of this section.

195 (c) The Legislature shall post for viewing on its
 196 public website the map referenced in subsection (b), including

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SB5 Enrolled



197 the corresponding boundary description provided by the census
 198 tracts, blocks, and counties, and any alternative map,
 199 including the corresponding boundary description provided by
 200 the census tracts, blocks, and counties, introduced by any
 201 member of the Legislature during the legislative session in
 202 which this section is added or amended.

203 (d) Upon enactment of ~~Act 2023-355, adding the act~~
 204 amending this section and adopting the map identified in
 205 subsection (b), the Clerk of the House of Representatives or
 206 the Secretary of the Senate, as appropriate, shall transmit
 207 the map and the corresponding boundary description provided by
 208 the census tracts, blocks, and counties identified in
 209 subsection (b) for certification and posting on the public
 210 website of the Secretary of State.

211 (e) The boundary descriptions provided by the certified
 212 map referenced in subsection (b) shall prevail over the
 213 boundary descriptions provided by the census tracts, blocks,
 214 and counties generated for the map."

215 Section 3. The provisions of this act are severable. If
 216 any part of this act is declared invalid or unconstitutional,
 217 that declaration shall not affect the part which remains.

218 Section 4. This act shall be effective for the election
 219 of members of the state's U.S. Congressional districts at the
 220 General Election of 2024 and thereafter, until the state's
 221 U.S. Congressional districts are reapportioned and
 222 redistricted after the 2030 decennial census.

223 Section 5. This act shall become effective immediately
 224 upon its passage and approval by the Governor, or upon its

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SB5 Enrolled




225 otherwise becoming law.

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SB5 Enrolled



[Signature]
President and Presiding Officer of the Senate

[Signature]
Speaker of the House of Representatives

SB5
Senate 19-Jul-23
I hereby certify that the within Act originated in and passed
the Senate, as amended.

Senate 21-Jul-23
I hereby certify that the within Act originated in and passed
the Senate, as amended by Conference Committee Report.

Patrick Harris,
Secretary.

House of Representatives
Amended and passed: 21-Jul-23

House of Representatives
Passed 21-Jul-23, as amended by Conference Committee Report:

By: Senator Livingston

APPROVED July 21, 2023
 TIME 5:28 PM
[Signature]
 Alabama Secretary Of State
 Act Num... SB53-563
 Bill Num... 5-5
 Rec'd 07/21/23 051410WLF
 Page 10

SOB INFORMATION ORSOBS 15 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35	SENATE ACTION I hereby certify that the Resolution as required in Section C of Act No. 81-809 was adopted and is attached to the Bill. year _____ month _____ PATRICK HARRIS, Secretary	BRUCE ALLEN DATE: 7-19-2023 RD 1 RFD: 505	
	I hereby certify that the notice & proof is attached to the Bill, SB _____ as required in the General Acts of Alabama, 1975 Act No. 919. PATRICK HARRIS, Secretary	REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE This bill having been referred by the House to its standing committee on _____ was acted upon by such committee in session, and returned thereon to the House with the recommendation that it be (Said/Amended) _____. This 20 day of July, 2023. <i>[Signature]</i> Chairman	DATE: 7-20-2022 RP: 12-5-2022 RD 2 CAL
	CONFERENCE COMMITTEE Senate Conference	DATE: _____ 20__ RE-REFERRED <input type="checkbox"/> RE-COMMITTED <input type="checkbox"/> Committee: _____	I hereby certify that the Resolution as required in Section C of Act No. 81-809 was adopted and is attached to the Bill. SB _____ YEARS _____ DAYS _____ JOHN TREADWELL, Clerk
	FURTHER HOUSE ACTION (OVER)		

APPENDIX B

**REAPPORTIONMENT COMMITTEE
 REDISTRICTING GUIDELINES**

May 5, 2021

I. POPULATION

The total Alabama state population, and the population of defined subunits thereof, as reported by the 2020 Census,

shall be the permissible data base used for the development, evaluation, and analysis of proposed redistricting plans. It is the intention of this provision to exclude from use any census data, for the purpose of determining compliance with the one person, one vote requirement, other than that provided by the United States Census Bureau.

II. CRITERIA FOR REDISTRICTING

a. Districts shall comply with the United States Constitution, including the requirement that they equalize total population.

b. Congressional districts shall have minimal population deviation.

c. Legislative and state board of education districts shall be drawn to achieve substantial equality of population among the districts and shall not exceed an overall population deviation range of ±5%.

d. A redistricting plan considered by the Reapportionment Committee shall comply with the one person, one vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.

e. The Reapportionment Committee shall not approve a redistricting plan that does not comply with these population requirements.

f. Districts shall be drawn in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended. A redistricting plan shall have neither the purpose nor the effect of diluting minority voting strength, and shall comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the United States Constitution.

g. No district will be drawn in a manner that subordinates race-neutral districting criteria to considerations of race, color, or membership in a language-minority group, except that race, color, or membership in a language-minority group may predominate over race-neutral districting criteria to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, provided there is a strong basis in evidence in support of such a race-based choice. A strong basis in evidence exists when there is good reason to believe that race must be used in order to satisfy the Voting Rights Act.

h. Districts will be composed of contiguous and reasonably compact geography.

i. The following requirements of the Alabama Constitution shall be complied with:

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(i) Sovereignty resides in the people of Alabama, and all districts should be drawn to reflect the democratic will of all the people concerning how their governments should be restructured.

*76 (ii) Districts shall be drawn on the basis of total population, except that voting age population may be considered, as necessary to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or other federal or state law.

(iii) The number of Alabama Senate districts is set by statute at 35 and, under the Alabama Constitution, may not exceed 35.

(iv) The number of Alabama Senate districts shall be not less than one-fourth or more than one-third of the number of House districts.

(v) The number of Alabama House districts is set by statute at 105 and, under the Alabama Constitution, may not exceed 106.

(vi) The number of Alabama House districts shall not be less than 67.

(vii) All districts will be single-member districts.

(viii) Every part of every district shall be contiguous with every other part of the district.

j. The following redistricting policies are embedded in the political values, traditions, customs, and usages of the State of Alabama and shall be observed to the extent that they do not violate or subordinate the foregoing policies prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Alabama:

(i) Contests between incumbents will be avoided whenever possible.

(ii) Contiguity by water is allowed, but point-to-point contiguity and long-lasso contiguity is not.

(iii) Districts shall respect communities of interest, neighborhoods, and political subdivisions to the extent practicable and in compliance with paragraphs a through i. A community of interest is defined as an area with recognized similarities of interests, including but not limited to ethnic, racial, economic, tribal, social, geographic, or historical identities. The term communities of interest may, in certain circumstances, include political subdivisions such as counties, voting precincts, municipalities, tribal lands and

reservations, or school districts. The discernment, weighing, and balancing of the varied factors that contribute to communities of interest is an intensely political process best carried out by elected representatives of the people.

(iv) The Legislature shall try to minimize the number of counties in each district.

(v) The Legislature shall try to preserve the cores of existing districts.

(vi) In establishing legislative districts, the Reapportionment Committee shall give due consideration to all the criteria herein. However, priority is to be given to the compelling State interests requiring equality of population among districts and compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, should the requirements of those criteria conflict with any other criteria.

g. The criteria identified in paragraphs j(i)-(vi) are not listed in order of precedence, and in each instance where they conflict, the Legislature shall at its discretion determine which takes priority.

III. PLANS PRODUCED BY LEGISLATORS

1. The confidentiality of any Legislator developing plans or portions thereof will be respected. The Reapportionment Office staff will not release any information on any Legislator's work without written permission of the Legislator developing the plan, subject to paragraph two below.

2. A proposed redistricting plan will become public information upon its introduction as a bill in the legislative process, or upon presentation for consideration by the Reapportionment Committee.

*77 3. Access to the Legislative Reapportionment Office Computer System, census population data, and redistricting work maps will be available to all members of the Legislature upon request. Reapportionment Office staff will provide technical assistance to all Legislators who wish to develop proposals.

4. In accordance with Rule 23 of the Joint Rules of the Alabama Legislature “[a]ll amendments or revisions to redistricting plans, following introduction as a bill, shall be drafted by the Reapportionment Office.” Amendments or revisions must be part of a whole plan. Partial plans are not allowed.

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5. In accordance with Rule 24 of the Joint Rules of the Alabama Legislature, “[d]rafts of all redistricting plans which are for introduction at any session of the Legislature, and which are not prepared by the Reapportionment Office, shall be presented to the Reapportionment Office for review of proper form and for entry into the Legislative Data System at least ten (10) days prior to introduction.”

IV. REAPPORTIONMENT COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND PUBLIC HEARINGS

1. All meetings of the Reapportionment Committee and its sub-committees will be open to the public and all plans presented at committee meetings will be made available to the public.

2. Minutes of all Reapportionment Committee meetings shall be taken and maintained as part of the public record. Copies of all minutes shall be made available to the public.

3. Transcripts of any public hearings shall be made and maintained as part of the public record, and shall be available to the public.

4. All interested persons are encouraged to appear before the Reapportionment Committee and to give their comments and input regarding legislative redistricting. Reasonable opportunity will be given to such persons, consistent with the criteria herein established, to present plans or amendments redistricting plans to the Reapportionment Committee, if desired, unless such plans or amendments fail to meet the minimal criteria herein established.

5. Notice of all Reapportionment Committee meetings will be posted on monitors throughout the Alabama State House, the Reapportionment Committee's website, and on the Secretary of State's website. Individual notice of Reapportionment Committee meetings will be sent by email to any citizen or organization who requests individual notice and provides the necessary information to the Reapportionment Committee staff. Persons or organizations who want to receive this information should contact the Reapportionment Office.

V. PUBLIC ACCESS

1. The Reapportionment Committee seeks active and informed public participation in all activities of the Committee and the widest range of public information and citizen input into its deliberations. Public access to the Reapportionment Office computer system is available every

Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Please contact the Reapportionment Office to schedule an appointment.

2. A redistricting plan may be presented to the Reapportionment Committee by any individual citizen or organization by written presentation at a public meeting or by submission in writing to the Committee. All plans submitted to the Reapportionment Committee will be made part of the public record and made available in the same manner as other public records of the Committee.

3. Any proposed redistricting plan drafted into legislation must be offered by a member of the Legislature for introduction into the legislative process.

*78 4. A redistricting plan developed outside the Legislature or a redistricting plan developed without Reapportionment Office assistance which is to be presented for consideration by the Reapportionment Committee must:

a. Be clearly depicted on maps which follow 2020 Census geographic boundaries;

b. Be accompanied by a statistical sheet listing total population for each district and listing the census geography making up each proposed district;

c. Stand as a complete statewide plan for redistricting.

d. Comply with the guidelines adopted by the Reapportionment Committee.

5. Electronic Submissions

a. Electronic submissions of redistricting plans will be accepted by the Reapportionment Committee.

b. Plans submitted electronically must also be accompanied by the paper materials referenced in this section.

c. See the Appendix for the technical documentation for the electronic submission of redistricting plans.

6. Census Data and Redistricting Materials

a. Census population data and census maps will be made available through the Reapportionment Office at a cost determined by the Permanent Legislative Committee on Reapportionment.

b. Summary population data at the precinct level and a statewide work maps will be made available to the public

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through the Reapportionment Office at a cost determined by the Permanent Legislative Committee on Reapportionment.

c. All such fees shall be deposited in the state treasury to the credit of the general fund and shall be used to cover the expenses of the Legislature.

Appendix.

**ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION OF
REDISTRICTING PLANS REAPPORTIONMENT
COMMITTEE - STATE OF ALABAMA**

The Legislative Reapportionment Computer System supports the electronic submission of redistricting plans. The electronic submission of these plans must be via email or a flash drive. The software used by the Reapportionment Office is Maptitude.

The electronic file should be in DOJ format (Block, district # or district #, Block). This should be a two column, comma

- SS is the 2 digit state FIPS code
- CCC is the 3 digit county FIPS code
- TTTTTT is the 6 digit census tract code
- BBBB is the 4 digit census block code
- DDDD is the district number, right adjusted

Contact Information:

Legislative Reapportionment Office
Room 317, State House
11 South Union Street
Montgomery, Alabama 36130
(334) 261-0706

For questions relating to reapportionment and redistricting, please contact:

Donna Overton Loftin, Supervisor
Legislative Reapportionment Office

delimited file containing the FIPS code for each block, and the district number. Maptitude has an automated plan import that creates a new plan from the block/district assignment list.

Web services that can be accessed directly with a URL and ArcView Shapefiles can be viewed as overlays. A new plan would have to be built using this overlay as a guide to assign units into a blank Maptitude plan. In order to analyze the plans with our attribute data, edit, and report on, a new plan will have to be built in Maptitude.

In order for plans to be analyzed with our attribute data, to be able to edit, report on, and produce maps in the most efficient, accurate and time saving procedure, electronic submissions are REQUIRED to be in DOJ format.

Example: (DOJ FORMAT BLOCK, DISTRICT #)

SSCCCTTTTTTBBBBDDDD

*79 donna.overton@alsenate.gov

Please Note: The above e-mail address is to be used only for the purposes of obtaining information regarding redistricting. Political messages, including those relative to specific legislation or other political matters, cannot be answered or disseminated via this email to members of the Legislature. Members of the Permanent Legislative Committee on Reapportionment may be contacted through information contained on their Member pages of the Official Website of the Alabama Legislature, legislature.state.al.us/aliswww/default.aspx.

All Citations

--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 5691156

Footnotes

- 1 *Singleton* remains before this three-judge Court but is not a part of the Section Two remedial proceedings. See *infra* at Part I.C.5.
- 2 When we cite an order or other filing that appears in more than one of these cases, for the reader's ease we cite only the document filed in the *Milligan* case.
- 3 Page number pincites in this order are to the CM/ECF page number that appears in the top right-hand corner of each page, if such a page number is available.
- 4 In a later filing, the State advised the Court that Secretary Allen needs a final map by October 1, 2023. *Milligan* Doc. 162 at 7.
- 5 On January 16, 2023, Wes Allen became the Secretary of State of Alabama. Pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25\(d\)](#), Secretary Allen was substituted for former Secretary Merrill as a defendant in these cases. *Milligan* Doc. 161.
- 6 Former Senator Jim McClendon then served as co-chair of the Committee. Senator Steve Livingston has since become co-chair of the Committee. See *Milligan* Doc. 173. Pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25\(d\)](#), Senator Livingston was substituted as a defendant in these cases. *Milligan* Doc. 269.
- 7 The parties previously stipulated that the Black Belt “is named for the region’s fertile black soil. The region has a substantial Black population because of the many enslaved people brought there to work in the antebellum period. All the counties in the Black Belt are majority-or near majority-BVAP,” where “BVAP” means Black share of the voting-age population. *Milligan* Doc. 53 ¶ 60. They further stipulated that the Black Belt includes eighteen “core counties” (Barbour, Bullock, Butler, Choctaw, Crenshaw, Dallas, Greene, Hale, Lowndes, Macon, Marengo, Montgomery, Perry, Pickens, Pike, Russell, Sumter, and Wilcox), and that five other counties (Clarke, Conecuh, Escambia, Monroe, and Washington) are “sometimes included.” *Id.* ¶ 61.
- 8 We already have described the Black Belt. See *supra* at n.7. When the State refers to the “Gulf Coast,” it refers to Mobile and Baldwin counties. See *Milligan* Doc. 220-11 at 5. When the State refers to the “Wiregrass,” it refers to an area in the southeast part of the state that includes Barbour, Coffee, Covington, Crenshaw, Dale, Geneva, Henry, Houston, and Pike counties. See *id.* at 8.
- 9 When we use the phrase “opportunity district” or “Black-opportunity,” we mean a district in which a “meaningful number” of non-Black voters often “join[] a politically cohesive black community to elect” the Black-preferred candidate. [Cooper](#), 581 U.S. at 303, 137 S.Ct. 1455. We distinguish an opportunity district from a majority-Black district, in which Black people comprise “50 percent or more of the voting population and ... constitute a compact voting majority” in the district. [Bartlett](#), 556 U.S. at 19, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (plurality opinion). For additional discussion, see *infra* at Part III.
- 10 When we cite to the transcript from the 2022 preliminary injunction hearing, pincites are to the numbered pages of the transcript, not the CM/ECF pagination. See *Milligan* Doc. 105.
- 11 For an explanation of these metrics, see *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 61–62 n.9.
- 12 We distinguish Part III-B-1, the opinion of four justices, from a “plurality opinion.” “A plurality opinion is one that doesn’t garner enough appellate judges’ votes to constitute a majority, but has received the greatest number of votes of any of the opinions filed, among those opinions supporting the mandate.” Bryan A. Garner,

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et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 195 (2016) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted) (alterations accepted). All the other parts of the Chief Justice's opinion garnered five votes.

- 13 The *Milligan* Plaintiffs relied on testimony from Dr. Liu during the preliminary injunction proceedings, and we found him credible. *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 174–75.
- 14 The *Milligan* Plaintiffs relied on expert testimony from Dr. Bagley about the Senate Factors during the preliminary injunction proceedings, and we found him credible. See *Milligan* Doc. 107 at 78–81 and 185–87.
- 15 The *Caster* Plaintiffs relied on testimony from Dr. Palmer during the preliminary injunction proceedings, and we found him credible. See *Milligan* Doc. 174–76.
- 16 The *Milligan* and *Caster* Plaintiffs do not offer the VRA Plan in this litigation as a remedial map for purposes of satisfying *Gingles* I or for any other purpose. See Aug. 14 Tr. 123. It is in the record only because they proposed it to the Committee and the State's expert witness, Mr. Bryan, prepared a report that includes statements about it. See *Milligan* Doc. 220-10 at 53, *discussed infra* at Part IV.B.2.a.
- 17 The depositions were taken after the briefing on the Plaintiffs' objections to the 2023 Plan was complete. See *Milligan* Doc. 261. The State did not raise a timeliness objection, and we discern no timeliness problem.
- 18 When we cite a deposition transcript, pincites are to the numbered pages of the transcript, not the CM/ECF pagination.
- 19 We understand that the 2023 Plan is enacted, not merely proposed. *Covington* used “proposed” to describe a remedial plan that had been passed by both houses of the North Carolina General Assembly after the previous maps were ruled unconstitutional. See 283 F. Supp. 3d at 413–14, 419; see also *infra* at — — —.
- 20 Notwithstanding that the issue was never formally presented to us by motion, federal courts have an “independent obligation to ensure that jurisdiction exists before federal judicial power is exercised over the merits” of a case, see *Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co.*, 228 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000), so we have carefully considered the mootness issue. It is clear to us that under *Covington* this case is not moot. Just as the district court in *Covington* (1) “ha[d] a duty to ensure that any remedy so far as possible eliminate[s] the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar[s] like discrimination in the future,” and (2) “ha[d] the inherent authority to enforce its own orders,” 283 F. Supp. 3d at 424–25, so too do we (1) have a duty to ensure that the State's proposed remedy completely cures the Section Two violation we have already found, and (2) have the inherent authority to enforce our preliminary injunction order. Moreover, we are acutely aware of the fact that Black Alabamians will be forced, if we do not address the matter, to continue to vote under a map that we have found likely violates Section Two. That constitutes a live and ongoing injury.
- 21 To facilitate the reader's opportunity to make this comparison conveniently, we attach the guidelines to this order as Appendix B. Compare App. B at 1, with App. A at 2.

End of Document

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2023 WL 7037537

2023 WL 7037537

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,
N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

ALPHA PHI ALPHA FRATERNITY

INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

Brad RAFFENSPERGER, in his official capacity
as Secretary of State of Georgia, Defendant.

Coakley Pendergrass et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

Brad Raffensperger et al., Defendants.

Annie Lois Grant et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

Brad Raffensperger et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE No. 1:21-CV-05337-SCJ,
CIVIL ACTION FILE No. 1:21-CV-05339-SCJ,
CIVIL ACTION FILE No. 1:22-CV-00122-SCJ

|

Signed October 26, 2023

Synopsis

Background: Intercollegiate fraternity, church, and Black registered voters brought three actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against Georgia Secretary of State and members of State Election Board (SEB), asserting vote dilution claims under § 2 of Voting Rights Act (VRA), relating to congressional and state legislative redistricting after 2020 Census.

Holdings: After non-jury trial, the District Court, [Steve C. Jones, J.](#), held that:

under totality of circumstances, congressional redistricting for west-metro Atlanta constituted vote dilution;

plaintiffs did not establish compactness, as Supreme Court's first *Gingles* precondition for vote dilution claim, for their proposed additional majority-Black State House district for south-metro Atlanta Region;

plaintiffs did not establish compactness for their proposed additional majority-Black State Senate district for Georgia's eastern Black Belt Region;

plaintiffs did not establish compactness for their proposed additional majority-Black Senate district for Macon-Bibb Region;

plaintiffs did not establish compactness for their proposed additional majority-Black House district for Southwest Georgia Region;

under totality of circumstances, redistricting for State Senate and State House in south-metro Atlanta constituted vote dilution; and

under totality of circumstances, redistricting for State Senate in Georgia's south-metro Atlanta Region and for State House in south-metro Atlanta, west-metro Atlanta, and Macon-Bibb Regions constituted vote dilution.

Permanent injunction granted; deadline set for State's enactment of new plans.

Procedural Posture(s): Motion to Dismiss; Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings; Motion for Permanent Injunction.

Attorneys and Law Firms

[Abigail Shaw](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Alex W. Miller](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Cassandra Mitchell](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Debo P. Adegbile](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Eliot Kim](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Joseph D. Zabel](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Juan M. Ruiz Toro](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Maura Douglas](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Robert Boone](#), Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, [Ari J. Savitzky](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Casey Katharine Smith](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Jenessa Calvo-Friedman](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Kelsey A. Miller](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Ming Cheung](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Sophia Lin Lakin](#), Pro Hac Vice, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., New York, NY, [Anuj Dixit](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Marisa A. DiGiuseppe](#), Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, [Anuradha Sivaram](#), Pro Hac Vice, [De'Ericka Aiken](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Edward Henderson Williams, II](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Sonika Data](#), Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, [Ayana Williams](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Sughrue Mion Zinn MacPeak & Seas](#), Washington, DC, [Charlotte Geaghan-Breiner](#), Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale, and Dorr, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, [Denise Tsai](#), Pro Hac Vice, [George P. Varghese](#), Pro Hac Vice, [Taeyoung Kim](#), Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr

2023 WL 7037537

LLP, Boston, MA, Rahul Garabadu, Caitlin Felt May, Cory Isaacson, ACLU Foundation of Georgia, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Inc. in No. 1:21-CV-05337.

Abigail Shaw, Pro Hac Vice, Alex W. Miller, Pro Hac Vice, Debo P. Adegbile, Pro Hac Vice, Eliot Kim, Pro Hac Vice, Joseph D. Zabel, Pro Hac Vice, Juan M. Ruiz Toro, Pro Hac Vice, Maura Douglas, Pro Hac Vice, Robert Boone, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, Ari J. Savitzky, Pro Hac Vice, Casey Katharine Smith, Pro Hac Vice, Jennessa Calvo-Friedman, Pro Hac Vice, Kelsey A. Miller, Pro Hac Vice, Ming Cheung, Pro Hac Vice, Sophia Lin Lakin, Pro Hac Vice, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., New York, NY, Anuj Dixit, Pro Hac Vice, Marisa A. DiGiuseppe, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Anuradha Sivaram, Pro Hac Vice, De'Ericka Aiken, Pro Hac Vice, Edward Henderson Williams, II, Pro Hac Vice, Sonika Data, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, Ayana Williams, Pro Hac Vice, Sughrue Mion Zinn MacPeak & Seas, Washington, DC, Charlotte Geaghan-Breiner, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale, and Dorr, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Denise Tsai, Pro Hac Vice, George P. Varghese, Pro Hac Vice, Taeyoung Kim, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, Rahul Garabadu, Caitlin Felt May, Cory Isaacson, ACLU Foundation of Georgia, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs Sixth District of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Eric T. Woods, Katie Bailey Glenn, Phil Brown, Janice Stewart in No. 1:21-CV-05337.

Bryan Francis Jacoutot, Bryan P. Tyson, Daniel H. Weigel, Diane Festin LaRoss, Donald P. Boyle, Jr., Frank B. Strickland, Taylor English Duma LLP, Atlanta, GA, Charlene S. McGowan, Office of the Georgia Attorney General, Atlanta, GA, Elizabeth Marie Wilson Vaughan, Department of Law - Division 5, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant in No. 1:21-CV-05337.

Daniel J. Hessel, Pro Hac Vice, Ruth M. Greenwood, Pro Hac Vice, Theresa J. Lee, Pro Hac Vice, Election Law Clinic, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Albert Matthews Pearson, III, Albert M. Pearson LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Amici Fair Districts GA, Election Law Clinic at Harvard Law School in No. 1:21-CV-05337.

Abha Khanna, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan Patrick Hawley, Pro Hac Vice, Makeba Rutahindurwa, Pro Hac Vice, Elias Law Group LLP, Seattle, WA, Kevin J. Hamilton, Pro Hac Vice,

Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, WA, Adam Martin Sparks, Joyce Gist Lewis, Krevolin & Horst, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Christina Ashley Ford, Pro Hac Vice, Daniel C. Osher, Pro Hac Vice, Michael Brandon Jones, Graham W. White, Pro Hac Vice, Elias Law Group LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs in No. 1:21-CV-05339.

Bryan Francis Jacoutot, Bryan P. Tyson, Diane Festin LaRoss, Donald P. Boyle, Jr., Frank B. Strickland, Taylor English Duma LLP, Atlanta, GA, Charlene S. McGowan, Office of the Georgia Attorney General, Atlanta, GA, Elizabeth Marie Wilson Vaughan, Department of Law - Division 5, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Brad Raffensperger in Nos. 1:22-CV-00122, 1:21-CV-05339, Sara Tindall Ghazal in Nos. 1:22-CV-00122, 1:21-CV-05339, Matthew Mashburn in Nos. 1:22-CV-00122, 1:21-CV-05339, Edward Lindsey in No. 1:22-CV-00122.

Bryan P. Tyson, Diane Festin LaRoss, Donald P. Boyle, Jr., Taylor English Duma LLP, Atlanta, GA, Elizabeth Marie Wilson Vaughan, Department of Law - Division 5, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Edward Lindsey in No. 1:21-CV-05339, Hon. William S. Duffey, Jr. in Nos. 1:22-CV-00122, 1:21-CV-05339, Janice W. Johnston in Nos. 1:22-CV-00122, 1:21-CV-05339.

Abha Khanna, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan Patrick Hawley, Pro Hac Vice, Makeba Rutahindurwa, Pro Hac Vice, Elias Law Group LLP, Seattle, WA, Kevin J. Hamilton, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, WA, Adam Martin Sparks, Joyce Gist Lewis, Krevolin & Horst, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Christina Ashley Ford, Pro Hac Vice, Daniel C. Osher, Pro Hac Vice, Michael Brandon Jones, Graham W. White, Pro Hac Vice, Elias Law Group LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs Annie Lois Grant, Quentin T. Howell, Elroy Tolbert, Triana Arnold James, Eunice Sykes, Elbert Solomon, Dexter Wimbish in No. 1:22-CV-00122.

Makeba Rutahindurwa, Pro Hac Vice, Elias Law Group LLP, Seattle, WA, Kevin J. Hamilton, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, WA, Adam Martin Sparks, Joyce Gist Lewis, Krevolin & Horst, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs Garrett Reynolds, Jacqueline Faye Arbutnot, Jacquelyn Bush, Mary Nell Conner in No. 1:22-CV-00122.

OPINION AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

STEVE C. JONES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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*2 The right to vote “is regarded as a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.” [Yick Wo v. Hopkins](#), 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).

The voting rights act has proven the most successful civil rights statute in the history of the nation because it has reflected the overwhelming consensus in this nation that the most fundamental civil right of all citizens--the right to vote--must be preserved at whatever cost and through whatever commitment required of the federal government.

[S. REP. 97-417, 111](#), 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 282. This past summer, Chief Justice Roberts confirmed that “the essence of a § 2 claim ... [is] where an electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out minority voters’ ability to elect their preferred candidates. Such a risk is greatest where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates and where minority voters are submerged in a majority voting population that regularly defeat[s] their choices.” [Allen v. Milligan](#), 599 U.S. 1, 17–18, 143 S.Ct. 1487, 216 L.Ed.2d 60 (2023) (citing [Thornburg v. Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 30, 47–49, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (1986)) (cleaned up).

In the three cases before the Court,¹ each set of Plaintiffs argues that their voting rights have been violated by the redistricting plans recently adopted by the State of Georgia in the wake of the 2020 Census. The Court thus approaches these cases “with caution, bearing in mind that these circumstances involve ‘one of the most fundamental rights of ... citizens: the right to vote.’ ” [Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs](#), 775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

After conducting a thorough and sifting review of the evidence in this case, the Court finds that the State of Georgia violated the Voting Rights Act when it enacted its congressional and legislative maps. The Court commends Georgia for the great strides that it has made to increase the political opportunities of Black voters in the 58 years since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Despite these great gains, the Court determines that in certain areas of the State, the political process is not equally open to Black voters.

For example, in the past decade, all of Georgia's population growth was attributable to the minority population, however, the number of majority-Black congressional and legislative districts remained the same.² In light of this fact and in conjunction with all of the evidence and testimony in this case, the Court determines that Georgia's congressional and legislative maps violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and enjoins their use in any future elections.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

Having considered the evidence at trial, the Parties’ presentations (pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52\(c\)](#)), and closing arguments, this Court makes the following findings of fact.³

*3 The Court divides its discussion of the factual findings into four parts. First, the Court explains the procedural history of the three cases and describes the named Parties. Second, the Court considers the history of race and voting in Georgia and its changing demographics. Third, the Court explains its findings of fact about the creation of the 2021 congressional, Senate, and House districting plans based on the testimony and evidence introduced at a coordinated trial of these actions. Fourth, the Court sets forth its findings regarding the Illustrative Plans.

For reference, the following citations are used for support for each of the findings below:

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Citation ⁴	Document Type
<u>APA</u> Doc. No. []	Docket entry from <u>Alpha Phi Alpha</u>
<u>Grant</u> Doc. No. []	Docket entry from <u>Grant</u>
<u>Pendergrass</u> Doc. No. []	Docket entry from <u>Pendergrass</u>
Tr.	Transcript of the trial hearing held September 5-14, 2023 in all three cases. ⁵
PI Tr.	<u>APA</u> Doc. Nos. [106]-[117]; <u>Pendergrass</u> Doc. Nos. [73]-[85]; <u>Grant</u> Doc. Nos. [68]-[79]
DX	Defendants' Exhibits
APAX	<u>Alpha Phi Alpha</u> Plaintiffs' Exhibits
GX	<u>Grant</u> Plaintiffs' Exhibits
PX	<u>Pendergrass</u> Plaintiffs' Exhibits
JX	Joint Exhibits
Stip.	Stipulations filed at <u>APA</u> Doc. No. [280], Attach. E.; <u>Grant</u> Doc. No. [243], Attach. E.; <u>Pendergrass</u> Doc. No. [231], Attach. E.
Jud. Not.	Court's Order taking judicial notice at <u>APA</u> Doc. No. [284], <u>Grant</u> Doc. No. [246], <u>Pendergrass</u> Doc. No. [234]

Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnotes ⁴, ⁵].

A. Procedural History

1. Initial Filings

On December 30, 2021, Plaintiffs in the Alpha Phi Alpha case filed their Complaint against Brad Raffensperger, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Georgia. APA Doc. No. [1]. On that same date, Plaintiffs in the Pendergrass case filed their Complaint against Raffensperger and the members of the State Election Board (the "SEB"). Pendergrass Doc. No. [1]. On January 11, 2022, Plaintiffs in the Grant case filed their Complaint against Raffensperger and the SEB. Grant Doc. No. [1]. All three Complaints alleged violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended 52 U.S.C. § 10301.

On January 7, 2022, Plaintiffs in Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs filed their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. APA Doc.

Nos. [26], [39].⁶ Pendergrass Plaintiffs filed their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction on January 12, 2022 (Pendergrass Doc. No. [32]) and the following day, the Grant Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Grant Doc. No. [19]).

On January 14, 2022, Defendant Raffensperger filed his Motion to Dismiss the Alpha Phi Alpha Complaint (APA Doc. No. [43]) and Defendants Raffensperger and the State Election Board members filed their Motions to Dismiss the Pendergrass and Grant Complaints (Pendergrass Doc. No. [38], Grant Doc. No. [23]). Defendants' motions primarily advanced two arguments: (1) Section 2 did not create a private right of action, therefore, Plaintiffs could not bring their claims and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) required the Alpha Phi Alpha and Grant Plaintiffs' claims be heard by a three-judge court. Id. The Parties then briefed the Motions to Dismiss and for Preliminary Injunction on an expedited basis (APA Doc. Nos. [45]-[47], [58], [59], Pendergrass Doc. Nos. [39], [40], [44], [45], Grant Doc. Nos. [24]-[25], [35], [37]).

*4 The Court denied Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. APA Doc. No. [65], Pendergrass Doc. No. [50], Grant Doc. No. [43]. The Court concluded that the text of Section 2284 does not require a plaintiff to request a three-judge court for purely statutory challenges to the apportionment of congressional districts and statewide legislative bodies. Id. The Court further concluded that Plaintiffs could assert their claims because, for the past forty-five years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have allowed private individuals to assert challenges under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id.

2. Preliminary Injunction

After denying the motions to dismiss, in February 2022, the Court convened a coordinated hearing on the motions for preliminary injunction. APA Doc. No. [127], Pendergrass Doc. No. [90], Grant Doc. No. [84].

On the first day of the preliminary injunction hearing, the United States Supreme Court granted the State of Alabama's motion to stay a three-judge district court's order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of a challenge to Alabama's congressional map under Section 2. Merrill v. Milligan, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 879, --- L.Ed.2d — (2022). The Supreme Court then accepted certiorari and placed the case on its October 2022 term calendar. Id. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, wrote separately to concur in the stay. See

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generally *id.* at 879–82. In his concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh first emphasized that the stay was not a ruling on the merits, but followed Supreme Court election-law precedent that established that federal courts generally “should not enjoin state election laws in the period close to an election.” *Id.* at 879 (citing *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006)) (per curiam).

The Court allowed the Parties in the cases *sub judice* to submit briefing and oral argument on the effect of the *Milligan* stay order. *APA* Doc. Nos. [97], [127]–[131], *Pendergrass* Doc. Nos. [65], [91]–[95], *Grant* Doc. Nos. [59], [85]–[89]. The Court thereafter decided to proceed with the preliminary injunction hearing. Over the course of the six-day preliminary injunction hearing—February 7 through February 14, 2022—the Court admitted various pieces of evidence and heard testimony from a variety of expert and fact witnesses. *Id.*

On February 28, 2022, the Court issued its Preliminary Injunction Order. The Court found a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in that additional majority-Black districts should have been drawn. The General Assembly should have drawn an additional majority-Black congressional district in the west-metro Atlanta (*Pendergrass* Plaintiffs); two additional majority-Black State Senate districts in south-metro Atlanta (*Grant*); two additional majority-Black State House districts in the south-metro Atlanta (*Grant*), and one additional majority-Black State House district in southwestern Georgia (*Alpha Phi Alpha*). *Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Inc. v. Raffensperger*, 587 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1243–320 (N.D. Ga. 2022).⁷ In light of the Supreme Court's decision to stay the *Milligan* case, the Court ultimately denied the preliminary injunction finding that the balance of harms and public interest weighed against granting the injunction. *Id.* at 1321–27. Specifically, the Court found based upon the evidence presented that “the public interest of the State of Georgia would be significantly undermined by altering the election calendar and unwinding the electoral process” as of the date of its ruling. *Id.* at 1324.

*5 Pursuant to *Federal Rule of Civil Procedure* 65(a)(2), certain evidence that was received on the preliminary injunction motions (in a format admissible at trial) has become a part of the trial record.

3. Discovery and Summary Judgment

Following the preliminary injunction hearing, all Plaintiffs amended their complaints and engaged in a nine-month discovery period. *APA* Doc. Nos. [133], [141], *Pendergrass* Doc. Nos. [96], [120], *Grant* Doc. No. [90], [96]. Following discovery, Defendants filed Motions for Summary Judgment in all three cases. *APA* Doc. No. [230], *Pendergrass* Doc. No. [175], *Grant* Doc. No. [190]. The *Pendergrass* and *Grant* Plaintiffs also filed Motions for Summary Judgment. *Pendergrass* Doc. No. [173], *Grant* Doc. No. [189]. On May 18, 2023, the Court heard argument on the pending motions. *APA* Doc. No. [260], *Pendergrass* Doc. No. [209], *Grant* Doc. No. [224]. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court informed the Parties that it would not rule on the motions for summary judgment until after the Supreme Court issued its opinion for the *Allen* case.

On June 8, 2023, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision in *Allen*, 599 U.S. 1, 143 S.Ct. 1487, 216 L.Ed.2d 60, affirming the three-judge court's *Grant* of the preliminary injunction.⁸ Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, upheld the existing three-part framework developed in *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752 and found under a clear error review that the three-judge district court did not err in finding a substantial likelihood of success on a Section 2 violation. *Id.*⁹

Following the Supreme Court's *Allen* decision, the Parties provided supplemental briefing. *APA* Doc. Nos. [263], [264], *Pendergrass* Doc. Nos. [212], [214], *Grant* Doc. Nos. [227], [228]. The Court then denied all pending motions for summary judgment. *APA* Doc. No. [268], *Pendergrass* Doc. No. [215], *Grant* Doc. No. [229]. In all three cases, the Court found that issues of fact and credibility remained on all three *Gingles* preconditions as well as the totality of the circumstances. *Id.*

4. Trial

The Parties then proceeded to trial on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' affirmative defenses. Although the Court did not consolidate the three cases, at the trial, the Court heard all three cases at once (utilizing coordinated hearing procedures). For the sake of clarity, the Court required the Parties to clearly state on the Record which testimony and which pieces of evidence were attributed to which case. *APA* Doc. No. [286], *Pendergrass* Doc. No. [236], *Grant* Doc. No. [248]. Over the course of the eight-day trial—spanning from September 5, 2023 through September 14, 2023—the Court heard from 20 live witnesses and accepted testimony from 22

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witnesses via deposition (APA Doc. No. [292], Pendergrass Doc. No. [243], Grant Doc. No. [254]).

At the conclusion of all three Plaintiffs' presentations of evidence, Defendants moved for Judgment on Partial Findings of Fact pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c). APA Doc. No. [305], Pendergrass Doc. No. [255], Grant Doc. No. [264]. The Court verbally denied the motion. APA Doc. No. [306], Pendergrass Doc. No. [257], Grant Doc. No. [266]. Defendants then proceeded to present their case-in-chief. The Court heard closing arguments and took the matter under advisement. APA Doc. No. [308], Pendergrass Doc. No. [259], Grant Doc. No. [268].

5. Post-Trial Proceedings

*6 Following the trial, all Parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the Court's consideration. APA Doc. Nos. [317], [318], Pendergrass Doc. Nos. [268], [269], Grant Doc. Nos. [277], [278].¹⁰ The Court has adopted and rejected portions of the Parties' submissions.

B. The Named Parties

1. Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs

a) Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Inc.

Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Inc. is the first intercollegiate Greek-letter fraternity established for Black men. Stip. ¶ 51. Alpha Phi Alpha has programs to raise political awareness, register voters, and empower Black communities. Stip. ¶ 53. Alpha Phi Alpha has thousands of members throughout Georgia. Stip. ¶ 52.

Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Alpha Phi Alpha has members who live in State Senate Districts 16, 17, and 23 and State House Districts 74, 114, 117, 128, 133, 134, 145, 171, and 173. Id. Harry Mays is a member of Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Inc. Doc. No. [94], at 2 ¶ 4; Stip. ¶ 54. Mr. Mays resides in House District 117 under the State's 2021 House Plan, and under Plaintiffs' illustrative maps would reside in a new majority-Black House District. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.

b) Sixth District African Methodist Episcopal Church

The Sixth District of the African Methodist Episcopal Church ("Sixth District AME") is a nonprofit religious organization. Stip. ¶ 57. The Sixth District AME is one of twenty districts of the AME Church and covers all of Georgia. Stip. ¶ 58. One of its core tenets is encouraging and supporting civic participation among its members through voter registration, transporting churchgoers to the polls, hosting "Get Out the Vote" efforts, and providing food, water and encouragement to people waiting in lines at the polls. Stip. ¶ 62.

Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, member-churches of the Sixth District AME are located in State Senate Districts 16, 17, and 23 and State House Districts 74, 114, 117, 128, 133, 134, 145, 171, and 173. Stip. ¶ 61. Plaintiff Phil S. Brown is a member of the Lofton Circuit AME Church in Wrens, Georgia, and Plaintiff Janice Stewart is a member of the Saint Peter AME Church in Camilla, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 63–64.

c) Individually-named Plaintiffs in the APA case

Eric T. Woods is a Black resident of Tyrone, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 65, 66. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Mr. Woods is a registered voter in State Senate District 16. Stip. ¶¶ 67, 68. Katie Bailey Glenn is a Black resident of McDonough, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 70, 71. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Ms. Bailey is a registered voter in State Senate District 17. Stip. ¶¶ 72, 73. Phil S. Brown is a Black resident of Wrens, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 75, 76. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Mr. Brown is a registered voter in State Senate District 23. Stip. ¶¶ 77, 78. Janice Stewart is a Black resident of Thomasville, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 80, 81. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Ms. Stewart is a registered voter in State House District 173. Stip. ¶¶ 82, 83.

2. Pendergrass Plaintiffs

*7 Coakley Pendergrass is a Black resident of Cobb County, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 1, 2. Under the Enacted Congressional Plan, Mr. Coakley is a registered voter in Congressional District 11. Stip. ¶ 3. Triana Arnold is a Black resident of Douglas County, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 4, 5. Under the Enacted Congressional Plan, Ms. Arnold is a registered voter in Congressional District 3. Stip. ¶ 6. Elliott Hennington is a Black resident of Cobb County, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 7, 8. Under the Enacted

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Congressional Plan, Mr. Hennington is a registered voter in Congressional District 14. Stip. ¶ 9. Robert Richards is a Black resident of Cobb County, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 10, 11. Under the Enacted Congressional Plan, he is a registered voter in Congressional District 14. Stip. ¶ 12. Jens Rueckert is a Black resident of Cobb County, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 13, 14. Under the Enacted Congressional Plan, Mr. Rueckert is a registered voter in Congressional District 14. Stip. ¶ 15. Ojuan Glaze is a Black resident of Douglas County, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 16, 17. Under the Enacted Congressional Plan, Mr. Glaze is a registered voter in Congressional District 13. Stip. ¶ 18.

3. *Grant Plaintiffs*

Annie Lois Grant is a Black resident of Union Point, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 19, 20. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Ms. Grant is a registered voter in State Senate District 24 and State House District 124. Stip. ¶ 20. Quentin T. Howell is a Black resident of Milledgeville, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 21, 22. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Mr. Howell is a registered voter in State Senate District 25 and State House District 133. Stip. ¶ 23. Elroy Tolbert is a Black resident of Macon, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 24, 25. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Mr. Tolbert is a registered voter in State Senate District 18 and State House District 144. Stip. ¶ 26. Triana Arnold James is a Black resident of Villa Rica, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 27, 28. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Ms. James is a registered voter in State Senate District 30 and State House District 64. Stip. ¶ 29. Eunice Sykes is a Black resident of Locust Grove, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 30, 31. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Ms. Sykes is a registered voter in State Senate District 25 and State House District 117. Stip. ¶ 33. Elbert Solomon is a Black resident of Griffin, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 33, 34. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Mr. Solomon is a registered voter in State Senate District 16 and State House District 117. Stip. ¶ 35.

Dexter Wimbish is a Black resident of Griffin, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 36, 37. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Mr. Wimbish is a registered voter in State Senate District 16 and State House District 74. Stip. ¶ 38. Garrett Reynolds is a Black resident of Tyrone, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 39, 40. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Mr. Reynolds is a registered voter in State Senate District 16 and State House District 68. Stip. ¶ 41. Jacqueline Faye Arbuthnot is a Black resident of Powder Springs, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 42, 43. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Ms. Arbuthnot is a registered voter in State Senate District 31 and State House District 64. Stip. ¶ 44.

Jacquelyn Bush is a Black resident of Fayetteville, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 45, 46. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Ms. Bush is a registered voter in State Senate District 16 and State House District 74. Stip. ¶ 47. Mary Nell Conner is a Black resident of Henry County, Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 48, 49. Under the Enacted Legislative Plans, Ms. Conner is a registered voter in State Senate District 25 and State House District 117. Stip. ¶ 50.

4. *Defendants*

a) Brad Raffensperger

Brad Raffensperger is the Georgia Secretary of State. Stip. ¶ 85. The Secretary of State is a constitutional officer elected by Georgia voters every four years. [Ga. Const. Art. 5, § 3, par. 1](#). Under Georgia law, the Secretary of State is required:

(1) [t]o determine the forms of nomination petitions, ballots, and other forms;

....

(6) [t]o receive from the superintendent the returns of primaries and elections and to canvass and compute the votes cast for candidates and upon questions;

....

(13) [t]o prepare and furnish information for citizens on voter registration and voting; and

*8

(15) [t]o develop, program, building, and review ballots for use by counties and municipalities on voting systems in use in the state.

[O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50\(a\)](#).

b) The State Election Board¹¹

The State Election Board (“SEB”) was created by legislation codified in the Georgia’s Election Code, [O.C.G.A. § 21-2-30\(a\)](#). It consists of five members, including a representative of each of the two major political parties. [Id. § 21-2-30\(c\)](#). Sarah Tindall Ghazal, Janice Johnston, Edward

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Lindsey, and Matthew Mashburn serve as members of the SEB. Stip. ¶¶ 86–89.¹²

Under Georgia law, moreover, the SEB has a statutory duty to “formulate, adopt, and promulgate such rules and regulations, consistent with law, as will be conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections.” *O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(2)*. Georgia law also tasks the SEB with “investigat[ing] or authoriz[ing] the Secretary of State to investigate, when necessary or advisable[,] the administration of primary and election laws and frauds and irregularities in primaries and elections and to report violations of the primary and election laws either to the Attorney General or the appropriate district attorney” *Id. § 21-2-31(5)*. Furthermore, the SEB is “vested with the power to issue orders, after the completion of appropriate proceedings, directing compliance with [the Election Code] or prohibiting the actual or threatened commission of any conduct constituting a violation” *Id. § 21-2-33.1(a)*.

Additionally, Georgia law tasks the SEB with oversight authority over the counties. *See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31(1)* (“It shall be the duty of the [SEB] ... [t]o promulgate rules and regulations so as to obtain uniformity in the practices and proceedings of superintendents, registrars, deputy registrars, poll officers, and other officials, as well as the legality and purity in all primaries and elections[.]”); *id. at § 21-2-31(2)* (“[t]o formulate, adopt, and promulgate such rules and regulations, consistent with law, as will be conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections”); *id. at § 21-2-31(5)* (“[t]o investigate, or authorize the Secretary of State to investigate, when necessary or advisable the administration of primary and election laws and frauds and irregularities in primaries and elections and to report violations of the primary and election laws either to the Attorney General or the appropriate district attorney who shall be responsible for further investigation and prosecution.”).

C. History of Race and Voting in Georgia

*9 In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”). While the VRA has been amended several times, as originally adopted, Section 2 prohibited practices that denied or abridged the right to vote “on account of” race or color. *See Allen*, 599 U.S. at 11 n.1, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970 ed.)).

The Act was amended in 1982. *Id. at 11, 143 S.Ct. 1487*. Section 4 of the VRA (the “coverage formula”) determined which jurisdictions were “covered” and were required to submit new voting procedures or practices for prior approval (“preclearance”) by the Department of Justice or a district court panel of three judges, pursuant to Section 5. *See James D. Wascher, Recognizing the 50th Anniversary of the Voting Rights Act, Fed. Law.*, May 2015, at 41 (hereinafter, “Wascher”). The VRA thus “employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem.” *Shelby Cnty. v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529, 534, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013). Georgia was a covered jurisdiction because in the 1960s and early 1970s, the whole state had low voter registration or turnout and maintained tests or devices as prerequisites to voting (i.e., poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfathering rules). *Id. at 536–37, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (28 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. (2012))*.

During Georgia's last redistricting cycle in 2011, which was subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) precleared Georgia's proposed State Senate, State House, and Congressional Plans. *See Jud. Not.*¹³

Following those determinations, in 2013, the Supreme Court held that the coverage formula was no longer constitutional because it had not been reformulated since 1975. *Shelby Cnty.*, 570 U.S. at 538, 556–57, 133 S.Ct. 2612. As a result, the State of Georgia is no longer a covered jurisdiction and is no longer required to send district plans or any proposed voting practices or procedural changes to the DOJ for preclearance. The 2020 redistricting cycle is the first in which Georgia was not required to seek preclearance before adopting its new congressional and legislative plans.

D. Georgia's Changing Demographics

1. Georgia's Total Population

Between 2000 and 2010, Georgia's population increased by a little over 1.5 million people (from 8,186,453 to 9,687,653), which marked a population growth rate of 18.34%. PX 1, fig.3. The growth of the minority population accounted for approximately 14.85% of this growth rate, the Any-Part Black (“AP Black”)¹⁴ population alone accounted for 8.07%, and the white population accounted for approximately 3.48% of Georgia's growth rate. *Id.* During this time, the minority population increased by 1,215,941 people and had a

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growth rate of 34.66%. PX 1, fig.3. The AP Black population increased by 660,673 people and had a growth rate of 27.60%. *Id.* Meanwhile, Georgia's white population grew by 285,259 people and had a growth rate of 5.56%. *Id.* Following the 2010 Census, as a result of population growth, Georgia was apportioned a 14th Congressional District. Stip. ¶ 94. During this time, the growth of the minority population outpaced the white population by approximately 6 times and the Black population outpaced the white population by approximately 5 times.

*10 In 2020, the United States Census Bureau conducted the 2020 Census. The Census results were provided to Georgia on August 21, 2021. Stip. ¶ 92. Between 2010 and 2020 Georgia's total population increased by over a million people to 10,711,908, which marked a population growth rate of 10.57%. *Id.* ¶ 93; PX 1, fig.3; Tr. 718:4–6. The growth of the minority population accounted for approximately 11.11% of this growth rate, the AP Black population alone accounted for 5.00%, and the white population accounted for approximately -0.53% of Georgia's growth rate. *Id.* Meaning, all of Georgia's population growth during the past decade is attributable to the growth of the minority population. PX 1 ¶ 14, fig.1, Tr. 718:7–15. During this time, the minority population increased by 1,076,019 people and had a growth rate of 25.18%. PX 1, fig.3. The AP Black population increased by 484,048 people and had a growth rate of 15.85%. *Id.* Meanwhile, Georgia's white population decreased by 51,764 people and had a negative growth rate of -0.9%. *Id.* Over the past two decades, Georgia's Black and minority populations continued to have a double-digit rate of growth; whereas, in the last decade, the white population has begun to decline in Georgia.

In total numbers, Georgia's AP Black population increased by 484,048 people since 2010. Stip. ¶ 95; PX 1 ¶ 14, fig.3. Between 2010 and 2020 the AP Black population accounted for 47.26% of Georgia's total population growth. Stip. ¶¶ 96, 102; PX 1 ¶ 14 & fig.1. And the proportion of the AP Black population overall increased from 31.53% to 33.03% over the same period. Stip. ¶ 102; PX 1 ¶ 16. Meanwhile, Georgia's single-race white population decreased by 51,764 people and makes up 50.06% of Georgia's population, which is a razor thin majority of Georgia's population. Stip. ¶¶ 99, 102. Georgia's minority population now totals 49.94%. PX 1 ¶ 14 & fig.1.

2. Metro Atlanta

The Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area (“Atlanta MSA”)¹⁵ had a population growth of 803,087 persons between 2010 and 2020, which accounts for approximately 78.41% of Georgia's total population growth. Stip. ¶ 107; PX. 1 ¶ 14 & fig.1; *id.* ¶ 30 & fig.5. The AP Black population accounted for 409,927 of those persons, which amounts to 51.04% of the population growth in Atlanta and 40.02% of Georgia's population growth. *Id.* The AP Black population is 35.91% of the Atlanta MSA, which was an increase from 33.61% in 2010. Stip. ¶ 108. The AP Black population accounts for 34.86% of the Atlanta MSA's total voting age population. Stip. ¶ 110.

According to the 2020 Census, the Atlanta MSA has a total voting-age population of 4,654,322 persons, of whom 1,622,469 (34.86%) are AP Black. Stip. ¶ 110. The non-Hispanic white voting-age population is 4,342,333 (52.1%). PX 1 ¶ 31 & fig.6. And, the 11 ARC counties account for more than half (54.7%) of the statewide Black population. PX 1 ¶ 28.

Based on the 2020 Census, the combined Black population in Cobb, Fulton, Douglas, and Fayette Counties is 807,076 persons, more than necessary to constitute an entirely AP Black congressional district¹⁶—or a majority in two congressional districts. PX 1 ¶ 42 & fig.8. The population is 100,000 people more than needed to constitute an entirely AP Black Senate district¹⁷ in this area, and nearly 5 entirely AP Black House Districts.¹⁸ More than half (53.27%) of the total population increase in these four counties since 2010 can be attributed to the increase in the Black population. PX 1 ¶ 43.

*11 The southeastern metro-Atlanta area has experienced similar growth patterns. In 2000, 18.51% of the population in the five-county Fayette-Spalding-Henry-Rockdale-Newton area was Black. Stip. ¶ 114; APAX 1, 25 & fig.7. By 2010, the Black population in that area more than doubled to reach 36.70% of the overall population, then grew to 46.57% in 2020. *Id.* Between 2000 and 2020, the Black population in this five-county South Metro Atlanta area quadrupled, from 74,249 to 294,914. Stip. ¶ 115. This area is now plurality Black. APAX 1, 25 & fig.7. Fayette and Spalding Counties have seen Black population increases of 54.5% and 18.7%, respectively, since 2010. APAX 1, at 40 ¶ 97. Henry County's Black population has increased by 39.3% in the last decade, and Henry County is now plurality Black. *Id.* ¶ 102. As Mr. Cooper explained, in the 1990s, Henry County was not even

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“10 percent Black” but the county has “change[d] over time.”
Tr. 116:17–18.

Meanwhile, under the 2000 Census, the population in the 29-county Atlanta MSA was 60.42% non-Hispanic white, decreased to 50.78% in 2010, and decreased further to 43.71% in 2020. PX 1 ¶ 25 & fig.4. Between 2010 and 2020, the non-Hispanic white population in the Atlanta MSA decreased by 22,736 persons. Stip. ¶ 112; PX 1 ¶ 25 & fig.4; Tr. 721:19–23.

3. The Black Belt

The Black Belt refers to an area that runs across the southeastern United States. Stip. ¶ 118. The Black Belt, is in part, characterized by significant Black populations and a shared history of antebellum slavery and plantation agriculture. *Id.* Georgia's portion of the Black Belt runs across the middle of the State between Augusta and Southwest Georgia. Stip. ¶ 119. Unlike, the Atlanta MSA, it is not comprised of a specific set of whole counties.

a) Eastern Black Belt Region

The Georgia Department of Community Affairs (“GDCA”) has prepared regional commission maps, including of the Central Savannah River Area region. APAX 1, 13 ¶ 26; *id.* at 118-119, Ex. F. The Central Savannah River Area Counties include: Jenkins, Burke, Richmond, Jefferson, McDuffie, Wilkes, Taliaferro, Glascock, Warren, Washington, and Hancock. Ten of these 11 contiguous counties—excluding Glascock—are identified as part of Georgia's Black Belt by the Georgia Budget and Policy Institute. APAX 1, 13–14 ¶ 27; DX 22, at 20–25; Stip. ¶¶ 120–123. Mr. Cooper defined this set of 11 counties as part of the “Eastern Black Belt.” APAX 1 ¶ 24. These same counties are consistent with Mr. Esselstyn's understanding of the eastern portion of the Black Belt. GX 1 ¶ 19 & fig.1.

According to Mr. Cooper's analysis, between 2000 and 2020, the total population in the Eastern Black Belt has remained relatively constant. APAX 1 ¶ 58 & fig.8. And, at least 40% of these eleven counties are AP Black and over the past two decades, their share of the population increased from 50.66% to 54.62%. Stip. ¶¶ 120, 122. Meanwhile, the white population decreased from 45.61% to 38.17% of the population over the same period. Stip. ¶ 123. In other

words, the Black population in this area has become more concentrated over time, and now comprises a majority.

b) Metro-Macon Region

Metropolitan Macon is a seven-county region in Middle Georgia defined by the combined Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) of Macon-Bibb and Warner Robins. Stip. ¶ 124; APAX 1, at 15–16 ¶ 33. The Macon-Bibb MSA includes the counties of Twiggs, Macon-Bibb, Jones, Monroe, and Crawford. Stip. ¶ 124; APAX 1, at 16 n.14. The adjacent Warner Robins MSA encompasses Houston and Peach Counties. Stip. ¶ 124; APAX 1, 16 n.14. Three of the Macon-area counties are “identified as part of Georgia's Black Belt”—Macon, Bibb, Peach, and Twiggs, encompassing about 59% of the Black population (177,269) in the seven-county region. APAX 1, 29; GX 1 ¶ 19 & fig.1. Between 2000 and 2020, the AP Black population increased from 36.89% to 41.67% of the Macon MSA. Stip. ¶ 126. Meanwhile, the white population decreased from 59.40% to 49.10% of the Macon MSA. Stip. ¶ 127.

c) Southwestern Georgia Region

*12 The relevant counties in southwest Georgia include: Sumpter, Webster, Stewart, Quitman, Clay, Randolph, Terrell, Calhoun, Dougherty, Early, Baker, and Mitchell. Stip. ¶¶ 128–132. Twelve of the thirteen counties in Senate District 12—all but Miller County—are identified by the Georgia Budget and Policy Institute as Black Belt counties. APAX 1, 15 ¶ 32; DX 22, at 20–25. At least 40% of this region is AP Black, and all but Miller County is at least 40% AP Black. Stip. ¶ 128. Between 2000 and 2020, the population decreased in this area from 214,686 to 190,819 (11.12%). Stip. ¶ 130. While the AP Black and white populations have decreased over the past two decades, the share of the AP Black population increased from 55.33% to 60.6%, and the white population decreased from 42.36% to 33.83%. Stip. ¶¶ 131, 132.

E. Georgia 2021 Enacted Plans

1. The 2021 Redistricting Process

a) Legislative activities

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In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Georgia General Assembly underwent the constitutionally required process of redistricting. Article One, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides: “Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within the Union, according to their respective Numbers The actual Enumeration shall be made ... every [] Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

In 2021 and prior to the public release of the redistricting plans, the House Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment and Senate Reapportionment and Redistricting Committees adopted guidelines. Stip. ¶¶ 134, 135. The general principles for drafting plans for the House Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment Committee are as follows:

III. REDISTRICTING PLANS

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR DRAFTING PLANS

1. Each congressional district should be drawn with a total population of plus or minus one person from the ideal district size.
2. Each legislative district of the General Assembly should be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable, considering the principles listed below.
3. All plans adopted by the Committee will comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.
4. All plans adopted by the Committee will comply with the United States and Georgia Constitutions.
5. Districts shall be composed of contiguous geography. Districts that connect on a single point are not contiguous.
6. No multi-member districts shall be drawn on any legislative redistricting plan.
7. The Committee should consider:
 - a. The boundaries of counties and precincts;
 - b. Compactness; and
 - c. Communities of interest.

8. Efforts should be made to avoid the unnecessary pairing of incumbents.

9. The identifying of these criteria is not intended to limit the consideration of any other principles or factors that the Committee deems appropriate.

Stip. ¶ 134; JX 2, 3. The general principles for drafting plans for the Senate Reapportionment and Redistricting Committee are as follows:

III. REDISTRICTING PLANS

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR DRAFTING PLANS

1. Each congressional district should be drawn with a total population of plus or minus one person from the ideal district size.
2. Each legislative district of the General Assembly should be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable, considering the principles listed below.
3. All plans adopted by the Committee will comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.
4. All plans adopted by the Committee will comply with the United States and Georgia Constitutions.
5. Districts shall be composed of contiguous geography. Districts that connect on a single point are not contiguous.
6. No multi-member districts shall be drawn on any legislative redistricting plan.
7. The Committee should consider:
 - a. The boundaries of counties and precincts;
 - b. Compactness; and
 - c. Communities of interest.
8. Efforts should be made to avoid the unnecessary pairing of incumbents.
9. The identifying of these criteria is not intended to limit the consideration of any other principles or factors that the Committee deems appropriate.

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Stip. ¶ 135; JX 1, 3.

The redistricting process consisted of the following actions. Beginning on June 15, 2021 and between June and July of 2021, the Georgia General Assembly held nine in-person and two virtual joint public hearing committees on redistricting. Stip. ¶ 136. The joint redistricting committee released educational videos about the redistricting process. Stip. ¶ 137. The Georgia General Assembly created an online portal and received 1,000 comments from voters in 86 counties. Stip. ¶ 138.

On August 21, 2021, the Census Bureau released its detailed population data gathered from its 2020 canvassing efforts. Stip. ¶ 140. On August 30, 2021, the General Assembly's joint redistricting committees held a meeting with interest groups. Stip. ¶ 141. The National Conference of State Legislatures, American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia, Common Cause, Fair Districts GA, the Democratic Party of Georgia, and Asian-Americans Advancing Justice—Atlanta presented at the August 30, 2021 joint meeting. Stip. ¶ 142.

b)Map drawing process

Gina Wright, the Executive Director of the Georgia General Assembly's Office of Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment, testified at trial that she drew Georgia's redistricting plans for Congress, State Senate, and State House in 2021. Tr. 1605:14–16. As a fact witness, the Court found Ms. Wright to be highly credible in her knowledge about Georgia's map drawing process. The Court also found Ms. Wright's testimony about various areas of the state to be credible and reliable.

Ms. Wright testified that generally she began drafting the new legislative plans by using blank maps, rather than starting from the existing plans. Tr. 1622:11–17; 1642:7–14. She then put the ideal population size, using the Census population, into the blank map. Tr. 1622:11–13. At times, she layered the new maps with the former map to see if she retained core districts. Tr. 1607:8–1621:18–22. Ms. Wright used the eyeball test and did not look at compactness scores when she drew the congressional and legislative districts. Tr. 1610:3–1611:12.

*13 Once she drew the blind map, she gave the map to the chairmen of the House Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment and Senate Reapportionment and

Redistricting Committees. Tr. 1623:4–6. Ms. Wright then made adjustments as requested by Senator Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Reapportionment and Redistricting Committee, Representative Bonnie Rich, a former member of the House Reapportionment and Redistricting Committee, and other members, if requested. Tr. 1626:10–1627:1; 1641:24–1642:1. Ms. Wright also incorporated the information she received from the public hearings when drawing the plans. Tr. 1627:2–13.

The Congressional map was drawn in a slightly different manner. Instead of starting with a blank map, Ms. Wright testified that the chairman asked her to draw a benchmark map that had a more specific framework than the State legislative plans. Tr. 1666:5–11. There was no testimony or further explanation about the specific framework that was requested to go into the benchmark map.

The Proposed 2021 Senate and House Plans were first released on November 2, 2021. Stip. ¶ 143. Following their release, the joint redistricting committees received public comment on the proposed maps. Stip. ¶ 146. On November 3, 2021, the General Assembly convened a special session, in part, to consider the proposed Senate and House Plans. Stip. ¶ 144. The House and Senate redistricting committees held multiple meetings during the special session. Stip. ¶ 145. During this time, the House and Senate redistricting committees received public comment on the draft plans during their committee meetings. Stip. ¶ 146.

On November 12, 2021, the General Assembly passed the 2021 Senate and House Plans (SB 1EX and HB 1EX, respectively) (collectively, the “Enacted Legislative Plans,” individually, the “Enacted Senate Plan” and “Enacted House Plan”). Stip. ¶ 147. On November 22, 2021, the General Assembly passed the 2021 Congressional Redistricting Plan (the “Enacted Congressional Plan”). Stip. ¶ 148. No Democratic members of the General Assembly or Black representatives voted in favor of the 2021 Enacted Congressional, Enacted Senate, or Enacted House Plans (collectively “the Enacted Plans”). Stip. ¶¶ 150, 151. On December 30, 2021, Governor Kemp signed the Enacted Plans into law. Stip. ¶ 149. The Enacted Plans were used in the 2022 Elections. Stip. ¶ 152.

2. Enacted Plan Statistics

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a) Congressional Plan

(1) 2012 Congressional plan

The 2012 Congressional Plan was precleared under Section 5 of the VRA by the DOJ. See Jud. Not.; see also Attorney General Press Release, <https://law.georgia.gov/press-releases/2011-12-23/justice-approves-georgias-redistricting-plans>; Charles Bullock, [The History of Redistricting in Georgia](#), 52 Ga. L. Rev. 1057, 1097–98 (Summer 2018).

Pursuant to the population increase shown in the 2010 Census results, for the first time, Georgia was apportioned an additional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, making Georgia's U.S. House of Representative delegation a total of 14 members. See United States Census Bureau, Historical Apportionment Data (1910-2020), <https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/dec/apportionment-data-text.html> (last visited Sept. 15, 2023).¹⁹


*14 The 2012 Congressional Plan contained four districts where the AP Black Voting Age Population (“AP BVAP”) was in the majority. Stip. ¶ 160. Three of those districts were located within the Atlanta MSA. Stip. ¶ 162. The 2012 Congressional Plan split 16 counties. Stip. ¶ 165. The average Reock Score²⁰ for the 2012 Congressional Plan is 0.45 and the average Polsby-Popper Score²¹ is 0.26. Stip. ¶ 168; PX 1, Ex. L-2.

District ²²	2012 Congressional Plan Reock Score	2012 Congressional Plan Polsby-Popper Score
1	0.40	0.23
*2	0.44	0.31
3	0.55	0.28
*4	0.54	0.27
*5	0.52	0.37
6	0.49	0.27
7	0.45	0.26
8	0.33	0.16
9	0.36	0.30
10	0.52	0.27
11	0.50	0.28
12	0.41	0.19
*13	0.38	0.16
14	0.45	0.31
Mean	0.45	0.26
Max:	0.55	0.37
Min:	0.33	0.16

[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnote²²].

(2) Enacted Congressional Plan

Pursuant to the 2020 Census, Georgia was apportioned 14 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Stip. ¶ 94. A colorized version of the Enacted Congressional Plan was introduced into evidence at trial and is below.




PX 1, Ex. G. The Enacted Congressional Plan contains four districts where the non-Hispanic Department of Justice Black citizen voting age population (“NH DOJ BCVAP”)²³ is in the majority—CD-2 (50.001%), CD-4 (58.46%), CD-5 (52.35%), and CD-13 (67.05%). Stip. ¶ 161; PX 1 ¶ 53 & fig.11. The AP BVAP, however, only exceeds 50% in 2 districts CD-4 (54.54%) and CD-13 (66.75%). The AP BVAP of CD-2 is 49.29% and CD-5 is 49.60%. PX 1, Ex. K-1. All but one of those districts is contained in the Atlanta MSA. Stip. ¶ 166; PX 1, Ex. J-2. The Enacted Congressional Plan splits 15 counties. Stip. ¶ 164. It also split 46 VTDS.²⁴ PX 1 ¶ 81. The average Reock Score for the 2021 Congressional Plan is 0.44 and the average Polsby-Popper Score is 0.27. Stip. ¶ 168; PX 1, Ex. L-3.

A table that shows the Reock and Polsby score comparisons is as follows:

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District ²⁵	2021 Congressional Plan Reock Score	2021 Congressional Plan Polsby-Popper Score
1	0.46	0.29
*2	0.46	0.27
3	0.46	0.28
*4	0.31	0.25
*5	0.51	0.32
6	0.42	0.20
7	0.50	0.39
8	0.34	0.21
9	0.38	0.25
10	0.56	0.28
11	0.48	0.21
12	0.50	0.28
*13	0.38	0.16
14	0.43	0.37
Mean	0.44	0.27
Max:	0.56	0.39
Min:	0.31	0.16

Below is the Enacted Senate Plan:



[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnote²⁵].

PX 1, Ex. L-3.

b)State Senate Plan

*15 Under Georgia law, “[t]here shall be 56 members of the Senate. The General Assembly shall by general law divide the state into 56 Senate districts which shall be composed of a portion of a county or counties or a combination thereof and shall be represented by one Senator elected only by the electors of such district.” O.C.G.A. § 28-2-2; see also Ga. Const. art. III, § 2, ¶ I. The ideal population for a Senate district in 191,284 people. Stip. ¶ 277.

APAX 1, Ex. L.

Under the Enacted Senate Plan, the greatest population deviation is ±1.03%. *Id.* The average population deviation is 0.53%. *Id.* The Enacted Senate Plan split 29 counties. APAX 1 ¶ 116; fig.21. It also split 40 VTDs. *Id.* The Enacted Senate Plan did not pair any incumbents who were running for reelection. Stip. ¶ 175.

The Enacted Senate Plan contains 14 Senate districts where the ABVAP is the majority of the population, ten of the districts are fully within the Atlanta MSA. Stip. ¶¶ 176, 186; APAX 1, Ex. M-1. This is a reduction of one majority-Black district in the Senate Plan as a whole. Stip. ¶¶ 173, 177 (indicating that the 2014 Senate Plan contained 15 majority-Black Senate Districts with 10 wholly within the Atlanta MSA). The following is a Table depicting the majority AP Black districts and the percentage of the districts that is AP BVAP.

District	% AP BVAP
10	71.46
12	57.97
15	54.00

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22	56.50
26	56.99
34	69.54
35	71.90
36	51.34
38	65.30
39	60.70
41	62.61
43	64.33
44	71.34
55	65.97

APAX 1, M-1.

The Enacted Senate Plan has an average Reock score of 0.43 and Polsby-Popper Score of 0.27. Stip. 189; APAX 1, Ex. S-2.

The maximum and minimum Reock scores are 0.68 and 0.14.

Id. The maximum and minimum Polsby-Popper scores are 0.62 and 0.11. Id. The compactness scores for the majority-Black districts are as follows:

Districts	Reock Score	Polsby-Popper Score
10	0.37	0.27
12	0.53	0.28
15	0.56	0.33
22	0.39	0.34
26	0.47	0.21
34	0.40	0.32
35	0.42	0.18
36	0.25	0.28
38	0.47	0.21
39	0.14	0.11
41	0.31	0.21
43	0.56	0.27
44	0.19	0.18
55	0.25	0.23

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APAX 1, S-2.


c)State House Plan

Under Georgia law, “[t]here shall be 180 members of the House of Representatives.” O.C.G.A. § 28-2-1(a)(1); see also Ga. Const. art. III, § 2, ¶ I. The Georgia Code further provides that: “[t]he General Assembly by general law shall divide the state into 180 representative districts which shall consist of either a portion of a county or a county or counties or any combination thereof and shall be represented by one Representative elected only by the electors of such district.” O.C.G.A. § 28-2-1 (a)(1)–(2); Stip. ¶ 179. The ideal population for a House district in 59,511. Stip. ¶ 278.

Under the Enacted Plan, the greatest population deviation of any district is ±1.40%. Stip. ¶ 186; APAX 1, 116. The Enacted House Plan contains 49 House districts where the ABVAP is the majority of the population. Stip. ¶ 186; APAX 1, Ex. Z-1. Thirty-three of these districts are fully within the Atlanta MSA. Stip. ¶ 186; APAX 1, Exs. C,Y. This results in an addition of two majority-Black House districts overall and two in the Atlanta MSA. Stip. ¶¶ 180, 183. The Enacted House Plan split 69 Counties. APAX 1 ¶ 189; fig.37. It also split 179 VTDs. *Id.* The Enacted House Plan paired four sets of incumbents who ran for reelection in 2022. Stip. ¶ 182.

*16 The following is a Table depicting the majority AP Black districts and the percentage of the districts that is AP BVAP.

Below is the Enacted House Plan:



APAX 1, Ex. Y.

District	%AP Black	District	%AP Black
38	54.23	90	58.49
39	55.29	91	70.04
55	55.38	92	68.79
58	63.04	93	65.36
59	70.09	94	69.04

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60	63.88	95	67.15
61	74.29	113	59.53
62	72.26	115	52.13
63	69.33	116	58.12
65	61.98	126	54.47
66	53.41	128	50.41
67	58.92	129	54.87
68	55.75	130	59.91
69	63.56	132	52.34
75	74.40	137	52.13
76	67.23	140	57.63
77	76.13	141	57.46
78	71.58	142	59.52
79	71.59	143	60.79
84	73.66	150	53.56
85	62.71	153	67.95
86	75.05	154	54.82
87	73.08	165	50.33
88	63.35	177	53.88
89	62.54		

APAX 1, Z-1.

The Enacted House Plan has an average Reock score of 0.39 and Polsby-Popper Score of 0.28. Stip. ¶ 189; APAX 1, AG-2.

The maximum and minimum Reock scores are 0.66 and 0.12.

Id. The maximum and minimum Polsby-Popper scores are 0.59 and 0.10. Id. The compactness scores for the majority-Black districts are as follows:

District	Reock Score	Polsby-Popper Score	District	Reock Score	Polsby-Popper Score
38	0.59	0.58	90	0.36	0.29
39	0.59	0.40	91	0.45	0.20
55	0.18	0.16	92	0.36	0.20
58	0.13	0.13	93	0.26	0.11
59	0.12	0.11	94	0.31	0.15

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60	0.19	0.15	95	0.44	0.25
61	0.25	0.20	113	0.50	0.32
62	0.16	0.10	115	0.44	0.23
63	0.16	0.14	116	0.41	0.28
65	0.46	0.17	126	0.52	0.41
66	0.36	0.25	128	0.60	0.32
67	0.36	0.12	129	0.48	0.25
68	0.32	0.17	130	0.51	0.25
69	0.40	0.25	132	0.27	0.30
75	0.42	0.28	137	0.33	0.16
76	0.53	0.51	140	0.29	0.19
77	0.40	0.21	141	0.26	0.20
78	0.21	0.19	142	0.35	0.23
79	0.50	0.21	143	0.50	0.30
84	0.25	0.20	150	0.44	0.28
85	0.36	0.32	153	0.30	0.30
86	0.17	0.17	154	0.41	0.33
87	0.26	0.24	165	0.23	0.16
88	0.26	0.20	177	0.43	0.34
89	0.14	0.10			

Stip. ¶¶ 186, 189; APAX 1, Ex. S-3.

F.Illustrative Plans

1. Credibility Determinations

The Court makes the following credibility determinations as it relates to the Gingles preconditions experts.

a) Mr. William S. Cooper

Both the Alpha Phi Alpha and the Pendergrass Plaintiffs engaged Mr. Cooper as an expert. APAX 1, PX 1. The Court qualified Mr. Cooper as an expert in redistricting demographics and use of Census data. Tr. 65:21–24, 67:10–11; 715:8–10, 717:3–4. Mr. Cooper earned his Bachelor of Arts in economics from Davidson College. APAX 1, Ex. A. Since the late 1980s, Mr. Cooper has testified as an expert trial witness on redistricting and demographics in federal courts in about 55 voting rights cases. Tr. 62:11–14; see also APAX 1, Ex. A. Over 25 of the cases led to changes in local election district plans and five resulted in changes to statewide legislative boundaries. APAX 1, Ex. A; see Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Old

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Person v. Brown, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (D. Mont. 2002); Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004); Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 231 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (M.D. Ala. 2017); and Thomas v. Reeves, 3:18-CV-441-CWR-FKB, 2021 WL 517038 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 11, 2021).

In Georgia alone, Mr. Cooper has testified as an expert on redistricting and demographics in four other federal cases: Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Love v. Cox, No. CV 679-037, 1992 WL 96307 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 1992); Askew v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997); Woodard v. Mayor and City Council of Lumber City, 676 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ga. 1987). Mr. Cooper also filed expert declarations or depositions in the following Georgia federal cases: Dwight v. Kemp, No. 1:18-cv-2869 (N.D. Ga. 2018); Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. Gwinnett County, No. 1:16-cv-02852-AT (N.D. Ga. 2016); Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. Fayette County, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2013); Knighton v. Dougherty County, No. 1:02-CV-130-2(WLS) (M.D. Ga. 2002); Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Jones v. Cook County, 7:94cv73 (M. D Ga. 1994). APAX 1, Ex. A.

*17 Following the 2020 Decennial Census, three local governments adopted commission level plans that Mr. Cooper drafted. Id. And Jefferson County, Alabama, adopted his proposed school board plans. Id. Mr. Cooper testified in seven redistricting trials or preliminary injunction hearings in 2022, including in these Actions. Id. In one of those cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding that his congressional maps were sufficient to show a substantial likelihood of success on the first Gingles precondition. Allen, 599 U.S. at 12–24, 143 S.Ct. 1487.

Finally, Mr. Cooper was qualified as a redistricting and demographics expert at the preliminary injunction hearing. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1244. This Court found that “Mr. Cooper's testimony [was] highly credible ... [and] that his methods and conclusions [we]re highly reliable, and ultimately that his work as an expert on the first Gingles precondition [wa]s helpful to the Court.” Id. at 1244–45.

Mr. Cooper spent around six hours on the stand testifying as to his Illustrative Plans, including over three hours of cross-examination. On voir dire, Defense counsel questioned Mr. Cooper about his involvement in a 2012 Alabama

redistricting case in which the three-judge court there stated in a 2017 memorandum of opinion and order that “plaintiffs’ mapmakers came dangerously close to admitting that race predominated in at least some of the districts in their plans.” Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 231 F. Supp. 3d 1026 at 1046. Nevertheless, the three-judge court also “credit[ed] much of [Mr.] Cooper's testimony” in an earlier 2013 opinion. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1271–72 (M.D. Ala. 2013), rev'd on other grounds, Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 191 L.Ed.2d 314 (2015).

During Mr. Cooper's time on the stand, the Court was able to question and observe Mr. Cooper closely. Throughout his reports and hours of live testimony, his opinions were clear, consistent, and forthright, and he had no difficulty articulating the bases for his districting decisions. He was also forthright with the Court when discussing the characteristics of his illustrative plans and admitted that while the illustrative plans were acceptable for the first Gingles precondition, there would be other ways to draw maps at the remedial stage. E.g., Tr. 235:24–25.

Having reviewed Mr. Cooper's expert report and evaluating his trial testimony, the Court again finds that Mr. Cooper is highly credible. Mr. Cooper has spent the majority of his career drawing maps for redistricting and demographic purposes, and he has accumulated extensive expertise (more so than any other expert qualified in redistricting demographics in this case) in redistricting litigation, particularly in Georgia.

b)Mr. Blakeman B. Esselstyn

The Grant Plaintiffs proffered and the Court qualified Mr. Esselstyn as an expert in redistricting, demography, and geographic information systems. Tr. 464:2–5, 466:19–20. Mr. Esselstyn earned his Bachelor's degree in geology & geophysics and international studies from Yale University and a master's degree in computer and information technology from University of Pennsylvania. GX 1 ¶ 5. Mr. Esselstyn is the founder and principal of a consultancy called Mapfigure Consulting, which provides expert services in the areas of redistricting, demographics, and geographic information systems (GIS). Id. ¶ 1. He has served as a consulting expert in four redistricting cases. Id. ¶ 3. Mr. Esselstyn has developed 16 redistricting plans that have been enacted for use in

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elections by jurisdictions at various levels of government. *Id.* ¶ 4.

*18 Mr. Esselstyn was a testifying expert witness in the following cases: *Jensen v. City of Asheville*, (N.C. Super. 2009); *Hall v. City of Asheville*, No. 05CV53804, 2007 WL 9210091 (N.C. Super. June 17, 2007); and *Arnold v. City of Asheville*, Buncombe Cnty., No. 02CV53945 (N.C. Super. Nov. 20, 2003). GX 1, Attach. A. On *voir dire*, Mr. Esselstyn acknowledged that he has never drawn a statewide map that was used in an election and that he has never drawn a map for any jurisdiction in Georgia. Tr. 465:20–25.

Following the 2020 Decennial Census, Mr. Esselstyn has been consulted as an expert for the plaintiffs in *League of United Latin American Citizens v. Abbott*, 3:21-CV-00259-DCG-JES-JVB (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2021) and *Rivera v. Schwab*, 315 Kan. 877, 512 P.3d 168 (2022). GX 1, Attach. A.

Mr. Esselstyn was qualified as a redistricting and demographics expert at the preliminary injunction hearing. *Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity*, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1245-46. This Court found that “Mr. Esselstyn's testimony [was] highly credible ... [and] that his methods and conclusions [we]re highly reliable, and ultimately that his work as an expert on the first *Gingles* precondition [wa]s helpful to the Court.” *Id.* at 1246.

Having reviewed Mr. Esselstyn's expert report and evaluating his trial testimony, the Court again finds that Mr. Esselstyn is highly credible. The Court does note that Mr. Esselstyn was less forthcoming on cross-examination in the trial than he was during the preliminary injunction hearing. However, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn's explanations were internally consistent and did not falter. Accordingly, the Court will give great weight to Mr. Esselstyn's testimony.

c)Mr. John B. Morgan

Defendant proffered and the Court qualified Mr. Morgan as its expert in redistricting and the analysis of demographic data in all three cases. Tr. 1748:8–11, 15–16. Mr. Morgan earned his Bachelor of Arts in history from the University of Chicago. DX 1 ¶ 2. Mr. Morgan worked on redistricting plans in the redistricting efforts and testified about demographics and redistricting following the 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2020 Censuses. *Id.* Over the course of his career, Mr. Morgan worked on statewide congressional and legislative redistrict

plans in the following states: Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin. DX 1. His plans have been adopted in whole or in part by various jurisdictions. *Id.*

Before this case, Mr. Morgan has provided expert reports and/or testified in seven cases. *Id.* (citing *Egolf v. Duran*, D-101-CV-2011-02, 2011 WL 12523985 (N.M. Dist. Dec. 28, 2011); *Georgia State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs*, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2013); *Page v. Va. Bd. of Elections*, 3:13CV678, 2015 WL 3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015); *Bethune-Hill v. Va. Bd. of Elections*, 114 F. Supp. 3d 323 (E.D. Va. 2015); *Vesilind v. Va. Bd. of Elections*, 295 Va. 427, 813 S.E.2d 739 (2018); and *Georgia State Conf. of the NAACP v. Gwinnet Cnty. Bd. of Elec.*).²⁶

Although Mr. Morgan has an extensive background in redistricting, the Court finds that other courts, including this one, have called Mr. Morgan's credibility into doubt. *Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity*, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1247–48. Although, this Court's ultimate determination as to Mr. Morgan's credibility is not dependent on the determinations made by its sister courts, or by its determinations in the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court gives great weight to the determinations made in those cases.

*19 In 2011, Mr. Morgan assisted Virginia with drawing its House of Delegates maps; and in that case, “[Mr.] Morgan testified ... that he played a substantial role in constructing the 2011 plan, which role included his use of the Maptitude software to draw district lines.” *Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections*, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 151 (E.D. Va. 2018). Ultimately, a three-judge court found that 11 of the House of Delegates districts were racial gerrymanders. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon PI Tr. 184:1–6; see also *Bethune-Hill*, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 137, 181.

Mr. Morgan served as both a fact and expert witness in *Bethune-Hill*. That court ultimately found that Mr. Morgan's testimony was not credible. That court found that “Morgan's testimony was wholly lacking in credibility. Th[is] adverse credibility finding [] [is] not limited to particular assertions of [this] witness [], but instead wholly undermine[s] the content of ... Morgan's testimony.” *Bethune-Hill*, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 174; Tr. 2101:7–2102:10; 2109:17–2110:7. Specifically, “Morgan testified in considerable detail about his reasons for drawing dozens of lines covering all 11 challenged districts,

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including purportedly race-neutral explanations for several boundaries that appeared facially suspicious.” [Bethune-Hill](#), 326 F. Supp.3d at 151. That court found: “Morgan’s contention, that the precision with which these splits divided white and black areas was mere happenstance, simply is not credible.” *Id.* “[W]e conclude that Morgan did not present credible testimony, and we decline to consider it in our predominance analysis.” *Id.* at 152.

Mr. Morgan also served as a testifying expert in [Page v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections](#), No. 3:13CV678, 2015 WL 3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015). Tr. 2108:24–2109:11. That court found “Mr. Morgan, contends that the majority-white populations excluded ... were predominately Republican The evidence at trial, however, revealed that Mr. Morgan’s analysis was based upon several pieces of mistaken data, a critical error ... Mr. Morgan’s coding mistakes were significant to the outcome of his analysis[.]” [Page](#), 2015 WL 3604029, at *15 n.25; Tr. 2108:24–2109:11. Mr. Morgan explained that his error was caused because the attorneys asked him to produce an additional exhibit on the day of trial. Tr. 2109:12–16.

Additionally, in [Georgia State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs](#), Mr. Morgan testified as an expert for the defense opposite Mr. Cooper, who testified as an expert for the plaintiffs. 950 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310–11 (N.D. Ga. 2013). In granting the motion for summary judgment, that court found that the plaintiffs successfully asserted a vote dilution claim. *Id.* at 1326.

Finally, Mr. Morgan admitted that he drew some plans for the 2011 North Carolina State Senate Maps. Tr. 2097:3–7. Ultimately, 28 districts in North Carolina’s 2011 State House and Senate redistricting plans were struck down as racial gerrymanders. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon PI Tr. 183:14–19; see also [Covington v. North Carolina](#), 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016), *aff’d* [North Carolina v. Covington](#), 581 U.S.1015, 137 S.Ct. 2211, 198 L.Ed.2d 655 (2017).

At the preliminary injunction hearing in the cases *sub judice*, the Court found that “Mr. Morgan’s testimony lack[ed] credibility, and the Court assign[ed] little weight to his testimony.” [Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity](#), 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1247–48. During the course of his testimony, Mr. Morgan was impeached about reading Mr. Cooper’s reports before preparing his expert report and he offered contradictory testimony when he testified that he watched Mr. Cooper testify and then later testified that he was viewing exhibits for

the first time, even though they were in Mr. Cooper’s report and they were displayed during Mr. Cooper’s testimony. Tr. 1959:5–1961:8; 2037:2–7.

*20 Having observed Mr. Morgan’s testimony and demeanor during the course of the trial, the Court again assigns less weight to his testimony.

d)Dr. Maxwell Palmer

The [Grant](#) and [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs proffered and the Court qualified Dr. Palmer as an expert in redistricting and data analysis. Tr. 396:11–14, 397:8–9. Dr. Palmer earned his Bachelor of Arts in mathematics and government and legal studies from Bowdoin College. PX 2, 20. Dr. Palmer also earned his master’s and doctorate in political science from Harvard University. *Id.* Dr. Palmer currently serves as an associate professor at Boston University in the political science department, where he has been teaching since 2014. *Id.* Dr. Palmer has extensively published academic articles and books on a variety of topics, including gerrymandering and redistricting. *Id.* at 20–22.

Outside of this case, Dr. Palmer has offered consulting or expert testimony in the following cases: [Bethune-Hill v. Virginia](#), 3:14-cv-00852-REP-AWA-BMK (E.D. Va. 2017); [Thomas v. Bryant](#), 3:18-CV-411-CWR-FKB (S.D. Miss. 2018); [Chestnut v. Merrill](#), 2:18-cv-00907-KOB (N.D. Ala. 2019); [Dwight v. Raffensperger](#), 1:18-cv-2869-RWS (N.D. Ga. 2018); [Bruni v. Hughs](#), 5:20-cv-35 (S.D. Tex. 2020); [Caster v. Merrill](#), 2:21-cv-1536-AMM (N.D. Ala. 2021); [Galmon v. Ardoin](#), 3:22-cv-214-SDD-SDJ (M.D. La. 2022). *Id.* at 27–28, 143 S.Ct. 1487.

In the preliminary injunction hearing, in the cases *sub judice*, Dr. Palmer testified as an expert witness for the [Grant](#) and [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs. The Court “[f]ound] that his methods and conclusions [we]re highly reliable, and ultimately that his work as an expert on the second and third [Gingles](#) preconditions [wa]s helpful to the Court.” [Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity](#), 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1304.

Having reviewed Dr. Palmer’s demeanor and his testimony, Dr. Palmer’s testimony was internally consistent, and he maintained a calm demeanor throughout. The Court deems Dr. Palmer to be highly credible and his testimony is extremely helpful to the Court. Thus, the Court assigns great weight to his testimony.

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e)Dr. Lisa Handley

The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs proffered and the Court qualified Dr. Handley as an expert in racial polarization analysis, minority vote dilution, and redistricting. Tr. 856:16–19, 861:11–12. Dr. Handley earned her doctorate in political science from George Washington University. APAX 5, 47. Dr. Handley serves as the president and co-founder of Frontier International Electoral Consulting LLC. Id. Dr. Handley has extensively published academic articles and books on a variety of topics, including gerrymandering and redistricting. Id.

Since 2000, Dr. Handley has served as a consultant and expert witness for the following jurisdictions: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island. Id. She has also served as a redistricting consultant for the ACLU and provided expert testimony in an Ohio partisan gerrymander challenge, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law in challenges to judicial elections in Texas and Alabama, the Department of Justice in Section 2 and Section 5 cases. Id.

*21 Other than this case, Dr. Handley has been a testifying expert in the following cases: In re: 2011 Redistricting Cases, No.4FA-11-2209CI (Alaska Super. 2013); Texas v. U.S., 11-1303 (TBG-RMC-BAH) (D.D.C. 2011); Jeffers v. Beebe, 2:12CV00016 JLH (E.D. Ark. 2012); Perry v. Perez, SA-11-CV0360 (W.D. Tex. 2011); Lopez v. Abbott, 2:16-CV-303 (S.D. Tex. 2016); Alabama State Conf. of the NAACP v. Alabama, 2:16-CV-731-WKW (M.D. Ala. 2020); U.S. v. Eastpointe, 4:17-cv-10079 (E.D. Mich. 2017); New York v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 18-CV-2921 (JMF), 18-CV-5025 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Ohio Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 1:18-cv-357 (S.D. Ohio 2018); League of Women Voters of Ohio, 2021-1449 (Ohio 2021); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n, 2021-1193 (Ohio 2021); Ark. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Ark. Bd. of Apportionment, 4:21-cv-1239-LPR (E.D. Ark. 2021). Id.

In the preliminary injunction hearing, in the cases *sub judice*, Dr. Handley testified as an expert witness for the Grant and Pendergrass Plaintiffs. The Court found that Dr. Handley's testimony was truthful and reliable. Alpha Phi Alpha, 597 F. Supp. 3d at 1309.

At the trial, Dr. Handley's methodology and conclusions about the existence of polarization were relatively unchallenged by Defendant. ²⁷ Accordingly, the Court will rely on the findings in her report.

f)Dr. John Alford

Defendants proffered and the Court qualified Dr. Alford as an expert on the second and third Gingles preconditions and Senate Factor Two. Tr. 2132:19–21, 2133:1. Dr. Alford earned his Bachelor of Science and Master of Public Administration from the University of Houston. DX 8, App. 1. He also achieved his masters and doctorate in political science from the University of Iowa. Id. Dr. Alford is a professor at Rice University of and has been teaching there since 1985. Id. Dr. Alford was an assistant professor at the University of Georgia between 1981 and 1985. Id. Dr. Alford has published academic articles and books on a variety of topics including voting. Id.

Dr. Alford has worked with local governments on districting plans and on VRA cases. Id. He has provided expert reports and testified as an expert witness in a variety of court cases. Id. Sister courts have found that Dr. Alford's methodology was unreliable. See Lopez v. Abbott, 339 F. Supp. 3d 589, 610 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (crediting Dr. Handley's testimony over Dr. Alford's because “Dr. Alford's testimony ... focused on issues other than the ethnicity of the voters and their preferred candidates—which are the issues relevant to bloc voting”); Texas v. U.S., 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 146–47 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 570 U.S. 928, 133 S.Ct. 2886, 186 L.Ed.2d 930 (2013) (critiquing Dr. Alford's approach because he used an analysis that “lies outside accepted academic norms among redistricting experts[,]” and the Court, instead, relied heavily on Dr. Handley's testimony), vacated on other grounds, 570 U.S. 928, 133 S.Ct. 2886, 186 L.Ed.2d 930 (2013).

*22 In the preliminary injunction hearing, in the cases *sub judice*, the Court found that Dr. Alford was credible, however “his conclusions were not reached through methodologically sound means and were therefore speculative and unreliable.” Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 3 at 1305–06.

The Court again finds that Dr. Alford was highly credible. However, Dr. Alford's testimony primarily relates to partisan polarization and not racial polarization. Accordingly, the

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Court will give little weight to Dr. Alford's testimony with respect to the Gingles preconditions because it does not effectively address that inquiry. The Court will give greater weight to Dr. Alford's testimony with respect to Senate Factor Two, because there it is appropriate to inquire about the non-racial reasons explaining racially polarized voting.

2. Illustrative Congressional Plan

a) First Gingles Precondition

Based on Georgia's demographics, Mr. Cooper concluded that “[t]he Black population in metro Atlanta is sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to allow for the creation of an additional majority-Black congressional district anchored in Cobb, Douglas, and Fulton Counties (CD-6 in the illustrative plan) consistent with traditional redistricting principles.” PX 1 ¶ 10; see also id. ¶¶ 42, 86. Defendants’ mapping expert Mr. Morgan agreed that his report “offers no opinion to dispute” this conclusion. Tr. 1954:1–12. Mr. Cooper drew an illustrative congressional plan (the “Illustrative Congressional Plan”) that includes an additional majority-Black congressional district (“Illustrative CD-6”) anchored in west-metro Atlanta. Stip. ¶ 190; PX 1 ¶ 55 & fig.12; Tr. 717:14–23.

(1) Mr. Cooper's process in drawing the maps

At the preliminary injunction hearing, he testified that he was not asked to either “draw as many majority black districts as possible” or “draw every conceivable way of drawing an additional majority black district.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning PI Tr. 98:17–24. And if in his expert opinion an additional majority-Black district could not have been drawn, Mr. Cooper testified that he would have reported that to counsel, as he has “done [] in other cases.” Id. 98:25–99:24.

Mr. Cooper, in his report, declared that he analyzed population and geographic data from the Decennial Census and the American Community Survey (“ACS”). PX 1, Ex. B. He also used the geographic information system software package called Maptitude for Redistricting (“Maptitude”) and the geographic boundary files in Maptitude (created by the U.S. Census). Id. He evaluated incumbent addresses, Georgia's current and historical legislative plans, Georgia's 2000 House, Senate, and Congressional Plans. Id. The Court notes that Mr.

Cooper was able to review the Enacted Congressional Plan's compactness scores when he was drawing his Illustrative Congressional Plans. Id.

When he began drawing the Illustrative Congressional Plan, for trial, he testified that he started by using the plan he drew from the preliminary injunction. Tr. 727: 20–23. He then stated that some of the map stayed very similar, but when drawing his proposed Illustrative CD-6 he made specific changes because “some concerns were raised about going further north into Acworth. And so for that reason, I'm taking local knowledge into account, I changed the district a bit to push the district in Cobb County further south.” Tr. 729: 4–7. He clarified that the local knowledge that he took into account was that of Ms. Wright. Id. at 13–16.

*23 Mr. Cooper also testified that he considers race when creating an illustrative plan that would satisfy the first Gingles precondition because “[t]hat's part of the inquiry.” Tr. 725:16–25. Specifically, when drawing the Illustrative Congressional Plan, Mr. Cooper displayed dots showing him where precincts with more than 30% Black population were located. Tr. 789:25–790:10, 823:25–824:7. Mr. Cooper explained that he “need[s] to show that the district would be over 50 percent Black voting age population, while adhering to traditional redistricting principles.” Id.; see also Feb. 7, 2022, Morning PI Tr. 48:4–15 (Mr. Cooper testifying at the preliminary injunction hearing that race “is something that one does consider as part of traditional redistricting principles” because “you have to be cognizant of race in order to develop a plan that respects communities of interest, as well as complying with the Voting Rights Act[,] because one of the key tenets of traditional redistricting principles is the importance of not diluting the minority vote”).

Mr. Cooper testified that race did not predominate in his drawing of the Illustrative Congressional Plan because he merely considered it along with the traditional redistricting principles that he was “constantly balancing.” Tr. 726:11–727:16. Indeed, Mr. Cooper explained that “in drafting this plan, [he] ... attempted to balance all of the traditional redistricting principles so that no one principle predominates.” Tr. 822:19–24.

Mr. Cooper testified that he did not have election return data available to him when drawing the Illustrative Congressional Plan and that he did not review any public testimony from Georgia voters as part of the process for preparing the Illustrative Congressional Plan. Tr. 524:24–25, 819:13–15.

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PX 1, 82.

(2) Illustrative Congressional Plan

i) numerosity

(a) Empirical Measures

The Illustrative Congressional Plan contains an additional majority-Black congressional district in west-metro Atlanta.

Illustrative CD-6 is 50.23% AP BVAP. PX 1 ¶ 73 & fig.14. Under all metrics, the Black voting age population of Illustrative CD-6 exceeded 50%. Id.




Figure 14

**BVAP and BCVAP Comparison:
 Illustrative Plan and 2021 Plan**

District*	Illustrative Plan			2021 Plan		
	% BVAP	% NH BCVAP	% NH DOJ BCVAP	% BVAP	% NH BCVAP	% NH DOJ BCVAP
1	28.17%	29.16%	29.67%	28.17%	29.16%	29.67%
2	49.29%	49.55%	50.001%	49.29%	49.55%	50.001%
3	20.47%	19.64%	20.02%	23.32%	22.53%	22.86%
4	52.77%	55.62%	56.37%	54.52%	57.71%	58.46%
5	49.60%	51.64%	52.35%	49.60%	51.64%	52.35%
6	50.23%	50.18%	50.98%	9.91%	9.72%	10.26%
7	29.82%	31.88%	32.44%	29.82%	31.88%	32.44%
8	30.04%	30.46%	30.76%	30.04%	30.46%	30.76%
9	11.66%	11.29%	11.74%	10.42%	10.03%	10.34%
10	14.31%	15.09%	15.39%	22.60%	22.11%	22.56%
11	13.67%	12.91%	13.48%	17.95%	17.57%	18.30%
12	36.72%	36.60%	37.19%	36.72%	36.60%	37.19%
13	51.13%	49.64%	50.34%	66.75%	66.36%	67.05%

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14	5.17%	4.80%	5.19%	14.28%	13.19%	13.71%
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*Bold font identifies districts that are changed from the 2021 Plan configuration.

PX 1 ¶ 73 & fig.14.

ii) population equality and contiguity

It is undisputed that the population in all districts in the Illustrative Congressional Plan is plus-or-minus one person from the ideal district population of 765,136. Stip. ¶ 197. It is also undisputed that all districts in the Illustrative Congressional Plan are contiguous. Stip. ¶ 198.

iii) Compactness scores

The Illustrative Congressional Plan has comparable, or slightly better, compactness scores as compared to the Enacted Congressional Plan. The mean Reock score for the Illustrative Congressional Plan is 0.43 and is 0.44 on the Enacted Plan. PX 1 ¶ 79 & fig.13. The mean Polsby-Popper scores are identical at 0.27. *Id.* Mr. Morgan does not dispute that the enacted and the illustrative plans have similar mean Reock scores and identical mean Polsby-Popper scores. Tr. 1948:22–1949:5. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan is comparably as compact as the Enacted Congressional Plan.

With respect to the majority-Black districts, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan scores generally fared better or were equal to the Enacted Congressional Plan.

PX	Illustrative Plan			Enacted Plan		L
	Districts	Reock	Polsby-Popper	Reock	Polsby-Popper	
Exs.	001	0.46	0.29	0.46	0.29	L-1,
L-3.	002*	0.46	0.27	0.46	0.27	
	003	0.39	0.24	0.46	0.28	
	004*	0.28	0.22	0.31	0.25	
	005*	0.51	0.32	0.51	0.32	
	006 ²⁸	0.45	0.27	0.42	0.20	
	007	0.50	0.39	0.50	0.39	
	008	0.34	0.21	0.34	0.21	
	009	0.40	0.32	0.38	0.25	
	010	0.40	0.18	0.56	0.28	
	011	0.40	0.19	0.48	0.21	
	012	0.50	0.28	0.50	0.28	
	013*	0.44	0.29	0.38	0.16	
	014	0.48	0.34	0.43	0.37	
	Mean:	0.43	0.27	0.44	0.27	
Max:	0.51	0.39	0.51	0.39		
Min:	0.28	0.18	0.31	0.16		

[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnote²⁸].

Mr. Morgan's report's compactness measures are identical to Mr. Cooper's. DX 4 ¶ 22, chart 2. The districts that immediately surround Illustrative CD-6 are, Illustrative CD-3, 5, 11, and 13. PX 1, Ex. H-2. Of the surrounding districts Illustrative and Enacted CD-5 have identical compactness scores, Illustrative CD-3 and 11 fare worse on both compactness measures than Enacted CD-3 and 11, and Illustrative CD-13 fares better on both compactness measures than Enacted CD-13. The Court notes that CD-5 and 13 are majority-Black districts on both the Enacted and Illustrative Congressional Plans, whereas CD-3 and CD-11 are majority-white districts. PX 1, Ex. H-2. Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper lowered the compactness scores in neighboring majority-white districts when he drew the Illustrative Congressional Plan.

*24 The Court concludes that the Illustrative Congressional Plan is comparably as compact as the Enacted Congressional Plan. The Illustrative Congressional Plan fares worse on the Reock measure by 0.01 points and had an identical Polsby-Popper score. PX 1, Exs. L-1, L-3. The Court finds that overall, the Plans are equivalently compact. With respect to the majority-Black districts, the Court finds that two of the districts (CD-2, and 5) have identical compactness scores, Illustrative CD-4 fares worse on both compactness scores by 0.03 points, Illustrative CD-13 fares better on the Reock score by 0.06 points and Polsby-Popper by 0.13 points. *Id.* Finally, Illustrative CD-6 fares better on Reock by 0.03 points and 0.07 on Polsby-Popper. *Id.* The Court finds that that, generally, the majority-Black districts are equivalently, if

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not slightly more compact than the Enacted Congressional majority-Black districts.

splits, VTD splits, city and town splits, and unique cities and town splits. PX 1 ¶ 81 & fig.14.

iv) political subdivision splits

Figure 14

The Illustrative Congressional Plan splits the same number of counties as the Enacted Plan, but has fewer unique county

County, VTD, and Municipal Splits: Illustrative Plan, 2012 Benchmark, and 2021 Plan (All Districts)

	Split Counties*	County Splits*	2020 VTD Splits*	Split Cities/Towns#	City/Town Splits*
Illustrative Plan	15	18	43	37	78
2012 Benchmark Plan	16	22	43	40	85
2021 Plan	15	21	46	43	91

*Excludes unpopulated areas

#Out of 531 municipalities (calculated by subtracting the number of whole cities in the Maptitude report from 531)

PX 1 ¶ 81 & fig.14.

Neither Defendants nor their experts have meaningfully suggested that the Illustrative Congressional Plan fails to respect city, town, and county lines. The Court notes that, as with compactness, Mr. Cooper was able to evaluate the Enacted Congressional Plans political subdivision splits when he drew his Illustrative Congressional Plan. PX 1, Ex. B. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan respected more political subdivisions than the Enacted Congressional Plan.

v) findings of fact

In sum, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan meets or exceeds the Enacted Congressional Plan on compactness scores and political subdivision splits. The Illustrative Congressional Plan and the Enacted Congressional Plan have identical Polsby-Popper scores and the Illustrative Congressional Plan is 0.01 less compact on Reock than the Enacted Plan. PX 1 ¶ 79 & fig.13.

(b)Core retention

The Court also finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan retained many of the cores of the districts in the Enacted Congressional Plan. The General Assembly did not enumerate core retention as a redistricting principle. JX 2. And Ms. Wright testified that when she draws the new Plans, she starts with a blank map and not from the existing Congressional Plan.

Generally, I like to create the new ideal size with the new census population that we have in the state. I plug that into a blank map. And then I just work with the data to create new districts. I don't usually start from the old and try to change it, I start blank, because that way I feel like it's easier for me to build a map rather than try to just move pieces that are already there.

I do use the existing district layer if I need to as a reference, to see if I'm retaining core districts and things like that. But I build that map out just as a balanced map population-wise first as a draft and a blind map to start with.

Tr. 1622:11–22.

Although not a requirement, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan does retain the majority of the core districts of the Enacted Congressional Plan. DX 4, Ex. 7. Pursuant to the data provided by Mr. Morgan, the Court finds that approximately 74.6% of individual's district are unchanged from the Enacted Congressional Plan and the Illustrative Congressional Plan. *Id.*; Tr. 1944:22–1945:13; PX 1 ¶ 13. In other words, only 25.4% of Georgians would be affected if the General Assembly were to enact the Illustrative

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Congressional Plan. The following is a table derived from the data in Mr. Morgan's report and that exemplifies the number of individuals who remain in the same district under the Illustrative Congressional Plan. As an initial note, the

population size of each congressional district is either 765,137 or 765,136 persons. Stip. ¶ 197.

District # of individuals whose district is unchanged

001	765,137
002	765,137
003	528,200
004	736,485
005	765,137
006	19,006
007	765,137
008	765,136
009	403,191
010	488,385
011	372,724
012	765,136
013	374,470
014	475,707

*25 DX 4, Ex. 7.

As the chart shows, in six of the district, no voter is impacted by the Illustrative Congressional Plan's changes (Illustrative CD-1, CD-2, CD-5, CD-7, CD-8, CD-12). And of the remaining eight changed districts, in only three of those districts (Illustrative CD-6, CD-11, and CD-13) does more than half of the population have a changed district. Illustrative CD-6 is the new majority-minority district and CD-11 and CD-13 are two districts that immediately surround Illustrative CD-6. Accordingly, the Court finds that Illustrative Congressional Plan, does respect district cores from the Enacted Congressional Plan.

(c)Racial predominance

The Court further concludes that Mr. Cooper did not subordinate traditional districting principles in favor of racial

considerations. Mr. Cooper was asked “to determine whether the African American population in Georgia is ‘sufficiently large and geographically compact’ to allow for the creation of an additional majority-Black congressional district in the Atlanta metropolitan area.” PX 1 ¶ 8 (footnotes omitted); Tr. 717:14–17. At the preliminary injunction hearing, he testified that he was not asked to either “draw as many majority black districts as possible” or “draw every conceivable way of drawing an additional majority black district.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning PI Tr. 98:17–24. And if in his expert opinion an additional majority-Black district could not have been drawn, Mr. Cooper testified that he would have reported that to counsel, as he has “done [] in other cases.” Id. 98:25–99:24.

Mr. Cooper testified that he considers race when creating an illustrative plan that would satisfy the first Gingles precondition because “[t]hat's part of the inquiry.” Tr. 725:16–25. Mr. Cooper explained that he “need[s] to show that the district would be over 50 percent Black voting age population,

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while adhering to traditional redistricting principles.” Id.; see also Feb. 7, 2022, Morning PI Tr. 48:4–15 (Mr. Cooper testifying at the preliminary injunction hearing that race “is something that one does consider as part of traditional redistricting principles” because “you have to be cognizant of race in order to develop a plan that respects communities of interest, as well as complying with the Voting Rights Act[,] because one of the key tenets of traditional redistricting principles is the importance of not diluting the minority vote”).

Mr. Cooper testified that race did not predominate in his drawing of the Illustrative Congressional Plan because he merely considered it along with the traditional redistricting principles that he was “constantly balancing.” Tr. 726:11–727:16. Indeed, Mr. Cooper explained that “in drafting this plan, [he] ... attempted to balance all of the traditional redistricting principles so that no one principle predominates.” Tr. 822:19–24. Defendants’ expert does not even contend that race predominated in the Illustrative Congressional Plan. Tr. 1952:23–1953:17; see generally DX 4.

*26 The Court finds that race did not predominate in the drawing of the Illustrative Congressional Plan.

b)Second and Third Gingles Preconditions

The Court finds that that the minority group within Illustrative CD-6 is politically cohesive. Both Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Palmer, and Defendants’ expert, Dr. Alford, testified that ecological inference (“EI”) is a reliable method for conducting the second and third Gingles preconditions analyses. “Q. Dr. Alford, you agree that ... the method of ecological inference Dr. Palmer applied is the best available method for estimating voting behavior by race; correct? A. Correct.” Tr. 2250:12–16; “Q. Do scholars and experts regularly use EI to examine racially polarized voting? A. Yes?” Tr. 401: 7–9. EI “estimates group-level preferences based on aggregate data.” PX 2 ¶ 13. The data analyzed under EI also includes confidence intervals, which measure the uncertainty of results. Id. at n. 12. “Larger confidence intervals reflect a higher degree of uncertainty in the estimates, while smaller confidence intervals reflect less uncertainty.” Id.

Dr. Palmer conducted a racially-polarized voting analysis of Enacted CD-3, 6, 11, 13, and 14, both as a region (the

“congressional focus area”) and individually. Stip. ¶ 214; PX 2 ¶ 7; Tr. 413:18–414:5.




Figure 1: Map of the Focus Area

PX 2 ¶ 11 & fig.1.

Dr. Palmer evaluated Black and white voters’ choices in the congressional focus area for each candidate in 40 statewide elections between 2012 and 2022. Stip. ¶ 217; PX 2 ¶¶ 13, 15. Dr. Palmer’s EI analysis relied on precinct-level election results and voter turnout by race, as compiled by the State of Georgia. PX 2 ¶ 11; Tr. 403:2–13.

Dr. Palmer first examined each racial group’s support for each candidate to determine if members of the group voted cohesively in support of a single candidate in each election. PX 2 ¶ 14. If a significant majority of the group supported a single candidate, he then identified that candidate as the group’s candidate of choice. Id. Dr. Palmer next compared the preferences of white voters to the preferences of Black voters. Id. He concludes that racially polarized voting existed when he found that Black voters and white voters support different candidates. Id.

3. Cooper Legislative Plans

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a)Mr. Cooper's process in drawing the maps

Mr. Cooper submitted an illustrative State Senate plan (the “Cooper Senate Plan”) and an illustrative State House plan (the “Cooper House Plan”) (collectively, the “Cooper Legislative Plans”) as a part of his expert report. APAX 1 ¶ 85 & fig.5; ¶ 151 & fig.27. When Mr. Cooper was retained as an expert, he was asked “to determine whether the African-American population in Georgia is ‘sufficiently large and geographically compact’ to allow for the creation, consistent with traditional redistricting principles, of additional majority-Black Senate and House districts[.]” APAX 1 ¶ 7; Tr. 67:23-68:1. At the preliminary injunction hearing, he testified that he was not asked to either “draw as many majority black districts as possible” or “draw every conceivable way of drawing an additional majority black district.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning PI Tr. 98:17–24. And if in his expert opinion an additional majority-Black district could not have been drawn, Mr. Cooper testified that he would have reported that to counsel, as he has “done [] in other cases.” *Id.* 98:25–99:24.

*27 Mr. Cooper, in his report, declared that he analyzed population and geographic data from the Decennial Census and the ACS. APAX 1, Ex. B. He also used Maptitude and its geographic boundary files (created by the U.S. Census). *Id.* He evaluated incumbent addresses, Georgia's current and historical legislative plans, Georgia's 2000s House, Senate, and Congressional Plans. *Id.* The Court notes that Mr. Cooper was able to review the Enacted Legislative Plan's compactness scores when he was drawing the Cooper Legislative Plans. APAX 1, Ex. B ¶ 7.


Mr. Cooper specifically testified in detail about how he followed the criteria in Georgia's districting guidelines when drawing the Cooper Legislative Plans. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 89:15-91:9. Mr. Cooper testified that, with respect to Cooper Legislative Plans, he balanced all of the traditional redistricting principles, and that they “all went into the mix as I was drawing the [I]llustrative [P]lan.” Tr. 90:16-19. He confirmed that he “balanced the traditional districting principles in drawing [the] illustrative districts,” (*Id.* at 168:19-22), and he testified that none of the factors predominated over any others. *Id.* at 90:16-19; *see also Id.* at 107:18-20 (“Q. Mr. Cooper, did any factors get more weight than others when you were drawing your [I]llustrative [P]lans? A. I don't believe so.”); Tr. 367:5-7 (“you really do

have to balance, balance, balance. That's the name of the game.”).

Traditional redistricting principles, that he considered, include population equality, compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivision lines like counties and voting tabulation districts (“VTDs,” otherwise known as precincts), respect for communities of interest, and non-dilution of minority voting strength. *See, e.g.*, Tr. 90:2-91:9. Mr. Cooper also testified that avoiding pairing incumbents is a consideration that he takes into account, consistent with Georgia's adopted districting guidelines. *See, e.g., Id.* 128:5-7, 166:25:167:8, 225:15-24.

b)Cooper Senate Plan

The Cooper Senate Plan contains three additional majority-Black Senate Districts, two in south-metro Atlanta and one in the Eastern Black Belt, anchored in and around Augusta.



APAX 1 ¶ 85 & fig.15.

(1) Empirical measures

(a)numerosity

The AP BVAP population for the additional districts are as follows: Cooper SD-17 is 62.55%, SD-23 is 50.21%, SD-28 is 51.32%. APAX 1, Ex. O-1. All of Cooper's proposed illustrative Senate districts exceed 50% as do the districts that are majority-Black under the Enacted Senate Plan.

District

AP BVAP

District

AP BVAP

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010	69.76%	028*	51.32%
012	57.97%	033	52.60%
015	54.00%	034	77.84%
016	56.52%	035	60.80%
017*	62.55%	036	51.34%
020	60.44%	038	54.25%
022	50.36%	041	64.57%
023*	50.21%	043	57.97%
026	52.81%	055	51.22%

(*) denotes a new majority-Black district

APAX 1, Ex. O-1.

(b) population equality and contiguity

It is undisputed that the population deviation for the Cooper Senate Plan is ±1.00% from the ideal district population size of 191,284 people. Stip. ¶¶ 277, 301. This is lower than the Enacted Senate Plan, which has a deviation range of -1.03% to +0.98%. Stip. ¶ 301. It is also undisputed that all districts in the Cooper Senate Plan are contiguous. Stip. ¶ 300.

(c) compactness

The Court finds that the Cooper Senate Plan and the Enacted Senate Plan, on the whole, are comparable. Mr. Cooper explained, the Cooper Legislative Plans “matched or beat the State’s plans on ... compactness measures[.]” Tr. 109:2-4. Mr. Cooper concluded that “[o]n balance, the Illustrative Senate Plan and 2021 Senate Plan score about the same on the widely referenced Reock and Polsby-Popper measures. If anything, the Illustrative Plan scores better inasmuch as its least compact district by Reock scores [0].22, compared to [0].17 for the 2021 Senate Plan.” APAX 1 ¶ 114.

*28 Mr. Cooper’s expert report provided detailed compactness measures for the Enacted Senate Plan as follows:

Compactness Scores

Illustrative Senate Plan and 2014 Benchmark and 2021 Senate Plans

	Reock		Polsby-Popper	
	Mean	Low	Mean	Low
Illustrative Senate Plan	.43	.22	.28	.14
2014 Benchmark Senate Plan	.43	.14	.27	.11
2021 Senate Plan	.42	.17	.29	.13

APAX 1 ¶ 114 & fig.20.

Dr. Morgan, Defendant’s mapping expert, concluded that the Cooper Senate Plan “still has mean compactness scores close

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to the enacted plan, with the mean compactness score on the Reock test higher and the mean compactness score on the Polsby-Popper test lower.” DX 2 ¶ 18.

The Court concludes that the Cooper Senate Plan is more compact than the Enacted Senate Plan on Reock by 0.01 points and less compact by 0.01 on Polsby-Popper. *Id.* Consistent with both Defendants’ and the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ experts, the Court finds that the compactness scores of the two plans are “similar.” Accordingly, the Court finds that the Cooper and Enacted Senate Plans are comparably compact with respect to the average and minimum scores.

With respect to the majority-Black districts, the Court finds that the additional majority-Black districts are all more compact than the least compact district in the Enacted Senate Plan. The following table is derived from the data contained in Exhibits S-1 and S-3:

Districts	Enacted Districts		Districts	Illustrative Districts	
	Reock	Polsby-Popper		Reock	Polsby-Popper
017	0.35	0.17	017	0.37	0.17
023	0.37	0.16	023	0.37	0.16
016 ²⁹	0.37	0.31	028	0.37	0.18

[**Editor's Note:** The preceding image contains the reference for footnote²⁹].

APAX 1, Exs. S-1, S-3.

	Split Counties	Total County Splits*	2020 VTD Splits*	Single-County Whole City/Towns (478)#	Single and Multi County Whole City/Towns (531#)	Total City/Town Splits*
Illustrative Senate	28	57	38	437	464	166
2014 Benchmark	38	65	86	422	448	198
2021 Senate	29	60	40	434	463	169

*Populated splits only

#Higher is better

Id.

Neither Defendants nor their experts have meaningfully suggested that the Cooper Senate Plan fails to respect city, town, and county lines. Accordingly, the Court finds that

The Court finds that generally, the majority-Black Senate districts performed identically to their corollary Enacted Senate Plan district, with the exception of Cooper SD-28, which has a lower Polsby-Popper score by 0.13 points. However, none of the compactness measures are below the least compact district's measures on the Enacted Senate Plan, in part because Cooper's Enacted Senate Plan's has a higher minimum compactness score than the Enacted Senate Plan. APAX 1 ¶ 114.

In sum, the Court finds that on the empirical compactness measures, the majority-Black districts in the Cooper Senate Plan are nearly identical to the compactness scores on the Enacted Senate Plan.

(d)political subdivision splits

The Cooper Senate Plan splits fewer political subdivisions than the Enacted Senate Plan and performs better across all metrics. APAX 1 ¶ 116 & fig.21.

County and VTD Splits/Whole Municipalities - Illustrative Plan versus 2014 Benchmark and 2021 Senate Plans

the Cooper Senate Plan respected more political subdivisions than the Enacted Senate Plan.

(e)findings of fact on empirical measures

In sum, the Court finds that the Cooper Senate Plan meets or exceeds the Enacted Senate Plan on population equality,

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compactness scores, and political subdivision splits. The Cooper Senate Plan's Reock score beats the Enacted Senate Plan's Reock score by 0.01 and the Enacted Senate Plan's Polsby-Popper score beats the Cooper Senate Plan's Polsby-Popper score by the same amount. APAX 1 ¶ 114 & fig.20. The Court thus finds that the compactness scores between the two plans are virtually identical.

(2) Core retention

*29 The Court also finds that the Cooper Senate Plan retained many of the cores of the districts in the Enacted Senate Plan. Georgia's Reapportionment Guidelines do not identify preservation of existing district cores as a "General Principles for Drafting Plans." See JX 1, JX2. The Cooper Senate Plan kept 21 Senate districts the same as the Enacted Senate Plan. DX 2 ¶ 17. And, if the General Assembly were to enact the Cooper Senate Plan, 82% of the Georgia population would remain in the same district in the Enacted Senate Plan. Tr. 88:13-18.

(3) Incumbent pairing

Georgia's redistricting guidelines provide that "efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary incumbent pairings." JX 1, 3; JX 2, 2. He testified that also sought to avoid incumbent pairings. Tr. 236:1-2. He used official incumbent address information that defense counsel provided in January 2022 and another potential database of incumbent address information that followed the November 2022 General Election. APAX 1 ¶ 12. Mr. Cooper testified, as he was drawing the Cooper Legislative Plans, "always in the back of my mind [I] was trying to avoid pairing incumbents." Tr. 236:1-2. The Cooper Senate Plan pairs six incumbents. The Enacted Senate Plan pairs four incumbents. DX 2 ¶ 16 & chart 2. The Court finds that two additional pairs of incumbents are paired under the Cooper Senate Plan than in the Enacted Senate Plan.

(4) Racial considerations

Georgia's redistricting guidelines provide all plans must "comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act[,] as amended." JX 1, at 3; JX 2, at 3. Mr. Cooper testified that non-dilution of minority voting strength means that "as you're drawing a plan, you should make a point of not excluding

the Black population in some areas where you might be able to draw a minority Black district or split one somehow or another into districts that don't necessarily have sufficient minority population to elect a candidate of choice or to overconcentrate Black voters in a single district when they could have been placed in two districts and perhaps have an opportunity in two districts instead of just one." Tr. 92:14-23.

Mr. Cooper testified that for purposes of non-dilution, "you have to at least be aware of where the minority population lives." Tr. 92:14-15. However, Mr. Cooper testified that while race is "out there and [he's] aware of it, ... it didn't control how [the Illustrative Plans] were drawn." Tr. 108:7-11. He stated that he did not aim to draw any maximum or minimum number of Black-majority districts. Tr. 112:11-14; see also Tr. 197:23-24 ("My goal was not to draw the maximum number of majority Black districts"). When asked whether he was "trying to maximize the number of Black majority districts when [he] drew the [I]llustrative [P]lans?" Mr. Cooper responded, "Not at all." Tr. 358:9-12.


Mr. Cooper testified that when he draws maps, he sometimes uses "a little dot for precincts that are 30 percent or greater Black." Tr. 200:11-15. He testified that he did not always use that feature. Tr. 93:23-94:2. Mr. Cooper repeatedly testified that "race did not predominate" in his drawing of the Illustrative Plans. Tr. 93:1, 108:4-11, 108:23-109:5, 168:15-18. When asked by the Court if race predominated, Mr. Cooper responded, "No. Because I also had to take into account these other factors, population equality, avoiding county splits, avoiding splitting municipalities. So it's out there and I'm aware of it, but it didn't control how these districts were drawn. Id. at 108:4-11.

Particularly in light of Mr. Cooper's extensive experience and his testimony regarding the process he used in this case and his balancing of the various considerations, the Court finds that race did not predominate over the other traditional redistricting principles when he drew the Cooper Legislative Plans.

c)Cooper House Plan

*30 The Cooper House Plan contains five additional majority-Black House Districts, two in south-metro Atlanta, one in the Eastern Black Belt, anchored in and around Augusta, one in and around Macon-Bibb, and one in southwest Georgia.

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APAX 1 ¶ 151 & fig.27.

(1) Empirical measures

(a) numerosity

The AP BVAP population for the additional districts are as follows: Cooper HD-74 is 61.49%, HD-117 is 54.64%, HD-133 is 51.97%, HD-145 is 50.20%, and HD-171 is 58.06%. APAX 1, Ex. AA-1. All of the districts in the Cooper House Plan exceed 50% as do the districts that are majority-Black under the Enacted House Plan. Id.

(b) population equality and contiguity

APAX 1 ¶ 187 & fig.36.

Dr. Morgan, Defendant's mapping expert, concluded that the average compactness scores in the Cooper House Plan and the Enacted House Plan “are similar.” DX 2 ¶ 47.

It is undisputed that the population deviations in all districts in the Cooper House Plan are within $\pm 1.49\%$ of the ideal district population size of 59,511 people. Stip. ¶¶ 278, 302. This is higher than the Enacted House Plan, which has a deviation range of -1.40% to $+1.34\%$. Stip. ¶ 302. It is also undisputed that all districts in the Cooper House Plan are contiguous. Stip. ¶ 300.

(c) compactness

The Court finds that the Cooper House Plan and the Enacted House Plan, on the whole, are comparable. Mr. Cooper explained, the Cooper Legislative Plans “matched or beat the State's plans on ... compactness measures[.]” Tr. 109:2-4. Mr. Cooper concluded that “[o]n balance, the Illustrative House Plan and 2021 Senate Plan score about the same on the widely referenced Reock and Polsby-Popper measures. If anything, the Illustrative Plan scores better inasmuch as its least compact district by Reock scores [0].16, compared to [0].12 for the 2021 House Plan.” APAX 1 ¶ 187.

Mr. Cooper's expert report provided detailed compactness measures for the Enacted Senate Plan as follows:

Compactness Scores

Illustrative House Plan versus

2015 Benchmark and 2021 House Plans

	Reock		Polsby-Popper	
	Mean	Low	Mean	Low
Illustrative House Plan	.39	.16	.27	.11
2015 Benchmark House Plan	.39	.13	.27	.09
2021 House Plan	.39	.12	.28	.10

The Court concludes that the Cooper and Enacted House Plans have identical Reock scores, but the Cooper House Plan is less compact by 0.01 on Polsby-Popper. Id. Consistent with both Defendants’ and the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ experts, the Court finds that the compactness scores of the two plans are “similar.” Accordingly, the Court finds that the

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Cooper and Enacted House Plans are comparably compact, with respect to the average and minimum scores.

the least compact district in the Enacted House Plan. The following table is derived from the data contained in Exhibits AG-1 and AG-2:

With respect to the additional majority-Black districts, the Court finds that those districts are all more compact than

Districts	Enacted Districts		Illustrative Districts	
	Reock	Polsby-Popper	Reock	Polsby-Popper
074	0.50	0.25	0.63	0.36
117	0.41	0.28	0.41	0.26
133	0.55	0.42	0.26	0.20
145	0.38	0.19	0.25	0.22
171	0.35	0.37	0.28	0.20

APAX 1, Exs. AG-1, AG-2.

The Court finds that in the south metro-Atlanta districts, the majority-Black districts in the Cooper House Plan are comparable. For example, Cooper HD-74 beats Enacted HD-74 by 0.13 on Reock and 0.11 on Polsby-Popper. The Court finds that for the districts outside of Atlanta, the majority-Black districts in the Cooper House Plan generally fared worse than the Enacted House Plan's majority-Black districts, with the exception of Cooper HD-145's Polsby-Popper score which is 0.03 more compact than Enacted HD-145. However, none of the compactness scores are below the least compact district's scores on the Enacted House Plan. APAX 1 ¶ 187 & fig.36.

(d)political subdivisions

*31 The Cooper House Plan's political splits are comparable to the Enacted House Plan's. APAX 1 ¶ 189 & fig.37. The Cooper House Plan splits one less county. The plans have the same numbers of unique county and VTD splits. Id. The chart below depicts the total findings on political subdivision splits:

County and VTD splits/Whole Municipalities

Illustrative House Plan versus

2015 Benchmark and 2021 House Plans

	Split Counties	Total County Splits*	2020 VTD Splits*	Single-County Whole City/Towns (478)#	Single and Multi County Whole City/Towns (538)#	Total City/Town Splits*
Illustrative House	68	209	179	393	402	361
2015 Benchmark	73	215	268	381	402	378
2021 House	69	209	179	384	412	344

*Populated splits only

#Higher is better

Id.

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Neither Defendant, nor his experts have meaningfully suggested that the Cooper House Plan fails to respect city, town, and county lines. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Cooper House Plan has comparable political subdivision splits to the Enacted House Plan.

(e) findings of fact on the empirical measures

In sum, the Court finds that the Cooper House Plan is comparable to the Enacted House Plan on population equality, compactness scores, and political subdivision splits.

(2) Core retention

The Court also finds that the Cooper House Plan retained many of the cores of the districts in the Enacted House Plan. Georgia's Reapportionment Guidelines do not identify as a traditional districting principle the goal to preserve existing district cores among "General Principles for Drafting Plans." See JX 1, JX2. The Cooper House Plan kept 87 House districts the same as the Enacted House Plan. DX 2 ¶ 47. If the General Assembly were to enact the Cooper House Plan, 86% of the Georgia population would remain in the same district in the Enacted House Plan. Tr. 88:13-18.

(3) Incumbent pairings

Georgia's redistricting guidelines provide that "efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary incumbent pairings." JX 1, at 3; JX 2, at 3. Mr. Cooper testified that he also sought to avoid incumbent pairings. Tr. 236:1-2. Mr. Cooper used official incumbent address information that defense counsel provided in January 2022 and another potential database of incumbent address information that followed the November 2022 General Election. APAX 1 ¶ 12. Mr. Cooper testified that as he was drawing the Illustrative Plans, "always in the back of my mind [I] was trying to avoid pairing incumbents." Tr. 236:1-2. Cooper House Plans pairs 25 incumbents. The Enacted House Plan pairs 20 incumbents. *Id.* at 25. Mr. Cooper paired five more incumbents than the Enacted House Plan.

(4) Racial considerations

The evidence regarding Mr. Cooper's racial considerations when drawing the Cooper House Plan is identical to the evidence regarding the drawing of the Cooper Senate Plan. Accordingly, the Court incorporates by reference its analysis of the Mr. Cooper's racial consideration in the Cooper Senate Plan here. See Section I(F)(3)(b)(4) *supra*.

4. Esselstyn Legislative Plans

a) Mr. Esselstyn's map drawing process

As a part of his expert report, Mr. Esselstyn submitted an illustrative State Senate Plan ("Esselstyn Senate Plan") and an illustrative State House Plan ("Esselstyn House Plan") (collectively the "Esselstyn Legislative Plans"). Mr. Esselstyn testified that he was asked whether "the Black population in Georgia is sufficiently large and geographically compact to allow for the creation of additional majority Black districts in the legislative maps relative to the enacted maps while adhering to traditional redistricting principles." Tr. 467: 11–15. To accomplish this inquiry, Mr. Esselstyn used data from the Census Bureau's website, the Georgia General Assembly's Legislative Congressional Reapportionment Office's website, and the Georgia General Assembly's Reapportionment Committees Guidelines. *Id.* ¶¶ 1–2. Mr. Esselstyn also drew upon his knowledge as a geologist for determining where "fall line cities" were located in Georgia. Tr. 529:12–530:1. Mr. Esselstyn did not have any political data or election return information available when drawing the illustrative plans. Tr. 524:19–25. He also did not review any public comments provided by Georgians at public hearings until after he drew his preliminary injunction plans, and the Esselstyn Legislative Plans are very similar to his preliminary injunction plans. Tr. 530:2–8.

*32 For the physical process of drawing his illustrative plans, Mr. Esselstyn primarily used the mapping software Maptitude, the same software used by the Georgia General Assembly. GX 2, Attach. B ¶ 4. Through Maptitude, he was able to import Census Bureau data files and the Enacted Legislative Plans. *Id.*

Maptitude shows statistics for the districts, such as compactness and population deviation. *Id.* Maptitude allows the map drawer to shade the map for racial demographics. Tr. 521:13–19. Mr. Esselstyn testified that "[a]t times" he would use the racial information to "inform decisions that he made about which parts of districts went in and out of a particular


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district.” Tr. 522:19–25. But, he stated that he did not always have it on when drawing the Esselstyn Legislative Plans. Tr. 587:18–24. He testified that the racial information “would have been one factor that [he] was considering in addition to other factors.” Tr. 522:24–25. Mr. Esselstyn testified that in determining where particular communities were located, he primarily relied on visible features that were displayed in the Maptitude software. Tr. 528:23–529:2.

b)Esselstyn Senate Plan

Analyzing these demographics and the Enacted Senate Plan, Mr. Esselstyn concluded that “[i]t is possible to create three additional majority-Black districts in the State Senate plan ... in accordance with traditional redistricting principles.” GX 1 ¶ 13; Tr. 468:2–4. Two in south-metro Atlanta and one in the Eastern Black Belt. GX 1 ¶ 13. Meaning, the Esselstyn Senate Plan has 17 majority-Black State Senate districts using the AP BVAP metric. Stip. ¶ 231; GX 1 ¶ 27.

Figure 4: Map of majority-Black districts in the illustrative State Senate plan.



GX 1 ¶ 27 & fig.4.

(1) Empirical measures

(a)numerosity

The Esselstyn Senate Plan contains 17 majority-Black districts. GX 1 ¶ 27 & tbl. 1. The AP BVAP in all 17 districts exceed 50 percent. Id. Of the additional

Table 1: Illustrative Senate plan majority-Black districts with BVAP percentages.

District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%
10	61.10%	26	52.84%	39	60.21%
12	57.97%	28	57.28%	41	62.61%
15	54.00%	34	58.97%	43	58.52%
22	50.84%	35	54.05%	44	71.52%
23	51.06%	36	51.34%	55	65.97%
25	58.93%	38	66.36%		

majority-Black districts, the majority-Black population is 51.06%, 58.93%, and 57.28% respectively. Id.

(b)population equality and contiguity

It is undisputed that the districts in the Esselstyn Senate Plan are all contiguous. Stip. ¶ 258.

The overall deviation range on the Enacted Senate Plan is higher than the overall deviation range on the Enacted Senate Plan. Tr. 527:11–15; DX 3, Chart 3. However, the Court finds that the Esselstyn Senate Plan complies with the General Assembly's population equality guidelines. Under the General Assembly's redistricting guidelines “[e]ach legislative district of the General Assembly shall be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable, considering the principles listed below.” JX 2, 2.

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Under the Esselstyn Senate Plan, all districts have a population deviation between ± 1 and 2%, with most within $\pm 1\%$. GX 1 ¶ 34. The district with the greatest deviation is + 1.90% and the district contains 194,919—3,635 persons more than the ideal population. GX 1, Attach. E. The average population deviation in Esselstyn's Senate Plan is $\pm 0.67\%$. Id. The Court finds that on average, Mr. Esselstyn's Senate Plan complies with the General Assembly's guideline on population equality.

(c) Compactness scores

The Court finds that the Esselstyn Senate Plan and the Enacted Senate Plan, on the whole, are comparable. Mr. Esselstyn reported the average compactness scores for both

Table 2: Compactness measures for enacted and illustrative State Senate plans.

	Reock (average)	Schwartzberg (average)	Polsby-Popper (average)	Area/Convex Hull (average)	Number of Cut Edges
Enacted	0.42	1.75	0.29	0.76	11,005
Illustrative	0.41	1.76	0.28	0.75	11,003

*33 GX 1 ¶ 36 & tbl. 2.

The Court concludes that the Esselstyn Senate Plan fares worse than the Enacted Senate Plan by 0.01 points on four of the five measures and has 2 fewer cut edges than the Enacted Senate Plan. Id. Consistent with both Defendants' and the Grant Plaintiffs' experts, the Court finds that the compactness scores of the two plans are "very close." Accordingly, the

the Enacted and Esselstyn Legislative Plans using five measures—Reock, Schwartzberg³⁰, Polsby-Popper, Area/Convex Hull³¹, and Number of Cut Edges³². GX 1 ¶¶ 36, 57 & tbls.2, 6; see also Tr. 475:18–476:18 (Mr. Esselstyn's testimony describing common measures of compactness).

Mr. Esselstyn concluded that the average compactness measures for the Enacted and Esselstyn Senate Plans "are almost identical." GX 1 ¶ 36 & tbl.2; see also Id. at 79–91 (Mr. Esselstyn's expert report providing detailed compactness measures for Enacted and Esselstyn Senate Plans); Tr. 485:19–21 (Mr. Esselstyn's testimony describing compliance with compactness principle). Mr. Morgan agreed that the mean compactness scores were "very close." Tr. 1843:19–1844:2. Mr. Esselstyn reported those measures as follows:

Court finds that the Esselstyn and Enacted Senate Plans are comparably compact.

The following chart is derived from the data in attachment H to Mr. Esselstyn's report and depicts the compactness scores for the minority-Black districts in the Enacted and Esselstyn Senate Plans.

District	Enacted Senate Plan		Esselstyn Senate Plan	
	Reock	Polsby-Popper	Reock	Polsby-Popper
010	0.28	0.23	0.25	0.19
012	0.62	0.39	0.62	0.39
015	0.57	0.32	0.57	0.32
022	0.41	0.29	0.33	0.32
023*	0.37	0.16	0.34	0.17
025*	0.39	0.24	0.57	0.34
026	0.47	0.20	0.44	0.25
028*	0.45	0.25	0.38	0.19

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034	0.45	0.34	0.31	0.21
035	0.47	0.26	0.59	0.42
036	0.32	0.30	0.32	0.30
038	0.36	0.21	0.37	0.20
039	0.17	0.13	0.18	0.13
041	0.51	0.30	0.51	0.30
043	0.64	0.35	0.49	0.25
044	0.18	0.19	0.33	0.24
045	0.35	0.30	0.35	0.30
Mean:	0.41	0.26	0.41	0.27
Max:	0.64	0.39	0.62	0.42
Min:	0.17	0.13	0.18	0.13

asterisk (*) denotes a new majority-Black district

With respect to the majority-Black districts, the Court finds that the Esselstyn Senate Plan is equivalent if not better than the Enacted Senate Plan. On average, the two plans have identical Reock scores and the Esselstyn Senate Plan fares 0.01 better on the Polsby-Popper measure. GX 1, Attach. H.

With respect to the maximum and minimum scores, the Enacted Senate Plan has a district that is 0.02 better on Reock than the most compact district in the Esselstyn Senate Plan. *Id.* Conversely, on the Polsby-Popper measure, the Esselstyn Senate Plan's most compact district is 0.03 points more compact than the most compact district in the Enacted Senate Plan. *Id.* The least compact districts in both plans have identical Polsby-Popper scores and the Esselstyn Senate Plan's least compact district is more compact by 0.01 points. *Id.*

*34 Finally, on the Reock measure, five of the majority-Black districts have identical scores, five districts are more

Table 4: Political subdivision splits for enacted and illustrative State Senate plans.

Intact Counties	Split Counties	Split VTDs
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compact in the Esselstyn Senate Plan, and seven districts are more compact in the Enacted Senate Plan. *Id.* On the Polsby-Popper measure, six of the majority-Black districts have identical scores, six districts are more compact in the Esselstyn Senate Plan, and five are more compact on the Enacted Senate Plan.

In sum, the Court finds that on the empirical compactness measures, the majority-Black districts in the Enacted and Esselstyn Senate Plans are comparably compact.

(d)political subdivisions

The Court finds that on the whole, the Esselstyn Senate Plan's political subdivision splits are comparable to the Enacted Senate Plan's. The Esselstyn Senate Plan splits more counties and VTDs than the Enacted Senate Plan. *Tr.* 528:1–5; DX 3, Chart 3. Mr. Esselstyn noted that he split fewer counties than in the 2014 Georgia Legislative Plans. *Tr.* 487:15–21; GX 1 ¶ 40 & tabl.4. He reported the splits in the enacted and illustrative State Senate maps as follows:

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
Enacted	130	29	47
Illustrative	125	34	49

GX 1, ¶ 40 & tbl.4.

Mr. Esselstyn concluded that “[w]hile the creation of three additional majority-Black State Senate districts involved the division of additional counties and VTDS, the differences are marginal.” GX 1 ¶ 40 & tbl.4; see also *Id.* at 92–103 (Mr. Esselstyn's expert report providing political subdivision splits for enacted and illustrative State Senate maps); *Tr.* 487:8–14 (Mr. Esselstyn's testimony that the number of political subdivision splits in the illustrative and enacted Senate plans are “very similar”).

Mr. Morgan's report confirms that the Esselstyn Senate Plan split the same counties as the Enacted Senate Plan. *See* DX 3 ¶ 35. Mr. Morgan also conceded that the ways in which the Esselstyn Senate Plan splits counties, at times, affected fewer people because he split smaller counties and united some of the bigger counties. *See* *Tr.* 1887:21–1891:1. Out of 2,698 VTDS statewide, only 49 are split in Esselstyn Senate Plan, and in only 18 of Georgia's 159 counties. Doc. No. GX 1 ¶ 40 & tbl.4; Mr. Esselstyn's report included a histogram depicting the VTD splits in the Esselstyn Senate Plan by county:

Figure 10: VTD splits in illustrative State Senate plan by county.



GX 1 ¶ 40 & fig.10.

(e) findings of fact on the empirical measures

In sum, the Court finds that the Esselstyn Senate Plan has greater population deviations than the Enacted Senate Plan; however, the Esselstyn Senate Plan has comparable compactness scores and political subdivision splits.

(2) Core retention

The General Assembly Guidelines did not include maintaining existing State Senate district cores. JX 1, JX 2. Similarly, Ms. Wright testified that when drafting the Enacted Senate Plan, she starts with a blank map and builds out from there. *Tr.* 1622:11–17; 1642:7–14. She does not start by using the most recent State Senate map. *Id.* Although not an enumerated guideline, the Court finds that the Esselstyn Senate Plan respects the core districts of the Enacted Senate Plan. Mr. Esselstyn used the Enacted Senate Plan as a starting point, and many of the districts are the same. Only 22 districts were modified, leaving the other 34 unchanged. *Stip.* ¶ 261; GX 1 ¶ 26; *Tr.* 485:3–5. As Mr. Morgan's report confirms, nearly 90% of Georgia's population would remain in their same numbered State Senate district under the Esselstyn Senate Plan. DX 3, Ex. 7. The Court finds that the Esselstyn Senate Plan retained the majority of the core districts from the Enacted Senate Plan.

(3) Incumbent Pairings

*35 Based on the record, the Court concludes that the Esselstyn Senate Plan complies with the districting criterion of avoiding unnecessary pairings of incumbents. *See* JX1, JX2. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Mr. Esselstyn submitted an illustrative State Senate plan that he created without knowledge of incumbent addresses. GX 1 ¶ 42; *Tr.* 479:23–480:21. That plan paired two incumbents in the State Senate.

The Esselstyn Senate Plan, submitted at trial, pairs fewer incumbents than Mr. Esselstyn's initial plans. Currently, no incumbent State Senators are paired. GX 1 ¶ 42; *Tr.* 480:18–21.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn Senate Plan respects the traditional redistricting principle of avoiding pairing incumbents because it paired no incumbents.

(4) Racial Considerations

The Court further concludes that Mr. Esselstyn did not subordinate traditional districting principles in favor of race-conscious considerations. Mr. Esselstyn was asked

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“to determine whether there are areas in the State of Georgia where the Black population is ‘sufficiently large and geographically compact’ to enable the creation of additional majority-Black legislative districts relative to the number of such districts provided in the enacted State Senate and State House of Representatives redistricting plans from 2021.” GX 1 ¶ 9 (footnote omitted); see also Tr. 467:8–15 (Mr. Esselstyn's testimony confirming what he was asked to do in this case). Mr. Esselstyn testified that he was not asked to maximize the number of majority-Black districts in the Enacted Legislative Plans. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon PI Tr. 150:23–25.

Mr. Esselstyn testified that it was necessary for him to consider race as part of his analysis because “the Gingles 1 precondition is looking at whether majority Black districts can be created. And in order to understand whether districts are majority Black, one has to be able to look at statistics for those districts.” Tr. 471:9–17. See Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon PI Tr. 155:15–156:2. (Mr. Esselstyn testifying that, under Section 2, “the key metric is whether a district has a majority of the Any Part Black population. So that means it has to be over 50 percent. And that means looking at a column of numbers in order to determine, to assess whether a district has that characteristic. You have to look at the numbers that measure the percentage of the population is Black.”).

Mr. Esselstyn emphasized that he took other considerations into account as well when drawing his illustrative plans, including population equality, compliance with the federal and Georgia constitutions, contiguity, and other traditional districting principles. Tr. 471:18–472:14.; Id. at 522:5–14 (“I’m constantly looking at the shape of the district, what it does for population equality, ... political subdivisions, communities of interest, incumbents, all that. So while yes, at times [race] would have been used to inform a decision, it was one of a number of factors.”).

Mr. Esselstyn confirmed that race did not predominate when he drew the Esselstyn Legislative Plans. Tr. 472:15–20. Although Mr. Morgan concluded that Mr. Esselstyn's changes from the Enacted Senate Plan indicate that he prioritized race, the Court does not credit Mr. Morgan's analysis or conclusions for several reasons.

First, Mr. Morgan conceded that he did not examine the extent to which Mr. Esselstyn's changes were designed to satisfy traditional districting criteria like avoiding the unnecessary pairing of incumbents and preserving communities of interest. Tr. 1897:11–1899:3, 1923:21–

1924:16. Mr. Morgan's overarching conclusion about the prioritization of race over other factors is difficult to square with his failure to actually examine all of the relevant factors Mr. Esselstyn stated he considered in drawing his illustrative plans.

*36 Second, Mr. Morgan's analysis is methodologically inconsistent. For instance, the text of his expert report, which purports to compare the district in the Enacted and Esselstyn Senate Plans, contains compactness scores for the enacted districts but makes no mention of the compactness scores for the corresponding illustrative districts. Tr. 1854:5–12.

Third, Mr. Morgan's analysis of the new majority-Black districts is incomplete. The text of Mr. Morgan's expert report provides no description or analysis whatsoever of Esselstyn SD-25, SD-28, HD-64, HD-117, HD-145 or HD-149. Tr. 1846:10–1847:6; Tr. 1896:21–23, 1922:22–25, 1923:1–15.

Fourth, Mr. Morgan's conclusion regarding the role of race seems to fault the Esselstyn Legislative Plans for taking the same approach as the Enacted Legislative Plans. Specifically, Mr. Morgan criticizes Esselstyn Legislative Plans for “elongating” various districts when creating new majority-Black districts, e.g., Tr. 1811:25–1812:18, but conceded that the Enacted Legislative Plans do the same thing. Tr. 1927:4–1928:25. Ms. Wright also agreed that several districts in the Enacted Legislative Plans, including Enacted SD-10, SD-44, HD-36, and HD-60, are “elongated.” Tr. 1702:3–1704:1.


For these reasons, the Court is not persuaded by Mr. Morgan's testimony and conclusions that race predominated when Mr. Esselstyn drew the Esselstyn Legislative Plans. The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn consistently testified that race did not predominate when he drew his plans. Rather, he made efforts to balance traditional redistricting principles when he made districting decisions. Thus, the Court finds that race did not predominate in the drawing of the Esselstyn Legislative Plans.

c)Esselstyn House Plan

Mr. Esselstyn concluded that it was possible to draw five additional majority-Black House districts in accordance with traditional redistricting principles. GX 1 ¶ 13.

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Figure 13: Map of majority-Black districts in the illustrative House plan.



GX 1 ¶ 48 & fig.13.

(I) Empirical measures

(a) numerosity

Esselstyn's The Esselstyn House Plan contains 54 majority-Black districts. GX 1 ¶ 48 & tbl. 5. The AP BVAP in all of these districts exceed 50 percent. Id. The majority-Black population in the majority-Black districts is 50.24%, 53.94%, 51.56%, 50.38%, and 51.53% respectively. Id.

Table 5: Illustrative House plan majority-Black districts with BVAP percentages.

District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%
38	54.23%	69	62.73%	91	60.01%	137	52.13%
39	55.29%	74	53.94%	92	68.79%	140	57.63%
55	55.38%	75	66.89%	93	65.36%	141	57.46%
58	63.04%	76	67.23%	94	69.04%	142	50.14%
59	70.09%	77	76.13%	95	67.15%	143	50.64%
60	63.88%	78	51.03%	113	59.53%	145	50.38%
61	53.49%	79	71.59%	115	53.77%	149	51.53%
62	72.26%	84	73.66%	116	51.95%	150	53.56%
63	69.33%	85	62.71%	117	51.56%	153	67.95%
64	50.24%	86	75.05%	126	54.47%	154	54.82%
65	63.34%	87	73.08%	128	50.41%	165	50.33%
66	53.88%	88	63.35%	129	54.87%	177	53.88%
67	58.92%	89	62.54%	130	59.91%		
68	55.75%	90	58.49%	132	52.34%		

GX 1 ¶ 48 & tbl. 5.

(b) population equality and contiguity

It is undisputed that the districts in the Esselstyn House Plan are all contiguous. Stip. ¶ 258.

The Esselstyn House Plan's overall population deviation is higher than the deviation range in the Enacted House Plan's. Tr. 527:11–15; DX 3, Chart 3. However, the Court finds that the Esselstyn House Plan complies with the General Assembly's population equality guidelines. Under the General Assembly's redistricting guidelines state that “[e]ach legislative district of the General Assembly shall be drawn

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to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable, considering the principles listed below.” JX 2, 2.

Under the Esselstyn House Plan, all districts have a population deviation between -1.94% and +1.91%, with a mean deviation of +0.64%. GX 1, Attach. J. The district with the greatest deviation is +1.91% and the district contains 58,358 people—1,153 persons less than the ideal population. GX 1, Attach. J. Comparatively, the Enacted House Plan has a population deviation range of -1.40 to +1.34%. GX 1, Attach. I. The Court finds that the Esselstyn House Plan has a greater deviation range than the Enacted House Plan, and on average, Mr. Esselstyn's House Plan complies with the General Assembly's guideline on population equality.

(c)compactness scores

Table 6: Compactness measures for enacted and illustrative House plans.

	Reock (average)	Schwartzberg (average)	Polsby-Popper (average)	Area/Convex Hull (average)	Number of Cut Edges
Enacted	0.39	1.80	0.28	0.72	22,020
Illustrative	0.39	1.81	0.28	0.72	22,359

GX 1 ¶ 57 & tbl.6.

Mr. Morgan characterized the overall compactness scores of the Enacted and Esselstyn House Plans as “similar.” DX 3 ¶ 50. The Court concludes that the Esselstyn House Plan is identical on Reock, Polsby-Popper, and Area/Convex Hull. Id. On the Schwartzberg measure, the Enacted Plan is 0.01 more compact and the Enacted House Plan cut 339 fewer edges. GX 1 ¶ 57 & tbl.6

Consistent with both Defendants’ and the Grant Plaintiffs’ experts, the Court finds that the compactness scores of the two plans are “similar.” Accordingly, the Court finds that the Esselstyn and Enacted House Plans are comparably compact. With respect to the maximum and minimum scores, the most compact district in the Enacted House Plan has a Reock score of 0.66 and the least compact district has a Reock Score of 0.12. GX 1, Attach. L. And on the Polsby-Popper measures,

*37 The Court finds that the Esselstyn House Plan and the Enacted House Plan, on the whole, are comparable. Mr. Esselstyn reported the average compactness scores for both the Enacted and Esselstyn House Plans using five measures—Reock, Schwartzberg, Polsby-Popper, Area/Convex Hull, and Number of Cut Edges. GX 1 ¶¶ 36, 57 & tbls.2, 6; see also Tr. 475:18–476:18 (Mr. Esselstyn's testimony describing common measures of compactness).

Mr. Esselstyn further concluded that the average compactness measures for the Enacted and Esselstyn House Plans “are almost identical, if not identical.” GX 1 ¶ 57 & tbl. 6; see also Id. at 135–65 (Mr. Esselstyn's expert report providing detailed compactness measures for enacted and illustrative House maps); Tr. 492:17–22 (Mr. Esselstyn's testimony describing compliance with compactness principle). Mr. Esselstyn reported those measures as follows:

the most compact district has a score of 0.59 and the least compact district has a score of 0.10. The Esselstyn House Plan has the same metrics. Id.

With respect to the additional majority-Black districts, the Court finds that the additional majority-Black districts compactness scores all exceed 0.12 on Reock and 0.10 on Polsby-Popper, which are the lowest compactness scores in the Enacted House Plan. Id.

However, generally, the Court finds that the majority-Black House districts performed worse than the districts in the Enacted House Plan. However, none of the compactness measures are below the least compact district's measures on the Enacted House Plan. The following table is derived from the data contained in attachment L to GX 1:

	Enacted House Plan		Illustrative House Plan	
Districts	Reock	Polsby-Popper	Reock	Polsby-Popper
064	0.37	0.36	0.22	0.22

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074	0.50	0.25	0.30	0.19
117	0.41	0.28	0.40	0.33
145	0.38	0.19	0.34	0.21
149	0.32	0.22	0.46	0.28

In sum, the Court finds that on the empirical compactness measures, the majority-Black districts in the Esselstyn House Plan fall within the compactness score range of the Enacted House Plan.

Mr. Esselstyn concluded that “[w]hile the creation of three additional majority-Black State House districts involved the division of additional counties and VTDs, the differences are marginal.” GX 1 ¶ 39 & tbl.4; see also Id. at 92–103 (Mr. Esselstyn’s expert report providing political subdivision splits for the Enacted and Esselstyn House Plans); Tr. 487:8–14 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony that the number of political subdivision splits in the Esselstyn and Enacted House Plans are “very similar”). He reported the splits in the Enacted and Esselstyn House Plans as follows:

(d)political subdivisions

The Court finds that on the whole, the Esselstyn House Plan’s political subdivision splits are comparable to the Enacted House Plan’s. The Enacted House Plan splits more counties and precincts than the Enacted House Plan. Tr. 528:1–5; DX 3, Chart 3.


Table 8: Political subdivision splits for enacted and illustrative House plans.

	Intact Counties	Split Counties	Split VTDs
Enacted	90	69	185
Illustrative	89	70	186

*38 GX 1 ¶ 59 & tbl. 8.

The Esselstyn House Plan splits one more county and VTD than the Enacted House Plan. Notably, out of 2,698 VTDs statewide, only 186 are split in Esselstyn House Plan, and in only 45 of Georgia’s 159 counties. GX 1 ¶ 59 & tbl.8; Tr. 494:16–495:3. Mr. Morgan also found that the ways in which the Esselstyn House Plan splits counties, at times, fewer people are affected because he split smaller counties and united some of the bigger counties. See Tr. 1887:21–1891:1. Mr. Esselstyn’s report included a histogram depicting the VTD splits in the Esselstyn House Plan by county:

Figure 18: VTD splits in illustrative State House plan by county.



GX 1 ¶ 59 & fig.18.

(e)findings of fact on the empirical measures

In sum, the Court finds that the Esselstyn House Plan has a greater range of population deviations than the Enacted House Plan; however, the Esselstyn House Plan has comparable compactness scores and political subdivision splits.

(2) Core retention

The General Assembly Guidelines did not include maintaining existing State House district cores. JX 1, JX 2. Similarly, Ms. Wright testified that when drafting the Enacted House Plan, she starts with a blank map and builds out from there. 1622:11–17; 1642:7–14. She does not start by using the most recent State House map. Id. Although not an enumerated guideline, the Court finds that the Esselstyn House Plan respects the core districts of the Enacted House Plan. Mr. Esselstyn used the Enacted House Plan as a starting

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point and many of the districts are the same. Only 25 districts were modified, leaving the other 155 unchanged. Stip. ¶ 261; GX 1 ¶ 47; DX 3, Ex. 14. As Mr. Morgan's report confirms, nearly 94% of Georgia's population would remain in their same numbered State House district under the Esselstyn House Plan. DX 3, Ex. 7. The Court finds that the Esselstyn House Plan retained the majority of the core districts from the Enacted House Plan.

(3) Incumbent Pairings

Based on the record, the Court concludes that the Esselstyn House Plan complies with the districting criterion of avoiding unnecessary pairings of incumbents. See JX1, JX2. Mr. Esselstyn's preliminary injunction State House plan was created without knowledge of incumbent addresses and paired 16 incumbents in the State House. GX 1 ¶ 61; Tr. 479:23–480:21.

The Esselstyn House Plan, submitted in his December 2022 expert report, pairs fewer incumbents than Mr. Esselstyn's initial plans. The Esselstyn House Plan would pair a total of eight incumbents in the same districts—the same number of incumbents that the Enacted House Plan paired in the same districts. GX 1 ¶ 61; Tr. 480:14–21.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Esselstyn House Plan pairs the same number of incumbents as the Enacted House Plan; therefore, it complies with the traditional redistricting principle of avoiding pairing incumbents.

(4) Racial Considerations

The evidence regarding the Esselstyn Senate and House Plans was identical. Accordingly, the Court incorporates its racial predominance analysis from the Esselstyn Senate Plan Section. See Section I(H)(4)(b)(4) *supra*.

G. Second and Third Gingles Preconditions

1. Pendergrass: Dr. Palmer's methodology

*39 Dr. Palmer who served as Pendergrass and Grant Plaintiffs' experts, evaluated the Black population's cohesion and white voter bloc voting using EI. PX 2, GX 2. Both Dr. Palmer and Defendants' expert, Dr. Alford, testified

that ecological inference (“EI”) is a reliable method for conducting the second and third Gingles preconditions analyses. “Q. Dr. Alford, you agree that ... the method of ecological inference Dr. Palmer applied is the best available method for estimating voting behavior by race; correct? A. Correct.” Tr. 2250:12–16; “Q. Do scholars and experts regularly use EI to examine racially polarized voting? A. Yes?” Tr. 401: 7–9. EI “estimates group-level preferences based on aggregate data.” PX 2 ¶ 13. The data analyzed under EI also includes confidence intervals, which measure the uncertainty of results. *Id.* at n. 12.

Dr. Palmer conducted a racially polarized voting analysis of Enacted CD-3, 6, 11, 13, and 14, both as a region (the “congressional focus area”) and individually. Stip. ¶ 214; PX 2 ¶ 7; Tr. 413:18–414:5.




Figure 1: Map of the Focus Area

PX 2 ¶ 11 & fig.1.

Dr. Palmer evaluated Black and white voters' choices in the congressional focus area that voted for each candidate in 40 statewide elections between 2012 and 2022. Stip. ¶ 217; PX 2 ¶¶ 13, 15. Dr. Palmer's EI analysis relied on precinct-level election results and voter turnout by race, as compiled by the State of Georgia. PX 2 ¶ 11; Tr. 403:2–13.

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Dr. Palmer first examined each racial group's support for each candidate to determine if members of the group voted cohesively in support of a single candidate in each election. PX 2 ¶ 14. If a significant majority of the group supported a single candidate, he then identified that candidate as the group's candidate of choice. *Id.* Dr. Palmer next compared the preferences of white voters to the preferences of Black voters. *Id.* He concluded that evidence of racially polarized voting is found when Black voters and white voters support different candidates. *Id.*

2. *Alpha Phi Alpha: Dr. Handley's methodology*

Dr. Handley, *Alpha Phi Alpha's* expert, analyzed voting patterns by race in seven areas of Georgia where the Cooper Legislative Plans created additional majority-Black districts. Tr. 861:21-25; APAX 5, 2; Stip. ¶ 307. As part of that analysis, she considered whether Black voters had the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in these areas under the Cooper Legislative Plans as compared to the Enacted Legislative Plans. *See* Tr. 862:22-863:5; APAX 5, 2, 12.

Dr. Handley stated that these seven areas in Georgia are where “districts that offered Black voters opportunities to elect their candidates of choice could have been drawn and were not drawn when you compare the illustrative to the adopted plan.” Tr. 861:21-25. Dr. Handley named these seven areas the Eastern Atlanta Metro Region, the Southern Atlanta Metro Region, East Central Georgia with Augusta, the Southeastern Atlanta Metro Region, Central Georgia, Southwest Georgia, and the Macon Region. *See* APAX 5, 8-9; Tr. 869:13-25.

The first area Dr. Handley analyzed—the Eastern Atlanta Metro Region—encompasses Cooper SD-10, SD-17, SD-43 and Enacted SD-10, SD-17, SD-43 (DeKalb, Henry, Morgan, Newton, Rockdale, and Walton Counties). Stip. ¶ 309; APAX 5, 8, 17-18. The second area—the Southern Atlanta Metro Region—encompasses Cooper SD-16, SD-28, SD-34, and SD-39 and Enacted SD-16, SD-28, SD-34, and SD-44 (Clayton, Coweta, Douglas, Fayette, Heard, Henry, Lamar, Pike, and Spalding Counties). Stip. ¶ 310; APAX 5, 8, 19-20.

The third area—the East Central Georgia Region—encompasses Cooper SD-22, SD-23, SD-26, and SD-44 and Enacted SD-22, SD-23, SD-25, and SD-26 (Baldwin, Bibb, Burke, Butts, Columbia, Emanuel, Glascock, Hancock, Henry, Houston, Jasper, Jefferson, Jenkins, Johnson, Jones, Lamar, McDuffie, Monroe, Morgan, Putnam, Richmond,

Screven, Taliaferro, Twiggs, Walton, Warren, Washington, Wilkes, and Wilkinson Counties). Stip. ¶ 311; APAX 5, 9, 21-22. The fourth area—Southeastern Atlanta Metro Region—encompasses Cooper HD-74, HD-75, HD-78, HD-115, HD-116, HD-117, HD-118, HD-134, and HD-135 and Enacted HD-74, HD-75, HD-78, HD-115, HD-116, HD-117, HD-118, HD-134, and HD-135 (Butts, Clayton, Fayette, Henry, Jasper, Lamar, Monroe, Pike, Putnam, Spalding, and Upson Counties). Stip. ¶ 312; APAX 5, 9, 23-24. The fifth area—Central Georgia—encompasses Cooper HD-128, HD-133, HD-144, and HD-155 and Enacted HD-128, HD-133, HD-149, and HD-155 (Baldwin, Bibb, Bleckley, Dodge, Glascock, Hancock, Jefferson, Johnson, Jones, Laurens, McDuffie, Taliaferro, Telfair, Twiggs, Warren, Washington, Wilkes, and Wilkinson Counties). Stip. ¶ 313; APAX 5, 9, 26-27.

*40 The sixth area—Southwest Georgia—encompasses Cooper HD-152, HD-153, HD-171, HD-172, and HD-173 and Enacted HD-152, HD-153, HD-171, HD-172, and HD-173 (Colquitt, Cook, Decatur, Dougherty, Grady, Lee, Mitchell, Seminole, Stewart, Terrell, Thomas, Tift, Webster, and Worth Counties). Stip. ¶ 314; APAX 5, 9, 28-29. The seventh area—the Macon Region—encompasses Cooper HD-142, HD-143, and HD-145 and Enacted HD-142, HD-143, and HD-145 (Bibb, Crawford, Houston, Peach, and Twiggs Counties). Stip. ¶ 315; APAX 5, 9, 30-31.

Dr. Handley employed three commonly used, well-accepted statistical methods to conduct her racially polarized voting analysis: homogeneous precinct analysis,³³ ecological regression³⁴, and EI.³⁵ Tr. 864:17-21, 868:10-12; APAX 5, 3-4; Stip. ¶ 308. With these three statistical methods, she calculated estimates of the percentage of Black and white voters who voted for candidates in recent statewide general elections and State legislative general elections in the seven areas. Tr. 863:21-864:25, 862:22-863:5. Dr. Handley uses homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological regression to check the estimates produced by EI. Tr. 868:7-9. When “they all come up with very similar estimates,” Dr. Handley testified that she can be confident in those estimates. *Id.*

Dr. Alford has “no concerns with [Dr. Handley's] use of EI RxC in her most recent [December 23, 2022] report.” Tr. 2216:1-3. He “[does not] question her ability,” and agrees that “her new report, most recent report, relies on methods that ... are acceptable.” *Id.* at 2220:21, 2216:13-17. Dr. Alford has “no concerns about the data that went into Dr. Handley's statistical analysis in this case[.]” Tr. 2221:5-7.

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
Dr. Handley evaluated 16 recent (2016-2022) general and runoff statewide elections, including for U.S. Senate, Governor, School Superintendent, Public Service Commission, and Commissioners of Agriculture, Insurance, and Labor. APAX 5, 6; Stip. ¶¶ 316-317. She also looked at 54 recent (2016-2022) State legislative elections in the areas of interest, including 16 State Senate contests and 38 State House contests. Tr. 890:2-12; APAX 5, at 7-8; Stip. ¶ 324. All 2022 State legislative contests in the Enacted Legislative Plans identified as districts of interest were analyzed, even if the contest did not include at least one Black candidate. APAX 5, at 7-8. In addition, because there has only been one set of State legislative elections (2022) under the Enacted Plans, Dr. Handley also analyzed biracial State legislative elections conducted between 2016 and 2020 in the State legislative districts under the previous State House and State Senate plans that are located within the seven areas of interest. *Id.*

*41 Dr. Handley also examined 11 statewide Democratic primaries. Tr. 879:25-880:2. She examined those because “we have a two-part election system here and you have to make it through the Democratic primary to make it into the general election” and, in some jurisdictions, primaries are the operative barrier for Black-preferred candidates, so Dr. Handley “would always look at both.” *Id.* at 892:22-893:8. With regard to the areas of interest in this litigation, Dr. Handley concluded that the Democratic primaries were “not a barrier” for Black-preferred candidates to win elections, and Dr. Handley rested her opinions of racially polarized voting in the areas of interest on the general elections. *Id.* at 894:13-22. Dr. Handley did not evaluate whether Democratic primaries are the barrier to electing Black-preferred candidates outside the areas of interest. *Id.* at 894:23-895:1.

3. Grant: Dr. Palmer's methodology

Dr. Palmer, who served as the Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ expert on political cohesion and voter polarization also served as the Grant Plaintiffs’ expert. Dr. Palmer used the same EI method as that used in Pendergrass. Tr. 418:21–25. Dr. Palmer conducted a racially polarized voting analysis of five different legislative focus areas. Stip. ¶ 262; GX 2 ¶ 10; Tr. 403:21–404:5. His EI analysis relied on precinct-level election results and voter turnout by race, as compiled by the State of Georgia. GX 2 ¶ 13; Tr. 403:2–13. Dr. Palmer analyzed two focus areas for the Enacted Senate Plan.

In the Black Belt, Dr. Palmer evaluated Enacted SD-22, SD-23, SD-24, SD-25, and SD-26 (“Palmer’s senate Black Belt focus area”). These districts include Baldwin, Burke, Butts, Columbia, Elbert, Emanuel, Glascock, Greene, Hancock, Hart, Jasper, Jefferson, Jenkins, Johnson, Jones, Lincoln, McDuffie, Oglethorpe, Putnam, Richmond, Screven, Taliaferro, Twiggs, Warren, Washington, Wilkes, and Wilkinson Counties and parts of Bibb, Henry, and Houston Counties. Tr. 403:21–404:5; GX 2 ¶ 12; Stip. ¶ 265. In south-metro Atlanta Dr. Palmer evaluated Enacted SD-10, SD-16, SD-17, SD-25, SD-28, SD-34, SD-35, SD-39, and SD-44. These districts include Baldwin, Butts, Clayton, Coweta, Fayette, Heard, Jasper, Jones, Lamar, Morgan, Pike, Putnam, and Spalding Counties and parts of Bibb, DeKalb, Douglas, Fulton, Henry, Newton, and Walton Counties. Tr. 403:21–404:5; GX 2 ¶ 12; Stip. ¶ 265.




GX 2 ¶ 12 & fig.1.

Dr. Palmer analyzed three focus areas for the State House Plan. In the Black Belt, Dr. Palmer evaluated Enacted HD-133, HD-142, HD-143, HD-145, HD-147, and HD-149. These districts include Bleckley, Crawford, Dodge, Twiggs, and Wilkinson Counties and parts of Baldwin, Bibb, Houston, Jones, Monroe, Peach, and Telfair Counties. Tr. 403:21–404:5; GX 2 ¶ 11; Stip. ¶ 264. In south-metro Atlanta, Dr. Palmer evaluated Enacted HD-69, HD-74, HD-75, HD-78, HD-115, and HD-117. These districts include parts of

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Clayton, Fayette, Fulton, Henry, and Spalding Counties. Tr. 403:21–404:5; GX 2 ¶ 11; Stip. ¶ 264. Finally, in west-metro Atlanta, Dr. Palmer evaluated Enacted HD-61 and HD-64. These districts include parts of Douglas, Fulton, and Paulding Counties. Tr. 403:21–404:5; GX 2 ¶ 11; Stip. ¶ 264.



GX 2 ¶ 12 & fig. 1.

Dr. Palmer first examined each racial group's support for each candidate to determine if members of the group voted cohesively in support of a single candidate in each election. GX 2 ¶ 16. If a significant majority of the group supported a single candidate, he then identified that candidate as the group's candidate of choice. *Id.* Dr. Palmer next compared the preferences of white voters to the preferences of Black voters. *Id.* He concluded that there was evidence of racially polarized voting when he found that Black voters and white voters support different candidates. *Id.* Defendants' expert, Dr. Alford, did not contest Dr. Palmer's methodology. Tr. 2145:23–2146:1, 2215:17–25.

H. Georgia's History of Voting and Recent Electoral Developments

1. Credibility Determinations

*42 The Court makes the following credibility determinations as it relates to the experts on the Senate Factors.

a) Dr. Orville Vernon Burton

The Grant and Pendergrass Plaintiffs³⁶ proffered and the Court qualified Dr. Burton as an expert on history of race discrimination and voting. Tr. 1419:14–17, 1424:8–9. Dr. Burton earned his undergraduate degree from Furman University in 1969 and his doctorate in American history from Princeton University in 1976. PX 4, 5. Dr. Burton has taught American history at various universities since 1971. *Id.* Currently, he serves as the Judge Matthew J. Perry Distinguished Professor of History and Professor of Global Black Studies, Sociology and Anthropology, and Computer Science at Clemson University. *Id.* at 6. Dr. Burton is the author or editor of more than 20 books and 300 articles. *Id.* Dr. Burton has received numerous awards based on his research. *Id.*

Dr. Burton also has connections to the state of Georgia. He was born in Madison County, Georgia and is a recognized authority on Morehouse College's former President Dr. Benjamin E. Mays. He has also written a book about an area in South Carolina that has strong ties to the city of Augusta, Georgia. *Id.* 6.

Dr. Burton has been retained as an expert witness and consultant in numerous voting rights case over the past forty years. *Id.* 7. Specifically, he was qualified as an expert on social and economic status, discrimination, historical intent in voting rights cases, and group voting behavior. *Id.* His testimony has been accepted and relied upon by various federal courts. *Id.* 7–8.

At the preliminary injunction, the Court found “Dr. Burton to be highly credible. His historical analysis was thorough and methodologically sound” and his “conclusions [were found] to be reliable.” Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1315. Having observed Dr. Burton's demeanor and testimony, the Court finds that Dr. Burton's testimony is highly credible. Dr. Burton answered all questions on direct-examination and cross-examination thoroughly. Dr. Burton engaged in an extensive colloquy with the Court on the history of voting and race that expounded upon information that was in his report. Accordingly, the Court finds that his testimony

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is highly credible and extremely helpful to the Court. Thus, the Court will assign great weight to Dr. Burton's testimony.

b)Dr. Loren Collingwood

The Grant and Pendergrass Plaintiffs proffered and the Court qualified Dr. Collingwood as an expert in political science, applied statistics, and demography. Tr. 671:18–21, 673:5–7. Dr. Collingwood received his Bachelor of Arts from California State University, Chico in 2002 and his Ph.D. in political science with a concentration in political methodology and applied statistics from the University of Washington in 2012. PX 5, 2. Currently, he serves as an associate professor of political science at the University of New Mexico. Id. Previously, he was an associate professor of political science and co-director of civic engagement at the Center for Social Innovation at the University of California, Riverside. Id. He has published two books, 39 articles, and nearly a dozen book chapters on sanctuary cities, race/ethnic politics, election administration, and racially polarized voting. Id. Dr. Collingwood has served as an expert witness in seven redistricting cases. Id. He has also served as an expert witness in three other voting related cases. Id.

*43 In the preliminary injunction order, the Court found that Dr. Collingwood was “qualified to opine as an expert on demographics and political science. The Court f[ound] Dr. Collingwood to be credible, his analysis methodologically sound, and his conclusions reliable.” Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1318.

Having observed Dr. Collingwood's demeanor and testimony, the Court finds that his testimony was internally consistent and he was able to thoroughly answer questions on direct and cross examination. Thus, the Court finds Dr. Collingwood to be highly credible and will assign great weight to his testimony.

c)Dr. Adrienne Jones

The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs³⁷ proffered and the Court qualified Dr. Jones as an expert in history of voting rights, voting-related discrimination, race and politics, and Black political development, but not various sections of the Civil Rights Act. Tr. 1149:8–11, 1158:2–5. Dr. Adrienne Jones received her Bachelor of Arts in Modern Culture and Media (Semiotics) from Brown University, her Juris Doctor from

the University of California at Berkley, her Masters and Ph.D. in political science from City University of New York Graduate Center. APAX 2, 4. Currently, Dr. Jones is an assistant professor of political science at Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia where she teaches political science and also serves as the Pre-Law Director. Id. at 4. Dr. Jones has written a doctoral dissertation and two peer-reviewed articles on the Voting Rights Act. Id. She is currently writing a book on the VRA. Id.

In addition to this case, Dr. Jones served as an expert witness in Fair Fight Action v. Raffensperger, 634 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (N.D. Ga. 2022), which was decided by this Court. In Fair Fight, the Court credited Dr. Jones's testimony as it related to the historical backdrop pertinent to Section 2 of the VRA. Id. at 1171. The Court gave less weight to the testimony regarding matters that occurred after 1990 and present voting practices. Id.

Having observed Dr. Jones's demeanor and testimony, the Court finds that her testimony was internally consistent and she was able to thoroughly answer questions on direct and cross examination that relate to the topics that she was qualified. The Court notes that on *voir dire*, Dr. Jones's testimony regarding various aspects of the Civil Rights Act were inconsistent with current law. Accordingly, the Court assigns little to no weight to testimony about the legal requirements under the Civil Right Act, to which Dr. Jones was not qualified as an expert. As to the portions of Dr. Jones's testimony for which she was qualified to testify, the Court finds it highly credible and will assign great weight to that testimony.

d)Dr. Traci Burch

The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs proffered and the Court qualified Dr. Burch as an expert on in political science, political participation and barriers to voting. Tr. 1041:25-1042:2, 1046:9-13. Dr. Burch has been an associate professor of political science at Northwestern University and a research professor at the American Bar Foundation since 2007. Tr. 1035:4-9. Dr. Burch received her Ph.D. in government and social policy from Harvard University, and her undergraduate degree in politics from Princeton University. Tr. 1034:19-1035:3.

*44 Dr. Burch has published numerous peer-reviewed publications and a book on political participation, including

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publications focusing on Georgia, and she teaches several courses related to voting and political participation. Tr. 1036:12-18, 1037:15-1038:2. Dr. Burch has received several prizes and awards, including national prizes, for her book and her dissertation. Tr. 1037:2-14. She has served as a peer reviewer for flagship scholarly journals in her field of political science. Tr. 1036:19-24. Dr. Burch's research and writing involves conducting data analysis on voter registration files and voter turnout data. Tr. 1038:8-1039:1.

Dr. Burch has previously testified as an expert in six other cases, including voting rights cases where she offered expert testimony relating to a Senate Factor or the Arlington Heights framework. Tr. 1039:4-1040:23. Dr. Burch was qualified to serve as an expert in all of the cases in which she has testified. Tr. 1040:24-1041:1.

In preparing her report, Dr. Burch relied on sources and methodologies that are consistent with her work as a political scientist. Tr. 1047:23-1048:9; APAX 6, at 4. The Court finds Dr. Burch credible, her methodology sound, and her conclusions reliable. Accordingly, the Court credits Dr. Burch's testimony and conclusions.

e)Dr. Jason Morgan Ward

The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs proffered and the Court qualified Dr. Ward as an expert in the history of Georgia and the history of racial politics in Georgia. Tr. 1333:17-19, 1335: 3-7. Dr. Ward has been a professor of history and at Emory University since 2018. Tr. 1331:1-4. He received his Ph.D., M.Phil, and M.A. in history from Yale University, and his undergraduate degree in history with honors from Duke University. Tr. 1330:17-19. Dr. Ward wrote his dissertation on civil rights and racial politics during the mid-20th century. Tr. 1330:20-24.

Dr. Ward has published numerous peer-reviewed publications and two books about the history of racial politics and violence in the South, including Georgia. Tr. 1332:17-1333:10; APAX 4, at 28-29. Dr. Ward has taught courses on the history of the modern United States, civil rights, race and politics, political violence and extremism, including courses that cover the history of racial politics in Georgia. Tr. 1331:2—1332:16.

In preparing his report, Dr. Ward relied on sources and methodologies that he would typically employ as a historian undertaking a historical analysis. Tr. 1335:17-1336:3. The

Court finds Dr. Ward credible, his methodology for historical analysis sound, and his conclusions reliable. Accordingly, the Court credits Dr. Ward's testimony and conclusions.

2. Analysis

Given the widely overlapping nature of the evidence adduced in the three different cases and to avoid confusion about what evidence applies to which case, the Court will address its factual findings as they relate to the Senate Factors and the totality of the circumstances below in the conclusion of law section.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Jurisdictional Considerations

In the Pretrial Order, Defendants raised affirmative defenses regarding constitutional and statutory standing. APA Doc. No. [280] at 23; Grant Doc. No. [243], 26; Pendergrass Doc. No. [231], 28. The Court now addresses these affirmative defenses and determines that, with the exception of claims against the SEB, Plaintiffs in all three cases have standing to bring these suits.

1. Constitutional Standing

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the courts to hearing actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Overall, the standing requirement arising out of Article III seeks to uphold separation-of-powers principles and “to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (citations omitted).

*45 To establish standing, a plaintiff must show three things:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury

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and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). The standing challenges specifically identified by Defendant are as to (1) claims by Plaintiff Sixth District AME (in Alpha Phi Alpha), and (2) claims against Defendant SEB (in Grant and Pendergrass).

a) Claims by the Sixth District AME

An organization may establish injury by invoking “associational standing,” which is established by proof that the organization’s members “would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right[.]” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). The Parties stipulate that the Sixth District AME has more than 500 member-churches in Georgia and that the member-churches of the Sixth District AME have tens of thousands of members across Georgia. Stip. ¶¶ 59–60. Sixth District AME specifically has churches located in Enacted SD-16, SD-17, and SD-23 as well as in Enacted HD-74, HD-114, HD-117, HD-128, HD-1h33, HD-134, HD-145, HD-171, and HD-173. Stip. ¶¶ 61.

While the Defendant presented no argument on the associational standing issue by motion or at trial, it did propose the following conclusion of law after conclusion of the trial:

This Court determines that Plaintiff Sixth District of the African Methodist Episcopal Church does not have associational standing because it has not established that it has individual members who are voters impacted by the enacted redistricting plans, but rather its membership consists of

member churches. Churches do not vote and thus cannot have an injury for the district in which the churches reside.

APA Doc. No. [317] ¶ 147. However, in that same filing, Defendant conceded that Alpha Phi Alpha (as a named Plaintiff) has associational standing and that the individual plaintiffs have standing as to the districts in which they reside. Id. ¶ 145. Therefore, as a jurisdictional matter, it is unnecessary for the court to determine whether Sixth District AME has standing. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (“Because of the presence of this plaintiff [who has demonstrated standing], we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit.”); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Comm., Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1108–09 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Because we have determined that at least these two individuals have met the requirements of Article III, it is unnecessary for us to consider the standing of the other plaintiffs in this action.”); see also Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439, 137 S.Ct. 1645, 198 L.Ed.2d 64 (2017) (“At least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint.”).

*46 Here, it is unchallenged that the individual plaintiffs and Alpha Phi Alpha have constitutional standing to challenge the districts at issue in this suit. Alpha Phi Alpha Defendant’s single proposed conclusion of law regarding applicability of associational standing to the final plaintiff, Sixth District AME, thereby is insufficient for the Court to further consider Defendant’s affirmative defense as to this one plaintiff.

b) Claims against the SEB

In moving for summary judgment, the Grant and Pendergrass Defendants argued that the Grant and Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ injuries are not fairly traceable to or redressable by the SEB. Grant Doc. No. [190-1], 17-19; Pendergrass Doc. No. [175-1], 12-14. In denying the Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court acknowledged that Pendergrass and Grants Plaintiffs failed to adduce facts to support a finding of traceability of their injuries to the SEB. Nevertheless, when taking all inferences in the light most favorable to the Pendergrass and Grant Plaintiffs as nonmovants, the Court found that the broad language of the Georgia statutes

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delineating the SEB's duties and roles in elections was sufficient to allow them to proceed to trial against the SEB. Grant Doc. No. [229], 28; Pendergrass Doc. No. [215], 26.

At trial, despite bearing the burden of proof and the Court's prompting in the summary judgement orders, Pendergrass and Grant Plaintiffs presented no evidence from which the Court could conclude that their injuries are traceable to the SEB.³⁸ Therefore, the Court concludes that the Grant and Pendergrass Plaintiffs lack standing to raise their claims against the SEB.³⁹

2. Statutory Standing

The question of statutory standing turns on whether the “statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The Supreme Court has clarified that the term “statutory standing” is “misleading, since the absence of a valid ... cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Lexmark Int'l. Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014) (cleaned up). Under Lexmark, the question is whether the plaintiff “has a cause of action under the statute.” Id. at 128, 134 S.Ct. 1377. The Court went on to explain that “a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Id. at 129, 134 S.Ct. 1377 (cleaned up).

*47 In the cases before the Court, Defendants have done nothing more than assert an affirmative defense that Plaintiffs' lack statutory standing. Because the question of statutory standing is not jurisdictional, the Court has no obligation to delve into the issue without benefit of argument or evidence from Defendants. Moreover, the Court has already determined that a private right of action under Section 2 exists. See APA Doc. No. [65], 31–34; Grant Doc. No. [43], 30–33; Pendergrass Doc. No. [50], 17–20; see also Allen, 599 U.S. at 41, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (affirming a preliminary injunction order, Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 1031–32 (N.D. Ala. 2022), which analyzed whether Section 2 provided a private right of action). Therefore, the Court has no difficulty concluding that Defendants have failed to carry their burden of establishing their affirmative defense based on statutory standing and rejects this affirmative defense.

B. Legal Standards

1. First Gingles Precondition

Under the first Gingles precondition, Plaintiffs must prove that the minority group exceeds 50% in the challenged area and that the minority group is sufficiently compact to draw a reasonably configured district. Wisc. Legis. v. Wisc. Elections Comm'n, 595 U.S. 398, 400, 142 S.Ct. 1245, 212 L.Ed.2d 251, (2022). Ct. “A district will be reasonably configured ... if it comports with traditional districting criteria, such as being contiguous and reasonably compact.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 18, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (citing Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 575 U.S. at 272, 135 S.Ct. 1257). To determine whether Plaintiffs have met the numerosity and compactness requirements, the Court must evaluate the specific challenged district and not the state as a whole. Cf. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 575 U.S. at 268, 135 S.Ct. 1257 (“[T]he District Court's analysis of racial gerrymandering of the State, [under [the Equal Protection Clause], ‘as a whole’ was legally erroneous.”).⁴⁰

2. Second and Third Gingles Precondition

The second Gingles precondition requires the Plaintiffs to show that “the minority group ... is politically cohesive.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. 2752. The third Gingles precondition requires the Plaintiffs to show that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.” Id.

3. Totality of the Circumstances: Senate Factors

In a Section 2 case, after evaluating the Gingles preconditions, the final assessment to determine whether vote dilution has actually occurred requires “assess[ing] the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities on the basis of objective factors.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (citations omitted). To do so, the Court looks at the VRA's 1982 Amendments' Senate Report, which specifies the factors relevant for a Section 2 analysis. “The totality of circumstances inquiry recognizes that application of the Gingles factors is ‘peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case.’ ” Allen, 599 U.S. at 19, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752).

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The totality of the circumstances’ inquiry is fact intensive and requires weighing and balancing various facts and factors, which is generally inappropriate on summary judgment. See [Rose v. Raffensperger](#), 1:20-cv-2921-SDG, 2022 WL 670080, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2022) (“[T]he Court ... cannot appropriately evaluate the totality of the circumstances before trial.”).

C. Congressional District

The Court finds that [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs successfully carried their burden in establishing that an additional majority-minority congressional district could be drawn in the west-metro Atlanta.

1. First Gingles Precondition

[Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs have proven that they meet the first [Gingles](#) precondition. The first [Gingles](#) precondition requires plaintiffs to prove that the “minority group [is] sufficiently large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district.” [Wisc. Legis.](#), 595 U.S. at 402, 142 S.Ct. 1245 (per curiam) (citing [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 50–51, 106 S.Ct. 2752). “A district will be reasonably configured ... if it comports with traditional districting criteria, such as being contiguous and reasonably compact.” [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 18, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (citing [Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama](#), 575 U.S. 254, 272, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 191 L.Ed.2d 314 (2015)). The first [Gingles](#) precondition focuses on the “need[] to establish that the minority [group] has the potential to elect a representative of [their] own choice in some single-member district.” [Growe v. Emison](#), 507 U.S. 25, 40, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993).

a) Numerosity

*48 First, [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs have shown, both at the preliminary injunction and trial that Georgia’s Black

population is sufficiently large to constitute a majority in an additional congressional district in west-metro Atlanta. “[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.” [Bartlett v. Strickland](#), 556 U.S. 1, 20, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009).

Mr. Cooper drew an illustrative plan that contains an additional majority-Black congressional district in west-metro Atlanta that balanced traditional redistricting criteria. Mr. Cooper submitted a similarly configured district at the preliminary injunction. DX 154. The Court instantly discusses both configurations for the purpose of showing that the population in this area of the State is sufficiently numerous because a majority-Black congressional district can be drawn in more than one way, contrary to Defendants submissions. See Feb. 7, 2022, Morning PI Tr. 21:5:8 (“[W]hile these are illustrative plans, the way they are configured are so tight in terms of population, there’s not really a whole lot of different ways to configure[.]”); Tr. 1806:2–19 (Mr. Morgan discussing that various districts in the Illustrative Plans are barely over 50% and took population from existing majority-Black districts to achieve the numerosity requirement). Illustrative CD-6 submitted both at the preliminary injunction hearing and at the trial (which was configured in Mr. Cooper’s December 5, 2022 Report) have an AP BVAP of 50.23%. Stip. ¶ 192; DX 20, 51 fig.9; PX 1, 73, fig.14.

Figure 9

BVAP and BCVAP Comparison in the Eight Modified Districts:

Illustrative Plan and 2021 Plan

District	Illustrative Plan		2021 Plan	
	% BVAP	% NH BCVAP	% BVAP	% NH BCVAP
03	20.92%	20.40%	23.32%	22.82%
04	52.40%	55.48%	54.52%	58.04%
06	50.23%	50.69%	9.91%	10.00%

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09	11.66%	11.66%	10.42%	10.38%
10	14.31%	15.38%	22.60%	22.56%
11	13.27%	13.30%	17.95%	18.09%
13	51.40%	50.05%	66.75%	66.88%
14	5.17%	5.14%	14.28%	13.38%

DX 154 ¶ 51 fig.9 (preliminary injunction).

**BVAP and BCVAP Comparison:
 Illustrative Plan and 2021 Plan**

Figure 14

District*	Illustrative Plan			2021 Plan		
	% BVAP	% NH BCVAP	% NH DOJ BCVAP	% BVAP	% NH BCVAP	% NH DOJ BCVAP
1	28.17%	29.16%	29.67%	28.17%	29.16%	29.67%
2	49.29%	49.55%	50.001%	49.29%	49.55%	50.001%
3	20.47%	19.64%	20.02%	23.32%	22.53%	22.86%
4	52.77%	55.62%	56.37%	54.52%	57.71%	58.46%
5	49.60%	51.64%	52.35%	49.60%	51.64%	52.35%
6	50.23%	50.18%	50.98%	9.91%	9.72%	10.26%
7	29.82%	31.88%	32.44%	29.82%	31.88%	32.44%
8	30.04%	30.46%	30.76%	30.04%	30.46%	30.76%
9	11.66%	11.29%	11.74%	10.42%	10.03%	10.34%
10	14.31%	15.09%	15.39%	22.60%	22.11%	22.56%
11	13.67%	12.91%	13.48%	17.95%	17.57%	18.30%
12	36.72%	36.60%	37.19%	36.72%	36.60%	37.19%
13	51.13%	49.64%	50.34%	66.75%	66.36%	67.05%
14	5.17%	4.80%	5.19%	14.28%	13.19%	13.71%


*Bold font identifies districts that are changed from the 2021 Plan configuration.

PX 1 ¶ 73 fig. 14 (trial plan).


The fact that Mr. Cooper has now successfully created two districts in this area exceeding 50% BVAP (one for the preliminary injunction hearing and one for the trial) despite changing the boundaries of the illustrative district,⁴¹ supports that the Black voting age population is sufficiently

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numerous in this area. Compare DX 20 ¶ 51, fig.9 (BVAP is 50.23%), with PX 1 ¶ 73, fig.14 (BVAP is 50.23%).



DX 154, Ex. K (preliminary injunction).



PX 1, I-2 (trial).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown that Georgia's Black population is large enough to constitute a majority in an additional congressional district in west-metro Atlanta.

b) Compactness

The Court further concludes that Pendergrass Plaintiffs have shown that Georgia's Black population in west-metro Atlanta is geographically compact to comprise a majority of the voting age population in an additional congressional district. Under the compactness requirement of the first Gingles precondition, plaintiffs must show that it is “possible to design an electoral district[] consistent with traditional redistricting principles[.]” Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998). The compactness inquiry “refers to the compactness

of the minority population, not ... the compactness of the contested district.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 433, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (hereinafter “LULAC”) (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 997, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996)).

*49 “A district that reaches out to grab small and apparently isolated minority communities’ is not reasonably compact.” Id. (citing Vera, 517 U.S. at 979, 116 S.Ct. 1941). The relevant factors for compactness under the first Gingles precondition include: population equality, contiguity, empirical compactness scores, the eyeball test for irregularities and contiguity, respect for political subdivisions, and uniting communities of interest. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) (population equality); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 433, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (communities of interest); Vera, 517 U.S. at 959-60, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (contiguity, eyeball test); Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 291, 312, 137 S.Ct. 1455, 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017) (political subdivisions, partisan advantage, empirical compactness measures).

(1) Empirical measures

(a) population equality

Article I § 2 of the Constitution “requires congressional districts to achieve population equality ‘as nearly as is practicable.’ ” Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997) (quoting Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8, 84 S.Ct. 526). This standard requires a mapmaker to “make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969)). A congressional plan achieves population equality when its districts are plus or minus one person. See Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (finding that “Mr. Cooper's Illustrative Congressional Map complies with the one-person, one-vote principle” where he testified that “the districts are plus or minus one person” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is undisputed that Mr. Cooper's Illustrative Plan meets the population equality requirement and that the population deviations are limited to plus or minus one person from the ideal district population of 765,136. Stip. ¶ 197. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Illustrative Congressional Plan achieves population equality.

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(b)contiguity

Similarly, an illustrative district should not disregard traditional redistricting principles, such as contiguity. [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 18, 143 S.Ct. 1487. A district is contiguous when it consists of “a single connected piece.” [Lopez](#), 339 F. Supp. 3d at 607. As it is undisputed (Stip. ¶ 198), the Court concludes that all the districts in the Illustrative Congressional Plan are contiguous.

(c)compactness scores

The Court also finds that the Illustrative CD-6 is sufficiently compact using empirical measures. One way in which courts assess the compactness of the districts in an illustrative plan is by relying on “widely acceptable tests to determine compactness scores,” including “the Polsby-Popper measure and the Reock indicator,” [Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections](#), 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570

(N.D. Ill. 2011). Mr. Cooper's Illustrative Congressional plan compares favorably on the empirical compactness scores to the Enacted Congressional Plan. The mean Reock score for the Illustrative Congressional Plan is 0.43 and is 0.44 on the Enacted Congressional Plan. PX 1, ¶ 79, fig.13. The mean Polsby-Popper score for the Illustrative Congressional Plan is 0.27 and the Enacted Congressional Plan is 0.27. *Id.* The Illustrative and Enacted Congressional Plans have identical Polsby-Popper scores and the Enacted Congressional Plan is 0.01 more compact using the Reock metric. Defendants’ rebuttal mapping expert, Mr. Morgan, does not dispute that the Enacted and the Illustrative Congressional Plans have similar mean Reock scores and identical mean Polsby-Popper scores. Tr. 1948:22–1949:5. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan is comparably as compact as the Enacted Congressional Plan.

*50 With respect to the majority-Black districts, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan compactness scores generally fared better or were equal to the Enacted Congressional Plan.

	Illustrative Plan		Enacted Plan	
Districts	Reock	Polsby-Popper	Reock	Polsby-Popper
004	0.28	0.22	0.31	0.25
005	0.51	0.32	0.51	0.32
006*	0.45	0.27	0.42	0.20
013	0.44	0.29	0.38	0.16

The asterisk (*) denotes the additional majority-Black district.

(d)political subdivisions

PX 1, Exs. L-1, L-3. Mr. Morgan's report's compactness measures are identical to Mr. Coopers. DX 4 ¶ 22 & chart 2. The Court finds that Illustrative CD-6, the challenged district, is 0.03 more compact on Reock and 0.07 more compact on Polsby-Popper. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that the Illustrative CD-6 is slightly more compact, on empirical measures than the Enacted CD-6. ⁴²

The Court also finds that Illustrative CD-6 “respected existing political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, and towns.” [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 20, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Illustrative CD-6 splits the same number of counties as the Enacted Plan, but has fewer county, VTD, and city and town split. PX 1 ¶ 81 & fig.14.

Figure 14

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County, VTD, and Municipal Splits: Illustrative Plan, 2012 Benchmark Plan, and 2021 Plan (All Districts)


	Split Counties*	County Splits*	2020 VTD Splits*	Split Cities/Towns#	City/Town Splits*
Illustrative Plan	15	18	43	37	78
2012 Benchmark Plan	16	22	43	40	85
2021 Plan	15	21	46	43	91

*Excludes unpopulated areas

#Out of 531 municipalities (calculated by subtracting the number of whole cities in the Maptitude report from 531)

PX 1 ¶ 81, fig.14.

Neither Defendants nor their experts have meaningfully suggested that the Illustrative Congressional Plan fails to respect city, town, and county lines. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan respected more political subdivisions than the Enacted Congressional Plan.



(2) Eyeball test

The Court finds that Illustrative CD-6 is also visually compact. The eyeball test is commonly utilized to determine if a district is compact or not. *See Allen*, 599 U.S. at 60 n.10, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (quoting *Singleton*, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1011) (crediting the district court's findings that the illustrative maps were compact because they did not contain “tentacles, appendages, bizarre shapes or any other obvious irregularities”); *Vera*, 517 U.S. at 960, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (crediting the district court's finding that the challenged district passed the eyeball test and was visually compact); *Ala. State Conf. of NAACP v. Alabama*, 612 F.Supp.3d at 1265 (“District 1 is contiguous and also passes the eyeball test for geographical compactness.”); *Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map*, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (three-judge court) (stating that the district “passe[d] muster under the ‘eyeball’ test for compactness”).

The Court finds that Illustrative CD-6 passes the eyeball test.

PX 1, Ex. I-2 (trial).

The district includes all of Douglas County, and portions of southern Fulton and southern Cobb Counties. Defendants’ mapping expert, Mr. Morgan, does not dispute the visual compactness of Illustrative CD-6, nor did he testify about the district's visual compactness. DX 4. Unlike at the preliminary injunction, where there was questioning regarding the “fingers” into Fayetteville and Kennesaw to “pick-up” Black population, Illustrative CD-6 no longer reaches into Fayetteville. Doc. No. [73] 82:21–83:1, 86:6–12. At the trial, Defendants elicited no testimony or questions about “fingers” branching off of Illustrative CD-6.

*51 The Court finds that the district does not have any tentacles or appendages. Illustrative CD-6 is about 40 miles from top to bottom (Tr. 835:19–20), is contained in a relatively small area of the state and is completely within the metro-Atlanta counties. Accordingly, it lacks any similarities to the map in *Miller*, which spanned from metro Atlanta to Augusta, or *LULAC*, which stretched 300 miles along the southern border of Texas. *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 909, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); *LULAC*, 548 U.S. at 424, 126 S.Ct. 2594. Thus, the Court finds that Illustrative CD-6 is visually compact.

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(3) *Communities of interest*

The Court also concludes Illustrative CD-6 respects communities of interest. A district that “reaches out to grab small and apparently isolated minority communities” is not reasonably compact. Vera, 517 U.S. at 979, 116 S.Ct. 1941. Plaintiffs “may not ‘assum[e] from a group of voters’ race that they think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.’ ” LULAC, 548 U.S. at 433, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 920, 115 S.Ct. 2475; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993)). LULAC instructs district courts to account for “the characteristics, needs, and interests” of the minority community in the contested area. Id. at 434, 126 S.Ct. 2594.

There is no bright line test for determining whether a district combines communities with common interests or disparate communities. Ms. Wright, the General Assembly's map drawer testified that “[c]ommunities of interest are very hard to measure.” Tr. 1617:8. They could include, “a school attendance zone, ... an incorporated city or town, ... share[d] resources[,] ... the same water authority[,] ... a religious community that attends one facility.” Id. at 1617:12–1618:22. LULAC provides some guidance on what courts should consider. “[R]ural and urban communities[] could share similar interests and therefore form a compact district if the areas are in reasonably close proximity.” 548 U.S. at 435, 126 S.Ct. 2594. However, when “the only common index is race” this is not a Section 2 remedy. Id. In LULAC, the Supreme Court held that the challenged district did not contain a community of interest because the district court found an enormous geographical distance separated one portion of the district from the other and the minority communities in the district had disparate needs and interests. Id.

In this case, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence that Illustrative CD-6 is made up of communities of interest and does not combine disparate minority communities. Mr. Cooper testified that when he draws districts he “ha[s] to look at communities of interest.” Tr. 726:19. He stated that he respects communities of interest because he “look[s] at political subdivisions, particularly towns and cities, and tr[ies] to keep those areas all together in one--in one district.” Tr. 740:13–15. Specifically for Illustrative CD-6, he looked at the federally described 29-county Atlanta MSA and the Georgia defined 11-county core Atlanta area. Tr. 741:18–742:1. He further concluded that Illustrative CD-6 is a

community of interest because it is wholly contained in suburban Atlanta. Tr. 799:2–7.

Pendergrass Plaintiffs also submitted the testimonial evidence of former General Assembly members Mr. Allen and Mr. Carter. The Court credits this testimony with respect to communities of interest. Both witnesses have served as representatives of metro Atlanta communities and Mr. Allen's former district is within Illustrative CD-6.

Mr. Allen, a former member of the Georgia House of Representatives and a Smyrna resident, agreed that his neighbors, the Black residents of Illustrative CD-6, face the same transportation-related challenges, specifically involving “access, congestion, [and] infrastructure.” Tr. 1009:9–13. He testified that “[a]s a resident of this area,” he knows that these communities rely on the same interstates. Id. at 1009:4–8. Residents of these areas attend some of the same places of worship. Id. at 1009:17–22. Mr. Allen also explained that the residents of Illustrative CD-6 share an interest in receiving services from Grady Hospital, the only Level One Trauma Center in Metro Atlanta. Id. at 1019:24–1020:3.

*52 Former Georgia State Senator and candidate for Governor Jason Carter also testified that Illustrative CD-6 constitutes a community of interest. He stated that all areas of the district can be described as suburbs of Atlanta. Tr. 966:11–19. He testified that all parts of the district are within a 20-to-40-minute drive of downtown Atlanta, without traffic. Tr. 967:22–968:5. It is an area that is growing and increasingly diversifying. Tr. 967:13–17. The individuals in the area use similar roadways and are impacted by Atlanta traffic patterns. Tr. 966:22–967:10. Finally, he testified that the Chattahoochee river runs through the middle of the district.

Neither Defendants’ experts nor Ms. Wright provided testimony disputing that Illustrative CD-6 unites communities of interest. The Court finds that Illustrative CD-6 combines areas of suburban metro Atlanta. The communities are relatively close in proximity. They share traffic concerns and have a common waterway. The Court finds that Illustrative CD-6 does not combine disparate minority communities, like the challenged district in LULAC (which stretched across 300 miles on the Texas border) or in Miller (which spanned from Augusta to Atlanta). Accordingly, the Court finds that Illustrative CD-6 respects the traditional districting principles of maintaining communities of interest.

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(4) Core retention

Although not a typical traditional redistricting principle, the Court also finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan retained many of the cores of the districts in the Enacted Congressional Plan. The Supreme Court recently called into question the importance of core retention for Section 2 Plaintiffs. “[T]his Court has never held that a State’s adherence to a previously used districting plan can defeat a § 2 claim. If that were the rule, a State could immunize from challenge a new racially discriminatory redistricting plan simply by claiming that it resembled an old racially discriminatory plan.” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Additionally, Ms. Wright testified that when she draws the new Plans, she starts with a blank map and not from the existing congressional plan, and then “work[s] with the data to

create new districts.” *Tr. 1622:11–17*. Ms. Wright admitted to using the existing district “as a reference” for other measures, such as retaining core districts. *Tr. 1622:18–20*.

To the extent that core retention is relevant as a traditional redistricting principle, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan retains a majority of the population’s districts. *See generally* DX 4. Pursuant to the data provided by Mr. Morgan, the Court finds that approximately 74.6% of voters would have the same congressional district as they do under the Enacted Congressional Plan. *Id.* In other words, only 25.4% of Georgians would be affected if Illustrative CD-6 were enacted into law. The following is a table derived from the data in Mr. Morgan’s Report and that exemplifies the number of individuals who remain in the same district under the Illustrative Congressional Plan.

District # of individuals whose district is unchanged

001	765,137*
002	765,137*
003	528,200
004	736,485
005	765,137*
006	19,006
007	765,137*
008	765,136*
009	403,191
010	488,385
011	372,724
012	765,136*
013	374,470
014	475,707

The asterisk (*) denotes a district unchanged on the illustrative map

DX 4, Ex. 7.

The ideal population size of a congressional district is 765,136 (plus or minus one person). As the chart above shows, six of the districts remain unchanged (Illustrative CD-1, CD-2, CD-5, CD-7, CD-8, CD-12). In the eight changed districts, only three districts (Illustrative CD-6,

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CD-11, and CD-13) change more than half of the population's congressional district. These changes logically follow from the fact that Illustrative CD-6 is the new majority-minority district and CD-11 and CD-13 are two districts immediately surrounding it. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan substantially retains the Enacted Congressional Plan's district cores.

(5) Racial considerations

*53 Finally, the Court concludes that race did not predominate in the drawing of the Illustrative Congressional Plan. Allen recognized that “[t]he question whether additional majority-minority districts can be drawn ... involves a ‘quintessentially race-conscious calculus.’ ” 599 U.S. at 31, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (plurality opinion) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994)). Consequently, “[t]he contention that mapmakers must be entirely ‘blind’ to race has no footing in our § 2 case law. The line that we have long since drawn is between consciousness and predominance.” Id. at 33, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (plurality opinion). Race does not predominate when a mapmaker “adhere[s] ... to traditional redistricting criteria,” testifies that “race was not the predominant factor motivating his design process,” and explains that he never sought to “maximize the number of majority-minority” districts. Davis, 139 F.3d at 1426; see also id. at 1425–26 (finding clear error with the district court's finding of racial predominance based on an expert's testimony that he was asked to draw additional majority-minority districts in an area with a high concentration of Black citizens).

During Defendants’ cross-examination of Mr. Cooper, questions were asked about whether race predominated when drawing the Illustrative Congressional Districts. Tr. 786:23–787:6. Mr. Cooper testified that he considered race among other traditional redistricting principles, balancing all considerations and did not allow any of them to predominate or subordinate the others. On this point, Mr. Cooper's testimony is well summarized by the following:

I'm constantly balancing the traditional redistricting principles, which would include population equality, which must be plus or minus one or so in most states. I'm looking at the compactness of the district. The district has to be

contiguous, it has to be connected with all parts. I have to look at communities of interest. I have to look at political subdivisions and try to keep those whole. And that's sort of subsumed under communities of interest. And, finally, also I have to be cognizant of avoiding the dilution of the minority voting source.

Tr. 726:14–23.

As the Court noted above, Mr. Cooper's testimony was highly credible. Mr. Cooper expressly disclaimed that race predominated the drawing of any district, let alone Illustrative CD-6. Tr. 1744–2129; PX 1. It does not appear from the face of the Illustrative Congressional Plan that race predominated its creation. Compare PX 1, Ex. I-2 (creating an additional majority-minority district that is wholly contained within four counties), with Miller, 512 U.S. at 108–09, 114 S.Ct. 2068 (a district that stretched from Augusta, Georgia to Atlanta, Georgia). The Court finds that the evidence shows that Mr. Cooper was aware of race when he drew the Illustrative Congressional Plan, but that race did not predominate the configuration of its districts. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Pendergrass Plaintiffs have sufficiently proven that race did not predominate over the drawing of the Illustrative Congressional Plan, or Illustrative CD-6.

(6) Possible remedy

In Nipper, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the first threshold factor of Gingles [] require[s] that there must be a remedy within the confines of the state's judicial model that does not undermine the administration of justice.” Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit later clarified that “[t]his requirement simply serves ‘to establish that the minority has the potential to elect a representative of its own choice from some single-member district.’ ” Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1199 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1530). Additionally, “[i]f a minority cannot establish that an alternate election scheme exists that would provide better access to the political process, then the challenged voting practice is not responsible for the claimed injury.” Id.; see also Brooks v. Miller, 158 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “[i]f the plaintiffs in a § 2 case cannot show the existence of an adequate alternative

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electoral system under which the minority group's rights will be protected, then the case ends on the first prerequisite”).

*54 Under Nipper, the question of remedy depends on whether the alternate scheme is a “workable remedy within the confines of the state's system of government.” Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1533. For example, in Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections and Registration, 979 F.3d 1282, 1304 (11th Cir. 2020), the Eleventh Circuit found that the first Gingles precondition had been met because the special master's maps showed that at least three majority-Black districts could have been drawn in that area, meaning “that a meaningful remedy was available.”

The Court has already determined that there is Record evidence that the minority population in Illustrative CD-6 is sufficiently compact. As is stated above, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper's Illustrative Congressional Plans, both from the preliminary injunction hearing and the trial, prove it is possible to draw an additional majority-Black congressional district in west-metro Atlanta. PX 1, I-2, DX 154, Ex. K. The Illustrative Congressional Plan achieves population equality and each district is plus or minus one person. PX 1 ¶ 48. All of the districts are contiguous. Stip. ¶ 198. The Illustrative Congressional Plan is comparably as compact as the Enacted Plan. PX 1 ¶ 81 & fig.14. Visually speaking, Illustrative CD-6 is compact and does not contain any tentacles or appendages. See Section II(D)(2)(b)(3) *supra*. The Illustrative Congressional Plan unites communities of interest. See Section II(D)(2)(b)(4) *supra*. The Illustrative Congressional Plan leaves approximately 75% of the Enacted Plan intact. DX 4 at 48–50; Tr. 1945:10–13. And there is substantial, un rebutted, evidence and testimony that race did not predominate the creation of the Illustrative Congressional Plan. Tr. 726:14–23.

Furthermore, Mr. Cooper testified that he used the General Assembly's guidelines to inform his decisions when drawing the Illustrative Congressional Plan. Tr. 818:18–20. Thus, the Court finds that the General Assembly could implement the Illustrative Congressional Plan, because Mr. Cooper used the legislative guidelines.

To the extent, that Defendants have argued that the General Assembly would have been barred from implementing this map because it impermissibly took race into consideration, the Supreme Court recently rejected this proposition. Allen, 599 U.S. at 33, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (plurality opinion), 43, 143 S.Ct. 1487. The Eleventh Circuit, moreover, has long held

that the first Gingles precondition specifically requires that Plaintiffs’ proposed maps consider race. ⁴³ Davis, 139 F.3d at 1425–26.

*55 Here, the Court found that race did not predominate the drawing of the Illustrative Congressional Plan and therefore, the State could implement it without violating the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan satisfies Nipper’s remedial requirement.

(7) *Conclusions of law*

In sum, the Court concludes that the Illustrative Congressional Plan meets or exceeds the Enacted Congressional Plan on all empirical measures. Accordingly, the Court finds that on the objective comparable measures, the Illustrative Congressional Plan is as compact as the Enacted Congressional Plan. The Court also finds that the Illustrative Congressional Plan is compact on the eyeball test, respects communities of interest, and retains the majority of the cores from the Enacted Congressional Plan. Finally, the Court finds that the Enacted Congressional Plan could be enacted as a possible remedy because it complies with traditional redistricting principles and race did not predominate in its creation. Accordingly, the Pendergrass Plaintiffs carried their burden in showing that the minority community in west-metro Atlanta is sufficiently large and compact to warrant drawing an additional majority-Black district. Accordingly, the Court finds that Pendergrass Plaintiffs have successfully proven the first Gingles precondition.

2. *Second Gingles Precondition*

The Court turns to the second and third Gingles preconditions. As the Court examined more thoroughly in its Order on the Pendergrass Motions for Summary Judgment (Pendergrass, Doc. No. [215], 48–65), to satisfy the second and third Gingles preconditions, plaintiffs must show (1) the existence of minority voter political cohesion and (2) that the majority votes as a bloc, usually to defeat the minority voter's candidate of choice. As a part of these preconditions, plaintiffs do not have to prove that race is the sole or predominant cause of the voting difference between the minority and majority voting blocs, nor must plaintiffs disprove that other race-neutral reasons, such as partisanship, are causing the racial bloc voting.

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The second Gingles precondition requires plaintiffs to show that “the minority group ... is politically cohesive.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. 2752. “The second [precondition], concern[s] the political cohesiveness of the minority group [and] shows that a representative of its choice would in fact be elected.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 19, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Plaintiffs can establish minority cohesiveness by showing that “a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates.” Solomon v. Liberty Cnty., 899 F.2d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 1990) (Kravitch, J., specially concurring); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (“A showing that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim, and, consequently, establishes minority bloc voting within the context of § 2.” (internal citations omitted)). The Court finds that Pendergrass Plaintiffs have successfully proven that the minority group in the challenged area is politically cohesive.

Courts generally rely on statistical analyses to estimate the proportion of each racial group that voted for each candidate. See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52–54, 106 S.Ct. 2752; Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1505 n.20. Courts have recognized ecological inference (“EI”) as an appropriate analysis for determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied the second and third Gingles preconditions. See, e.g., Rose v. Raffensperger, 584 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2022); Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Benavidez v. City of Irving, 638 F. Supp. 2d 709, 723–24 (N.D. Tex. 2009); Bone Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1003, aff’d 461 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2006). Both Drs. Palmer and Alford testified that EI is a reliable method for conducting the second and third Gingles preconditions analyses. Tr. 2250:12–16; 401: 7–9.

*56 Pendergrass Plaintiffs polarization expert, Dr. Palmer, concluded that in the 40 statewide general elections examined, in both the congressional focus area (i.e., Enacted CD-3, 6, 11, 13, and 14) and each congressional district, Black voters had clearly identifiable candidates of choice. Stip. ¶¶ 218, 220–21; PX 2 ¶ 16, tbl.1 & figs.2–3, 5; Tr. 414:25–416:13, 417:16–418:4. On average, Black voters supported their candidates of choice with 98.4% of the vote. Stip. ¶ 219; PX 2 ¶¶ 7,16. Defendants’ rebuttal expert on racially polarized voting, Dr. John Alford, does not dispute Dr. Palmer’s conclusions as to the second Gingles precondition. DX 8, 3; Tr. 2250:12–2251:9. Additionally, the Parties stipulated that “Black voters in Georgia are extremely

cohesive, with a clear candidate of choice in all 40 general elections Dr. Palmer examined.” Stip. ¶ 218.

The Court finds that the second Gingles precondition is satisfied here because Black voters in Georgia are extremely politically cohesive. See 478 U.S. at 49, 106 S.Ct. 2752. “Bloc voting by blacks tends to prove that the [B]lack community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that [B]lacks prefer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-member, [B]lack majority district.” Id. at 68, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Dr. Palmer’s analysis clearly demonstrates high levels of cohesiveness among Black Georgians in supporting their preferred candidates, both across the congressional focus area and in the individual districts that comprise it. In Allen, the Supreme Court credited the lower court’s finding of “very strong” Black voter cohesion in Alabama, with an average of 92.3%. 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Here in Georgia, Black voter cohesion is even stronger, with an average of 98.4%.⁴⁴ Stip. ¶¶ 218–19. Accordingly, the Court finds that Pendergrass Plaintiffs have successfully carried their burden and proven that Black voters in the challenged area are politically cohesive.

3. Third Gingles Precondition

The third Gingles precondition requires plaintiffs demonstrate that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. 2752. “[A] white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white ‘crossover’ votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting.” Id. at 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752. This precondition “establishes that the challenged districting thwarts a distinctive minority vote at least plausibly on account of race.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 19, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (cleaned up) (quoting Growe, 507 U.S. at 40, 113 S.Ct. 1075). No specific threshold percentage is required to demonstrate bloc voting. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (“The amount of white bloc voting that can generally ‘minimize or cancel’ black voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice ... will vary from district to district.” (citation omitted)).

Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ polarization expert, Dr. Palmer, demonstrated (and the Parties have stipulated) that white voters in the congressional focus area usually vote as a bloc to defeat Black-preferred candidates. Stip. ¶¶ 222–227. In each congressional district examined and in the focus area

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as a whole, white voters had clearly identifiable candidates of choice for every election examined. [Id.](#) ¶ 223; PX 2 ¶ 17 & figs.2–4; Tr. 414:25–416:13, 417:16–418:4. In the 40 statewide general elections examined, white voters were highly cohesive in voting in opposition to the Black candidate of choice. Stip. ¶ 222. On average, Dr. Palmer found that white voters supported Black-preferred candidates with an average of just 12.4% of the vote. [Id.](#) ¶ 223. In other words, white voters on average supported their preferred candidates with an estimated vote share of 87.6%.⁴⁵

*57 Overall, Dr. Palmer found “strong evidence of racially polarized voting across the focus area” as a whole and in each individual congressional district he examined. PX 2 ¶¶ 7, 19; Tr. 398:17–21, 418:5–8. As a result of this racially polarized voting, candidates preferred by Black voters in the focus area have generally been unable to win elections outside of majority-Black districts. Tr. 419:11–420:2. Excluding the majority-Black Congressional District 13, white bloc voting defeated Black-preferred candidates in all 40 elections in the focus area that Dr. Palmer examined. Stip. ¶¶ 225, 227; PX 2 ¶ 22. Defendants have offered no evidence suggesting that this is no longer the case. To the contrary, just as with the second [Gingles](#) precondition, the parties have stipulated to satisfaction of the third [Gingles](#) precondition. Stip. ¶ 225.

The Court concludes that Dr. Palmer's analysis demonstrates high levels of white bloc voting in the congressional focus area and in the individual districts that comprise it. The Court also finds that candidates preferred by Black voters are almost always defeated by white bloc voting except in those areas where they form a majority. The evidence of polarization is stronger in this case than it was in [Allen](#): in Georgia, only 12.4% of white voters support Black-preferred candidates, whereas in Alabama 15.4% of white voters supported Black-preferred candidates. [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487. There the Supreme Court affirmed that there was “very clear” evidence of racially polarized voting. [Id.](#) Thus, this Court likewise finds “very clear” evidence of racially polarized voting in the challenged district.⁴⁶ Accordingly, the Court concludes that [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that white voters vote in opposition to and typically defeat Black preferred candidates and thus [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs have carried their burden as to the third [Gingles](#) precondition.

* * * *

The Court concludes that the [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs have carried their burden in proving the three [Gingles](#)

preconditions. Accordingly, the Court now turns to the totality of the circumstances inquiry.

4. *Totality of the Circumstances*

The Court must determine whether Georgia's political process is equally open to the affected Black voters. [Wright](#), 979 F.3d at 1288 (“[I]n the words of the Supreme Court, the district court is required to determine, after reviewing the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and, ‘based upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality, whether the political process is equally open to minority voters.’” (quoting [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752)); [Solomon v. Liberty Cnty. Com'rs](#), 166 F.3d 1135, 1148 (11th Cir. 1999), [vacated](#) 206 F.3d 1054 (acknowledging that the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have found it to be “unusual” or “rare” if a plaintiff can establish the [Gingles](#) preconditions, but fail to establish a Section 2 violation on the totality of the circumstances (quoting [Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.](#), 4 F.3d 1103, 1135 (3d Cir. 1993)); [Sanchez v. Colorado](#), 97 F.3d 1303, 1322 (10th Cir. 1996)) (citing [Clark v. Calhoun Cnty.](#), 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994)).

a) Totality of circumstances inquiry: purpose and framework

*58 For a Section 2 violation to be found, the Court must conduct “an intensely local appraisal” of the electoral mechanism at issue, as well as a “searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reality.’” [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 19, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (citing [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752). The purpose of this appraisal is to determine the “essential inquiry” of a Section 2 case, which is “whether the political process is *equally open* to minority voters.” [Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP](#), 775 F.3d at 1342 (emphasis added) (quoting [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752). Put differently, the totality of the circumstances inquiry ensures that violations of Section 2 may only be found when “members of the protected class have *less opportunity* to participate in the political process.” [Chisom v. Roemer](#), 501 U.S. 380, 397, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991) (emphasis added).

Over the last fifty years Georgia has become increasingly more politically open to Black voters and in recent elections Black candidates have enjoyed success—five of Georgia's representatives to the United States House of Representatives

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and one of its Senators are Black. Although the Court commends the progress that Georgia has made since 1965, when weighing the Senate Factors, the Court finds that the Enacted Congressional Plan dilutes Black voting power in west-metro Atlanta. The Enacted Congressional Plan in west metro-Atlanta has resulted in Black voters having less of an opportunity to participate equally in the political process than white voters. [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752; [Chisom](#), 501 U.S. at 397, 111 S.Ct. 2354. The whole of the evidence shows that the political process is not currently *equally* to Black Georgians in west-metro Atlanta—Black voters still suffer from *less* opportunity to partake in the political process in the area than white voters. Thus, given the consideration of the factors named *infra*, the Court determines that the totality of the circumstances inquiry supports finding a Section 2 violation in this case and that an additional majority-minority congressional district must be drawn in the western-metro Atlanta area.

Turning to the legal framework guiding the totality of the circumstances inquiry: the totality inquiry focuses on a number of non-comprehensive and non-exclusive Senate Factors. [Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP](#), 775 F.3d at 1342. The Senate Factors include: (1) “the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision”; (2) “the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized”; (3) “the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting”; (4) “the exclusion of members of the minority group from the candidate slating processes”; (5) “the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process”; (6) “the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns”; and (7) “the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.” [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 44–45, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Furthermore, “[t]he [Senate] Report notes also that evidence demonstrating [8] that elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group and [9] that the policy underlying the State’s ... use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous may have probative value.” [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. 2752.

*59 The Court now will consider and weigh each of these factors in addition to the proportionality of Black citizens to majority-Black districts and the State’s changing demographics. Again, the Court ultimately concludes that the totality of the circumstances’ inquiry weighs in favor of finding a Section 2 violation in the [Pendergrass Plaintiffs’](#) case.⁴⁷

b)Senate Factor One and Three: historical evidence of discrimination and State’s use of voting procedures enhancing opportunity to discriminate

The Court first turns to Georgia electoral practices, both past and present, that bear on discrimination against Black voters under Senate Factors One and Three.⁴⁸ Senate Factor One focuses on “the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state ... that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process[.]” [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Senate Factor Three “considers ‘the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting.’ ” [Wright](#), 979 F.3d at 1295 (quoting [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 44–45, 106 S.Ct. 2752).

The Court finds that [Pendergrass Plaintiffs](#) have shown evidence of both past and present history in Georgia that the State’s voting practices disproportionately affect Black voters. Per guidance from binding authorities, the Court is careful in this analysis to assess both past *and present* efforts that have caused a disproportionate impact on Black voters. Indeed, “past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.” [Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State for Ala.](#), 992 F.3d 1299, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting [Mobile v. Bolden](#), 446 U.S. 55, 74, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980)); see also [Abbott v. Perez](#), 585 U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324, 201 L.Ed.2d 714 (2018) (explaining that “the presumption of legislative good faith [is] not changed by a finding of past discrimination”).

While present evidence of disproportionate impact is necessary, the Court’s reading of recent decisions is that past discrimination and disproportionate effects cannot be overlooked. To be sure, the Supreme Court recently opined that Section 2 looks at both the *past* and present realities

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of Georgia's electoral mechanism by recounting Alabama's history of past discrimination from the Reconstruction Era. [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 19, 143 S.Ct. 1487; [see also](#) [id.](#) at 14, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (“For the first 115 years following Reconstruction, the State of Alabama elected no [B]lack Representatives to Congress.”). In the wake of the [Allen](#) decision, Chief Judge Pryor recently clarified that “[p]ast discrimination *is relevant*” even if it is “one evidentiary source” that is “not to be outweighed.” [League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Fla. Sec’y of State](#), 81 F.4th 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2023) (Pryor, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting [Abbott](#), 138 S. Ct. at 2325); [see also id.](#) (“[Allen](#) cited the ‘extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related discrimination’ in Alabama as relevant to whether the political process today is ‘equally open’ to minority voters.” (quoting [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487)). Accordingly, the Court takes these cues from both recent Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence and evaluates Georgia's practices of discrimination *past and present* as relevant evidence in the totality of the circumstances inquiry.

(1) Historical evidence of discrimination broadly

*60 “Georgia has a history chocked full of racial discrimination at all levels. This discrimination was ratified into state constitutions, enacted into state statutes, and promulgated in state policy. Racism and race discrimination were apparent and conspicuous realities, the norm rather than the exception.” [Wright](#), 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1310 (citation omitted). “African-Americans have in the past been subject to legal and cultural segregation in Georgia[.]” [Cofield](#), 969 F. Supp. at 767. “Black residents did not enjoy the right to vote until Reconstruction. Moreover, early in this century, Georgia passed a constitutional amendment establishing a literacy test, poll tax, property ownership requirement, and a good-character test for voting. This act was accurately called the ‘Disfranchisement Act.’ Such devices that limited black participation in elections continued into the 1950s.” [Id.](#)

In this case, one of [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses opined that “[t]hroughout the history of the state of Georgia, voting rights have followed a pattern where after periods of increased nonwhite voter registration and turnout, the state has passed legislation, and often used extralegal means, to disenfranchise minority voters.” PX 4, 10; [Tr. 1428:3–24](#). Another expert witness testified, Georgia has “used basically every expedient ... associated with Jim Crow to prevent Black

voters from voting in the state of Georgia.” [Tr. 1161:20–1162:11](#).

During the trial, Defendants stipulated “up until 1990 we had historical discrimination in Georgia.” [Tr. 1524:14–15](#). Thus, the unrebutted testimony and the extensive accounts of Georgia's history of discrimination in [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs’ expert reports demonstrate that Georgia's discriminatory history—including in voting procedures—spans from the end of the Civil War onward and have uncontrovertibly burdened Black Georgians. [See, e.g., Tr. 1429:11–21](#).

(2) Georgia practice from the passage of the VRA to 2000

Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to address these discriminatory practices. One of the Voting Rights Act's provisions was the preclearance requirement that prohibited certain jurisdictions with well-documented practices of discrimination—including Georgia—from making changes to their voting laws without approval from the federal government. PX 4, 36; [Tr. 1436:11–1437:6](#).

The Voting Rights Act, however, “did not translate to instant success” for Black political participation. PX 4, 36. Among states subject to preclearance in their entirety, Georgia ranked second only to Alabama in the disparity in voter registration between its Black and white citizens by 1976. [Id.](#); [Tr. 1437:10–1438:3](#). These continued disparities following the VRA were at least caused because “Georgia resisted the Voting Rights Act ... [and] for a period, it refused to comply[.]” [Tr. 1163:9–1164:1](#). For example, a study found that local jurisdictions in Georgia and Mississippi “went ahead with election changes despite a pending preclearance request.” PX 4, 39. Even still, from 1965 to 1981, the Department of Justice objected to more than 200 changes submitted by Georgia, more than any other state in the country. [Id.](#)

Georgia's history of discrimination against Black voters did not end in 1981. When the VRA was reauthorized in 1982, the Senate Report specifically cited to Georgia's discriminatory practices that diminished the voting power of Black voters. [S. Rep. 97-417, at 10, 13](#) (1982). During the 1990 redistricting cycle, twice the DOJ rejected the State's reapportionment plans. PX 4, 42.

During the process of reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act in 2006, Georgia legislators “took a leadership position

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in challenging the reauthorization of the [A]ct.” *Tr. 1164:2–17*. As Dr. Jones reminds us, “Georgia’s resistance to the VRA is consistent with its history of resisting the expansion of voting rights to Black citizens at every turn.” APAX 2, 9. Even following the 2000 Census, the district court in the District of Columbia refused to preclear the General Assembly’s Senate plan because the court found “the presence of racially polarized voting” and that “the State ha[d] failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the reapportionment plan for the State Senate will not have a retrogressive effect.” *Georgia v. Ashcroft*, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 94 (D.D.C. 2002), *affirmed by King v. Georgia*, 537 U.S. 1100, 123 S.Ct. 962, 154 L.Ed.2d 768 (2003).

(3) More recent voting practices with a disproportionate impact on Black voters

*61 The Court concludes that *Pendergrass* Plaintiffs submitted evidence about more recent practices in Georgia which disproportionately impact Black voters and have resulted in a discriminatory effect. These practices include polling place closures, voter purges, and the Exact Match requirement. *Pendergrass* Plaintiffs’ also continually rely on the Georgia’s General Assembly passage of SB 202 following the 2020 presidential election as evidence of recent and present discrimination disproportionately affecting Black voters.⁴⁹

Following *Shelby County* and the end of pre-clearance, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, found that Georgia had adopted five of the most common restrictions that impose roadblocks to the franchise for minority voters: (1) voter ID laws, (2) proof of citizenship requirements, (3) voter purges, (4) cuts in early voting⁵⁰, and (5) widespread polling place closures. PX 4, 48–49 (citing U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *An Assessment of Minority Voting Rights Access in the United States: 2018 Statutory Enforcement Report* (Washington, 2018), 369). No other State has engaged in all five practices. PX 4, 49.

The Court ultimately weighs the evidence submitted and determines that the present evidence of Georgia’s voting practices show they had a disproportionately negative impact on Black voters. The Court proceeds by assessing *Pendergrass* Plaintiffs’ evidence of (a) Georgia’s practice of closing polling places, (b) Georgia’s Exact Match requirement and purging of its registration lists, (c) the General Assembly’s passage of SB 202, and (d) the State’s rebuttal evidence of open and

fair election procedures.⁵¹ The Court finally (e) renders its conclusion of law on this Senate Factor.

(a) polling place closures

*62 The Court finds that there is compelling evidence that Georgia’s recent closure of numerous polling places disproportionately impacts Black voters. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Shelby County*, “ ‘dozens of polling places’ were ‘closed, consolidated, or moved.’ ” PX 4, 49 (citing Kristina Torres, “Cost-Cutting Raises Voter Access Fears,” *Atlanta Journal Constitution*, (Oct. 13, 2016); Kristina Torres, “State Monitored For Voting Rights Issues,” *Atlanta Journal Constitution*, (Jun. 20, 2016)).

By 2019, the Leadership Conference Education Fund determined that Georgia had closed over 200 polling locations since June of 2012, despite the significant growth in Georgia’s population. PX 4, 50. “A 2020 study found that ‘about two-thirds of the polling places that had to stay open late for the June primary to accommodate waiting voters were in majority-Black neighborhoods, even though they made up only about one-third of the state’s polling places.’ ” *Id.* (citing Stephen Fowler, “Why Do Nonwhite Georgia Voters Have to Wait in Line for Hours? Their Numbers Have Soared, and Their Polling Places Have Dwindled,” *ProPublica*, <https://www.propublica.org/article/why-do-nonwhite-georgia-voters-have-to-wait-in-line-for-hours-their-numbers-have-soared-and-their-polling-places-have-dwindled>, (Oct. 17, 2020)).

Specifically, in the challenged area (i.e., around Illustrative CD-6), “[i]n 2020, the nine counties in metro Atlanta that had nearly half of the registered voters (and the majority of the Black voters in the state)[, but] had only 38% of the state’s polling places.” PX 4, 51 (citing Fowler, “Why Do Nonwhite Georgia Voters Have to Wait in Line for Hours?”). In 2020, Union City, which is within Illustrative CD-6 and has a Black voting age population of 88%, had wait times as long as five hours. PX 4, 51 (citing Mark Niese and Nick Thieme, “Fewer Polls Cut Voter Turnout Across Georgia,” *Atlanta Journal Constitution* (Dec. 15, 2009); Fowler, “Why Do Nonwhite Georgia Voters Have to Wait in Line for Hours?”).

At trial, Dr. Burton testified about his findings as to polling place closures and his conclusion that they disproportionately impacted Black voters. *Tr. 1432:21–25; 1441:2–21*. These

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conclusions were not raised on cross examination. [Tr. 1465:6–1494:14](#).

The Court concludes that [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs' evidence of polling place closures—and, notably, in west-metro Atlanta where [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs propose Illustrative CD-6 be drawn as an additional majority-minority district—is recent evidence of a voting practice with a disproportionate impact on Black voters.

(b) exact match and registration list purges

[Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs' evidence also shows Georgia's voting practices include roadblocks to the voting efforts of minority voters in the form of the Exact Match system and the State's purging of voter registration lists. PX 4, 49–51 (citing U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, [An Assessment of Minority Voting Rights Access in the United States: 2018 Statutory Enforcement Report](#) (Washington, 2018), 369).

These practices, however, have been determined in prior decisions by the Court to *not* be illegal under federal law. The prior decisions upholding the Exact Match requirement and registration list purges certainly impact the weight to afford these voting practices. However, in this case, the evidence shows—without contradicting the prior legal determinations—that these practices have a *disproportionate effect* on Black voters for purposes of the instant totality of the circumstances inquiry. Specifically, when these prior decisions are considered in the light of the legal frameworks at issue, the Court finds that these practices can be used as evidentiary support of a disproportionate discriminatory impact on Black voters in Georgia without contradicting or minimizing the prior decisions upholding Georgia's laws.

*63 Specifically, Georgia's Exact Match procedure was determined to not violate VRA's Section 2 because when the burden on voters, the disparate impact, and the State's interest in preventing fraud were considered together, the weighing of these considerations counseled against finding a violation. [Fair Fight Action](#), 634 F. Supp. 3d at 1246. The Exact Match decision in [Fair Fight](#) relied on the [Brnovich](#) decision and emphasized that “the modest burdens allegedly imposed by [the Exact Match law], the small size of the disparate impact [on Georgia voters as a whole], and the State's justifications” did not support a Section 2 violation. [Id.](#) at 1245 (citing [Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.](#), 594 U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2346, 210 L.Ed.2d 753 (2021)). Even without

a Section 2 violation, however, the Court found that the Exact Match requirement disproportionately impacted Black voters given that: Black voters were a smaller portion of the electorate but as of January 2020, 69.4% of individuals flagged as “missing identification required” were African American, and 31.6% of the voters flagged for pending citizenship 31.6% were African American, whereas white voters only accounted for 20.9%. [Fair Fight Action](#), 634 F. Supp. 3d at 1160, 1162; [Tr. 1283:3–10](#). The Court's decision in [Fair Fight](#) itself acknowledged that the Exact Match practice in Georgia has a *discriminatory impact* on Black voters—the inquiry specifically at issue here. When the Court considers [Fair Fight](#)'s determination in the light of the Civil Rights' Commission's report that generally Exact Match practices are a roadblock to minority voters, the Court concludes that this modern practice in Georgia supports that Georgia's modern voting practices have a discriminatory effect on Black voters.

The same [Fair Fight](#) case also resolved on summary judgment (in favor of the State) claims that purges of voter registration lists violated the Constitution. [Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger](#), No. 18-cv-5391, 2021 WL 9553856 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2021). The [Anderson-Burdick](#) framework governed this summary judgment resolution and notably did not require any showing or determination of racial discrimination. [Id.](#) Instead, the Court's task was to balance the voter's burden with the State's interest in complying with federal law (i.e., the National Voter Registration Act). [2021 WL 9553856, *at 15–18](#). The Court's weighing of these considerations does not instantly preclude a finding that Georgia's voter purges have a disproportionate impact on Black voters for purposes of the totality of the circumstances inquiry here. This is especially the case in the light of the expert evidence that these voter purges have minimized the “electoral influence of minority voters and particularly of Black Georgians.” PX 4, 2. Thus, the Court finds that, while not illegal under [Anderson-Burdick](#), the voter purges provide some evidence of modern practices with disproportionate discriminatory impact on Black voters in Georgia.

Accordingly, while the Court is cognizant of the prior decisions upholding the Exact Match and registration list purges in Georgia, the Court still finds that these voting practices are *some* evidence indicating a disproportionate impact on Black voters.

(c) SB 202's disparate impact

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The Pendergrass Plaintiffs also cite to Georgia's passage of SB 202 as evidence of modern discrimination. The General Assembly passed SB 202 following the 2020 Presidential election. PX 4, 53–56; Tr. 1474:10–1481:1. A challenge to SB 202 is pending in the Northern District of Georgia and has not been resolved at the time the Court enters this Order.⁵² In re SB 202, 1:21-mi-55555 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2021). The Court acknowledges that the evidence presented in that case is not presently before this Court.⁵³ Given this pending challenge to SB 202, the Court proceeds cautiously in an effort of judicial restraint, which counsels against the Court preemptively making any findings that could lead to inconsistent rulings or implicate the ultimate determination of the legality of SB 202.

*64 With these qualifications in mind, the Court cannot ignore that evidence on SB 202 has been presented by the Plaintiffs as proof of present discriminatory practices in Georgia's treatment of Black voters. PX 4, 53–55, Tr. 1474:10–1481:1.⁵⁴ Defendants likewise provided rebuttal testimony. See generally Tr. 2261–2307. The Court, treading cautiously, tethers its findings regarding SB 202 to the testimony and evidence provided by Pendergrass Plaintiffs' experts for purposes of the totality of the circumstances inquiry on the Senate Factors. Namely, the Court considers the passage of SB 202, once again, as some evidence of practices with a disproportionate impact on Black voters. This determination is made with the conclusion of Dr. Burton, Pendergrass Plaintiffs' expert, in mind: “[t]he history of Georgia demonstrates a clear pattern” (PX 4, 4), where “periods of increased nonwhite voter registration and turnout” have been followed by the state [passing] legislation” to deter minority voters. PX 4, 10. Dr. Burton specifically cites the passage of SB 202 as evidence of this pattern. PX 4, 10.

Accordingly, the Court considers SB 202 as evidence of a current manifestation of a historical pattern that following an election, the General Assembly responsively passes voting laws that disproportionately impact Black voters in Georgia.

(4) Defendant's rebuttal evidence

The Court now turns to Defendants' rebuttal evidence. To begin, Defendants submit no rebuttal expert or report to Dr. Burton's report and testimony. Tr. 1425:8–16. In fact, Defendants do not affirmatively rebut the aforementioned evidence with their own evidence. Instead, Defendants cross-

examined Dr. Jones on the prior legal determinations that the Exact Match and list maintenance procedures utilized by Georgia. Tr. 1251:16–19. As the Court has already determined, it considers these prior judicial decisions as part of its weighing of this evidence. It also has assessed the basis for these prior decisions and has determined that it is not inconsistent with these prior rulings to now find that these voting practices have a discriminatory impact on Black voters for purposes of the instant totality of the circumstances. See Section II(C)(4)(b)(3)(b) *supra*.

Defendants also, through lay witness testimony, submitted that Georgia has implemented legislation to make it easier for all voters to participate.⁵⁵ In favor of Defendants on these factors, the Court considers Mr. Germany's testimony about SB 202 indicates that the motive for passing the law was to alleviate stress on the electoral system and increase voter confidence. Tr. 2265:5–23. Moreover, SB 202, among other things, expanded the number of early voting days in Georgia. Tr. 1476:7–9. There's evidence that Georgia employs no-excuse absentee voting (Tr. 1476:10–13), automatic voter registration through the Department of Driver Services (Tr. 2263:12–20) and voters to register the vote using both paper registration and online voter registration (Tr. 2263:14–23). Georgia offers free, state-issued, identification cards that voters can use to satisfy Georgia's photo ID laws. Tr. 2264:15–22.

*65 Additionally, the Court has also been presented with additional evidence that immediately prior to Shelby County, the DOJ precleared Georgia's 2011 Congressional Plan. Tr. 1471:14–17. Moreover, following the passage of SB 202, Georgia experienced record voter turnout in the 2022 midterm election cycle. Tr. 1480:3–9.

(5) Conclusion on Senate Factors One and Three

In sum, the majority of the evidence before the Court shows that Georgia has a long history of discrimination against Black voters. This history has persisted in the wake of the VRA and even into the present through various voting practices that disproportionately effect Black voters. Pendergrass Plaintiffs have provided concrete recent examples of the discriminatory impact of recent Georgia practices, some specifically in the challenged area of Illustrative CD-6.

Defendants have submitted some recent evidence of Georgia increasing the access and availability of voting. The evidence

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even shows that *overall* voter turnout has increased in the most recent national election.⁵⁶ These efforts are commendable, and the Court is encouraged by these developments. In the Court's view, however, it is insufficient rebuttal evidence. Thereby, *in toto*, the Court concludes that Georgia has a history—uncontrovertibly in the past, and extending into the present—of voting practices that disproportionately impact Black voters. Thus, Senate Factors One and Three, on the whole, weigh in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

c)Senate Factor Two: racial polarization

The second Senate Factor assesses “the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized.” [Wright](#), 979 F.3d at 1305 (quoting [LULAC](#), 548 U.S. at 426, 126 S.Ct. 2594). As indicated in the [Pendergrass](#) Summary Judgment Order (Doc. No. [215], 97), polarization is a factor to be considered in the totality of circumstances inquiry, in addition to the second and third [Gingles](#) preconditions. Pursuant to persuasive authority, the Court finds that when a Defendant has raised a race-neutral reason for the polarization, the Court must look beyond the straight empirical conclusions of polarization. See [Nipper](#), 39 F.3d at 1524 (plurality opinion) (finding that Defendants may rebut evidence of polarization by showing racial bias is based on nonracial circumstances); [Uno v. City of Holyoke](#), 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that an inference of racial polarization “will endure *unless* and *until* the defendant adduces credible evidence tending to prove the detected voting patterns can most logically be explained by factors unconnected to the intersection of race with the electoral system.”).

Defendants have consistently argued that partisanship is a race-neutral explanation for polarization of voters in Georgia. See, e.g., [Tr. 2410:18–2411:14](#). In an intentional discrimination context, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned courts “against conflating discrimination on the basis of party affiliation on the basis of race [e]vidence of *race-based* discrimination is necessary to establish a constitutional violation.” [League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Fla. Sec'y of State](#), 66 F.4th 905, 924 (11th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original) (citing [Brnovich](#), 141 S. Ct. at 2349). However, Chief Justice Roberts recently confirmed that a Section 2 violation “occurs where an ‘electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out’ minority voters’ ‘ability to elect their preferred candidates.’ Such as risk is greatest ‘where minority

and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates’ and where minority voters are submerged in a majority voting population that ‘regularly defeat[s]’ their choices.” [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 1, 17–18, 143 S.Ct. 1487.

*66 The Court acknowledges that whether voter polarization is on account of partisanship and race is a difficult issue to disentangle. During an extended colloquy with the Court, Dr. Alford testified that “voting behavior is complicated” and that in his view democracy is about “voting for a person that follows their philosophy or they think is going to respond to their needs.” [Tr. 2182:4–5; 2183:4–8](#). He went on to clarify that party identity and affiliation is exceptionally strong in this country and starts at a young age. [Tr. 2183:8–2184:6](#).

Dr. Alford concluded that, from the empirical evidence presented by [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs, one cannot causally determine whether the data is best explained by party affiliation or racial polarization. He specifically testified that:

[T]he kind of data that we use here, which is, you know ecological and highly abstract data, cannot demonstrate cohesion in sort of its natural form.

Much of the work on things like individual-level surveys, exit polls, et cetera, also make it very difficult in a non-experimental setting to demonstrate causation. It really takes an experimental setting. So there is some work done in experimental settings, but this is not an area of inquiry that is—scientific causation in the social sciences is very difficult to establish. This is not an area where there has been any work that's established that.

[Tr. 2226:7–18](#).

The Court is not in a position to resolve the global question of what causes voter behavior. Such question is empirically driven, and one in which the expert political scientists and statisticians did not agree. The Court can, however, assess the *evidence* of polarization presented at trial. In doing so, the Court determines that the [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs shown sufficient evidence of racial polarization in Georgia voting.

The [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs present Dr. Palmer's report, indicating strong evidence of racial polarization in voting. PX 2; see also Section II(C)(2)–(3) *supra*. Plaintiffs also offered testimony about the strong connection between race and partisanship as it currently exists in Georgia. [Tr. 424:5–8](#) (affirming that “race and party cannot be separated for the purpose of [Dr. Palmer's] racial polarization analysis”);

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1460:11–15 (“[O]ne party is highly supporting ... issues that are most important to minorities, particularly African Americans. And another party is not getting a good grade on how they're voting for them.”); PX 4, 74 (indicating the “opposing positions that member's of Georgia's Democratic and Republican parties take on issues inexplicably linked to race.”).

Defendants also argued that there must be evidence that voter's change their behavior based on the candidate to show that the polarization is race-based. *Tr.* 2409:25–2410:9. The Court finds that this is not a necessary precondition to determining whether voting is polarized on account of race. Race of a candidate is not dispositive for a polarization inquiry. *DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 1027, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (“The assumption that majority-minority districts elect only minority representatives, or that majority-white districts elect only white representatives, is false as an empirical matter. And on a more fundamental level, the assumption reflects the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain minority views that must be different from those of other citizens.” (citation omitted)). The Court,

however, finds that an assessment of the success of Black candidates in reference to different percentages of white voters, is good evidence that partisanship is not the best logical explanation of racial voting patterns in Georgia. *Cf. Johnson v. Hamrick*, 196 F.3d 1216, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We do not mean to imply that district courts *should* give elections involving [B]lack candidates more weight; rather, we merely note that in light of existing case law district courts may do so without committing clear error.”).

*67 Assuming *arguendo* that evidence of voter behavior in relation to the race of the candidate were required, *Pendergrass* Plaintiffs have provided evidence showing racial polarization based on the race of the candidate. *Pendergrass* Plaintiffs offer the expert opinions and testimony of Dr. Burton, who assessed the success of Black candidates in the light of the percentage of white voters in the district.

The following chart showcases his findings:

Winning Candidates in 2020 in Georgia House of Representatives

Percentage white registered voters in district	White Republicans ¹⁹⁷	Black Democrats	White Democrats
Under 40%	0	48	7
40-46.2%	1	3	2
46.2-54.9	11	1	6
55-62.4%	23	0	5
Over 62.4%	68	0	0

Winning Candidates in 2020 in Georgia State Senate

Percentage white registered voters in district	White Republicans	Black Democrats	White Democrats
Under 47%	0	16	1
47-54.9%	3	0	3
Over 55%	51	0	0

PX 4, 56 (footnote content omitted).

There is a meaningful difference in Black candidate success depending on the percentage of white voters in a district. When the white voter percentage is lowest, Black Democratic candidates have the most success. However, as the percentage

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of white voters increases, Black elected officials decreased. Id. And, when the white voter percentage reaches 47% (for the State Senate) or 55% (for the State House) of the electorate no Black candidates are elected, even though white Democrats do achieve some success. PX 4, 56. These findings are consistent with Dr. Palmer's un rebutted findings about the challenged districts: Black voters voted for the same candidate, on average, 98.4% of the time and white voters voted for a different candidate, on average, 87.6% of the time. Stip. ¶ 223.

In contrast to Pendergrass Plaintiffs' evidence, Defendants' expert, Dr. Alford, rendered only descriptive conclusions based on Dr. Palmer's data set and, most importantly, did not offer additional support for a conclusion that voter behavior was caused by partisanship rather than race. DX 8. To be sure, Defendants did not offer any further evidence—quantitative or qualitative—in support of their theory that partisanship, not race, is controlling voting patterns in Georgia.

While the Court acknowledges that the Black preferred candidate was the Democrat in all elections reviewed, the Court also finds that there is not sufficient evidence to show that Black people myopically vote for the Democrat candidate. The Court specifically asked Dr. Alford, “[a]re you saying that whites folks will vote for Republicans just because they're Republicans, and Blacks folks will vote for Democrats just because they're Democrat?” Tr. 2180:23–25. Dr. Alford responded by answering, “I've spent a lifetime trying to understand voting behavior and, I would never say something as simple as that. It's much more complicated than that.” Tr. 2181:1–3. The Court agrees that it is too simple to find that partisanship is the moving force behind a Black voter's choice of candidate. The history provided to the Court shows the complicated history between the current Republican Party and Black citizens. See Tr. 1444:23–1448:21 (explaining the history of politics in Georgia, and nationwide, as it relates to race and partisan affiliation).

Finally, even Defendant's expert agreed that candidate choices and Black political alignment with the Democratic party is not just based on the party label.

The Court: So could it be said that voters are not necessarily voting for the party; they're voting for a person that follows their philosophy or they think is going to respond to their needs?

[Dr. Alford]: That's -- with my view, that's what democracy is about. That's what's going on. It is the case that in the

United States, unlike in most other democracies, party identity is also really important, that we identify with a party.

*68 Tr. 2183:4–12. Given all the evidence before the Court, the Court finds that there is significant evidence that “minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates”, and because “minority voters are submerged into a majority voting population that ‘regularly defeat[s]’ their choice,” Georgia's “electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out’ [Black] voters’ ‘ability to elect their preferred candidates.’ ” Allen, 559 U.S. at 17–18, 130 S.Ct. 983.

In light of the foregoing evidence, the Court finds that Senate Factor Two weighs heavily in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

d) Senate Factor Five:⁵⁷ socioeconomic disparities

Senate Factor Five considers socioeconomic disparities between Black and white voters and these disparities' impact on Black voter participation. The Eleventh Circuit recognized in binding precedent that “ ‘disproportionate educational, employment, income level, and living conditions arising from past discrimination tend to depress minority political participation.’ ” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1294 (quoting United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1568 (1984)). “Where these conditions are shown, and where the level of [B]lack participation is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further causal nexus between their disparate socio-economic status and the depressed level of political participation.” Id. (quoting Marengo Cnty., 731 F.2d at 1568-69); United States v. Dallas Cnty. Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Once lower socio-economic status of [B]lacks has been shown, there is no need to show the causal link of this lower status on political participation.”).

(1) Black voter participation

The Court finds that, as a quantitative matter, Black voters participate less than white voters in Georgia's elections. Pendergrass Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Collingwood, in evaluating Black and white voter turnout used the data from the Secretary of State's website, which records the actual number of registrations and votes cast by racial group. Tr. 684:2–10.

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Dr. Collingwood's data shows that in the 2022 election cycle Black voters had a 45% turnout rate and white voters had a 58.3% turnout rate—a 13.3% gap. PX 6, 8. The 2020 election recorded similar results, where Black voter turnout was 60% and white voter turnout was 72.6%, a 12.6% difference. Id. By contrast in 2018 Black voter turnout was 53.9% and white voter turnout was 62.2%, which is only a 8.3% difference and 2012, which recorded the smallest gap, Black voters turned out at 72.6% and white voters turned out at 75.7%. Id. Using the precinct specific data, in 2020 white voters had a higher turnout in 79.2% of precincts and in 2022 that increased to 81.0%. PX 6, 14. Based on this data, Dr. Collingwood concluded that overall Black voter turnout has decreased over the last 6–8 years. Id.; Tr. 684:23–25.

Specifically, in the challenged district, Dr. Collingwood found that in the 2020 election, the percentage of Black voter turnout did not exceed the percentage of white voter turnout in any county.⁵⁸ In the counties affected most by the Illustrative Congressional Plan (Cobb, Fulton, Douglas, and Fayette), the percentage of white voter turnout exceeded the percentage of Black voter turnout. Id.; PX 6, 16.

*69 In addition to voter turnout rates, Dr. Collingwood provided statistical evidence that white voters had higher participation rates in the political process outside of casting a ballot more than Black voters. White voters had higher participation than Black voters in attending local political meeting (5.92% of white voters, 3.51% Black voters); putting up political signs (17.95% white voters, 6.46% Black voters), working for a candidate's campaign (3.65% white voters, 1.84% Black voters); contacting a public official (21.01% white voters, 8.84% Black voters), and donating money to political campaigns (24.36% white voters, 13.63% Black voters). PX 6, 36–37, tbls. 4–6, 8, 9; Tr. 700:6–701:20, 702:8–24. Some of these metrics present relatively comparable white voter participation and Black voter participation (i.e., attending local political meetings, working for political campaigns). Dr. Collingwood testified that under ordinary methods, these close percentages still are statistically significant.⁵⁹ Tr. 700:11–15. The Court credits Dr. Collingwood's conclusions and finds that white voters tend to engage more with the political process than Black voters across various metrics.

Defendants did not put forth rebuttal evidence contesting that Black voter participation in the political process was lower than white voters. Defendants also did not challenge or rebut the accuracy of Dr. Collingwood's findings on voter turnout,

but rather questioned whether they were sufficient to prove lower percentages of Black voter participation. Tr. 695:5–13; 700:6–704:10. Defendants argue that voter turnout depends on voter mobilization, which can be explained largely by the candidates on the ballot. See Tr. at 694:9–696:13. At the trial, Defendants questioned Dr. Collingwood about the significance of particular Black candidates appearing on the ballot—i.e., President Obama in 2012 and Stacy Abrams in 2018. Tr. 695:5–21. Dr. Collingwood agreed that the particular candidate on the ballot could have some effect. Tr. 695:5–21.

The Court understands Defendants argument to be that voter turnout is not suppressed because Black voters are actively *choosing not* to vote, unless an “exciting” candidate is running for office. To prove this point, Defendants cited to discrete elections of Black candidates where voter turnout was high for both Black and white voters.⁶⁰ However, Defendants provide no empirical evidence to support this conclusion; rather, the only evidence on this point is a hypothetical question asked to Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ expert. The Court is not persuaded by this argument.

Even assuming that Defendants’ theory of voter mobilization could be a valid legal argument rebutting statistical evidence of suppressed Black voter turnout, Defendants submitted little-to-no evidence connecting lower Black voter turnout to a lack of motivation to vote. Some nonempirical testimonial evidence on cross examination that the candidates on a ballot impact voter turnout is insufficient to rebut the expert statistical evidence presented by Pendergrass Plaintiffs that Black voter turnout is, on the whole and across elections, disproportionately lower than white voter turnout, and that Black voters participate less in the political process than white voters. Thus, the Court concludes that Pendergrass Plaintiffs submitted evidence that Black Georgians participate in the political process, both generally and in voter turnout, less than white voters.

(2) *Socio-economic disparities*

*70 The Court also concludes that there is sufficient evidence in the Record to show disproportionate educational, employment, income level, and living conditions arising from past discrimination. Census estimates provide: the unemployment rate among Black Georgians (8.7%) is nearly double that of white Georgians (4.4%); white households are twice as likely as Black households to report an annual

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income above \$100,000; Black Georgians are more than twice as likely—and Black children, in particular, are more than three times as likely—to live below the poverty line; Black Georgians are nearly three times more likely than white Georgians to receive SNAP benefits; Black adults are more likely than white adults to lack a high school diploma (13.3% as compared to 9.4%); 35% of white Georgians over the age of 25 have obtained a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to only 24% of Black Georgians over the age of 25. PX 6, 4 & tbl.1; Stip. ¶ 342–347. Additionally, Black Georgians are more likely to report a disability than white Georgians (11.8% compared to 10.9%) and are more likely to lack health insurance (18.9% compared to 14.2%, among 19-to-64-year-olds). PX 6 at 4. Defendant did not meaningfully contest this evidence. Thereby, the Court concludes that this evidence is more than sufficient to show socioeconomic disparities exist between Black and white Georgians.

(3) Conclusion on Senate Factor Five

Under binding precedent, Pendergrass Plaintiffs have proven that rates of Black voter political participation are depressed as compared to white voters participation. The aforementioned evidence also shows that Black Georgians suffer from significant socioeconomic disparities, including educational attainment, unemployment rates, income levels, and healthcare access. When both of these showings have been made, the law does not require a causal link be proven between the socioeconomic status and Black voter participation. Wright, 979 F.3d at 1294 (citing Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d at 1568).⁶¹ Accordingly, the Court concludes that the socioeconomic evidence and the lower rates of Black voter participation support a finding that Senate Factor Five weighs heavily in favor of a Section 2 violation.

e) Senate Factor Six: racial appeals in Georgia's political campaigns

Senate Factor Six “asks whether political campaigns in the area are characterized by subtle or overt racial appeals.” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. 2752). Courts have continually affirmed district courts’ findings of “overt and blatant” as well as “subtle and furtive” racial appeals. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 40, 106 S.Ct. 2752; see also Allen, 599 U.S. at 22–23, 143 S.Ct. 1487. However, in the Alabama district court proceedings, which preceded the Allen appeal, the trial court had assigned less

weight to the evidence of racial appeals because the plaintiffs had only shown three examples of racial appeals in recent campaigns, but did not submit “any systematic or statistical evaluation of the extent to which political campaigns are characterized by racial appeals” and thus the court could not evaluate if these appeals “occur frequently, regularly, occasionally, or rarely.” Singleton, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1024.

Similarly here, the Court finds that there is evidence of isolated racial appeals in recent Georgia statewide campaigns.⁶² However, there is no evidence for the Court to determine if these appeals characterize political campaigns in Georgia. Thus, while Pendergrass Plaintiffs submitted at least six instances⁶³ in recent elections where racial appeals were invoked—which is some evidence of political campaigns being characterized by racial appeals—the Court cannot meaningfully evaluate whether these appeals “occur frequently, regularly, occasionally, or rarely” and thereby does not afford great weight to this factor. Singleton, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1024.

f) Senate Factor Seven: minority candidate success

*71 Senate Factor Seven “focuses on ‘the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.’ ” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1295 (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426, 126 S.Ct. 2594). Unlike the second and third Gingles preconditions, the Court now must specifically look at the success of Black candidates, not just the success of Black preferred candidates. Assessing the results of Georgia's recent elections, the Court finds that Black candidates have achieved little success, particularly in majority-white districts.

As a population, Black Georgians have historically been and continue to be underrepresented by Black elected officials across Georgia's statewide offices. Georgia has never elected a Black governor (Stip. ¶ 349) and Black candidates have otherwise only had isolated success in statewide partisan elections in the last 30-years. Specifically, in 2000, David Burgess was elected Public Service Commissioner, in 2002 and 2006 Mike Thurmond was elected to Labor Commissioner, and in 1998, 2002, and 2006 Thurbert Baker was elected Georgia Attorney General.⁶⁴ Stip. ¶361. Most recently, after 230 years of exclusively white Senators, Senator Raphael Warnock was twice elected to U.S. Senate and in his most recent election he defeated a Black candidate.

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Jud. Not., 11. Finally, nine Black individuals have been elected to statewide nonpartisan office in Georgia.⁶⁵ Stip. ¶ 362.

In Georgia's congressional elections, only 12 Black candidates have ever been elected to the Congress. Tr. 1201:1–5. Five Black individuals serve in the United States House of Representatives from Georgia's current congressional districts. Stip. ¶ 359. Four of these Black congresspersons are elected in majority-Black districts. PX 1, K-1. The other Black Representative, Congresswoman Lucy McBath, represents Congressional District 7, which is a majority-minority district where the white voting age population is 32.78%.⁶⁶ PX 1, Ex. G.

*72 In State legislative districts, the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus has only 14 members in the Georgia State Senate (25%) and 41 members in the Georgia House of Representatives (less than 23%).⁶⁷ Stip. ¶ 348. As shown Section II(C)(4)(f) *supra*, Pendergrass Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Burton, submits a chart showing that in the 2020 and 2022 legislative elections, Black candidates had little-to-no success when they did not make up the majority of a district.⁶⁸ Specifically, Black candidates in the 2020 legislative elections did not have any success when they did not make up at least 45.1% of a House District or 53.8% of a Senate District.

Winning Candidates in 2020 in Georgia House of Representatives

Percentage white registered voters in district	White Republicans ¹⁹⁷	Black Democrats	White Democrats
Under 40%	0	48	7
40-46.2%	1	3	2
46.2-54.9	11	1	6
55-62.4%	23	0	5
Over 62.4%	68	0	0

Winning Candidates in 2020 in Georgia State Senate

Percentage white registered voters in district	White Republicans	Black Democrats	White Democrats
Under 47%	0	16	1
47-54.9%	3	0	3
Over 55%	51	0	0

PX 4, 56.

Although the Court finds that Black candidates have achieved some success in statewide elections following 2000, the Court nonetheless finds that this factor weighs heavily in favor of Pendergrass Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court in Gingles, when discussing the success of a select few Black candidates, cautioned courts in conflating the success of few as dispositive. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 76, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (“Nothing in the statute or its legislative history prohibited

the court from viewing with some caution black candidates' success in the 1982 election, and from deciding on the basis of all the relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections.”).

In short, since Reconstruction, Georgia has only elected *four* Black candidates in statewide partisan elections: Mike Thurmond, Thurbert Baker, David Burgess, and Raphael Warnock. Stip. ¶ 361. For statewide non-partisan elections,

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Georgia has elected nine successful Black candidates: Robert Benham, Leah Ward-Sears, Harold Melton, Verda Colvin, John Ruffin, Clarence Cooper, Herbert Phipps, Yvette Miller, Clyde Reese. Stip. ¶ 362. Georgia has sent twelve successful Black candidates to the U.S. House of Representatives. Tr. 1201:1–5. Currently, the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus has 55 members in the Georgia General Assembly (of 236 total members). Stip. ¶ 348.

The Court concludes that these isolated successes of Black candidates show that the Black population is underrepresented in Georgia's statewide elected offices. This conclusion is even stronger in majority-white districts.

To be sure, Dr. Burton acknowledged, that some academic scholarship indicates “the future electoral prospects of African American statewide nominees in growth states such as Georgia are indeed promising.” Tr. 1470:2–24. The Court is likewise hopeful about the prospects of increased enfranchisement of all voters and for the potential success of minority candidates in Georgia. However, Dr. Burton also emphasized that, specifically in Georgia, dating back to Reconstruction, “when these things happen, then you get more legislation from whichever party is in power that works to sort of disenfranchise or at least dilute or make the vote count less.” Tr. 1470:12–24. The optimism about Georgia's future elections does not rebut the contrary evidence of the present lack of success of Black candidates; accordingly, the Court finds that Senate Factor Seven weighs heavily in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

g)Senate Factor Eight: responsiveness to Black residents

*73 Senate Factor Eight considers whether elected officials are responsive to the particularized needs of Black voters. A lack of responsiveness is “evidence that minorities have insufficient political influence to ensure that their desires are considered by those in power.” Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d at 1572. The Eleventh Circuit noted that “although a showing of unresponsiveness might have some probative value a showing of responsiveness would have very little.” Id. Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Collingwood, discussed the existence of significant socioeconomic disparities between Black and white Georgians, which he concluded contributed to the lower rates at which Blacks engage their elected representatives. PX 5, 34, 37. He further explained, “such clear disadvantages in healthcare, economics, and education” demonstrates that “the political system is

relatively unresponsive to Black Georgians.” Id. at 4, 143 S.Ct. 1487; see also id. at 7, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (“If the [political] system did respond, we would expect to see fewer gaps in both health and economic indicators and a reduction in voter turnout gaps.”); Tr. 675:14–24. Dr. Collingwood also testified that lower Black voter turnout “typically means that elected officials as a whole are going to be less responsive to you” and thus perpetuates “these same gaps [i]n [] economic, health, [and] educational outcomes.” Tr. 690:2–20.

The Court finds that the arguments regarding socioeconomic disparities are not particularly helpful in determining whether Georgia's elected officials are responsive to Black Georgians. At the trial, a number of Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ lay witnesses testified about socioeconomic issues affecting Black voters, but also admitted that these issues are not exclusive to the Black population. Tr. 657:23–658:4; 1014:16–1015:4, 1016:1–8, 1016:18–24, 1016:25–1017:8; 639:24–640:25.

Ultimately, there is an absence of evidence regarding the level of responsiveness of Georgia's elected representatives to Black voters and white voters. Due to the lack of evidence, the Court finds that Senate Factor Eight does not weigh in favor of finding a Section 2 violation. See Greater Birmingham Ministries, 992 F.3d at 1334 (finding that failure to consider amendments to a particular piece of legislation does not show that legislatures were unresponsive to the needs of minority voters).

h)Senate Factor Nine: justification for the Enacted Congressional Plan

The Court considers Defendants’ justification for the Enacted Congressional Plan and finds that this factor weighs in favor of Defendants and thus weights against finding a Section 2 violation. The “final Senate Factor considers whether the policy underlying Georgia's use of the voting standard, practice, or procedure at issue is ‘tenuous.’ ” Rose v. Raffensperger, 619 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1267 (N.D. 2022) (quoting Senate Report at 29, 1982 USCCAN 207). “Under our cases, the States retain a flexibility that federal courts enforcing § 2 lack ... deference is due to their reasonable fears of, and to their reasonable efforts to avoid, § 2 liability.” Vera, 517 U.S. at 978, 116 S.Ct. 1941.

At the trial, Ms. Wright testified that the Enacted Congressional Plan began with the creation of a blank map that largely balanced population that then could be

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modified based on input from legislators. *Tr.* 1665:2–1666:14. Ms. Wright also relied on information obtained from the public hearings on redistricting. *Tr.* 1668:24–1670:5. Political performance was an important consideration in the design of the Enacted Congressional Plan. *Tr.* 1668:20–23. In Enacted CD-6 specifically, Ms. Wright emphasized and explained that the four-way split of Cobb County was because Cobb County was better able to handle a split of a congressional district than a smaller nearby county. *Tr.* 1671:5–1672:4. She further testified that the inclusion of parts of west Cobb County in Enacted CD-14 was because of population and political considerations, namely putting a democratic area into District 14 instead of District 11 (which was more political competitive). *Tr.* 1673:6–1674:2.

The Court finds that Defendants’ evidence that the Enacted Congressional Plan was drawn to further partisan goals is a sufficient, non-tenuous justification for this Senate Factor. The Supreme Court has held that partisan gerrymandering is outside of the reach of the federal courts and “[f]ederal judges have no license to reallocate political power between the two major political parties, with no plausible *Grant* of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their decisions.” *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 588 U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507, 204 L.Ed.2d 931 (2019). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants’ justification, supported by Ms. Wright’s testimony, that the General Assembly drew the congressional plan to capitalize on a partisan advantage is sufficient for Senate Factor Nine to not weigh in favor of a Section 2 violation.⁶⁹

i)Proportionality

*74 Finally, Defendants argued that Georgia’s Black congressional delegation is proportional to Georgia’s Black voting age population, which shows that Georgia’s political process is equally open to Black voters. *Tr.* 52:16–17; 2392:12-2393:1. However, *De Grandy*, the Supreme Court expressly rejected proportionality as a safe harbor for Section 2 violations. *De Grandy*, 512 U.S. at 1017–18, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (“Proportionality ... would thus be a safe harbor for any districting scheme. The safety would be in derogation of the statutory text and its considered purpose, however, and of the ideal that the Voting Right Act of 1965 attempts to foster.”). *De Grandy* did find, however, that proportionality is helpful in determining the “apparent[]” political effectiveness, based solely on an analysis of district makeups. *Id.* at 1014, 114 S.Ct. 2647.

According to the 2020 Census population statistics,⁷⁰ under the Enacted Congressional Plan, four of Georgia’s U.S. House Congressional districts are majority-Black districts, using the total AP Black population. (CD-2, 4, 5, 13) (or 28.6% of the congressional districts⁷¹) and one additional majority-minority district (CD-7) (for, a total of 5 majority-minority districts, which is 35.7% of the congressional districts⁷²). See PX 1, Ex. K-1 (reproduced below). Thus, under the Enacted Congressional Plan, 28.57% of Georgia’s Congressional Districts are

Georgia U.S. House -- 2020 Census -- Enacted Plan

District	Population	Deviation	% Deviation	AP Black	% AP Black	Latino	% Latino	NH White	% NH White
001	765137	1	0.00%	230783	30.16%	59328	7.75%	440636	57.59%
002	765137	1	0.00%	393195	51.39%	45499	5.95%	305611	39.94%
003	765136	0	0.00%	188947	24.69%	48285	6.31%	492494	64.37%
004	765135	-1	0.00%	423763	55.38%	88947	11.63%	197536	25.82%
005	765137	1	0.00%	392822	51.34%	56496	7.38%	273819	35.79%
006	765136	0	0.00%	78871	10.31%	78299	10.23%	487400	63.70%
007	765137	1	0.00%	239717	31.33%	181851	23.77%	225905	29.52%
008	765136	0	0.00%	241628	31.58%	54850	7.17%	443123	57.91%
009	765137	1	0.00%	87130	11.39%	117758	15.39%	495078	64.70%

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010	765135	-1	0.00%	184137	24.07%	58645	7.66%	486487	63.58%
011	765137	1	0.00%	143404	18.74%	99794	13.04%	469264	61.33%
012	765136	0	0.00%	294961	38.55%	43065	5.63%	398843	52.13%
013	765137	1	0.00%	520094	67.97%	93554	12.23%	125106	16.35%
014	765135	-1	0.00%	118694	15.51%	97086	12.69%	520854	68.07%
Total	10711908		0.00%	3538146	33.03%	1123457	10.49%	5362156	50.06%

majority-Black and 35.71% are majority-minority, and 64.29% are majority-white. Id.

The Black voting age population in Georgia is 31.73%, total minority voting age population is 47.18%, and the white voting age population is 52.82%. PX 1 ¶ 18, fig.2. Under the Enacted Congressional Plan, the only group that has representation that is equal to or exceeds their proportion of the State's population is white voters, who receive 64.29% of the districts, but only make up 55.7% of the electorate.

The Illustrative Congressional Plan, however, reaches near proportional representation. The addition of one majority-Black district brings the proportion of Black congressional districts to 35.7% (i.e., 5 of 14 congressional districts), which is close to the 33.3% AP Black voting age population in the State (PX 1 ¶ 18 & fig.2.). The additional Illustrative CD-6, moreover, brings the number of majority-minority congressional districts to 6, which is approximately 42.9% of the 14 congressional districts and close to the 44.3% of the total minority voting age population (PX 1 ¶ 18 & fig.2). And 57.14% of Georgia's congressional districts will be majority-white districts and close to the 52.82% of the total white voting age population. Id.

*75 The Court understands that Defendants are arguing that the recent election of five Black Congresspersons to the U.S. House of Representatives (35.7% of Georgia's congressional delegation) is proportionate to the percentage of Georgia's Black residents (33.03%); therefore, Georgia's political system is equally open to Black voters. As is clear from the text of Section 2, “nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in their population.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that it is reversible error for the District Court to attempt to maximize the number of majority-minority districts. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1000, 114 S.Ct. 2647; Miller, 515

U.S. at 926–27, 115 S.Ct. 2475. However, the existence of near proportional representation or a remedy that results in proportional representation, in and of itself, is not reversible error because “proportionality is not dispositive.” DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1000, 114 S.Ct. 2647; see also Allen, 599 U.S. at 26–30, 42, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (affirming three-judge court's finding of a Section 2 violation, even though the remedy would result in proportional representation). Having considered the evidence provided in support of and to rebut the Senate Factors and after conducting a “careful [] and searching review [of] the totality of the circumstances,” the Court finds that Black voters do not have equal access to the political process in the challenged area. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1026, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (O’Conner, J., concurring).

The Supreme Court recently confirmed that:

what must be shown to prove a § 2 violation[,] [] requires consideration of the totality of circumstances in each case and demands proof that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not *equally open* to participation by members of a protected class *in that its members have less opportunity* than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2332 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). The Court has reviewed all of the evidence before it, and even with Georgia's election of five Black congresspersons, the Black voters in the area of the challenged congressional districts do not have an equal

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opportunity to participate. As Justice O'Connor opined, “the presence of proportionality [does not] prove the absence of dilution.” *DeGrandy*, 512 U.S. at 1026, 114 S.Ct. 2647.

This past summer, the Supreme Court was again confronted with the question of proportionality. *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 26–30, 143 S.Ct. 1487. In Justice Thomas's dissent, he opined that it is error to use proportionality as a benchmark for a Section 2 violation.” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 71–73, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Kavanaugh specifically addressed this issue and explained that *Gingles* “does not mandate a proportional number of majority-minority districts.” *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 43 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Rather, a Section 2 violation occurs only when (1) the redistricting maps split the minority community and (2) a reasonably configured district could be drawn in that area. *Id.* He concluded that “[i]f *Gingles* required proportional representation, then States would be forced to group together geographically dispersed minority communities in unusually shaped districts. *Id.* That is not the case here, as is evidenced above, Illustrative CD-6 is more compact on objective measures than Enacted CD-6, and the district is in a relatively small area of the State. *See* Section II(C)(1)(b)–(c) *supra*.

Consistent with *DeGrandy*, *Brnovich*, and *Allen*, the Court finds that if there is sufficient evidence of minority voter dilution under the totality of the circumstances, taking into consideration the Senate Factors, then proportionality cannot immunize the State from a Section 2 challenge. In other

words, proportionality is neither a benchmark for plaintiffs, nor a safe harbor for States.

Accordingly, the Court finds that proportionality neither weighs in favor of Defendants, nor weighs against finding a Section 2 violation.⁷³

j)Demographic Changes

*76 Finally, the Court considers Georgia's demographic changes as part of its totality of the circumstances analysis. *See Singleton*, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 977. The greatest population growth since the last Decennial Census was in metro-Atlanta. PX 1 ¶ 25 & fig.4. More than half (53.27%) of the population increase in the counties included in Illustrative CD-6 results from the increased Black population. *Id.* ¶ 42 & fig.8. And, in all but Fulton County, the Black population accounts for most of the population changes. *Id.* The Enacted Congressional Plan does not account for the growth in the Black population in this area.

Figure 8

**Four-County Area: 2010 Census to 2020 Census
 Population and Black Population Changes**

	2020 Population	2020 Black Population	2010-2020 Population Change	2010-2020 Black Population Change	Black Population Change as Percentage of Total Change
Cobb	766,149	223,116	78,071	42,151	53.99%
Douglas	144,237	74,260	11,834	20,007	169.06%
Fayette	119,194	32,076	12,627	9,578	75.85%
Fulton	1,066,710	477,624	146,129	60,732	41.56%
Total	2,096,290	807,076	248,661	132,468	53.27%

PX 1 ¶ 42 & fig.8; *Id.* ¶ 43.

In *Allen*, the three-judge court noted that, over the past decade, the Black population grew by 6.53%, and the white population's share of Alabama's total population decreased by 3.92%. *Singleton*, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 977. The Black population's growth in Georgia, as a whole, and in metro-

Atlanta, specifically, is greater than the demographic changes in Alabama. In fact, during the same period, Georgia's Black population grew by 15.84% and accounted for 5.00% percent of Georgia's population growth, while the white population's share of the State's total population decreased by 5.82%. PX 1 ¶ 14 & fig.1. In metro-Atlanta alone, the Black population is responsible for 51.04% of Atlanta MSA's population growth,

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and their population share increased by 2.30%. PX 1 ¶ 30 & fig.5. Conversely, the white population in the Atlanta MSA decreased by 2.83%, their share of the population decreased by 7.08%. *Id.* Meaning, that the demographic shifts in Georgia—as a whole and in the area where the proposed majority-minority district is located—are greater than those in Alabama, where a Section 2 violation was found and affirmed.

Despite the growth in the Black population in the affected areas and the voter polarization between white and Black Georgians, *see* Section II(C)(2)(4)(c) *supra*, the Enacted Congressional Plan did not increase the number of majority-Black districts in the Atlanta metro area. By failing to do so, the Enacted Congressional Plan in effect dilutes and diminishes the Black population's voting power in that area of the State. Accordingly, the Court finds that the population changes in metro-Atlanta weigh heavily in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

5. Conclusions of Law

The Court finds that the Pendergrass Plaintiffs have met their burden in establishing that (1) the Black community in the west-metro Atlanta metro area is sufficiently numerous and compact to constitute an additional majority-Black district; (2) the Black community is politically cohesive; and (3) that the white majority votes as a bloc to typically defeat the Black-preferred candidate. The Court also finds that in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, Georgia's electoral system is not equally open to Black voters. Specifically, the Court finds that Senate Factors One, Two, Three, Five, and Seven weigh in favor of showing the present realities of lack of opportunity for Black voters. The Court also finds that Senate Factor Six weighs slightly in favor finding a Section 2 violations. Additionally, the growth of Georgia's Black population in metro-Atlanta while the white population decreased weighs in favor of a Section 2 violation.

Only Senate Factors Four, Eight⁷⁴ and Nine do not weigh in favor of finding a Section 2 violation. The Court also finds that proportionality does not weigh against finding a Section 2 violation.

*77 In sum, the Court finds that the majority of the totality of the circumstances' evidence weighs in favor of finding a Section 2 violation. Because Pendergrass Plaintiffs have carried their burden of proof on all of the legal requirements,

the Court concludes that SB 2EX violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

D. Legislative Districts

The Court will now discuss the State legislative districts (i.e., State Senate and State House districts). First, the Court will discuss the first Gingles precondition for all illustrative legislative districts. This portion of the Section is divided into different regions of the State (i.e., metro Atlanta, eastern Black Belt, Macon-Bibb, and southwest Georgia). For the regions where both the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs and the Grant Plaintiffs challenged districts, the Court will first make its findings as to all of the Alpha Phi Alpha illustrative districts and will then make findings as to all of the Grant illustrative districts. For the illustrative districts that survive the first Gingles precondition, the Court will then evaluate them under the second and third Gingles preconditions (Alpha Phi Alpha first and then Grant). For the illustrative districts that survive all three Gingles precondition, the Court will then turn and evaluate whether the political process is equally open to Black voters in those areas (again, Alpha Phi Alpha first and Grant second).

1. First Gingles Precondition

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have met their burden in proving the first Gingles precondition in three of the proposed district in south-metro Atlanta (i.e., Cooper SD-17, SD-28, and HD-74). The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not met their burden in proving the first Gingles precondition in one of the House district in south-metro Atlanta, the districts in the Eastern Black Belt, in and around Macon-Bibb, or southwest Georgia (Cooper SD-23, HD-133, HD-117, HD-145, HD-171).

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden in proving the first Gingles precondition in the south-metro Atlanta Senate districts, two House districts in metro Atlanta, and two House districts in the Macon-Bibb region (i.e., Esselstyn SD-25, SD-28, HD-64, HD-117, HD-145, and HD-149). The Grant Plaintiffs have not met their burden in proving the first Gingles precondition as to the proposed district in the eastern Black Belt, or one proposed district in south-metro Atlanta (Esselstyn SD-23, HD-74).

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a) Racial predominance

The Court begins its discussion of the illustrative districts by finding that race did not predominate in the drawing of either the Cooper or Esselstyn Legislative Plans. In a Section 2 case “the question [of] whether additional majority-minority districts can be drawn ... involves a ‘quintessentially race-conscious calculus.’” [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 31, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (plurality opinion) (quoting [DeGrandy](#), 512 U.S. at 1020, 114 S.Ct. 2647). “The line that [has] long since [been] drawn is between consciousness and predominance.” [Id.](#) at 33, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (plurality opinion). Race does not predominate when a mapmaker “adhere[s] ... to traditional redistricting criteria,” testifies that “race was not the predominate factor motivating his design process,” and explains that he never sought to “maximize the number of majority-minority” districts. [Davis](#), 139 F.3d at 1426.

*78 Both Mr. Cooper and Mr. Esselstyn testified at the trial and preliminary injunction that they were aware of race when drawing their illustrative legislative plans, but that race did not outweigh any of the other traditional redistricting principles. [See Tr. 108:4–11](#) (Mr. Cooper testifying that he is “aware of [race], but it didn't control how these districts were drawn”); [Tr. 522:5–14](#) (“I'm constantly looking at the shape of the district, what it does for population equality, ... political subdivisions, communities of interest, incumbents, all that. So while yes, at time [race] would have been used to inform a decision, it was one of a number of factors.”); [Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity](#), 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1244 (crediting Mr. Cooper's testimony that race did not predominate when he drew his illustrative maps); [id.](#) at 1245–46 (crediting Mr. Esselstyn's testimony that race was but one factor he considered when drawing his illustrative maps). The Court again finds that Mr. Cooper and Esselstyn testified credibly that race did not predominate when they drew their illustrative legislative plans. Accordingly, the Court finds that race did not predominate in the creation of the Cooper Legislative Plan or the Esselstyn Legislative Plan.

The Court will now determine whether the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in each of the proposed legislative districts.

b) Metro Atlanta region**(1) Alpha Phi Alpha****(a) numerosity**

The Court finds that the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing that the Black voting age population in metro Atlanta is large enough to create two additional majority-Black Senate districts and two majority-Black House districts in south-metro Atlanta. “[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.” [Bartlett](#), 556 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 1231.

It is undisputed that Cooper SD-17 and SD-28 have an AP BVAP of 62.55% and 51.32%, respectively, both of which exceed the 50% threshold required by [Gingles](#). APAX 1, Ex. O-1. It is also undisputed that Cooper HD-74, and HD-117 have an AP BVAP of 61.49% and 54.64%, respectively. APAX 1, Ex. AA-1.

Based on these numbers, the Court finds that the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have met their burden with respect to the numerosity prong of the first [Gingles](#) precondition in all additional majority-Black districts that Mr. Cooper proposed in metro Atlanta (i.e., SD-17, SD-28, HD-74, and HD-117).

(b) Compactness

The Court finds that the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that the minority community is sufficiently compact to warrant the creation of two additional majority-Black State Senate (Cooper SD-17 and SD-28) and one majority-Black House district (Cooper HD-74) in south-metro Atlanta.

The standards governing the compactness inquiry for these additional districts is the same as the compactness inquiry in the [Pendergrass](#) case. [See](#) Section II(C)(1)(b) *supra*. The Court must consider if the illustrative proposed districts adhered to traditional redistricting principles, namely: population equality, contiguity, empirical compactness scores, the eyeball test for irregularities and contiguity, respecting political subdivisions, and uniting communities of interest. [See id.](#)

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i) Cooper SD-17

The Court finds that Cooper SD-17 is reasonably compact. The Court notes that Cooper SD-17 is in the same area as Enacted SD-17. APAX 1 ¶ 104 (“a majority-Black Senate District 17 can be drawn in the vicinity of 2021 Senate District 17”).

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Cooper SD-17 is not malapportioned. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (requiring “an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... of nearly equal population as practicable.”); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983) (finding “minor deviations” do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). The General Assembly's “General Principles for Drafting Plans” specifies that “[e]ach legislative district ... should be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable.” Stip. ¶ 135; JX 2, 2.

*79 The ideal population size of a State Senate district is 191,284. Stip. ¶ 277. The General Assembly did not enumerate a specific deviation range that is acceptable for the State Senate districts. However, relying on the Enacted Senate Plan as a rough guide, an acceptable population deviation range is between -1.03% and +0.98% is acceptable. APAX 1, Ex. M-1. Cooper SD-17 has a population deviation of +0.002%, which is 35 people from perfect correlation. APAX 1, Ex. O-1. Cooper SD-17 achieves better population equality than Enacted SD-17, which has a population deviation of +0.67%. APAX 1, Ex. M-1. Thus, the Court finds that Cooper SD-17 achieves population equality that is consistent with the General Assembly's Redistricting Guidelines and traditional redistricting principles.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Cooper SD-17 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 300. Hence, the Court finds that Cooper SD-17 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds that Cooper SD-17 is more compact than Enacted SD-17. In reaching this conclusion, the Court, as it did in the Pendergrass case, looks to the objective compactness scores of the Polsby-Popper and the Reock indicators.

Using the Reock measure, Cooper SD-17 is 0.37 compared with Enacted SD-17, which is 0.35. GX 1, Attach. H. As such, Cooper SD-17 is 0.02 points more compact under the Reock indicator. When using the Polsby-Popper measure, Cooper SD-17 is 0.17 as is the Enacted SD-17, i.e., the two districts have identical Polsby-Popper scores. Id. Hence, the Court finds that on the empirical compactness measures, Cooper SD-17 fares better than or is identical to Enacted SD-17. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper SD-17 is slightly more compact when compared to Enacted SD-17.

((4)) political subdivisions


The Court also finds that Cooper SD-17 generally respected political subdivisions. That proposed district consists of portions of DeKalb, Henry, and Rockdale Counties. APAX 1 ¶ 105 & fig.17D. Enacted SD-17 also split three counties—Henry, Newton and Rockdale. APAX 1 ¶ 102 & fig.17C. Thus, the Court finds that both Cooper SD-17 and Enacted SD-17 split the same number of counties. Although the county splits remain the same, the Court notes that Cooper SD-17 splits more VTDs (4) than Enacted SD-17 (none). APAX 1, Exs. T-1, T-3. There was no testimony that Cooper SD-17 split municipalities, even though there was testimony regarding the municipalities that were included in the district, such as McDonough in Henry County and Stonecrest in DeKalb County. Tr. 117:5–11.

Although Cooper SD-17 splits more VTDs, the Court finds that generally, SD-17 respects political subdivisions because he split the same number of counties and seemingly kept municipalities intact.

((b)) eyeball test

The Court finds that Cooper SD-17 is visually compact under the eyeball test:

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APAX 1 ¶ 105 & fig.17D.

Moreover, using the mapping tool provided by Mr. Esselstyn, the Court finds that the district at its most distant points is less than 30 miles in length. *Id.* Cooper SD-17 has no appendages or tentacles. *Id.* And there is no contrary evidence or testimony in the Record. In fact, Mr. Morgan testified that Cooper SD-17 is “geographically more compact in the sense that it doesn’t go quite the distance as the enacted District 17 ... [g]eographically, generally, yes, it appears more compact.” *Tr.* 2027:11–24. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper SD-17 is visually compact.

((c)) communities of interest

The Court finds that Cooper SD-17 respects communities of interest. Cooper SD-17 includes neighboring parts of south DeKalb, Henry, and Rockdale Counties, connecting the nearby communities of Stonecrest, Conyers, and McDonough. APAX 1, 45-6 ¶¶ 104-5 & fig. 17D. Both Cooper SD-17 and Enacted SD-17 overlap in and around McDonough in Henry County. *Id.* at 44, 46, 129 S.Ct. 1231.

*80 Mr. Cooper testified that he is familiar with this area of Georgia because he has drawn districting maps for Henry County before, dating back to 1991 and most recently in the 2018 *Dwight v. Kemp* case. *Tr.* 116:12–24. He also testified that the communities in Cooper SD-17 are primarily suburban or exurban. *Tr.* 116:6–8. And, the distance between the portions of the district in south DeKalb and south Henry Counties are probably a 10-minute drive from one another. *Tr.* 231:14–20. Furthermore, he testified that in configuring the district in this manner, he was able to keep Newton County, whole (rather than split it, as the Enacted Senate Plan

does) and include it in Cooper SD-43, which is compact and majority-Black. APAX 1, 48 & fig.17F.

Moreover, Mr. Cooper examined ACS data showing that the counties included in Cooper SD-17 share certain socioeconomic characteristics, such as similar educational attainment rates among Black residents in Henry, Rockdale, and DeKalb Counties. APAX 1 ¶¶ 127-128 & Ex. CD at 21-22.

The testimony of Mr. Lofton, who lives in McDonough, bolster's Mr. Cooper's testimony. Mr. Lofton testified regarding the interconnectedness of the different counties in south-metro Atlanta, including competing against one another in sports. *Tr.* 1306:23-25 (“I visited Rockdale even from high school. We used to compete against Rockdale County Heritage High School when I was in high school. We were [in] the same region.”). Mr. Lofton testified about the similarities and connections between DeKalb, Stonecrest, Conyers and McDonough. *Tr.* 1308:16-22 (discussing the “major thoroughfares” connecting DeKalb, Rockdale, and Henry Counties that people drive up and down “all day.”); *Id.* at 1308:23-1309:8 (discussing travelling between McDonough, Stonecrest, Conyers, and Covington for shopping and dining “because they're not terribly far out of the way.”). He also testified that Henry, Rockdale, and DeKalb Counties are getting more diverse and “on par” with one another. *Id.* at 1298:16-20, 1306:16-1307:8, 1308:4-7.

In sum, the Court finds that Cooper SD-17 is a small district contained wholly within metro Atlanta, unlike the districts in *LULAC* and *Miller*. There was extensive testimony from Mr. Cooper and a resident of McDonough about the interrelatedness of the communities in the district. Furthermore, Mr. Cooper's report details the shared socioeconomic characteristics of the voters living in the district. In all the Court finds that this testimony shows that the district preserves existing communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court determines that the *Alpha Phi Alpha* Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in Cooper SD-17 to constitute an-additional majority-Black district. The Court finds that Cooper SD-17 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions,

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and preservation of communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, it is relatively small in size and does not contain any appendages or tentacles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have carried their burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition in the area contained in Cooper SD-17.

ii) Cooper SD-28

The Court finds also that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have shown that it is possible to draw an electoral district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area encompassed by Cooper SD-28. As an initial note, Mr. Cooper explained that Cooper SD-28 is in the same general area as, and correlates with, Enacted SD-16. APAX 1 ¶ 99 (“a majority-Black District 28 [] can be drawn in the vicinity of 2021 Senate District 16”).

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

*81 The Court finds that Cooper SD-28 achieves relative population equality. As stated above, the General Assembly did not enumerate a specific acceptable deviation range for the State Senate Districts. However, relying on the Enacted Plan as a guide, a population deviation range between -1.03% and +0.98% is acceptable. APAX 1, Ex. M-1. In comparison, Cooper SD-28 has a population deviation of -0.73%, which is within range of the population deviations in the Enacted Senate Plan. APAX 1, Ex. O-1. The Court finds that Cooper SD-28 is consistent with the General Assembly's Redistricting Guidelines, and traditional redistricting principles.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Cooper SD-28 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 300. Hence, the Court finds that Cooper SD-28 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds Cooper SD-28's compactness scores are within the range of compactness scores found in the Enacted Senate Plan. APAX 1, Exs. S-1, S-3. Cooper SD-28 and Enacted SD-16 have identical Reock scores of 0.37. Enacted SD-16 is more compact on the Polsby-Popper measure with a score of 0.31, while Cooper SD-28 has a Polsby-Popper score of 0.18. APAX 1, Exs. S-1, S-3.

Although Enacted SD-16 is more compact on the Polsby-Popper measure, Cooper SD-28 is within the range of compactness scores found in the Enacted Senate Plan. Specifically, the Enacted Senate Plan has a minimum Polsby-Popper score of 0.13. APAX 1, Ex. S-3. Cooper SD-28's Polsby-Popper score (0.18) exceeds the minimum threshold Polsby-Popper score found in the Enacted Senate Plan. Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper SD-28 falls within the range of compactness scores found in the Enacted Senate Plan and therefore constitutes a compact district for purposes of the first Gingles precondition.

((4)) political subdivisions

The Court finds that Cooper SD-28 generally respects political subdivisions. The Court notes that Cooper SD-28 does have more political subdivision splits than Enacted SD-16. Cooper SD-28 contains portions of Fayette, Spalding, and Clayton Counties, resulting in three county splits. APAX 1 ¶ 99. Enacted SD-16 splits only Fayette County, and keeps Spalding, Pike, and Lamar Counties whole. Additionally, Cooper SD-28 splits two VTDs, whereas Enacted SD-16 splits none. APAX 1, Exs. T-1, T-3. Mr. Cooper testified, “[y]ou can see that I separated or made the boundary for District 28, which is the new majority Black district, following the municipal lines of Griffin, which can be kind of odd shaped in places.” Tr. 114:4-7; APAX 11, at 41 ¶ 99 & fig.17B; see also Id. Ex. T-1 (listing a single split VTD in Fayette County and one in Spalding County).


Although those increased splits do exist, Mr. Cooper testified that he was able to keep municipalities whole. Specifically, when drawing these districts, he was able to keep the city of Griffin wholly within Cooper SD-28 and Peachtree City was kept wholly within Cooper SD-39. APAX 1 ¶ 99 & fig.17A; Tr. 114:1-7, 238:4-7. Mr. Cooper explained that some of his mapping decisions, were made to comply with population equality. See Tr. 238:23-239:3 (“once you pick up Griffin and some of the area between Spalding and Fayetteville, there's a lot of population as you approach Fayetteville.

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So, from one person one voter standpoint you could not include Peachtree City in District 28.”). The Court credits Mr. Cooper's testimony regarding decisions for drawing boundary lines. Therefore, the Court finds that Cooper SD-28 respects political subdivisions.

((b)) eyeball test

The Court finds that Cooper SD-28 is visually compact under the eyeball test:



*82 APAX 1 ¶ 99 & fig.17A.

Using the mapping tool, the Court finds that at its most distant points, Cooper SD-28 is approximate 30 miles long. *Id.* Mr. Morgan testified that north to south the district is 24 miles long. *Tr.* 1982:7–12. Cooper SD-28 does not contain any tentacles or appendages. Mr. Cooper also testified that when looking at the district, one can see that “[t]he towns and cities are—suburbs are all very close together.” *Tr.* 113:18–21. The Court agrees with Mr. Cooper's assessment, the district itself visually encompasses a small geographic area. Defendant submits no evidence or testimony in the Record suggesting that Cooper SD-28 is not visually compact. *See generally* DX 1; *Tr.* 1896:13-23. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Cooper SD-28 is visually compact.

((c)) communities of interest

Mr. Cooper testified that the areas of Fayette and Spalding County that he included in Cooper SD-28 are growing, becoming more diverse and suburban, and thus more similar to Clayton County. *Tr.* 113:6-114:18; *see also* *Tr.* 242:15-24. He noted that these parts of Spalding and Fayette Counties

are experiencing population growth and change as well as suburbanization, which warranted grouping them with Clayton County. *Tr.* 113:6-114:18. Moreover, he explained that the areas he connected are similarly suburban and exurban in nature, in comparison to the more rural and predominantly white Pike and Lamar Counties, which were not included in Cooper SD-28. *Tr.* 113:24-25 (“Yes. This area is predominantly a suburban/exurban. So the area matches up socioeconomically, I believe.”).

Mr. Cooper also explained why it made sense to not include western Fayette County in Illustrative District 28, highlighting the differences between Peachtree City and Griffin. *Tr.* 114:19-115:5

THE COURT: What are the commonalities of the people in Griffin and Peachtree City?

THE WITNESS: Well, the -- Griffin and Peachtree City are quite different, frankly.

THE COURT: They are.

THE WITNESS: Peachtree City is predominantly white. Just kind of sprung up there I think in the 1980s. They drive around in golf carts. I mean, that's --.

THE COURT: Yeah.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. And so it doesn't really fit with Griffin exactly, which is one of the reasons why I didn't include it in District 28. It is the western part of Fayette County.

Tr. 1311:21-1312:13.

Additionally, Mr. Cooper examined ACS data showing that the counties included in Cooper SD-28—namely, Fayette, Spalding, and Clayton—share socioeconomic commonalities. Specifically, Fayette, Spalding, and Clayton Counties share certain socioeconomic characteristics, as all have a relatively high proportion of Black residents in the labor force. APAX 1, at 56 ¶ 125, Ex. CD, at 53-55.

The testimony of Mr. Lofton, a lifelong metro Atlantan, and a long-time resident of Henry County with connections in Fayette, Clayton, and DeKalb Counties, was consistent with Mr. Cooper's. Mr. Lofton attested to the interconnectedness of the communities included in Cooper SD-28. For example, as Mr. Lofton explained, if you visit shopping centers in Griffin you will see Fayette and Clayton car tags. *Tr.* 1302:9-11.

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Mr. Lofton also testified that areas covered by Cooper SD-28 share common places of worship and that Black communities in the area share certain socioeconomic characteristics, like similar educational attainment. *Id.* at 1309:25-1310:9. Gina Wright, who testified that she was familiar with the area, agreed that the area of South Clayton County that is included in Cooper SD-28 is suburban. *Id.* at 1685:2-20.

*83 Thus, the Court finds that Cooper SD-28 is a small district contained wholly within metro Atlanta and has no resemblance to the districts in *LULAC* and *Miller*. Mr. Cooper testified extensively about the communities that are contained within the district, the shared socio-economic factors, and the characteristics that unite them. Additionally, Mr. Lofton, with his lifelong experience as a resident in the area, explained how the communities interact with one another. The Court finds that the size of the district coupled with the witness testimony shows Cooper SD-28 preserves communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court finds that the *Alpha Phi Alpha* Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in Cooper SD-28 to constitute an additional majority-Black district. The Court finds that Cooper SD-28 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, it is relatively small in size and does not contain any appendages or tentacles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the *Alpha Phi Alpha* Plaintiffs have carried their burden on the first *Gingles* precondition in the area encompassed by Cooper SD-28

iii) Cooper HD-74

The Court finds that Cooper HD-74 is reasonably compact. The Court notes that Cooper SD-17 is in the area of Enacted HD-74. APAX 1 ¶ 162.

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Cooper HD-74 is not malapportioned. See *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362 (requiring “an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... of nearly equal population as practicable.”); *Brown*, 462 U.S. at 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690 (finding “minor deviations” are not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment). The General Assembly's “General Principles for Drafting Plans” specifies that “[e]ach legislative district ... should be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable.” Stip. ¶ 135; JX 2, 2.

The ideal population size of a State House District is 59,511. Stip. ¶ 278. The General Assembly did not enumerate the deviation range for State House Districts. However, relying on the Enacted House Plan as a rough guide, a population deviation range between -1.40% and +1.34% is acceptable. APAX 1, Z-1. Cooper HD-74 has a population deviation of +0.78%. APAX 1, Ex. AA-1. Cooper HD-74 achieves better population equality than Enacted HD-74, which has a population deviation of -0.93%. APAX 1, Ex. M-1. Thus, the Court finds that Cooper HD-74 achieves population equality that is consistent with the General Assembly's Redistricting Guidelines and traditional redistricting principles.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Cooper HD-74 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 300. Hence, the Court finds that Cooper HD-74 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds that Cooper HD-74 is more compact than Enacted HD-74. In reaching this conclusion, the Court, as it did in the *Pendergrass* case, looks at the objective compactness scores of the Polsby-Popper and Reock measures.

Using the Reock indicator, Cooper HD-74 measures 0.63 as compared to Enacted HD-74 which measures 0.50. APAX 1, Exs. AG-1, AG-2. This means that on the Reock measure, Cooper HD-74 is 0.13 points more compact than Enacted HD-74. *Id.* Using the Polsby-Popper measure, Cooper HD-74

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has an 0.11 compactness advantage: Cooper HD-74 is 0.36 and Enacted HD-74 is 0.25. Id. Hence, the Court finds that on the empirical compactness scores, Cooper HD-74 fares better than Enacted HD-74.


*84 Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-74 is more compact when compared to Enacted HD-74.

((4)) political subdivisions

The Court also finds that Cooper HD-74 exhibits respect for political subdivisions more so than Enacted HD-74. Cooper HD-74 consists of portions of Clayton, Henry and Spalding Counties. APAX 1 ¶ 164 & fig.29. Enacted HD-74 also split three counties—Fayette, Harris, and Spalding. APAX 1 ¶ 162 & fig.28. Yet Cooper HD-74 split fewer VTDs than Enacted HD-74. Enacted HD-74 split five VTDs while Cooper HD-74 split only two. APAX 1, Exs. AH-1, AH-3. There is no testimony or opinion that Cooper HD-74 split municipalities. In fact, Mr. Morgan, Defendant's mapping expert, agreed that it includes the “panhandle of Clayton, which is not included in the enacted District 74.” Tr. 2049: 10–12. Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper respected political subdivisions when drawing Cooper HD-74.

((b)) eyeball test

The Court finds that Cooper SD-17 is visually compact under the eyeball test:



APAX 1 ¶ 164 & fig.29. Using the mapping tool provided by Mr. Esselstyn, the Court finds that the district at its most distant points is less than 15 miles in length. Id. Cooper HD-74 has no appendages or

tentacles. Id. Mr. Cooper testified that the district “couldn't be more compact.” Tr. 122:18. And, Mr. Morgan testified that Cooper HD-74 is “a smaller geographic area and it contains the panhandle of Clayton, which is not included in the enacted District 74.” Tr. 2027:11–24. The Court agrees with both mapping experts, Cooper HD-74 is a very compact district, visually. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-74 passes the eyeball test.

((c)) communities of interest

The Court finds that Cooper HD-74 respects communities of interest. Cooper HD-74 unites nearby, adjacent communities on either side of the line between south Clayton and Henry Counties. APAX 1 ¶ 198. As Mr. Cooper testified, “the distance[] there to get from one part of the district to the other are ... maybe a 20-minute drive at most, unless you're going during rush hour traffic or something.” Tr. 272:24-273:2.

Mr. Cooper testified that the communities included in the district are “largely suburban” in nature. Tr. 273:17-22. Consistent with that, Mr. Cooper's examination of the ACS data shows that the counties included in Cooper HD-74 share a similar proportion of population in the labor force (71.0%, 58.2%, and 69.5% respectively). APAX 1 ¶ 198. Mr. Lofton's testimony was consistent, testifying that Black communities in south-metro Atlanta are “middle class, upper middle class, professional, college educated. A lot of families, single families.” Tr. 1309:25-1310:4.

The Court finds that Cooper HD-74 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of preserving communities of interest. Defendant's expert admitted that Mr. Cooper's district is geographically compact. This district in no way resembles the districts in Miller and LULAC that stretched across large swaths of their respective States. There is unrebutted testimony that the voters in this area have similar socio-economic characteristics. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-74 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of preserving communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

*85 The Court determines that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in Cooper HD-74 to constitute an additional majority-

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Black district. The Court finds that Cooper HD-74 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity, compactness scores, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, it is relatively small in size and does not contain any appendages or tentacles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have carried their burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition as to the area contained in Cooper HD-74.

iv) Cooper HD-117

The Court next finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not shown that it is possible to draw an electoral district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area encompassed by Cooper HD-117. As an initial note, Mr. Cooper explained that Cooper HD-117 is in the same general area, and correlates with, Enacted HD-117. APAX 1 ¶ 165 (“another majority-Black House District can be drawn around where District 117 in the 2021 House Plan is drawn”).

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Cooper HD-117 is not malapportioned. As stated above, the General Assembly did not enumerate the deviation range for the State Senate Districts. However, using the Enacted House Plan as a guide a population deviation range of $\pm 1.40\%$ is acceptable. Stip. ¶ 302. In comparison, Cooper SD-28 has a population deviation of -1.38% , which is within the deviation found in the Enacted House Plan. APAX 1, Ex. AA-1. The Court does note that Enacted HD-117 has a lower population deviation-- $+1.04\%$. The population deviation of Cooper HD-117 is higher than its enacted corollary, and it is barely within the range of population deviations approved by the Georgia General Assembly when it passed the Enacted House Plan. Although the Court finds that Cooper HD-117 is not malapportioned, the Court also finds that it respects the traditional redistricting principle of population equality less than Enacted HD-117.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Cooper HD-117 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 300. Hence, the Court finds that Cooper HD-117 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds Cooper HD-117's compactness scores are either identical or very close to the compactness scores found in the Enacted House Plan. APAX 1, Exs. AG-1, AG-2. Cooper HD-117 and Enacted HD-117 have identical Reock scores of 0.41. Id. Enacted HD-117 is slightly more compact on the Polsby-Popper measure with a score of 0.28 while Cooper HD-117 has a Polsby-Popper score of 0.26. APAX 1, Exs. AG-2, AG-3. In sum,, the districts have identical Reock scores, but Enacted HD-117 is slightly more compact on the Polsby-Popper measure.

Despite a disadvantage of 0.02 points on the Polsby-Popper measure, Cooper HD-117 is well within the range of compactness scores of the Enacted House Plan. Specifically, the Enacted Senate Plan has a minimum Polsby-Popper score is 0.10. APAX 1, Ex. AG-2. Cooper HD-117's Polsby-Popper score (0.26) far exceeds the lowest threshold Polsby-Popper score found in the Enacted House Plan. Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-117 has identical or near identical compactness scores as Enacted HD-117, and Cooper HD-117 falls comfortably within the range of compactness scores in the Enacted House Plan. Therefore, Cooper HD-117 constitutes a compact district for purposes of the first Gingles precondition.

((4)) political subdivisions


*86 In considering respect for the preservation of political subdivisions, Cooper HD-117 fares worse than Enacted HD-117. For example, Cooper HD-117 has more political subdivision splits than Enacted HD-117. Both districts split Henry and Spalding Counties. APAX 1 ¶ 165 & fig.29A; ¶ 167 & fig.29C. But, Cooper HD-117 splits six VTDs, while Enacted HD-117 splits only one. APAX 1, Exs. AH-1, AH-3. Mr. Cooper testified, “[y]ou can see that I separated or made the boundary for District 28, which is the new majority Black district, following the municipal lines of Griffin, which can be kind of odd shaped in places.” Tr. 114:4-7; APAX 11, at 41 ¶ 99 & fig.17B; see also id. at T-1 (listing a single split VTD in Fayette County and one in Spalding County). Mr.

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Cooper also testified that he did not keep the cities of Griffin or Locust Grove intact. [Tr. 276:22–277:1](#). The Court finds that on balance, Cooper HD-117 reflects less respect for political subdivisions than Enacted HD-117.

(b) eyeball test

The Court finds that Cooper HD-117 is visually compact under the eyeball test:



APAX 1 ¶ 198, Ex. AC-1.

Using the mapping tool, the Court finds that at its most points, Cooper HD-117 is less than 20 miles long. [Id.](#) Cooper HD-117 does not contain any tentacles or appendages. Defendant's own mapping expert agreed that Cooper HD-117 and Enacted HD-117 are both fairly compact. [Tr. 2051:20–2052:1](#). (“Q. And illustrative 117 and enacted 117 are similarly compact? A. On compactness scores or just looking at it? Q. Both. A. I mean, it's hard to say whether it would be that way on compactness scores. But looking at it, they're both fairly compact, yes. They're not a great distance between anything.”). Consistent with Defendant's mapping expert, the Court concludes that Cooper HD-117 is visually compact.

(c) communities of interest

Cooper HD-117 unites communities that are geographically proximate to one another. Cooper HD-117 is in an area that includes adjacent portions of South Henry County around Locust Grove and a portion of Spalding County, including much of Griffin (Spalding County's seat and largest city) which is majority-Black. APAX 1 ¶ 198 & Ex. AC-2.

Mr. Cooper testified that “everyone” in Cooper HD-117 “lives close by.” [Tr. 123:17](#). Again, Defendant's mapping expert agreed, testifying that Griffin and Locust Grove are “close.” [Tr. 1794:23](#). When specifically asked about the connection between Griffin and Locust Grove, Mr. Cooper testified that “they are in an exurban area of Metro Atlanta.” [Tr. 277:25](#). Further Mr. Cooper noted that the area has a “somewhat younger population” ([Tr. 123:24](#)) and has a similar Black labor force participation rate. APAX 1 ¶ 198.

Mr. Lofton's testimony was consistent with respect to the proximity and connections between the communities in Cooper HD-117. For example, he testified about the shared commercial centers used by residents of the area, such as Tanger Outlets, and about how Highways 138 and 155 are important transportation corridors that unite the district. [Tr. 1308:20–1309:8](#).

Thus, the Court finds that Cooper HD-117 is a small district contained wholly with metro Atlanta and has no resemblance to the districts in [LULAC](#) and [Miller](#). Mr. Cooper testified about the communities that are contained within the district, the shared socio-economic factors, and the characteristics that unite them. Additionally, Mr. Lofton, with his lifelong experience as a resident in the area, explained how the communities interact with one another. The Court finds that the size of the district coupled with the witness testimony shows Cooper HD-117 preserves communities of interest.

(d) conclusions of law

The Court finds that the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently compact in Cooper HD-117 to constitute an additional majority-Black district. Although Cooper HD-117 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of contiguity, compactness scores, and preservation of communities of interest, the Court finds that it split more political subdivisions than Enacted HD-117. Additionally, the district's population deviation is both higher than Enacted HD-117 and is barely within the range of the Enacted House Plan's population deviations.

*87 Although there is no requirement that an illustrative district match or perform better than the correlating enacted district,⁷⁵ the Court finds that the higher deviation coupled with the splitting of an additional four VTDs as well as two

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municipalities leads to a finding that the district could not be drawn in accordance with traditional redistricting principles.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not carried their burden on the first Gingles precondition in the area encompassed by Cooper HD-117.

(2) Grant

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden in proving the three Gingles preconditions in relation to the challenged Senate districts in metro Atlanta and two of the challenged House districts in metro Atlanta.

The Court finds that Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing that the Black voting age population in metro Atlanta is large enough to create two additional majority-Black Senate districts, two majority-Black House districts in south metro Atlanta, and one additional majority-Black House district in western metro Atlanta. “[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.” Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 1231.

It is undisputed that Esselstyn SD-25 and SD-28 have an AP BVAP of 58.93% and 57.28%, respectively, both of which exceed the 50% threshold required by Gingles. GX 1 ¶ 27 & tbl.1; Stip. ¶ 234.

(a) numerosity

Table 1: Illustrative Senate plan majority-Black districts with BVAP percentages.

District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%
10	61.10%	26	52.84%	39	60.21%
12	57.97%	28	57.28%	41	62.61%
15	54.00%	34	58.97%	43	58.52%
22	50.84%	35	54.05%	44	71.52%
23	51.06%	36	51.34%	55	65.97%
25	58.93%	38	66.36%		

It is also undisputed that Esselstyn HD-64, HD-74, and HD-117 have an AP BVAP of 50.24%, 53.94%, and 51.56%, respectively. Stip. ¶ 239, GX 1 ¶ 48 & tbl.5.

Table 5: Illustrative House plan majority-Black districts with BVAP percentages.

District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%
38	54.23%	69	62.73%	91	60.01%	137	52.13%
39	55.29%	74	53.94%	92	68.79%	140	57.63%
55	55.38%	75	66.89%	93	65.36%	141	57.46%
58	63.04%	76	67.23%	94	69.04%	142	50.14%
59	70.09%	77	76.13%	95	67.15%	143	50.64%
60	63.88%	78	51.03%	113	59.53%	145	50.38%

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61	53.49%	79	71.59%	115	53.77%	149	51.53%
62	72.26%	84	73.66%	116	51.95%	150	53.56%
63	69.33%	85	62.71%	117	51.56%	153	67.95%
64	50.24%	86	75.05%	126	54.47%	154	54.82%
65	63.34%	87	73.08%	128	50.41%	165	50.33%
66	53.88%	88	63.35%	129	54.87%	177	53.88%
67	58.92%	89	62.54%	130	59.91%		
68	55.75%	90	58.49%	132	52.34%		

Based on these numbers, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden with respect to the numerosity prong of the first Gingles precondition in all additional majority-Black districts that Mr. Esselstyn proposed in metro Atlanta (i.e., SD-25, SD-28, HD-64, HD-74, and HD-117).

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 is not malapportioned. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362 (requiring “an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... of nearly equal population as practicable.”); Brown, 462 U.S. at 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690 (“minor deviations” are not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment). The General Assembly’s “General Principles for Drafting Plans” specifies that “[e]ach legislative district ... should be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable.” Stip. ¶ 135; JX 2, 2.

The ideal population size of a State Senate District is 191,284. Stip. ¶ 277. The General Assembly did not enumerate a specific acceptable deviation range for the State Senate Districts. However, using the Enacted Plan as a rough guide, a population deviation range between -1.03% and -0.98% is acceptable. GX 1, Attach. E. Esselstyn SD-25 has a population deviation of +0.74%. GX 1, Attach. F. This deviation falls squarely within the range of deviations in the Enacted Senate Plan. Thus, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 achieves population equality that is consistent with the General Assembly’s Redistricting Guidelines and traditional redistricting principles.

((b)) compactness

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have also met their burden to show that the minority community is sufficiently compact to warrant the creation of two additional majority-Black State Senate districts in south-metro Atlanta. They have also met their burden in showing that one additional compact majority-Black district can be drawn in south metro Atlanta and one can be drawn in west-metro Atlanta. The Grant Plaintiffs have not met their burden with respect to Esselstyn HD-74, in south-metro Atlanta.

The standards governing the compactness inquiry for these additional proposed State Senate Districts is the same as the compactness inquiry undertaken in the Pendergrass case. See Section II(C)(1)(b) *supra*. The Court must consider if the illustrative proposed districts adhered to traditional redistricting principles, namely: population equality, contiguity, empirical compactness scores, the eyeball test for irregularities and contiguity, respect for political subdivisions, and preserving communities of interest. See Section II(C)(1)(b) *supra*.

((2)) contiguity

i) Esselstyn SD-25⁷⁶

*88 The Court finds that the minority community in Esselstyn SD-25 is sufficiently compact.

The Parties stipulated that Esselstyn SD-25 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 258. Hence, the Court finds that Esselstyn

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SD-25 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 is more compact than Enacted SD-25. In reaching this conclusion, the Court, as it did in the Pendergrass case, looks at the objective compactness scores of the Polsby-Popper measure and Reock indicator.

Using the Reock indicator, Esselstyn's SD-25 is 0.57 as compared to the Enacted Senate Plan, which has an average Reock score of 0.42. GX 1, Attach. H. Thus, under the Reock measure, Esselstyn SD-25 is 0.15 points more compact than Enacted Senate Plan's average Reock score. Under the Polsby-Popper measure, Esselstyn's SD-25 is 0.34, and the Enacted Senate Plan has an average score of 0.29, a 0.05 point advantage for Esselstyn's SD-25 on this measure. Id. Hence, the Court finds that upon application of the empirical compactness measures, Esselstyn SD-25 fares better than the Enacted Senate Plan's average compactness scores.


The State's mapping expert, Mr. Morgan, agreed that Esselstyn SD-25 is significantly more compact than Enacted SD-25. Tr. 1850:8–11. Mr. Morgan conceded, furthermore, that Esselstyn SD-25 is more compact on the Reock and Polsby-Popper scale than *all* of the districts implicated by in the Enacted Senate Plan, except for one with an identical Polsby-Popper score. Tr. 1895:17–1896:1.

In sum, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 is sufficiently compact w.

((4)) political subdivisions

The Court also finds that in creating Esselstyn SD-25, Mr. Esselstyn respected political subdivisions. Esselstyn SD-25 consists of portions of Henry and Clayton Counties. GX 1 ¶ 30 & fig.6. Additionally, Esselstyn SD-25 does not split any VTDs. GX 1 ¶ 40 & fig.10. See below for a graphic depiction of the Esselstyn Senate Plan's VTD splits:

Figure 10: VTD splits in illustrative State Senate plan by county.




*89 GX 1 ¶ 40 & fig.10.

Mr. Esselstyn also testified that he made an effort to keep municipalities intact. Tr. 544:8–12 (testifying that McDonough is mostly intact, and that Locust Grove, Hampton, Bonanza and Lovejoy are kept intact). Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 reflects a respect for political subdivisions.

((b)) eyeball test

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 is visually compact under the eyeball test:



GX 1 ¶ 30 & fig.6.

Using the mapping tool provided by Mr. Esselstyn, the Court finds that the district at its most distant points is approximately 20 miles in length. Id. Esselstyn SD-25 has no appendages or tentacles. Id. There is no contrary evidence or testimony in the Record. In fact, Mr. Morgan's report includes no analysis on the visual compactness of Esselstyn SD-25. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 is visually compact.

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((c)) communities of interest

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 demonstrates respect for communities of interest. Mr. Esselstyn testified that the district is in metro Atlanta. *Tr.* 484:5–9. He also explained that he combined Henry and Clayton Counties because they are adjacent to one another. *Tr.* 544:1–7.

On cross-examination, Mr. Esselstyn admitted that he was unable to articulate a community of interest that connects south Clayton County with Locust Grove. *Tr.* 546:16–21. The Grant Plaintiffs, however, supplemented this testimony with testimony from Jason Carter, a former member of the State Senate and 2014 candidate for Governor of Georgia. Mr. Carter noted that Mr. Esselstyn's districts in south metro Atlanta are “suburban and exurban,” “clearly [] fast-growing, ... Atlanta commuter communit[ies] that ha[ve] all of the traffic concerns and the concerns of ... expanding schools and massive population boom.” *Id.* at 953:20–954:3. *See also* *id.* at 958:9–19 (similar); *id.* at 959:6–19 (similar); *id.* at 962:1–965:17 (similar). Addressing their shared interests, Mr. Carter explained that residents of these areas need their government officials to be responsive to their “transportation, education, [and] healthcare” needs. *Id.* at 955:7–21. In the same vein, Eric Allen, 2020 candidate for Lt. Governor, testified that the residents of Esselstyn SD-25 share similar entertainment districts, hospitals, transit systems, education systems, employment, and all travel on I-75, I-285, I-20, and I-85. *Tr.* 1000:18–1001:2. In fact, the State's own map drawer, Ms. Wright, testified in connection with Enacted SD-28 and said that it was important to keep the city of Locust Grove wholly within that district (*Tr.* 1634:3–6), which Mr. Esselstyn accomplished (*Tr.* 546:16–21).

In sum, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 is a small district contained wholly within metro Atlanta. It is comprised of two adjacent counties. The communities share the same concerns with transportation routes and have both experienced recent major population growth. Additionally, the Court finds that this district is not long and sprawling, like the districts in LULAC and Miller that stretched across large portions of the States and combined disparate minority populations. Rather, as is evidenced by the size of the district and the trial testimony, Esselstyn SD-25 preserves communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

*90 The Court determines that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in Esselstyn SD-25 to constitute an additional majority-Black district. The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-25 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, it is relatively small in size and does not contain any appendages or tentacles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition in the area contained in Esselstyn SD-25.

ii) Esselstyn SD-28⁷⁷

The Court finds also that Grant Plaintiffs have shown that it is possible to draw a reasonably compact electoral district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area encompassed by Esselstyn SD-28.

((a)) empirical measures***((1)) population equality***

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 achieves relative population equality. As stated above, the General Assembly did not enumerate a specific acceptable deviation range for the Enacted Senate Plan. However, using the Enacted Plan as a guide, a population deviation range between -1.03% and -0.98% is acceptable. GX 1, Attach. D. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 is within the acceptable range of population deviations approved by the Georgia General Assembly when it passed the Enacted Senate Plan. Thus, it achieves population equality that is consistent with the Enacted Senate Plan, the General Assembly's Redistricting Guidelines, and traditional redistricting principles.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Esselstyn SD-28 is a contiguous district. *Stip.* ¶ 258. Hence, the Court finds that Esselstyn

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SD-28 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores


The Court finds Esselstyn SD-28's compactness scores, while lower on a side-by-side comparison with the Enacted Senate Plan, are within the acceptable range of compactness scores found in the Enacted Senate Plan. GX 1, Attach. H. Esselstyn SD-28 has a Reock score of 0.38 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.19. *Id.* The Enacted Senate Plan has an average Reock score of 0.42 and Polsby-Popper score of 0.29. Accordingly, the Enacted Senate Plan's average compactness scores beats Esselstyn SD-28 on all empirical measures—0.05 points on Reock and 0.10 on Polsby-Popper.

Despite a lower compactness score under both empirical measures, Esselstyn SD-28 is within the range of compactness scores found in the Enacted Senate Plan. Specifically, the Enacted Senate Plan has a minimum Reock score of 0.17. GX 1, Attach. H. Esselstyn SD-28's Reock score (0.38) far exceeds that minimum threshold Reock score in the Enacted Senate Plan. *Id.* Similarly, the Enacted Senate Plan's minimum Polsby-Popper score is 0.13. *Id.* Esselstyn SD-28's Polsby-Popper score (0.19) exceeds, albeit slightly, the minimum threshold Polsby-Popper score in the Enacted Senate Plan. *Id.* Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 falls within the range of compactness scores in the Enacted Senate Plan and therefore constitutes a compact district for purposes of the first *Gingles* precondition.

((4)) political subdivisions

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 exhibits respect for political subdivisions. Esselstyn SD-28 contains portions of Clayton, Coweta, Fayette, and Fulton Counties. GX 1 ¶ 31.

Figure 10: VTD splits in illustrative State Senate plan by county.




GX 1 ¶ 40 & fig.10. As this chart shows, the only county that is included within Esselstyn SD-28 with VTD splits is Fulton County. Put differently, Esselstyn SD-28 does not split any VTDs in Coweta, Clayton, and Fayette Counties, which make up the majority of the district. *Id.*; at ¶ 31 & fig.7. Even though Esselstyn SD-28 splits the city of Newnan, 90% of the city is contained within a single district. *Tr.* 549:2-5, 550:25-551:9. Esselstyn, moreover, did not split any VTDs in Newnan, which is in Coweta County, itself. GX 1 ¶ 40 & fig.10.

*91 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 exhibits a respect for political subdivisions.

((b)) eyeball test

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 is visually compact under the eyeball test:



GX 1 ¶ 31 & fig.7. Using the mapping tool, the Court finds that at its most distant points, Esselstyn SD-28 is approximately 25 miles long. *Id.* Esselstyn SD-28 does not contain any tentacles or appendages. Defendants submit no evidence or testimony in the Record suggesting that Esselstyn SD-28 is not visually compact. *See generally* DX 3; *Tr.* 1896:13-23. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Esselstyn SD-28 is visually compact.

((c)) communities of interest

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 respects communities of interest. Because Esselstyn SD-25 and SD-28 are in close proximity to one another, much of the testimony

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adduced about SD-28 was also discussed in relation to Esselstyn SD-25. See [Tr. 484:5–9](#) (Mr. Esselstyn testimony); see also [generally id.](#) 953:20–965:17 (Mr. Carter testimony). The Court thereby incorporates its general analysis on communities of interest in south-metro Atlanta from Esselstyn SD-25 above into this section on Esselstyn SD-28. See Section II(D)(1)(2)(b)(i)(c) *supra*.

Specific to Esselstyn SD-28, Mr. Esselstyn testified that he drew the district to best keep together municipalities in Fulton County, and specifically to keep 90% of Newnan intact. [Tr. 548:20–549:24](#). Similar to Locust Grove, Mr. Esselstyn admitted that he was unable to articulate a community of interest that connects the city of Newnan with Fulton and Clayton Counties ([Tr. 548:20–549:1](#)). Again, however, the [Grant](#) Plaintiffs’ supplemented this testimony with testimony from Mr. Allen, who testified that all of Esselstyn SD-28 is within metro Atlanta. [Tr. 1002:18–20](#). He also mentioned that the area was serviced by the same healthcare systems (i.e., Emory Hospital and Grady Hospital) and relied on the same interstates for transportation. [Id.](#) at 1002:21–1003:5. Additionally, the State’s map drawer, Ms. Wright, who is herself a resident of nearby Henry County ([Tr. 1653:17–21](#)), testified about the general communities in this area. In reference to the Enacted Senate Plan, Ms. Wright testified that it makes sense to group Coweta and Fayette Counties in a single district because the counties “are commonly sharing resources and things like that.” [Tr. 1656:18–21](#).

Thus, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 is a small district contained wholly within metro Atlanta. Its communities share the same concerns with transportation routes and have experienced recent major population growth. Additionally, the Court finds that this district is not long and sprawling, like the districts in [LULAC](#) and [Miller](#) that stretched across large portions of their respective States and combined disparate minority populations. Rather, as is evidenced by the size of the district and the trial testimony, Esselstyn SD-28 preserves communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court finds that the [Grant](#) Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in Esselstyn SD-28 to constitute an additional majority-Black district. The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-28 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity,

compactness scores, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, it is relatively small in size and does not contain any appendages or tentacles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the [Grant](#) Plaintiffs have carried their burden on the first [Gingles](#) precondition in the area encompassed by Esselstyn SD-28.

iii) Esselstyn HD-64

*92 The Court finds that the [Grant](#) Plaintiffs have shown that it is possible to draw a State House district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area encompassed by Esselstyn HD-64.

((a)) Empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 achieves better population equality than Enacted HD-64. Enacted HD-64 has a population deviation of -0.88%, whereas Esselstyn HD-64 has a population deviation of +0.23%. GX 1, attaches. I, J. Accordingly, Esselstyn HD-64 achieves population equality consistent with the General Assembly’s Guidelines and traditional redistricting principles.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Esselstyn HD-64 is a contiguous district. [Stip.](#) ¶ 258. Hence, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64’s compactness score is within the range of scores achieved by the Enacted House Plan. Esselstyn HD-64 has a compactness measure of 0.22 on both metrics. GX 1, Attach. L. Enacted HD-64 has a Reock score of 0.38 and Polsby-Popper score of 0.36. [Id.](#) While Esselstyn HD-64 is less compact than Enacted HD-64 using empirical measures, the proposed district is still within the range of acceptable range of compactness scores found in the

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Enacted House Plan (i.e., a minimum Reock score of 0.12 and a minimum Polsby-Popper score of 0.10).Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 is reasonably compact in terms of empirical scoring.

((4)) political subdivisions


The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 respects political subdivisions. Esselstyn HD-64 consists of portions of Douglas, Fulton, and Paulding Counties. GX 1 ¶ 49. Esselstyn HD-64 splits one more county than Enacted HD-64, which includes only portions of Douglas and Paulding Counties. GX 1, Attach. I. When comparing the VTD splits in Enacted HD-64 and Esselstyn HD-64, they both split only one VTD (in Paulding County). GX 1, Attach. L. ⁷⁸ Additionally, Mr. Esselstyn testified he was able to keep Lithia Springs intact, which is an incorporated community. Tr. 562:4-13.

Defendants’ mapping expert, Mr. Morgan, did not opine about Esselstyn HD-64 in his report. DX 3. However, at the trial, he testified that Esselstyn HD-64 contains the same Fulton and Douglas County precincts as Enacted HD-61. Tr. 1826:17–21. Outside of this testimony, Mr. Morgan offered no opinion about whether Esselstyn HD-64 exhibited respect for existing political subdivisions.

The Court finds that not only are Esselstyn HD-64 subdivision splits consistent with Enacted HD-64, but Esselstyn HD-64 on the whole respects political subdivisions.

((b)) eyeball test

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 is visually compact:



GX 1 ¶ 49 & fig.14.

Mr. Esselstyn testified that he modeled the shape of Esselstyn HD-64 on the shape of Enacted HD-61. Tr. 560:14–24. Visually, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 does not have appendages or tentacles. Esselstyn HD-64 is relatively small in size. In fact, when measured with the mapping tool, it is less than 20 miles at its most distant points. GX 1 ¶ 49 & fig.14.

***93** Because of these considerations and the fact that Defendants do not meaningfully dispute the visual compactness of this district, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 is visually compact.

((c)) communities of interest

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 preserves communities of interest and does not combine disparate communities. As an initial note, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 is in the same relative area as Illustrative CD-6. Both proposed districts combine areas in-and-around Fulton and Douglas Counties. ⁷⁹ GX 1 ¶ 49. As the Court stated above, it found that Illustrative CD-6 preserved communities of interest. See Section II(C)(1)(b)(3) *supra*.

Specific to Esselstyn HD-64, Mr. Allen explained that the residents of this west-metro Atlanta district have shared interests. Tr. 1004:1–10. They rely on the same roadways and face many of the same transportation-related challenges. Id. at 1004:11–22. They rely on the same healthcare systems and share an interest in preserving access to Grady Hospital, the only Level One Trauma Center in the metro area. Id. at 1005:1–24. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 preserves existing communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in Esselstyn HD-64 to constitute an additional majority-Black district. The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-64 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, it is relatively small in size and does not contain any appendages or tentacles.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition in the area encompassed by Esselstyn HD-64.

iv) Esselstyn HD-74

The Court finds that Grant Plaintiffs have not shown that it is possible to draw a legislative district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area encompassed by Esselstyn HD-74.

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74's population deviation of -1.84% is greater than any district in the Enacted House Plan (-1.40% and +1.34%). Esselstyn HD-74 is nearly one point greater than the deviation of Enacted HD-74 (-0.93%). GX 1, attachs. J, I.; Stip. ¶ 278. Mr. Esselstyn admitted that it was one of the most underpopulated districts on his House Plan. Tr. 567:23–568:6. “[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as practicable.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362.

[M]inor deviations from mathematical equality among State legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case ... under the Fourteenth Amendments Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations.

*94 Brown, 462 U.S. at 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362) (quotation marks omitted). More recently, the Supreme Court held that population deviations that are below 10 percent are not entitled to a safe harbor. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949, 124 S.Ct. 2806, 159 L.Ed.2d 831 (2004). Specifically, “the

equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.” Id. at 949–50, 124 S.Ct. 2806. In 2004, that three-judge court noted that with technology it is possible to have perfect population equality. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2004). In 1991, a court in the Northern District of Illinois similarly remarked that “[t]he use of increasingly sophisticated computers in the congressional map drawing process has reduced population deviations to nearly infinitesimal proportions.” Harstert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 643 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

Although perfect population deviation is not a requirement by the Supreme Court or the Georgia General Assembly, “[e]ach legislative district of the General Assembly shall be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable, considering the principles listed below.” JX 2, 2. The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 achieves population equality less so than Enacted HD-74. Using the Georgia Enacted House Plan as a guide, the accepted population deviation range is $\pm 1.40\%$. Esselstyn HD-74, at -1.84%, is significantly greater than that range.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Esselstyn HD-74 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 258. Hence, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds that the Esselstyn HD-74's compactness scores are within the acceptable range of compactness scores on the overall Enacted House Plan. Esselstyn HD-74 has a Reock score of 0.30 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.19. GX 1, Attach. L. The Court notes that Enacted HD-74 performs better on the Reock measure (0.50) as well as the Polsby-Popper measure (0.25). Id. The Court notes Esselstyn HD-74's scores do not fall below the minimum compactness scores for the Enacted Plan—0.12 (on Reock) and 0.10 (on Polsby-Popper). Id. In sum, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 is less compact than Enacted HD-74.

((4)) political subdivisions

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The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 generally exhibited respect for communities of interest. The Court notes that Esselstyn HD-74 splits one less county than Enacted HD-74. GX 1 ¶ 50 & fig.15 (Esselstyn HD-74 is contained in Clayton and Fulton Counties); GX 1, Ex. I (Enacted HD-74 is contained in Fayette, Henry, and Spalding Counties).

However, at the trial Mr. Esselstyn testified that he split Peachtree City. Tr. 567:6–13; 1657:22–23. It is worth noting that the Enacted House Plan also split Peachtree City. *Id.* Esselstyn HD-74 testified that he was able to keep the communities of Irondale, Brooks, and Woolsey “if not entirely intact, almost entirely intact,” but conceded that Irondale is not an incorporated municipality. Tr. 566:22–567:5.


Finally, Esselstyn HD-74 split fewer VTDs than Enacted HD-74. Enacted HD-74 split four VTDs, one in Fayette and three in Spalding Counties (GX 1, Ex. L),⁸⁰ whereas Esselstyn HD-74 split only one VTD in Clayton County (*id.*).

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 reflects respect for political subdivisions.

(b) eyeball test

*95 The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 is visually compact:

Figure 15: Map of southern Metro Atlanta area of illustrative plan with majority-Black House districts indicated.



GX 1 ¶ 50 & fig.15.
 Esselstyn HD-74 does not have appendages or tentacles. Using the mapping tool, Esselstyn HD-74 is approximately 20 miles in length at its most distant points.

Defendants do not meaningfully dispute the visual compactness of this district. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 is visually compact.

((c)) communities of interest

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 combines rural, urban, and suburban populations. In fact, Mr. Esselstyn testified that the proposed district contained rural, urban, and suburban populations. Tr. 566:22–24. Mr. Carter's testimony about the communities of interest in this district was generally the same as his testimony about the communities of interest in Esselstyn HD-117, SD-25, and SD-28 because they are in the same relative region of the state. However, on cross-examination, Mr. Carter agreed that the parts of south Fayette County included in Esselstyn HD-74 were exurban, if not rural, compared with other parts of the district. Tr. 987:2–16.

The Court finds that the testimony specific to Esselstyn HD-74 shows that it combined widely diverse communities into a district. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-74 combines disparate communities into one district.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court has determined that the Grant Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in establishing that the Black community in Esselstyn HD-74 is sufficiently numerous and compact to constitute an additional majority-Black district. Although the Black population in Esselstyn HD-74 exceeds 50%, the Court finds that it does so by having one of the most underpopulated districts in the Esselstyn House Plan. Tr. 567:23–568:6. Additionally, the Court finds that although the district is visually compact, it is significantly less compact than Enacted HD-74 in other ways. Furthermore, Mr. Esselstyn admitted and Mr. Carter agreed that the district combines urban, suburban, and rural communities. Neither witness was able to explain the commonalities that the voters in Esselstyn HD-74 share, except for the general commonalities that all metro Atlanta voters share. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Grant Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition in the area drawn by Esselstyn HD-74.

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i) Esselstyn HD-117

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have shown that it is possible to draw a legislative district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area encompassed by Esselstyn HD-117.

(a) Empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Esselstyn and Enacted HD-117 have comparable population deviations. Esselstyn HD-117 has a population deviation of +1.06% whereas Enacted HD-117 has a population deviation of +1.04%. GX 1, Attachs. I, J. The Court finds that the difference in population deviations between the two districts is not legally significant. Additionally, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117's population deviation is within the range of population deviations found in the Enacted House Plan (-1.40% and 1.34%). Id. at Attach. I. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 complies with traditional redistricting principle of population equality.

((2)) contiguity

*96 The Parties stipulated that Esselstyn HD-117 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 258. Hence, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds that Esselstyn and Enacted HD-117 are comparably compact. Esselstyn HD-117 has a Reock score of 0.40 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.33. GX 1, Attach. L. Enacted HD-117 has a Reock score of 0.41 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.28. Id. Thus, Enacted HD-117 is more compact on the Reock measure (by 0.01 points), and Esselstyn HD-117 is more compact on the Polsby-Popper score (by 0.05 points). Generally, however, the two districts are roughly equal in terms of objective compactness scores. The Court also finds that Esselstyn HD-117 performs better than the Enacted House Plan's average compactness scores

(0.39 on Reock and 0.28 on Polsby-Popper). Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 is compact as compared to Enacted HD-117 and overall qualifies as a compact district.

((4)) political subdivisions

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 demonstrates respect for political subdivisions. Esselstyn HD-117 is wholly within Henry County, meaning it does not split any counties (GX 1 ¶ 50 & fig.15), whereas Enacted HD-117 consists of Henry and Spalding Counties (GX 1, Ex. I). Accordingly, Esselstyn HD-117 splits one less county than Enacted HD-117.


Conversely, however, Mr. Esselstyn split the city of McDonough, even though he kept the core of the city whole. Tr. 571:19–25. Mr. Esselstyn also split the city of Locust Grove, by using I-75 as a boundary. ⁸¹ Tr. 571:16–21. Finally, Esselstyn HD-117 splits two VTDs in Henry County, whereas the Enacted HD-117 split only one VTD in Henry County. GX 1, Ex. L. ⁸²

Given the above evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn, generally, respected political subdivisions in creating Esselstyn HD-117.

((b)) Eyeball test

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 is visually compact:

Figure 15: Map of southern Metro Atlanta area of illustrative plan with majority-Black House districts indicated.



GX 1 ¶ 50 & fig.15.

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Esselstyn HD-117 does not have appendages or tentacles. Using the mapping tool, Esselstyn HD-117 is approximately 15 miles at its most distant points. Defendants do not meaningfully dispute the visual compactness of this district. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 is visually compact.

((c)) Communities of interest

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 respects communities of interest. The testimony about HD-117 is virtually identical to the testimony regarding Esselstyn HD-74 because both districts are relatively close in proximity. See Section II(D) (1)(b)(2)(i)(c), id. at (ii)(c), id. at (iii)(c) *supra* (HD-74 and in Senate districts for south metro). There is no evidence or testimony opining or showing that Esselstyn HD-117 includes disparate communities.

The Court does not find Mr. Esselstyn's split of McDonough and Locust Grove to constitute a failure in preserving communities of interest. Mr. Esselstyn testified that when drawing the district, he made his best effort to keep the core of McDonough whole and only the "fringes of McDonough [] are outside of District 117." *Tr.* 570: 22–25. And Locust Grove is divided based on the I-75 boundary. *Tr.* 571:16–19. The Court credits Mr. Esselstyn's explanations for the reasons why McDonough and Locust Grove were not kept intact and finds that they are sufficient for purposes of showing that Mr. Esselstyn preserved communities of interest.

*97 In sum, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 is a small district contained wholly within metro Atlanta. The communities share the same concerns with transportation routes and have experienced recent major population growth. Additionally, the Court finds that this district is not long and sprawling, like the districts in LULAC and Miller that stretched across large portions of their respective States and combined disparate minority populations. Rather, as is evidenced by the size of the district and the trial testimony, Esselstyn HD-117 preserves communities of interest.

((d)) Conclusions of law

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in Esselstyn HD-117 to constitute an additional majority-Black district. The

Court finds that Esselstyn HD-117 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, it is relatively small in size and does not contain any appendages or tentacles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition in the area drawn by Esselstyn HD-117.

c) Eastern Black Belt region

(1) Alpha Phi Alpha

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not met their burden in establishing that the Black community in the eastern Black Belt sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute an additional majority-Black Senate or House district.

(a) numerosity

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing that the Black voting age population in the eastern Black Belt is large enough to constitute an additional majority-Black district. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 1231 ("[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.").

Cooper SD-23 has an AP BVAP of 50.21%, which slightly exceeds the 50% threshold required by Gingles. APAX 1, 227 & Ex. O-1. As the Court discusses further below, it is significant that Mr. Cooper removed Black population from SD-22 to create SD-23, which resulted in two underpopulated districts that meet the 50% majority-Black threshold by only slight margins. *Tr.* 257:1-4.

The Black voting age population in the eastern Black Belt is also large enough to constitute an additional majority-Black House district. Cooper HD-133 has an AP BVAP of 51.97%, which exceeds the 50% threshold required by Gingles APAX 1, Ex. AA-1. Thus, Cooper HD-133 meets the first Gingles precondition's numerosity requirement.

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(b) compactness

The Court concludes that neither Cooper SD-23 nor Cooper HD-133 are, on the whole, compact pursuant to the standards for the first Gingles precondition in the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs' case.

i) Cooper SD-23**((a)) empirical measures****((1)) population equality**

The ideal population size of a State Senate District is 191,284 people. Stip. ¶ 277. Cooper SD-23 has a population of 190,081 people, which constitutes a population deviation of -0.63%. APAX 1, Ex. O-1. The neighboring majority-Black district, SD-22, is also underpopulated—its population is 189,518, which constitutes a population deviation of -0.92%. APAX 1, Ex. O-1. Conversely, Enacted SD-23 is slightly underpopulated with a population of 190,344, with a population deviation of only -0.49%. APAX 1, Ex. M-1. For its part, Enacted SD-22 is overpopulated with a population of 193,163 and a population deviation of +0.98%. Id.

*98 The Supreme Court has indicated a strong preference for “population equality with little more than *de minimis* variation.” Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975)). While the Equal Protection Clause does not require that Legislative Districts meet perfect population deviations, with the advent of technology, it seems that $\pm 10\%$ deviation is no longer a safe harbor for proposed districts. See Section II(D)(1)(b)(2)(b)(iii)(a)(1) *supra* (Esselstyn HD-74); see also JX 2, 2 (stating a guideline that “[e]ach legislative district of the General Assembly shall be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable, considering the principles listed below.”).

The Court finds that Cooper SD-23 itself is not malapportioned. To create the district, however, Mr. Cooper reduced the population in SD-22 to nearly the lowest deviation on the Cooper Senate Plan. Tr. 254:14-255:3, 1783:10-14. Therefore, the Court concludes it is significant that Mr. Cooper's creation of SD-23 required creating

increasing the population deviation in SD-22, so that it is barely within Mr. Cooper's $\pm 1.00\%$ deviation guidepost. Stop. ¶ 301, APAX 1 ¶ 111. Moreover, even though the General Assembly did not enumerate a specific population deviation range for the Legislative Districts, the Court finds Cooper SD-23 performs worse on the population equality metric than Enacted SD-23. JX 2, 2; APAX 1, Exs. O-1, M-1. Accordingly, the Court finds that the evidence shows that Cooper SD-23 achieves the traditional redistricting principle of population equality less so than Enacted SD-23.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Cooper SD-23 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 300. Therefore, the Court finds that Cooper SD-23 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

Under the objective Reock and Polsby-Popper measures, Cooper SD-23 and Enacted SD-23 are comparably compact. In fact, they achieve the same scores: Enacted SD-23 has a Reock score of 0.37 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.16. APAX 1, Ex. S-3. Likewise, Cooper's SD-23 has a Reock score 0.37 and a Polsby-Popper 0.16. Id., Ex. S-1. Thus, the Court considers Cooper's SD-23 to be comparably compact to Enacted SD-23.


((4)) political subdivisions

Both Enacted SD-23 and Cooper SD-23 split two counties: Enacted SD-23 splits Richmond and Columbia Counties while Cooper SD-23 splits Richmond and Wilkes Counties. Tr. 119: 4-13. However, Cooper SD-23 splits the City of Washington (Tr. 258:24-259:2), whereas Enacted SD-23 does not. APAX 1 ¶ 107 & fig.18 (the city of Washington is in Wilkes County and all of Wilkes County is within Enacted SD-24). Additionally, Cooper SD-23 splits two VTDs in Wilkes County, whereas Enacted SD-23 splits none. APAX 1, Exs. T-1, T-3. Thus, the Court concludes that Cooper SD-23 does not exhibit respect for political subdivisions as well as Enacted SD-23.

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(b) eyeball test

The Court concludes that Cooper SD-23 does not pass the eyeball test for visual compactness:




APAX 1 ¶ 108 & fig.19A.

Cooper SD-23 is an oddly shaped, sprawling district that spans north to south from Wilkes County to Jenkins County and east to west from Twiggs County to Burke County. APAX Ex. 1, fig.19A. Milledgeville in Baldwin County (western part of the district) is more than 100 miles from Augusta in Richmond County (eastern part of the district). DX 2 ¶ 36. Based on the foregoing, Cooper SD-23 is not visually compact.

Admittedly, Enacted SD-23 is also large and sprawling, albeit in a different way than Cooper SD-23. However, as a majority-white district, Enacted SD-23 is not subject to Gingles' compactness requirements. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 430–31, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (“[T]here is no § 2 right to a district that is not reasonably compact, the creation of a noncompact district does not compensate for the dismantling of a compact opportunity district.” (citing Abrams, 521 U.S. at 91–92, 117 S.Ct. 1925)). In other words, the large and sprawling nature of Enacted SD-23 does not alleviate the concerns with the shape and size of Cooper SD-23. Moreover, plaintiffs, who have alleged a Section 2 violation, have the burden to show that the minority community is sufficiently compact to create the proposed majority-minority district. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show visual compactness.

(c) communities of interest

*99 The Court furthermore finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in showing that Cooper SD-23 unites communities of interest. Mr. Cooper stated that the “Black Belt” formed a community of interest in relation to Cooper SD-23. Tr. 267:12–22. But when asked to define the factors that unite the Black communities in Cooper SD-23, Mr. Cooper only vaguely referenced “cultural and historical factors,” a response the Court finds unpersuasive. First, the Black Belt is a wide region that “stretches from one side of the State to another and “that is a pretty significant amount of distance to define as one community.” Tr. 1619:6-9.




APAX 1 ¶ 18 & fig.1.

Ms. Wright, the State's map drawer, testified that there is a natural barrier in the area of the Ogeechee River that runs through Warren, Glascock, and Jefferson Counties, which runs through the center of Cooper SD-23. Tr. 1639:12-1640:1. She also testified that Augusta is a more urban area, whereas the surrounding counties are rural. Tr. 1639:12-14; 1695:25-1696:8.

With respect to the demographic makeup of the district, Mr. Morgan, Defendant's mapping expert, described Cooper SD-23 as a district that “connects separate enclaves of Black population.” DX 2 ¶ 35. The Court agrees. For example, Cooper SD-23 links Black population from Milledgeville in Baldwin County to the Black population residing more than 100 miles away in Augusta. Id. Furthermore, Mr. Cooper conceded that Cooper SD-23 includes counties from different regions and splits a regional commission. Tr. 260:23–261:13.

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DX 2 ¶ 34 & Ex. 23.

The Court finds that, although communities of interest are hard to define, the distance between the Black population in Cooper SD-23 coupled with the sprawling geographic nature of the district indicates that there is not a unified community of interest in Cooper SD-23. Mr. Cooper's vague reference to shared historical and cultural similarities of the Black Belt is insufficient to establish communities of interest. The Black Belt runs across the southeastern United States, and in Georgia, it spans from Augusta, near the South Carolina border to the southwest corner of the State near Alabama and Florida. Stip. ¶ 118; GX 1 ¶ 19 & fig.1. The Court finds that portions of Cooper SD-23 are both urban and rural and that a river divides the proposed district.

The Court also finds that the lay witness testimony does not sufficiently prove that Cooper SD-23 preserves communities of interest. Dr. Diane Evans,⁸³ who lives in Jefferson County—at the heart of Cooper SD-23—testified about communities in the proposed district that share numerous interests. She said that Black residents in the eastern section of the Black Belt attend the same houses of worship and share church leadership. Tr. 627:19-628:6. She identified other common interests shared by the Black residents in the area such as sports, and farming; she said they also have similar policy concerns regarding high school dropout rates and education. *Id.* at 625:3-8, 629:22-630:13.

While the Court finds Dr. Evans to be highly credible, the Court also finds that the evidence presented at trial is not enough to show that the Black communities in Esselstyn SD-23 are part of a community of interest. Although there is some evidence of shared concerns over high rates of gun violence and low high school graduation rates, it is unclear how these commonalities unite the widely dispersed Black

communities in the proposed district. Additionally, given the widely dispersed nature of the pockets of high concentration of Black people, the evidence is insufficient to show that all of the communities in this area share these same concerns.

*100 Although the three-judge court in [Singleton](#) found a community of interest in Alabama's Black Belt, the evidence in this case differs. There, the three-judge court found that “Black voters in the Black Belt share common ‘political beliefs, cultural values, and economic interests.’” [Singleton](#), 582 F. Supp. 3d at 953. The Court finds that there is not sufficient evidence in the Record for it to conclude that the Black community in this region constitutes a community of interest. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper SD-23 does not preserve communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court concludes that the Black community is not sufficiently compact in Cooper SD-23. This conclusion is based on (a) the underpopulation of Cooper SD-23 (and its ripple effect of reducing the population in Cooper SD-22), (b) Cooper SD-23's treatment of political subdivisions, (c) a lack of visual compactness, and (d) Cooper SD-23's unification of geographically distant disparate black populations without preserving articulable communities of interest.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in meeting the first [Gingles](#) precondition as to Cooper SD-23. The three [Gingles](#) requirements are necessary preconditions, intended “to help courts determine which claims could meet the totality-of-the-circumstances standard for a § 2 violation.” [Bartlett](#), 556 U.S. at 21, 129 S.Ct. 1231. Failure to prove any one of the preconditions is fatal to a plaintiff's Section 2 claim. [Greater Birmingham Ministries](#), 992 F.3d at 1332. Because the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have not successfully carried their burden in establishing that the Black community in the eastern Black Belt is sufficiently compact, they have failed to demonstrate that the Enacted Senate Plan violates Section 2 with respect to the area of Cooper SD-23.

ii) Cooper HD-133

As with Cooper SD-23, the Court concludes, based on the following measures of compactness, that Cooper HD-133

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does not satisfy the first Gingles’ precondition’s compactness requirement either.

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The ideal population size of a State House District is 59,511 people. Stip. ¶ 278. Cooper HD-133 and Enacted HD-133 have identical population deviations of -1.33%. APAX 1, Exs. Z-1, AA-1. Accordingly, the Court finds that the population of Cooper HD-133 complies with the General Assembly’s guidelines and the traditional redistricting principle for population equality.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Cooper HD-133 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 300. Therefore, the Court finds that Cooper HD-133 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

Under the Reock and Polsby-Popper measures, Cooper HD-133 is much less compact than Enacted HD-133: Enacted HD-133 has a Reock score of 0.55 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.42, whereas Cooper’s HD-133 has a Reock score 0.26 and a Polsby-Popper 0.20. DX 2, 25 & Chart 7. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Cooper HD-133 is not comparably compact to Enacted HD-133. The Court does note, however that both of these compactness scores are within the range of compactness scores found in the Enacted House Plan, i.e., minimum Reock score is 0.12 and minimum Polsby-Popper score is 0.10. APAX 1, Ex. AG-2. Although Cooper HD-133 exceeds the minimum threshold, the Court finds that, compared to Enacted HD-133, it performs far worse on compactness measures.


((4)) political subdivisions

Evidence at trial established that Mr. Cooper sacrificed preservation of political subdivisions, including counties and precincts, in creating Cooper HD-133. Mr. Cooper testified

that there are more splits in this area of the Cooper House Plan than in other illustrative plans he has drawn. Tr. 282:3-4. Also, Cooper HD-133 split *nine* precincts—again, more than any other district on the Cooper House Plan. DX 2 ¶ 62; APAX 1, T-1, T-3. Furthermore, to create Cooper HD-133, Mr. Cooper made changes to Enacted HD-128—a majority-Black district—that resulted in additional split counties in that area. Tr. 282:13–19. Likewise, the creation of Cooper HD-133 required changes to Enacted HD-126 that resulted in additional county splits in that district. Tr. 283:23–284:11. Thus, the Court determines that Cooper HD-133 does not respect political subdivisions, either itself in the proposed district, or in the districts experiencing the ripple effect of Mr. Cooper’s changes to the area.

((b)) eyeball test

*101 The Court concludes that Cooper HD-133 does not pass the eyeball test:



APAX 1 ¶ 169 & fig.31.

Cooper HD-133 is a long district that stretches from Wilkes County in the north, narrows around Milledgeville, and then widens out to Wilkinson County in the south. DX 2, 75 fig.31. According to Mr. Morgan, Defendants’ mapping expert, Cooper HD-133 stretches north to south for 90 miles to pick up Black population from Milledgeville. DX 2 ¶ 61. In these ways, Cooper HD-133 stands in stark contrast to Enacted HD-133, which covers a much smaller geographic area. See DX 2, 74 fig.30. Thus, the Court concludes that Cooper HD-133 is not visually compact.

((c)) communities of interest

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Finally, the Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in showing that Cooper HD-133 unites communities of interest. Mr. Cooper identified the “Black Belt” as a community of interest that joined the various counties within Cooper HD-133. Tr. 280:23–25. He further stated that the counties in Cooper HD-133 are rural in nature, and with the exception of Glascock County, are significantly Black. Id. at 281:3-8.

The Court finds that, although communities of interest are hard to define, Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence show that this 90-mile district preserves communities of interest as opposed to combining disparate communities. This is true even in light of Dr. Evan's testimony, which is incorporated here (see Section II(D)(1)(c) (1)(b)(i)(c) *supra*). Without more, the Court cannot conclude that Cooper HD-133 preserves communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court concludes that the Black community is not sufficiently compact in Cooper HD-133. This conclusion is based on the following findings of fact: compared to Enacted HD-133 Cooper HD-133 splits more VTDs, and added numerous county splits in the area. Additionally, the creation of Cooper HD-133 led to increased VTD splits in neighboring districts. Cooper HD-133, moreover, is not visually compact and unites Black populations whose only commonalities are being in the Black Belt in mostly rural areas—an insufficient showing of communities of interest.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition as to Cooper HD-133. Like with Cooper SD-23, *supra*, failure to prove any one of the preconditions is fatal to Plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim. Greater Birmingham Ministries, 992 F.3d at 1332. Accordingly, Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Enacted House Plan violates Section 2 with respect to that area of the State.

(2) Grant: Esselstyn SD-23

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Black community is not sufficiently compact to constitute an additional majority-Black Senate district in the Eastern Black Belt region.

(a)numerosity

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing that the Black voting age population in the eastern Black Belt is large enough to constitute an additional majority-Black district. It is undisputed that Esselstyn SD-23 has an AP BVAP of 51.06%, which exceeds the 50% threshold required by Gingles. GX 11 ¶ 27 & tbl.1; Stip. ¶ 234.

(b)compactness

*102 Based on a review of traditional redistricting principles, the Court finds that the minority community is not sufficiently compact to warrant the creation of an additional majority-Black district in the eastern Black Belt as found in Esselstyn SD-23. Additionally, Esselstyn SD-23 fails to respect the other traditional redistricting principles (visual compactness and preservation of communities of interest).

i) empirical measures

((a)) population equality

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-23 is not malapportioned. Nevertheless, as explained below, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-23 has the *greatest* population deviation of any district in the Esselstyn and Enacted Senate Plans.

The ideal population size of a State Senate District is 191,284 people. Stip. ¶ 277. Esselstyn SD-23 has a population of 188,095 people, which amounts to a population deviation of -1.67%. GX 1, attach E. Esselstyn SD-23 is the most underpopulated district in either the Esselstyn or Enacted Senate Plan. Additionally, the Court finds that neighboring majority-Black district, SD-22 is underpopulated under the Esselstyn Senate Plan. Esselstyn SD-22 has a population of 188,930, which is a population deviation of -1.23%. GX 1, attach E. In the Enacted Senate Plan, conversely, Enacted SD-23 is slightly underpopulated with a population of 190,344 (a population deviation of -0.49%), and Enacted SD-22 is overpopulated with a population of 193,163 (a population deviation of +0.98%). GX 1, Attach. D.

Although the General Assembly did not enumerate a specific deviation range for the Legislative Districts, the Court finds

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that the population of Esselstyn SD-23 does not comply with the guideline that “[e]ach legislative district of the General Assembly shall be drawn to achieve a total population that is substantially equal as practicable, considering the principles listed below.” JX 2, 2. Additionally, in creating Esselstyn SD-23, Mr. Esselstyn did not keep his deviations within the range of the Enacted Senate Plan, which is $\pm 1.03\%$. Cf. Stip. ¶ 301 (indicating the 2021 Senate Plan's population deviation range in comparison to Mr. Cooper's population deviation range). Thereby, for all these reasons, Esselstyn SD-23 fails to achieve population equality to the same degree as any district in the Enacted Senate Plan.

((b)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Esselstyn SD-23 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 258. Hence, the Court finds that Esselstyn SD-23 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((c)) compactness scores

Under the Reock and Polsby-Popper measures, Esselstyn SD-23 and Enacted SD-23 are comparably compact. Enacted SD-23 has a Reock score of 0.37 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.16. GX 1, Attach. H. Esselstyn SD-23 has a Reock score of 0.34 and a Polsby-Popper 0.17. *Id.* Thus, Enacted SD-23 is 0.03 points more compact on the Reock measure, but Esselstyn SD-23 is 0.01 points more compact on Polsby-Popper. On the whole, the Court finds that the Enacted and Esselstyn SD-23 are comparably compact.


((d)) political subdivisions

The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-23 split more counties than Enacted SD-23. Enacted SD-23 splits Richmond and Columbia Counties but otherwise keeps nine counties whole. DX 3 ¶ 31. Meanwhile, Esselstyn SD-23 split more counties than any other district on the Esselstyn Senate Plan. DX 3 ¶¶ 33, 36. Specifically, Esselstyn SD-23 splits Richmond, McDuffie, Wilkes, Greene, and Baldwin Counties. GX 1 ¶ 29; Tr. 536:22–237:5, 1818:7–13. As part of Esselstyn SD-23's ripple effect, Esselstyn SD-22 includes more counties than Enacted SD-22. DX 3 ¶ 31. Enacted SD-22, which is a majority-Black district, is wholly within Richmond County. *Id.* Under the Esselstyn Senate Plan, however, Esselstyn

SD-22 includes parts of Richmond and Columbia Counties. Based on the foregoing, the Court overall finds that it does not respect political subdivisions.

ii) eyeball test

*103 The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-23 is not visually compact and does not pass the eyeball test:



GX 1 ¶ 29 & fig.5.

Esselstyn SD-23 is a long sprawling district that spans from Wilkes and Greene counties in the north, down to Screven County in the south. DX 3, 16. Additionally, Esselstyn SD-23 starts in Augusta in the east and stretches to Milledgeville in the west. GX 1 ¶ 29 & fig.5. From the Augusta portion of the district to Milledgeville, the district is approximately 80 miles using the mapping tool. Tr. 1854:18–22. It is more than 100 miles from Greene County to Screven County. GX 1 ¶ 29 & fig.5. The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-23 it is not visually compact.

As with the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) case's proposed Senate district in this area, the Court acknowledges that Enacted SD-23 is also large and sprawling. GX 1 ¶ 29 & fig.2. However, for purposes of a Section 2 violation, the large and sprawling nature of Enacted SD-23, a non-remedial district, does not alleviate the concerns with the shape and size of Esselstyn SD-23. See [LULAC](#), 548 U.S. at 430–31, 126 S.Ct. 2594. Enacted SD-23 is a majority-white district that was not required to comply with [Gingles](#)' compactness requirements. The [Grant Plaintiffs](#), who have alleged a Section 2 violation, however, must show that the minority community is sufficiently compact to create a majority-


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minority district. Upon review of Esselstyn SD-23, the Court finds that the proposed district is not visually compact.

iii) communities of interest

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in showing that Esselstyn SD-23 unites communities of interest. Rather, the evidence shows that the areas of high Black concentration in Esselstyn SD-23 are spread out across the district and have large areas of intervening white population.

Mr. Esselstyn was unable to identify any community of interest shared by the counties and portions of counties in Esselstyn SD-23. Tr. 539:11–23. The district combines geographically separate Black populations in McDuffie and Wilkes Counties and in Milledgeville. Tr. 540:15–541:13.



DX 3, Ex. 29.

Esselstyn SD-23's disparate Black population, moreover, is separated by an intervening white population. The Black population is concentrated in distinct areas of Augusta, the middle of Burke County, south Jefferson County, Hancock and Warren Counties, Milledgeville, and north Wilkes County. Id. As the map shows, between those pockets within the district, the Black population ranges between 0 and 35%. Id. Thereby, the concentrations of Black population in Esselstyn SD-23 are not in close proximity to one another.

In defining what constitutes a community of interest, Mr. Esselstyn explained, “[t]here’s not a simple definition for communities of interest in my mind because they can vary a lot. They can be made up of a large number of counties. Like the Black Belt could be considered a community of

interest.” Tr. 479:19-23. Ms. Wright testified that she does not consider the Black Belt to be a community of interest, however, because it stretches from one side of the State to the other and “that is a pretty significant amount of distance to define as one community.” Tr. 1619:6-9.

***104** The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn's definition that the “Black Belt” alone is insufficient to constitute a community of interest. There is not a unified community of interest in Esselstyn SD-23 given the distance separating the Black populations in Esselstyn SD-23 and the large distance the district spans. As discussed above, the Court also does not find that Dr. Evan's testimony sufficiently establishes that there is a unified community of interest in the area drawn by Esselstyn SD-23. See Section II(D)(1)(b)(1)(b)(iii) *supra*. The Black Belt runs across the southeastern United States, and in Georgia, it spans from Augusta, near the South Carolina border, and to the southwest corner of the State near Alabama and Florida. Stip. ¶ 118; GX 1 ¶ 19 & fig.1. Tr. 1639:12-1640:1; 1695:25-1696:8.

Again, although the counties in this region do share commonalities, such as high rates of gun violence and low high school graduation rates, it is unclear how these commonalities unite the widely dispersed Black communities in the proposed district. Furthermore, the State's map drawer, Ms. Wright testified about geographic boundaries in this region and said that portions of the region are urban, portions are rural, and portions are more suburban. Tr. 1640:12–1641:1.

Pursuant to the evidence presently before this Court, it finds that Esselstyn SD-23 does not preserve communities of interest, but rather unites distinct Black communities within the eastern portion of the Black Belt.

iv) conclusions of law

The Court finds that the Black community is not sufficiently compact in Esselstyn SD-23. The Court finds that Esselstyn SD-23 is underpopulated and has the greatest population deviation of any district in either the Enacted or Esselstyn Senate Plans. Esselstyn SD-23 does not respect political subdivisions, and its creation accounts for the increased county splits in the Esselstyn Senate Plan as a whole. The district is not visually compact and unites disparate Black populations with intervening white populations.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition in the area drawn by Esselstyn SD-23. Failure to prove any one of the preconditions is fatal to plaintiffs' Section 2 claim. Because the Grant Plaintiffs have not successfully carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently compact to warrant the creation of an additional majority-Black State Senate district in the eastern Black Belt, the Court concludes there is no Section 2 violation in this region.

d)Macon-Bibb region

(1) Alpha Phi Alpha: Cooper HD-145

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not met their burden in establishing that an additional majority-Black House district can be drawn in or around Macon-Bibb.

(a)numerosity

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing that the Black voting age population in and around Macon-Bibb is large enough to create a majority-Black House districts. “[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.” Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 1231.

It is undisputed that Cooper HD-145 has an AP BVAP of 50.20%. APAX 1, AA-1. Accordingly, the Court finds that Black population is sufficiently numerous in Cooper HD-145.

(b)compactness

The Court finds, however, that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not shown that it is possible to draw an electoral district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area encompassed by Cooper HD-145. As an initial note, Mr. Cooper explained that Cooper HD-145 is in the same general area, and correlates with, Enacted HD-145. APAX 1 ¶ 181–82 & fig.34.

i) empirical measures

((a) population equality

*105 The Court finds that Cooper HD-145 is not malapportioned, but Cooper HD-145's population deviation is double the deviation of Enacted HD-145. As stated above, the General Assembly did not enumerate an acceptable deviation range for State Senate Districts. However, using the Enacted House Plan as a guide, a population deviation range between $\pm 1.40\%$ is acceptable. Stip. ¶ 302. In comparison, Cooper SD-28 has a population deviation of +1.18%. APAX 1, Ex. AA-1. The Court does note that Enacted HD-145's population deviation is half that at +0.59%. APAX 1, Ex. Z-1. Thus, the Court finds that this district does not comply with the traditional redistricting principle of population equality as well as Enacted HD-145.

((b) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Cooper HD-145 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 300. Hence, the Court finds that Cooper HD-145 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((c) compactness scores

The Court finds Cooper HD-145's compactness scores are comparable to Enacted HD-145. APAX 1, Exs. AG-1, AG-2. Enacted HD-145 has a higher Reock Score (0.38) than Cooper HD-145 (0.25), but Cooper HD-145 has a higher Polsby-Popper Score (0.22) than Enacted HD-145 (0.19). Id.

Although Enacted HD-145 is more compact on the Reock measure, Cooper HD-145 is well within the range of compactness scores of the Enacted House Plan. Specifically, the Enacted House Plan has a minimum Reock score of 0.12. APAX 1, Ex. AG-2. Cooper HD-145's Reock score (0.25) far exceeds the minimum threshold Reock score. Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-145 constitutes a compact district for purposes of the first Gingles precondition, though, less so than Enacted HD-145.


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(d) political subdivisions

The Court finds that Cooper HD-145 demonstrates a respect for political subdivisions more so than Enacted HD-145. Cooper HD-145 is contained within portions of two counties —Bibb and Monroe. APAX 1 ¶ 183 & fig.35, Ex. AH-1. Meanwhile, Enacted HD-145 contains portions of Bibb, Houston, Monroe, Paulding Counties, and all of Crawford County. APAX 1 ¶ 181–82 & fig.34, Ex. AH-3. Thus, Cooper HD-145 splits half of the Counties that Enacted HD-145 splits. Both districts split the same number of VTDs, three. APAX 1, Exs. AH-1, AH-3. Mr. Cooper testified that in Monroe County he followed county and VTD lines. *Id.* at 167:10-12. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-145 exhibits respect for political subdivisions more so than Enacted HD-145.

ii) eyeball test

The Court finds that Cooper HD-145 is not visually compact under the eyeball test:



APAX 1 ¶ 198 & fig.35.

Using the mapping tool, the Court finds that at its most distant points, Cooper HD-145 is less than 30 miles long. *Id.* Despite its small size, the district does contain a tentacle. The majority of the district is contained within the western half of Bibb County, but one thin line extends into Monroe County. *Id.* When asked why the district extended into Monroe County, Mr. Cooper explained that his decision to include portions of Monroe County was because it has “a very small population. And [he] made that decision to make sure we has a district that was within plus or minus 1.5 percent, taking into account

where incumbents live in Macon-Bibb.” *Id.* 16–19, 129 S.Ct. 1231.

Although the Court credits Mr. Cooper's testimony regarding the reasons for extending the district in this manner, the Court still finds that the district does not pass the eyeball test.

iii) communities of interest

Mr. Cooper testified that Cooper HD-145 stays entirely within the Macon-Bibb MSA. *Tr.* 166:19-20. Mr. Cooper's report also demonstrated commonalities shared by the portion of the district that is within Bibb County. About 91% of all persons and 96% of Black persons in Cooper HD-145 are Macon-Bibb residents. APAX 1 ¶ 201. One-third of the Black population and nearly half (47.5%) of Black children in Macon-Bibb live in poverty. *Id.* By contrast, 11.6% of the white population in Macon-Bibb and 14.1% of white children live in poverty. *Id.* The Court finds that there is evidence in the Record of the commonalities in the communities in Bibb County, but there is nothing about Monroe County.

*106 On cross-examination, Mr. Cooper was unable to provide an explanation of the connections between the communities in downtown Macon and Monroe County. *Tr.* 288:13–15. The Court credits Mr. Cooper's non-racial reasons for extending the district into Monroe County (population equality, incumbency protection, and avoidance of VTD splits). The Court finds, however, that this testimony does not remedy the lack of evidence about the commonalities between Monroe County and the rest of the district (even if that portion is only a small part of the districts composition).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-145 does not comply with the traditional redistricting principle of preserving communities of interest.

iv) conclusions of law

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous to constitute an additional majority-Black district. The proposed district is not compact, however. Although, Cooper HD-145 complies with traditional redistricting principles of contiguity, empirical compactness scores, and respect for political subdivisions, the Court finds that the district fails to comply with population

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equality to the same degree as Enacted HD-145, and it united disparate communities. Additionally, the Court finds that the district is not visually compact, it contains a tentacle that stretches into Monroe County, and the Record is devoid of any evidence showing a connection between this portion of the district and Bibb County. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not carried their burden on the first Gingles precondition in the area encompassed by Cooper HD-145.

(2) Grant

Based on the following analysis, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden in establishing that the Black community was sufficiently numerous and compact to create two additional majority-Black districts in the Macon-Bibb region.

Table 5: Illustrative House plan majority-Black districts with BVAP percentages.

District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%	District	BVAP%
38	54.23%	69	62.73%	91	60.01%	137	52.13%
39	55.29%	74	53.94%	92	68.79%	140	57.63%
55	55.38%	75	66.89%	93	65.36%	141	57.46%
58	63.04%	76	67.23%	94	69.04%	142	50.14%
59	70.09%	77	76.13%	95	67.15%	143	50.64%
60	63.88%	78	51.03%	113	59.53%	145	50.38%
61	53.49%	79	71.59%	115	53.77%	149	51.53%
62	72.26%	84	73.66%	116	51.95%	150	53.56%
63	69.33%	85	62.71%	117	51.56%	153	67.95%
64	50.24%	86	75.05%	126	54.47%	154	54.82%
65	63.34%	87	73.08%	128	50.41%	165	50.33%
66	53.88%	88	63.35%	129	54.87%	177	53.88%
67	58.92%	89	62.54%	130	59.91%		
68	55.75%	90	58.49%	132	52.34%		

Thus, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden with respect to the numerosity prong of the first Gingles precondition for the additional two majority-Black

(a) numerosity

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing that the Black voting age population in the area around Macon-Bibb is large enough to create two majority-Black House districts in the region. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (“[A] party asserting § 2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.”). It is undisputed that the proposed House districts—Esselstyn HD-145 and HD-149—have AP BVAP of 50.38% and 51.53%, respectively. Stip. ¶ 239, GX 1 ¶ 48 & tbl.5.

House districts that Mr. Esselstyn proposed in the Macon-Bibb region.

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(b) compactness

The Court also finds that Mr. Esselstyn drew two additional majority-Black districts in the Macon-Bibb region that are sufficiently compact and that comply with traditional redistricting principles.

i) Esselstyn HD-145

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have shown that it is possible to draw a legislative district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area encompassed by Esselstyn HD-145.

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-145 achieves population equality better than Enacted HD-145. Esselstyn HD-145 has a population deviation of -0.26%, whereas Enacted HD-145 has a population deviation of +0.59%. GX 1, attaches. I, J. Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-145 achieves relative population equality better than the Enacted HD-145 and complies with the General Assembly's population equality guidelines and traditional redistricting principles.

((2)) contiguity

*107 The Parties stipulated that Esselstyn HD-145 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 258. Hence, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-145 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

The Court finds that Enacted HD-145 and Esselstyn HD-145 are comparably the same under empirical compactness measures. Enacted HD-145 has a Reock score of 0.38 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.19. GX 1, Attach. L. Esselstyn HD-145 has a Reock score of 0.34 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.21. Id. Accordingly, Enacted HD-145 performs

better on the Reock measure (by 0.04 points) and Esselstyn HD-145 performs better on the Polsby-Popper measure (by 0.02 points). The Court finds that Enacted HD-145 and Esselstyn HD-145 are therefore comparably compact based on these objective compactness measures.


((4)) political subdivisions

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-145 demonstrates respect for political subdivisions. Esselstyn HD-145 contains portions of Bibb and Houston Counties. GX 1 ¶ 51 & fig.16. Enacted HD-145 contains portions of Bibb, Houston, Monroe, and Peach Counties. GX 1, Ex. L. As such, Esselstyn HD-145 contains two fewer county splits than Enacted HD-145. Moreover, Esselstyn HD-145 splits two VTDs (one in Houston and one in Bibb Counties)⁸⁴ while Enacted HD-145 splits four VTDs (one in Bibb and three in Houston Counties). GX 1, Ex. L. Accordingly, Esselstyn HD-145 splits fewer VTDs than Enacted HD-145, a factor that supports a finding that Esselstyn HD-145 exhibits respect for political subdivisions based on objective metrics.

((b)) eyeball test

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-145 is visually compact:

Figure 16: Map of central Black Belt region of illustrative plan with majority-Black House districts indicated.



GX 1 ¶ 51 & fig.16.

Esselstyn HD-145 does not have appendages or tentacles. Vera, 517 U.S. at 962–63, 116 S.Ct. 1941. Using the mapping tool, Esselstyn HD-145 is less than 20 miles in length at its most distant points. There is no evidence in the Record that suggests that Esselstyn HD-145 is not visually compact.

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Accordingly, the Court concludes that Esselstyn HD-145 is visually compact.

((c)) communities of interest

The Court also finds that Esselstyn HD-145 demonstrates respect for communities of interest. Mr. Esselstyn testified that HD-145 preserves communities of interest because it combines populations from adjacent counties in communities that are highly developed. *Tr. 578:22–579:10*. For example, Esselstyn HD-145 keeps an entire Air Force base intact. *Tr. 578:4–7*.

Commenting on Mr. Esselstyn's HD-145, Ms. Fenika Miller, a lifelong Houston County resident and community organizer, identified several needs and interests shared by the Black residents in this area. *Tr. 644:3–646:3*. Ms. Miller observed that North Houston County and South Bibb County both lack certain public services and accommodations. *Tr. 654:16–655:6*. North Houston County has one grocery store, no public transportation, and lacks parks and recreation services. *Tr. 654:16–22*. “And for South Bibb, that would be the same ... It used to be a thriving community and now most of those businesses have shuttered. And, typically, most of the shopping and the growth have moved.” *Tr. 654:23–655:2*.

*108 The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-145 is a small district contained in and around Macon. The communities share the same infrastructural concerns. Additionally, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-145 is not long and sprawling, and, as is evidenced by the size of the district and the trial testimony, preserves communities of interest.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact in Esselstyn HD-145 to constitute an additional majority-Black district. The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-145 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity, compactness scores, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, it is relatively small in size and does not contain any appendages or tentacles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their

burden in meeting the first Gingles precondition in the area drawn by Esselstyn HD-145.

i) Esselstyn HD-149

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have shown that it is possible to draw a legislative district consistent with traditional redistricting principles in the area of Esselstyn HD-149.

((a)) empirical measures

((1)) population equality

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 performs significantly better on population equality than Enacted HD-149—Esselstyn HD-149's population deviation is -0.20%, whereas Enacted HD-149's population deviation is -1.04%. GX 1 ¶¶ 46, 53 & attachs. I, J. Thus, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 complies with the principle of population equality.

((2)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Esselstyn HD-149 is a contiguous district. *Stip. ¶ 258*. Hence, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

((3)) compactness scores

Esselstyn HD-149 is also more compact on both compactness measures than Enacted HD-149. Esselstyn HD-149 has a Reock score of 0.44 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.28. GX 1, Attach. L. Enacted HD-149 has a Reock score of 0.32 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.22. *Id.* Accordingly, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 is reasonably compact as it compares to Enacted HD-149 under the objective compactness measures.

((4)) political subdivisions

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 respects political subdivisions. Esselstyn HD-149 includes all of Twiggs and

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
Wilkinson Counties and portions of Baldwin and Bibb Counties⁸⁵. GX 1 ¶ 51 & fig.16. Enacted HD-149 includes all of Wilkinson, Twiggs, Bleckley, and Dodge Counties and a portion of Telfair County. GX 1, Attach. I. Thus, both plans are primarily made up of whole counties—Esselstyn HD-149 splits two counties and Enacted HD-149 splits one.

However, Esselstyn HD-149 has more VTD splits than Enacted HD-149—Esselstyn HD-149 splits three VTDs in Baldwin and one in Bibb, whereas there are no VTD splits in Enacted HD-149. GX 1, Attach. L.⁸⁶ Mr. Esselstyn testified that these splits can be partially explained by his decision to keep Mercer University mostly intact (with an exception for one portion excluded because it would have split another VTD), as well as keeping the core of Milledgeville, Georgia College, and a Native American historical site intact. Tr. 491:3–13, 580:7–11. Although Esselstyn HD-149 contains more VTD splits than Enacted HD-149, the Court finds Mr. Esselstyn's explanations for keeping other specific subdivisions intact (i.e., colleges, landmarks, the cores of towns) to be credible. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn generally respected political subdivisions when he drafted Esselstyn HD-149.

((b)) eyeball test

*109 The Court also finds that Esselstyn HD-149 is visually compact:

Figure 16: Map of central Black Belt region of illustrative plan with majority-Black House districts indicated.



GX 1 ¶ 51 & fig.16.

Visually, the Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 does not have appendages or tentacles. Using the mapping tool, Esselstyn HD-149 is approximately 50 miles long at its most distant

points. Although generally a larger district than others at issue in this Order, Esselstyn HD-149 is still significantly smaller than Enacted HD-149, which is, at its most distant points, approximately 80 miles apart. GX 1, Attach. I.⁸⁷

There is no evidence in the Record disputing the visual compactness of Esselstyn HD-149 and thereby the Court finds Esselstyn HD-149 is visually compact.

((c)) communities of interest

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 respects communities of interest. Mr. Esselstyn testified that one commonality between all the individuals in Esselstyn HD-149 is that they are within the same Enacted Senate District (Enacted SD 25). Tr. 582:9–16. Additionally, a prior State House candidate from the area, Ms. Miller, testified that Esselstyn HD-149 contains rural communities that have few shopping areas, food security concerns, and no hospitals (individuals have to drive to either Macon or Milledgeville to go to the hospital). Tr. 653:18–25. This district also contains two places of higher education: Mercer University at one end of the district (in Bibb County) and Georgia College at the other (in Baldwin County, i.e., Milledgeville). Tr. 491:3–7, 579:21–58:7; see also Tr. 1898:2–16.

The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 adequately preserves communities of interest. The majority of the district is rural and shares the same infrastructure concerns. The district is not long and sprawling. Accordingly, Esselstyn HD-149 preserves communities of interest for purposes of the first Gingles precondition.

((d)) conclusions of law

The Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that the Black community in Esselstyn HD-149 is sufficiently numerous and compact to create an additional majority-Black district. The Court finds that Esselstyn HD-149 complies with the traditional redistricting principles of population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest. Additionally, when visually inspecting the district, does not contain any appendages or tentacles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden in showing the first Gingles precondition in the area drawn by Esselstyn HD-149.

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e)Southwest Georgia region

(1) Alpha Phi Alpha: Cooper HD-171

The Court finds that Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not carried their burden with respect to establishing that an additional compact majority-Black district in southwest Georgia could be drawn. To begin, the Court notes that following the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court concluded that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of success in proving a Section 2 violation in this area of the State. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1293–1302. “A substantial likelihood of success on the merits requires a showing of only *likely* or *probable*, rather than *certain* success.” Schiavo Ex. rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005). At trial, conversely, the plaintiffs have the higher burden of proving every aspect of their case by *a preponderance of the evidence*. See Mo. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 924, 930 (8th Cir. 2018).

*110 In conducting a thorough and sifting analysis of the evidence provided at the trial, the Court finds that while the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs met the lower threshold of proof at the preliminary injunction phase, they were unable to clear the hurdle of preponderance of the evidence at the trial. Accordingly, the Court finds that with the evidence currently before it, Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs were unable to show by a preponderance of the evidence that an additional compact majority-Black district could be drawn in southwest Georgia.

(a)numerosity

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have met their burden in showing that the Black voting age population in southwest Georgia is large enough to create an additional majority-Black House district. It is undisputed that Cooper HD-171 has an AP BVAP of 58.06%. APAX 1, AA-1. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Black population is sufficiently numerous to constitute an additional majority-Black district in southwest Georgia.

(b)compactness

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not shown that it is possible to draw an additional majority-Black House district in the area drawn by Cooper HD-171 consistent with traditional redistricting principles. As an initial note, Mr. Cooper explained that the district is drawn in the same general area as Enacted HD-153 and HD-171. APAX 1, ¶ 176 & fig.32. This differs from the preliminary injunction, where it was only compared to House District 153. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1295–96. Thus, the Court considers the differences between the districts proposed by the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs in its instant compactness analysis.

i) empirical measures

((a)) population equality

The Court finds that Cooper HD-171 achieves relative population equality. As stated above, the General Assembly did not enumerate the deviation range for the State House Districts. However, using the Enacted House Plan as a guide, the Enacted House Plan has a population deviation range between $\pm 1.40\%$. Stip. ¶ 302. In comparison, Cooper HD-171 has a population deviation of $+1.38\%$, which is within the population deviation of the Enacted House Plan. APAX 1, Ex. AA-1. However, of any of Mr. Cooper's illustrative districts, this district departs the most from the population deviation in the Enacted Plan. Enacted HD-171 has a population deviation of -0.46% , meaning that it is almost 1 percentage point closer to achieving perfect population deviation than Cooper HD-171. APAX 1, Ex. Z-1. Although Cooper HD-171's population deviation is within the acceptable range of, the Court finds that its wide disparity in comparison to the Enacted Plan is of concern.

Thus, while HD-171 district is consistent with the population deviations in Enacted House Plan, the Court finds that it does not respect population equality nearly to the same degree as Enacted HD-171.

((b)) contiguity

The Parties stipulated that Cooper HD-171 is a contiguous district. Stip. ¶ 300. Hence, the Court finds that Cooper HD-171 complies with the traditional redistricting principle of contiguity.

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((c)) compactness scores

The Court finds that Enacted HD-171 performs better on both compactness measures than Cooper HD-171. Enacted HD-171 has a Reock score of 0.35 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.37. APAX 1, Ex. AG-2. Cooper HD-171 has a Reock score of 0.28 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.20. APAX 1, Ex. AG-1.

At the preliminary injunction, the Court found that Mr. Cooper's illustrative district in this region had comparable compactness scores to its corollary. [Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity](#), 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1296. However, at the preliminary injunction, Mr. Cooper submitted an illustrative district that compared to Enacted HD-153, not HD-171. *Id.* Enacted HD-153 has a Reock score of 0.30 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.30, which are higher, but much closer to Cooper HD-171's scores of 0.28 and 0.20, respectively. *Id.*, APAX 1, Exs. AG-1, AG-2. However, Mr. Cooper has now changed the configuration of his illustrative district in this region, and now it correlates with Enacted HD-171, which has higher compactness scores in comparison.

*111 Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-171 is not as compact as Enacted HD-171, nor are the compactness scores as comparable to its corollary district as they were on the preliminary injunction evidence.


((d)) political subdivisions

The Court finds that Cooper HD-171 does not respect political subdivisions as well as Enacted HD-171. Cooper HD-171 splits two counties (Dougherty and Thomas) and keeps Mitchell County whole; whereas, Enacted HD-171 only splits Grady County and keeps Decatur and Mitchell Counties whole. APAX 1 ¶¶ 175, 177 & figs.32, 33. Cooper HD-171 splits seven VTDs, but Enacted HD-171 splits only one. APAX 1, Exs. AH-1, AH-3. Additionally, in drawing Cooper HD-171, Mr. Cooper created a split in neighboring Lee County, which was kept whole in the Enacted House Plan. [Tr. 290:23–291:12.](#)⁸⁸

Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-171 fails to respect political subdivisions as well as Enacted HD-171.

ii) eyeball test

The Court finds that Cooper HD-171 is visually compact under the eyeball test:



APAX 1 ¶ 177 & fig.33.

Using the mapping tool, the Court finds that at its most distant points, Cooper HD-171 is less than 60 miles long, which is consistent with the surrounding districts in the Enacted House Plan. *Id.* Ms. Wright testified that because of the decreases in population in the southern portion of the State, the map drawers had to collapse (i.e., consolidate) the prior districts to account for the population changes. [Tr. 1623:17–12.](#)

Cooper HD-171 does not contain any tentacles or appendages. In reviewing Cooper HD-171 the Court finds that it is visually compact, and thus passes the eyeball test.

iii) communities of interest

The Court finds Cooper HD-171 preserves communities of interest. Mr. Cooper offered extensive testimony regarding the connections between the communities included in Cooper HD-171, and the Court also received documentary evidence on point. Mr. Cooper pointed out that US-19 and the historic Dixie Highway run as a corridor through Mitchell County between Albany and Thomasville. APAX 1 ¶ 178. The communities along that corridor, such as Albany, Camilla, Pelham, Meigs, and Thomasville, work together under the auspices of the Southwest Georgia Regional Commission, including to designate the Dixie Highway as a state-recognized scenic byway. [Tr. 128:18-129:19, 294:23–295:4; APAX 54 \(Corridor Management Plan\); APAX 325 \(Designation of Historic Dixie Highway Scenic Byway\).](#)

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Mr. Cooper testified further about the connection between Thomasville and Albany: “there are commonalities between the Black population in Thomasville and the Black population in Albany. The two towns are only about 60 miles apart. It takes you about an hour to get there along Highway 9. They’re in the same high school football leagues.” *Tr.* 128:22-129:1. Bishop Reginald T. Jackson of the Sixth District AME also testified that Dougherty, Mitchell, and Thomas Counties—all included in Cooper HD-171—share certain similarities, including more “rural and agrarian” communities, similar education attainment levels, and income levels “at the lower end of middle class.” *Tr.* 382:12–19, 383:11–384:2. Further evidencing the connections between the communities in Cooper HD-171, Plaintiff Janice Stewart lives in Thomasville, but attends church at Saint Peter AME Church in Camilla, Georgia (in Mitchell County). *Stip.* ¶¶ 64, 80-81.

*112 Thus, the Court finds that there is sufficient testimony and evidence to show the Black community in Cooper HD-171 interacts with one another and shares a number of similar concerns. Mr. Cooper testified extensively about the communities that are contained within the district, the shared socio-economic factors, and the characteristics that unite them and Plaintiffs submitted lay witness testimonial evidence of the same. Accordingly, the Court finds that Cooper HD-171 preserves communities of interest.

iv) conclusions of law

Ultimately, the Court concludes that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have not met their burden in showing that a compact majority-Black district could be drawn in southwest Georgia. Although the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs were able to show that the district preserved communities of interest and was visually compact, the district fared far worse on all the objective measures of compactness than Enacted HD-171. Cooper HD-171 had the greatest population deviation disparity of any of Mr. Cooper's illustrative districts. The district is significantly less compact on both compactness measures. Additionally, the district split more counties than Enacted HD-171 and had the most political subdivision splits of any of Mr. Cooper's new majority-Black districts.

Of all of the illustrative districts submitted in these cases, no other illustrative district performed worse on all objective measures. Even Esselstyn HD-74 and Esselstyn SD-23, in the

companion Grant case, and Cooper SD-23, Cooper HD-133, and Cooper HD-145 performed equally or better on at least one objective measure. Moreover, the disparity in the performance on objective measures is stark here and does not lend to a finding that Cooper HD-171 is a reasonably compact district, consistent with traditional redistricting principles. Accordingly, the Court concludes that in southwest Georgia, the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs did not meet their burden under the first Gingles precondition.

* * * *

In sum, the Court makes the following conclusions with respect to the first Gingles preconditions.

The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact to create:

- Two additional majority-Black Senate districts in south-metro Atlanta, and
- One additional majority-Black House district in south-metro Atlanta, in the area depicted in Cooper HD-74.

The Grant Plaintiffs have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact to create:

- Two additional majority-Black Senate districts in south-metro Atlanta,
- One additional majority-Black House district in south-metro Atlanta, in the area depicted in Esselstyn HD-117,
- One additional majority-Black House district in west-metro Atlanta, and
- Two additional majority-Black house districts in the Macon-Bibb region.

Conversely, the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have **NOT** proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact to create:

- One additional majority-Black Senate district in the eastern Black Belt region,
- One additional majority-Black House district in south-metro Atlanta, in the area depicted in Cooper HD-117,

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- One additional majority-Black House district in the eastern Black Belt region,
- One additional majority-Black House district around the Macon-Bibb region, or
- One additional majority-Black district in southwest Georgia.

The Grant Plaintiffs have **NOT** proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Black community is sufficiently numerous and compact to create:

- *113 • One additional majority-Black Senate district in the eastern Black Belt region, or
- One additional majority-Black House district in south-metro Atlanta, in the area depicted in Esselstyn HD-74.

The Court now determines whether the Alpha Phi Alpha and Grant Plaintiffs have satisfied the remaining two Gingles preconditions, in the areas where they successfully proved the first Gingles precondition.

2. Second Gingles Precondition

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha and Grant Plaintiffs have each proven the second Gingles precondition for all their remaining proposed majority-Black districts.

a) Alpha Phi Alpha

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have met their burden in establishing the second Gingles precondition in the relevant areas. Dr. Handley evaluated 16 recent (2016-2022) general and runoff statewide elections, including for U.S. Senate, Governor, School Superintendent, Public Service Commission, and Commissioners of Agriculture, Insurance, and Labor. APAX 5, 5; Stip. ¶¶ 316-317. She also looked at 54 recent (2016-2022) State legislative elections in the areas of interest, including 16 State Senate contests and 38 State House contests. Tr. 890:2-12; APAX 5, 7-8; Stip. ¶ 324.

All 2022 State legislative contests in the Enacted Plans identified as districts of interest were analyzed, even if the contest did not include at least one Black candidate. APAX 5, 7-8. In addition, because there has only been one set of

State legislative elections under the Enacted Plans (in 2022), Dr. Handley also analyzed biracial State legislative elections held between 2016 and 2020 in the State legislative districts under the previous State House and State Senate plans in the seven areas of interest. Id.

Dr. Handley focused on elections that include at least one Black candidate, an approach that multiple courts have endorsed in other cases because they are the most probative for measuring racial polarization. Tr. 871:3-6, 872:11-14; see also id. at 871:10-14 (“[I]f I have enough contests that include Black candidates, I focus on those, because the courts have made it clear and because we want to make sure that Black voters are able to elect Black candidates of choice and not just white candidates of choice, if that’s what they choose to do.”); Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 801 (crediting Dr. Handley’s opinion that “courts consider election contests that include minority candidates to be more probative than contests with only White candidates, because this approach recognizes that it is not sufficient for minority voters to be able to elect their preferred candidate only when that candidate is White”); United States v. City of Eastpointe, 378 F. Supp. 3d 589, 610 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (“These [white-only] elections are, however, less probative because the fact that black voters also support white candidates acceptable to the majority does not negate instances in which a white voting majority operates to defeat the candidate preferred by black voters when that candidate is a minority.”); United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 598 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“These contests are probative of racial bloc voting because they ... featured African-American candidates.”).

*114 Courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, agree that reviewing biracial elections is probative of the polarization inquiry. Davis, 139 F.3d at 1417 n.5 (“[E]vidence drawn from elections involving black candidates is more probative in Section Two cases[.]”); Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1313 (“While still relevant, elections without a black candidate are less probative in evaluating the Gingles factors.”); see also Tr. 871:5-6; Tr. 2222:11-15. However, the Court wants to make clear, that a Section 2 violation does not require Black voters to vote for Black candidates and white voters to vote in opposition to Black candidates. See DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1027, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (explaining that this assumption is empirically false).

As the Court addressed in its credibility determinations, the Court agrees with the Alabama State Conference of the NAACP court that although elections with Black and

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white candidates may be the most helpful in determining polarization, the manner in which Dr. Handley chose her data set makes her findings less reliable. [Ala. State Conf. of NAACP](#), 612 F. Supp. 3d at 1274. However, the Court notes that the Parties stipulated to her findings and Defendants’ expert did not take issue with her data set. Stip. ¶¶ 318–341; 2199:11–2200:4

That Black voters in the seven areas of interest are politically cohesive is not contested. In fact, Defendant stipulated that in the 16 recent statewide general and general runoff elections from 2016-2022, Black voters were “highly cohesive” in their support for their preferred candidate. Stip. ¶¶ 320 (“In these 16 statewide general and general runoff elections from 2016-2022, Black voters were highly cohesive in their support for their preferred candidate.”), 330 (“In the seven areas of interest, Black voters were very cohesive in supporting their preferred candidates in general elections for statewide offices.”). As Dr. Handley concluded and Defendant stipulated, Black-preferred candidates typically received 96.1% of the Black vote in statewide races in these areas and only 11.2% of the White vote. Stip. ¶¶ 321, 322.

Dr. Handley's analysis of State legislative general elections in the areas of interest also found “starkly racially polarized” voting. Tr. 862:4-6; APAX 5, 7. As with the statewide general elections, “Black voters were very cohesive in support of their preferred candidates and white voters bloc voted against these candidates.” Tr. 890:19-21. Again, this is not contested—the Parties stipulated that, in State legislative general elections, Black voters were highly cohesive in their support for their preferred candidate. Stip. ¶¶ 326 (“In these 54 State legislative elections, Black voters were highly cohesive in their support for their preferred candidates.”), 335 (“In the seven areas of interest, Black voters exhibit cohesive support for a single candidate in State legislative general elections.”).

In all but one of the 54 State legislative elections that Dr. Handley analyzed (i.e., 98.1%) were starkly racially polarized, with Black candidates receiving a very small share of the white vote and the overwhelming support of Black voters. See Tr. 890:16-21; APAX 5, 7. As Dr. Handley concluded and the Parties stipulated, on average, over 97% of Black voters supported their preferred Black State Senate candidates and over 91% supported their preferred Black State House candidates. Stip. ¶ 327.

Defendant's expert, Dr. Alford, agreed “with [Dr. Handley's] analysis that Black voters in general elections in the areas of Georgia that she analyzed are very cohesive in their support for a single preferred candidate.” Tr. 2224:14-18. Consistent with the uncontested evidence, the Court finds that Black voters in the seven areas of Georgia that Dr. Handley analyzed are highly cohesive in supporting a single preferred candidate.⁸⁹ Moreover, the Black voter cohesion is stronger in the relevant areas (between 91 and 98%) than in the voter cohesion in Alabama (92.3%), which the Supreme Court agreed with the three-judge court was “very clear.” [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Accordingly, the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have satisfied the second [Gingles](#) precondition in the relevant areas.

b)Grant

*115 The Court finds that the [Grant](#) Plaintiffs have proven the second [Gingles](#) precondition as well. The [Grant](#) Plaintiffs’ expert in racial polarization, Dr. Palmer, determined that Black voters had a clearly identifiable candidate of choice in every election examined, across the focus areas and in each State Senate and House district. Stip. ¶¶ 268, 270; GX 2 ¶ 18, tbl.1 & figs.2–4. On average, Black voters supported their candidates of choice with 98.5% of the vote. Stip. ¶ 269; GX 2 ¶ 18.

Table 1: Average Support for Black-Preferred Candidates by Voters’ Race

	Focus Area	Black Voters	White Voters
House	Black Belt	98.1%	10.4%
	Southern Atlanta	98.7%	4.6%
	Western Atlanta	98.2%	7.7%
Senate	Black Belt	98.4%	8.2%


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Southern Atlanta

98.9%

10.7%

GX 2 ¶ 18 & tbl. 1.



GX 2 ¶ 18 & fig.2.

Defendants’ racially polarized voting expert, Dr. Alford, does not dispute Dr. Palmer’s conclusions as to the second Gingles precondition. DX 8, 2–5; Tr. 2251:2–5. However, Dr. Alford notes that in all of the races examined by Dr. Palmer, the Black voters’ candidate of choice was the Democrat candidate. DX 8, 4. As the Court discussed extensively in its Order on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the second and third Gingles preconditions are results based inquiries that do not require plaintiffs to prove that race cause the polarization or disprove that party caused the polarization. See Grant Doc. No. [229], 51–57. Thus, Dr. Alford’s suggestions about the cause and effect of racial polarization are not persuasive for the Gingles preconditions.

As the data above shows, Black voters in south-Metro and west-Metro Atlanta support the same candidate more than 98% of the time and in the Macon-Bibb region, Black voters supported the same candidate 98.1% of the time. GX 2 ¶ 18 & tbl.1. “Bloc voting by [B]lacks tends to prove that the [B]lack community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that [B]lacks prefer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-member, [B]lack majority district.”Gingles, 478 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. 2752. As was noted above, Dr. Palmer’s data shows that Black voter cohesion is greater in these areas than it is in Alabama (92.3%), where the Supreme Court credited the lower court’s finding of “very strong” Black voter cohesion. Allen, 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden on the second Gingles precondition. Based on the stipulated facts, expert reports, and testimony provided in this

case, the Court concludes that Black voters in the focus areas are politically cohesive.

3. Third Gingles Precondition

The Court also finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha and Grant Plaintiffs have proven the third Gingles precondition for all the legislative districts remaining.

a) Alpha Phi Alpha

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have met their burden in establishing the third Gingles precondition in their remaining proposed legislative districts. Dr. Handley concluded that the starkly racially polarized voting in the areas that she analyzed “substantially impedes” the ability of Black voters to elect candidates of their choice to the Georgia General Assembly unless districts are drawn to provide Black voters with this opportunity. See APAX 5, 22; see also Tr. 892:15-21.

Specifically, in the seven areas of interest, white voters consistently bloc voted to defeat the candidates supported by Black voters. See APAX 5, 21–22. Indeed, Dr. Handley testified that, in general elections, due to White bloc voting, candidates preferred by Black voters were consistently unable to win elections and will likely continue to be unable to win elections outside of majority-Black districts. See Tr. 890:16-21 (noting that in 53 out of 54 State legislative contests, “Black voters were very cohesive in support of their preferred candidates and white voters bloc voted against these candidates); cf. Tr. 863:9-11 (“In each of the areas, the districts that provided Black voters with an opportunity to elect were districts that were at least 50 percent Black in voting age population.”).

*116 Dr. Handley testified that white voters voted as a bloc against Black-preferred candidates in all the 16 general elections that she analyzed. Tr. 862:4-14, 877:14-21. As Dr. Handley concluded and Defendant stipulated, Black-preferred candidates typically received only 11.2% of the white vote. Stip. ¶¶ 321, 322. Similarly, in the State legislative elections Dr. Handley analyzed, the Black-preferred candidate on average secured the support of only

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10.1% of white voters in State Senate races and 9.8% of white voters in State House races. Stip. ¶ 328.

This pattern of white bloc voting against Black-preferred candidates is not contested. In fact, the Parties stipulated that white voters were “very cohesive” in their support for their preferred candidates in both statewide and State legislative general elections (Stip. ¶¶ 332, 336), and that the candidates preferred by white voters in the seven areas of interest are voting against the candidates preferred by Black voters (Stip. ¶ 337).

Defendant's expert, Dr. Alford, similarly agreed that “with small exceptions, white voters are highly cohesive” in “the general elections that Dr. Handley analyzed across the areas of interest in Georgia,” and that, in these general elections, “large majorities of Black and white voters are supporting different candidates.” Tr. 2224:25-2225:9; see also DX 8, 6.

Due to the low level of white support for Black-preferred candidates, Dr. Handley found that blocs of white voters in the areas of interest were able to consistently defeat Black-preferred candidates in State legislative general elections, except where the districts were majority Black. APAX 5, 22; Tr. 891:5-7 (“Black-preferred Black candidates were successful only in districts that were majority Black in the elections that I looked at.”). As Dr. Handley testified and Defendant stipulated, all but one of the successful Black State legislative candidates in the contests that Dr. Handley analyzed were elected from majority Black districts—the one exception being a district that was majority minority in composition. Stip. ¶ 329; Tr. 891:13-21.

“Because voting is starkly polarized in general elections,” Dr. Handley concluded that “without drawing districts that provide Black voters with an opportunity to elect [their candidate of choice] districts in the areas examined will not elect Black-preferred candidates.” Tr. 906:5-8. The Court finds that the uncontested evidence shows white voters in the relevant areas only vote for the Black-preferred candidate between 9.8% to 11.2% of the time. White voters in Georgia vote in opposition to the Black-preferred candidate at a higher rate than in Alabama (where 15.4% of white voters supported the Black-preferred candidate) where the Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court's finding of “very clear” racial polarization. *Allen*, 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Accordingly, the Court finds that the *Alpha Phi Alpha* Plaintiffs have met their burden and proved that white voters bloc vote in opposition to the Black-preferred candidate.

In other words, in the relevant areas, the Black-preferred candidate will typically be defeated by white voters in majority-white districts.

b)Grant

The Court also finds that the *Grant* Plaintiffs carried their burden on the third *Gingles* precondition. The *Grant* Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Palmer, demonstrated that white voters in the legislative focus area usually vote as a bloc to defeat Black-preferred candidates. This too has been stipulated by the Parties. Stip. ¶¶ 271–74. In each legislative district examined and in the focus areas as a whole, white voters had clearly identifiable candidates of choice for every election examined. GX 2 ¶ 18 & fig.2; Tr. 404:20–405:18.

*117 In the elections Dr. Palmer examined, white voters were highly cohesive in voting in opposition to the Black-preferred candidate. Stip. ¶ 271. On average, Dr. Palmer found that white voters supported Black-preferred candidates with only 8.3% of the vote. *Id.* ¶ 272; see also GX 2 ¶ 18. In other words, on average, 91.7% of the time white voters voted against the Black-preferred candidate.

Dr. Palmer then calculated in the success of Black preferred candidates in districts under the Enacted Plan. GX 2 ¶ 21. In the races examined, Dr. Palmer concluded that the Black-preferred candidate was only successful in majority-Black districts. GX 2 ¶ 21 & fig.4.




Figure 4: Average Performance of Black-Preferred Candidates by District

GX 2 ¶ 18 & fig.4. When he performed the same analysis with Mr. Esselstyn's illustrative majority-Black districts, he

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found that the Black-preferred candidate would have been successful in all of the elections that he analyzed. GX 2 ¶¶ 23, 25 & fig.5.

Overall, Dr. Palmer found “strong evidence of racially polarized voting across the areas ... examined.” GX 2 ¶ 7; see also GX ¶¶ 18–19; Tr. 398:10–16, 407:17–21. As a result of this racially polarized voting, candidates preferred by Black voters have generally been unable to win elections in the focus areas if not in a majority-Black district. Tr. 408:9–409:12; GX 2 ¶¶ 20–21 & fig.4. Dr. Palmer concluded that “Black-preferred candidates win almost every election in the Black-majority districts, but lose almost every election in the non-Black-majority districts.” GX 2 ¶ 21. Defendants’ expert Dr. Alford does not dispute Dr. Palmer’s conclusions as to the third Gingles precondition. DX 8, 2–3; Tr. 2251:6–9. However, Dr. Alford opined once more that in all of the elections that Dr. Palmer reviewed, the Black-preferred candidate was a Democrat and the white-preferred candidate was a Republican. DX 8, 3–5. The Court does not find Dr. Alford’s conclusion relevant to the Gingles preconditions because it relates to the *causes* and not the *effects* of voter behavior. See Section II(D)(1)(b)(2) *supra*.

Using the returns from the 31 statewide elections, Dr. Palmer also analyzed whether Black voters in Mr. Esselstyn’s additional majority-Black State Senate and House districts could elect their candidates of choice. GX 2 ¶¶ 22, 24, 25. He specifically concluded that “[i]n House Districts 64, 74, and 149, and Senate Districts 23, 25, and 28, the Black-preferred candidate won a larger share of the vote in all 40 statewide elections. In House District 117, the Black-preferred candidate won all 19 elections since 2018.” GX 2 ¶ 24 & tbl.9. Dr. Alford does not dispute Dr. Palmer’s performance analysis of Esselstyn’s Legislative Plan. Tr. 2250:20–22.




Figure 5: Vote Shares of Black-Preferred Candidates in Under the Illustrative Maps

PX 2 ¶ 25 & fig.5.

Again, the evidence of polarization is stronger in this case than it was in Allen: in the focus areas the highest average support of white voters for the Black-preferred candidate was 10.7%, whereas in Alabama 15.4% of white voters supported the Black-preferred candidates—which was “very clear” evidence of racially polarized voting. Allen, 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Based on the stipulated facts, expert reports, and testimony provided in this case, the Court concludes that white voters in Esselstyn SD-25, SD-28, HD-64, HD-74, HD-145, and HD-149 “very clearly” vote as a bloc to defeat Black-preferred candidates. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden in proving the third Gingles precondition.

* * * *

*118 The Court finds that in Cooper SD-17, SD-28, HD-74, HD-117 and Esselstyn SD-25, SD-28, HD-64, HD-117, HD-145, and HD-149, the Alpha Phi Alpha and Grant Plaintiffs, respectively, have proven all three Gingles preconditions by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the Court will evaluate whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the political process is equally open to Black voters in these areas.

4. Totality of the Circumstances

The Court now turns to the totality of the circumstances inquiry to determine if Georgia’s political process is equally open to the affected Black voters. Wright, 979 F.3d at 1288 (“[I]n the words of the Supreme Court, the district court

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is required to determine, after reviewing the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and, ‘based upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality, whether the political process is equally open to minority voters.’ ” (quoting [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752)).

For the proposed districts where Plaintiffs satisfied the [Gingles](#) preconditions, the Court must now determine if the electoral system is equally open to them. Put differently, the Court must determine if the Black voters in these areas have less of an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice based on race. [Wright](#), 979 F.3d at 1288.

Again, the Court notes that Georgia has made great strides since the passage of the Voting Rights Act to give Black voters more of an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. For example, Georgia’s current congressional delegation has five Black representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives and one Black senator. However, the Court acknowledges that as far as the State General Assembly’s representation is concerned, the numbers are less proportional.⁹⁰ See GX 1 ¶¶ 22 (indicating the Enacted State Senate Plan contains 14 majority-Black districts out of 56 districts, or 25%), 45 (indicating the Enacted State House Plan contains 49 majority-Black districts out of 180 districts,⁹¹ or approximately 27.2%).

Like the [Pendergrass](#) case, however, the whole of the evidence in the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) and [Grant](#) Plaintiffs’ case for the totality of the circumstances inquiry shows that, while promising gains have been made in the State of Georgia, the political process is not currently *equally* open to Black Georgians. When evaluating the Senate Factors, the evidence shows that Black voters have *less* of opportunity to partake in the political process than white voters. Thus, the Court determines that the totality of the circumstances inquiry supports finding a Section 2 violation in the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) and the [Grant](#) Plaintiffs’ case.

a) [Alpha Phi Alpha](#)

The Court finds that the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have proven that, under the totality of the circumstances, Georgia’s electoral system is not equally open to Black voters in the districts meeting the [Gingles](#) preconditions (i.e., Cooper SD-17, SD-28, SD-74).

(1) *Totality of circumstances inquiry: purpose and framework*

To reiterate, for a Section 2 violation to be found, the Court must conduct “an intensely local appraisal” of the electoral mechanism at issue, as well as a “searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reality.’ ” [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 19, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (citing [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752). The purpose of this appraisal is to determine the “essential inquiry” of a Section 2 case, which is “whether the political process is *equally open* to minority voters.” [Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP](#), 775 F.3d at 1342 (emphasis added) (quoting [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752). Put differently, the totality of the circumstances inquiry ensures that violations of Section 2 may only be found when “members of the protected class have *less opportunity* to participate in the political process.” [Chisom](#), 501 U.S. at 397, 111 S.Ct. 2354 (emphasis added).

*119 The legal framework for the totality of the circumstances inquiry is the same applied in the [Pendergrass](#) case. In short, in this analysis the Court considers the relevant Senate Factors—Georgia’s history of discrimination and its voting practices enhancing the opportunity for discrimination, racial polarization in elections, socioeconomic factors, use racial appeals, Black-candidate success in elections, elected officials’ responsiveness to the Black community, and the State’s policy justification for the enacted map. [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 44–45, 106 S.Ct. 2752. The Court also considers the proportionality achieved by the Enacted Legislative Plans. The Court ultimately concludes that the totality of the circumstances’ inquiry weighs in favor of finding a Section 2 violation in the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) case.

(2) *Senate Factors One and Three: historical evidence of discrimination and State’s use of voting procedures enhancing opportunity to discriminate*

The Court first turns to Georgia electoral practices, both past and present, that bear on discrimination against Black voters under Senate Factors One and Three.⁹² Senate Factor One focuses on “[t]he extent of any history of official discrimination in the state ... that touched the right of the members of minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process[.]” [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 36–37, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Senate Factor Three “considers ‘the extent to which the State or political subdivision has

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used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting.’ ” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44–45, 106 S.Ct. 2752).

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have presented evidence of both past and present history in Georgia that the State's voting practices disproportionately effect Black voters. Like in the Pendergrass case, the Court is careful in this analysis to assess both past *and present* efforts that have caused a disproportionate impact on Black voters. Allen, 599 U.S. at 19, 143 S.Ct. 1487. Both types of evidence are relevant because certainly “past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.” Greater Birmingham Ministries, 992 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74). But past discrimination and disproportionate effects cannot be completely overlooked. See Allen, 599 U.S. at 14, 19, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (assessing a history of discrimination in Alabama following Reconstruction); League of Women Voters, 81 F.4th at 1333 (asserting that “[p]ast discrimination *is relevant*” and citing to Allen). Accordingly, taking these statements from recent Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases, the Court and evaluates Georgia's practices of discrimination *past and present* as relevant evidence in the totality of the circumstances inquiry.

(a) historical evidence of discrimination broadly

Courts have continuously found that Georgia has a history of discrimination. Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1310 (“Georgia has a history chocked full of racial discrimination at all levels. This discrimination was ratified into state constitutions, enacted into state statutes, and promulgated in state policy. Racism and race discrimination were apparent and conspicuous realities, the norm rather than the exception.”); Cofield, 969 F. Supp. at 767 (“African-Americans have in the past been subject to legal and cultural segregation in Georgia[.]”); id. (“Black residents did not enjoy the right to vote until Reconstruction. Moreover, early in this century, Georgia passed a constitutional amendment establishing a literacy test, poll tax, property ownership requirement, and a good-character test for voting. This act was accurately called the ‘Disfranchisement Act.’ Such devices that limited black participation in elections continued into the 1950s.”).

*120 During the trial, Defendant stipulated that “up until 1990 we had historical discrimination in Georgia.” Tr. 1524:14–15. Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ experts conclusions are consistent with this assertion. Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Ward concluded that “Georgia has a long history of state-sanctioned discrimination against Black voters that extended beyond written law to harassment, intimidation and violence.” APAX 4, 1.⁹³ Another expert in these cases, Dr. Burton⁹⁴ opined that “[t]hroughout the history of the state of Georgia, voting rights have followed a pattern where after periods of increased nonwhite voter registration and turnout, the state has passed legislation, and often used extralegal means, to disenfranchise minority voters.” PX 4 at 10; see also Tr. 1428:3–24. The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jones, also testified that Georgia has “used basically every expedient ... associated with Jim Crow to prevent Black voters from voting in the state of Georgia.” Tr. 1162:9–11.

This unrebutted testimony and the extensive accounts of Georgia's history of discrimination in Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ expert reports demonstrate that Georgia's history—including its voting procedures—spans from the end of the Civil War onward. See, e.g., Tr. 1431:13–17; APAX 2, 7; APAX 4, 3–13. This history has uncontrovertibly burdened Black Georgians. Id.

(b) Georgia practice from the passage of the VRA to 2000

Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to address these discriminatory practices. One of the Voting Rights Act's provisions was the preclearance requirement, which mandated certain jurisdictions with well-documented practices of discrimination (including Georgia) to get approval from the federal government before making changes to their voting laws. 52 U.S.C. § 10304.

The Voting Rights Act, however, did not instantly translate into equal voting in Georgia. In fact, Dr. Jones opined that “Georgia resisted the VRA from its inception.” APAX 2, 8. In the early years following the passage of the VRA, “Georgia refused to submit new laws for preclearance.” Id. Specifically, between 1965 and 1967, Georgia submitted only one proposed change to DOJ for preclearance. Id. Among states subject to preclearance in their entirety, Georgia ranked second only to Alabama in the disparity in voter registration between its Black and white citizens in 1976. Tr. 1437:10–1438:3. These continued disparities following the VRA were at least caused because “Georgia resisted the Voting Rights

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Act [and] for a period, it refused to comply.” [Tr. 1163:9–17](#). Even still, from 1965 to 1981, the Department of Justice objected to more than 200 changes submitted by Georgia, which accounted for almost one-third of DOJ’s objections for all states during that period. [APAX 2, 8–9](#).

Georgia’s history of discrimination against Black voters did not end in 1981. When the VRA was reauthorized in 1982, the Senate Report specifically cited to Georgia’s discriminatory practices that diminished the voting power of Black voters. [S. Rep. 97-417](#), 9th Cong. 2d Sess. 10, 13 (1982). During the 2006 reauthorization process of the Voting Rights Act, Georgia legislators “took a leadership position in challenging the reauthorization of the [A]ct.” [Tr. 1164:2–17](#). As Dr. Jones reminds us, “Georgia’s resistance to the VRA is consistent with its history of resisting the expansion of voting rights to Black citizens at every turn.” [APAX 2, 9](#). Even following the 2000 Census, the district court in the District of Columbia refused to preclear the General Assembly’s Senate plan because the court found “the presence of racially polarized voting” and that “the State ha[d] failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the reapportionment plan for the State will not have a retrogressive effect.” [Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 94](#).

(c) more recent voting practices with a disproportionate impact on Black voters

***121** The Court moreover concludes that the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs submitted evidence of more recent practices in Georgia which disproportionately impact Black voters and have resulted in a discriminatory effect. These practices include county at-large voting systems, polling place closures, voter purges, and the Exact Match requirement. The [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs also rely on the Georgia General Assembly’s passage of SB 202 following the 2020 presidential election as evidence of recent and present practice disproportionately affecting Black voters.⁹⁵

As in [Pendergrass](#), the evidence in the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) case shows that following [Shelby County](#) and the end of pre-clearance, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that Georgia had adopted five of the most common restrictions that impose roadblocks to the franchise for minority voters: (1) voter ID laws, (2) proof of citizenship requirements, (3) voter purges, (4) cuts in early voting⁹⁶, and (5) widespread polling place closures. [Tr. 1442:3–12](#) (referencing [PX 4, 48–49](#)). No

other State has engaged in all five practices. [Id.](#) (referencing [PX 4, 48–49](#)).

The Court ultimately weighs the evidence submitted and determines that the evidence of Georgia’s present voting practices disproportionately impact Black voters. The Court proceeds by assessing the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs’ evidence of (i) at-large voting practices, (ii) Georgia’s practice of closing polling places, (iii) Georgia’s Exact Match requirement, (iv) the General Assembly’s passage of SB 202, and (v) the State’s rebuttal evidence of open and fair election procedures.⁹⁷ The Court finally (vi) renders its conclusion of law on this Senate Factor.

i) at-large voting

One example of a recent discriminatory practice that Dr. Jones relied on was recent use of at-large voting systems in Georgia. [APAX 2, 10–12](#). It is undisputed that as a state, Georgia does not use at-large voting systems. However, some counties do. In fact, as recently as 2015, a federal court, under Section 2, enjoined Fayette County’s use of at-large voting methods for electing members to the Fayette County Board of Commissioners and Board of Education. [Id.](#) (citing [Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1339 \(N.D. Ga. 2015\)](#)). Following the enactment of the remedial maps, a Black candidate was elected for the first time to the Fayette County Board of Commissioners. [APAX 2, 11](#). This evidence was un rebutted. The Court notes that Cooper SD-28 even contains a portion of Fayette County. [APAX 1 ¶ 99](#). The Court finds that the 2015 district court opinion finding that Fayette County’s use of at-large voting violated Section 2 is particularly persuasive in showing recent discriminatory practices in voting given that this county is a part of one of the challenged areas.

ii) polling place closures

***122** The Court finds that there is also compelling evidence that Georgia’s recent closure of numerous polling places disproportionately impacts Black voters. Between 2012 and 2018, Georgia closed 214 voter precincts, “decreasing the number of precincts in many minority majority neighborhoods.” [APAX 2, 29](#) (citing [Patrik Jonsson, “Voting After Shelby: How a 2013 Supreme Court Ruling Shaped the 2018 Election,” Christian Science Monitor, November 21, 2018, https://www.csrnmonitor.com/USAJustice/2018/1121/](#)

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Voting-after-Shelby-How-a-2013-Supreme-Court-ruling-shaped-the-2018-election; The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, “Democracy Diverted: Polling Place Closures and the Right to Vote,” at 32, September 2019, <https://civilrights.org/democracy-diverted/>). In five of the counties where the polls were closed Black turnout was under 50% in 2020, when it had been between 61.36% and 77.50% in the 2018 election. APAX 2, 29–30 (citing Mark Niese and Maya T. Prabhu, “Voting Locations Closed across Georgia after Supreme Court Ruling,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 31, 2018, <https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt-politics/votingprecincts-closed-across-georgia-since-election-oversight-1iftedJ bBkHxpflirn0Gp9pKu7dfirN/>; Georgia Secretary of State, “Elections,” 2018. <https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections>.)

A 2020 study found that “about two-thirds of the polling places that had to stay open late for the June primary to accommodate waiting voters were in majority-Black neighborhoods, even though they made up only about one-third of the state's polling places.” APAX 2, 30 (citing Stephen Fowler, “Why Do Nonwhite Georgia Voters Have to Wait in Line for Hours?,” ProPublica (Oct. 17, 2020), <https://www.propublica.org/article/why-do-nonwhite-georgia-voters-have-to-wait-in-line-for-hours-their-numbers-have-soared-and-their-polling-places-have-dwindled>). Additionally, on average, the “wait time after 7 p.m. across Georgia was 51 minutes in polling places that were 90% or more nonwhite, but only 6 minutes in polling places that were 90% white.” *Id.* The study that Dr. Jones cited for these statements is the same as the one cited by Dr. Burton that found that “[i]n 2020, the nine counties in metro Atlanta that had nearly half of the registered voters (and the majority of the Black voters in the state)[, but] had only 38% of the state's polling places.” PX 4, 50 n.173. Notably, at trial, both Drs. Jones and Burton testified consistently about polling place closures and that they disproportionately impacted Black voters. Tr. 1432:21–25; 1440:16–1441:21; 1347:10–1348:9.

The Court concludes that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ evidence of polling place closures—and, notably, in metro Atlanta where some of the challenged districts are located—is recent evidence of a voting practice with a disproportionate impact on Black voters.

iii) exact match

The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ evidence also shows Georgia’s voting practices include roadblocks to the voting efforts of minority voters in the form of the Exact Match system and the State’s purging of voter registration lists.⁹⁸ APAX 2, 23–28.

These practices, however, have been determined in prior decisions by the Court to *not* be illegal under federal law. The prior decisions upholding the Exact Match requirement and registration list purges certainly impact the weight to afford these voting practices. However, in this case, the evidence shows—without contradicting the prior legal determinations—that these practices have a *disproportionate effect* on Black voters for purposes of the instant totality of the circumstances’ inquiry. Specifically, when these prior decisions are considered in the light of the legal frameworks at issue, the Court finds that these practices can be used as evidentiary support of a disproportionate discriminatory impact on Black voters in Georgia without contradicting or minimizing the prior decisions upholding Georgia’s laws.

*123 Specifically, Georgia’s Exact Match procedure was determined to not violate VRA’s Section 2 because when the burden on voters, the disparate impact, and the State’s interest in preventing fraud were considered together, the weighing of these considerations counseled against finding a violation. Fair Fight Action, 634 F. Supp. 3d at 1246. The Exact Match ruling in Fair Fight relied on the Brnovich decision and emphasized that “the modest burdens allegedly imposed by [the Exact Match law], the small size of the disparate impact, and the State’s justifications” did not support a Section 2 violation. *Id.* at 1245–46 (quoting Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2346). Even without a Section 2 violation, however, the Court found that the Exact Match requirement disproportionately impacted Black voters given that: Black voters were a smaller portion of the electorate but as of January 2020, 69.4% of individuals flagged as “missing identification required” were African American, and 31.6% of the voters flagged for pending citizenship 31.6% were African American, whereas white voters only accounted for 20.9%. Fair Fight Action, 634 F. Supp. 3d at 1160, 1162; Tr. 1283:3–10. Thus, the Court’s decision in Fair Fight itself acknowledged that the Exact Match practice in Georgia has a *discriminatory impact* on Black voters—which is the inquiry specifically at issue here. When the Court considers Fair Fight’s determination in the light of the Civil Rights’ Commission’s report that generally

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Exact Match practices are a roadblock to minority voters, the Court concludes that this modern practice in Georgia supports that Georgia's modern voting practices have a discriminatory effect on Black voters.

iv) SB 202's disproportionate impact

The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs also cite to Georgia's passage of SB 202 as evidence of modern discrimination. The General Assembly passed SB 202 following the 2020 Presidential election. APAX 2, 28–29; Tr. 1182:1–9. A challenge to SB 202 is pending in the Northern District of Georgia and has not been resolved at the time the Court enters this Order.⁹⁹ In re SB 202, 1:21-mi-55555 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2021). The Court acknowledges that the evidence presented in that case is not presently before this Court.¹⁰⁰ Given this pending challenge to SB 202, the Court proceeds cautiously in an effort of judicial restraint, which counsels against the Court preemptively making any findings that could lead to inconsistent rulings with decisions already made or implicating the ultimate determination of the legality of the law.

With these qualifications in mind, the Court cannot ignore that evidence on SB 202 has been presented by the Plaintiffs as proof of present discriminatory practices in Georgia's treatment of Black voters. See, e.g., APAX 2, 28–29.¹⁰¹ Defendants likewise provided rebuttal testimony. See generally Tr. 2261–2307. The Court, treading cautiously, tethers its findings regarding SB 202 to the testimony and evidence advanced by the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs' experts *for purposes of the totality of the circumstances inquiry on the Senate Factors*. Namely, the Court considers the passage of SB 202, once again, as some evidence of practices with a disproportionate impact on Black voters. This conclusion is made with the expert conclusion of Dr. Burton in mind that “in Georgia [it] was the pattern that every time ... that Black citizens made gains in some way or another or were being successful, that the party in power in the state, whether it's Democrat or Republican, found ways or came up with ways to either disenfranchise, but particularly dilute or in some way make less effective the franchise of Black citizens than those of white citizens.” Tr. 1428:9–21. Dr. Burton specifically cites the passage of SB 202 as evidence of this pattern in his trial testimony (Tr. 1442:16–1444:25), which was incorporated by the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs in their case (Tr. 1464:10–25).

*124 Accordingly, the Court considers SB 202 as evidence of a current manifestation of a historical pattern that following an election, the General Assembly responsively passes voting laws that disproportionately impact Black voters in Georgia.

(d)Defendant's rebuttal evidence

The Court now turns to Defendants' rebuttal evidence. Defendants do not affirmatively rebut the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs' expert evidence with their own expert evidence. Instead, Defendants cross-examined Drs. Jones and Burton on the prior legal determinations upholding some of the voting practices raised. See, e.g., Tr. 1251:16–19. The Court, however, has already determined that it is not inconsistent with these prior rulings to now find that these voting practices have a discriminatory impact on Black voters for purposes of the instant totality of the circumstances. See Section II(D)(4)(a)(2)(iii) supra exact match section.

Defendants instead, through lay witness testimony, submitted that Georgia has implemented legislation to make it easier for all voters to participate.¹⁰² In favor of Defendants on these factors, the Court considers Mr. Germany's testimony about SB 202. Mr. Germany indicates that the motive for passing the law was to alleviate stress on the electoral system and increase voter confidence. Tr. 2265:3–23. Moreover, SB 202, among other things, expanded the number of early voting days in Georgia. Tr. 1476:7–9, 2269:8–21. Mr. Germany testified that Georgia employs no-excuse absentee voting (Tr. 2268:9–16) and was the second state in the country to implement automatic voter registration through the Department of Driver Services, which also allows voters to register the vote using both paper registration and online voter registration (Tr. 2263:12–20). Georgia furthermore offers free, state-issued, identification cards that voters can use to satisfy Georgia's photo ID laws. Tr. 2264:15–22.

The Court has also been presented additional evidence that immediately prior to Shelby County, the DOJ precleared Georgia's 2011 Congressional Plan. Tr. 1471:14–20. Moreover, following the passage of SB 202, Georgia experienced record voter turnout in the 2022 midterm election cycle. Tr. 1480:3–8.

(e)conclusion on Senate Factors One and Three

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In sum, the majority of the evidence before the Court shows that Georgia has a long history of discrimination against Black minority voters. This history has persisted in the wake of the VRA and even into the present through various voting practices that disproportionately affect Black voters. The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have provided concrete recent examples of the discriminatory impact of recent Georgia practices, some specifically in the area of the districts proposed.

Defendants conversely have submitted some recent evidence of Georgia increasing the access and availability of voting. The evidence even shows that *overall* voter turnout has increased in the most recent national election.¹⁰³ These efforts are commendable, and the Court encourages these developments. In the Court's view, however, it is insufficient rebuttal evidence. Thereby, *in toto*, the Court concludes that Georgia has a history—uncontrovertibly in the past, and extending into the present—of voting practices that disproportionately impact Black voters. Thus, Senate Factors One and Three on the whole weigh in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

(3) Senate Factor Two: racial polarization

*125 The second Senate Factor assesses “the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized.” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1305 (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426, 126 S.Ct. 2594). As indicated in the Alpha Phi Alpha Summary Judgment Order, polarization is a factor to be considered in the totality of circumstances inquiry, in addition to the second and third Gingles preconditions. Alpha Phi Alpha Doc. No. [268], 44. Pursuant to persuasive authority, the Court finds that when a Defendant has raised a race-neutral reason for the polarization, the Court must look beyond the straight empirical conclusions of polarization. See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1524 (plurality opinion) (finding that Defendants may rebut evidence of polarization by showing racial bias is based on nonracial circumstances); Uno, 72 F.3d at 983 (asserting the evidence of racial polarization on the second and third Gingles preconditions “will endure *unless* and *until* the defendant adduces credible evidence tending to prove the detected voting patterns can most logically be explained by factors unconnected to the intersection of race with the electoral system.”).

Defendants have consistently argued that partisanship is a race-neutral explanation for polarization of voters in

Georgia. See, e.g., Tr. 2410:18–2411:14. In an intentional discrimination context, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned courts “against conflating discrimination on the basis of party affiliation with discrimination on the basis of race [e]vidence of *race-based* discrimination is necessary to establish a constitutional violation.” League of Women Voters, 66 F.4th at 924.

The Court acknowledges that whether voter polarization is on account of partisanship or race is a difficult question to disentangle. During an extended colloquy with the Court, Dr. Alford testified that “voting behavior is very complicated” and that in his view democracy is about “voting for a person that follows their philosophy or they think is going to respond to their needs.” Tr. 2182:4–5; 2183:4–8. He went on to clarify that party identity and affiliation is exceptionally strong in this country and starts at a young age. Tr. 2183:8–2184:6.

Dr. Alford concluded that, from the empirical evidence presented by the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs, one cannot causally determine whether the data is best explained by party affiliation or racial polarization. He specifically testified:

[T]he kind of data that we use here, which is, you know ecological and highly abstract data, cannot demonstrate cohesion in sort of its natural form.

Much of the work on things like individual-level surveys, exit polls, et cetera, also make it very difficult in a non-experimental setting to demonstrate causation. It really takes an experimental setting. So there is some work done in experimental settings, but this is not an area of inquiry that is—scientific causation in the social sciences is very difficult to establish. This is not an area where there has been any work that's established that.

Tr. 2226:7–18.

The Court is not in a position to resolve the global question of what causes voter behavior. Such question is empirically driven, and one in which expert political scientists and statisticians do not agree. The Court can, however, assess the *evidence* of polarization presented at trial. In doing so, the Court determines that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have shown sufficient evidence of racial polarization in Georgia voting for this factor to weigh in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

First, the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs present Dr. Handley's report, indicating strong evidence of racial polarization in

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voting. APAX 5. Plaintiffs also offered testimony about the strong connection between race and partisanship as it currently exists in Georgia. Dr. Handley testified that Black and white voters have, for over decades, realigned their partisan affiliations based on the political parties' positions with respect to racial equality and civil rights. See Tr. 885:1-886:7. See also APAX 10, 4 (“Researchers have traced Southern ealignment—the shift of white voters from overwhelming support for the Democratic party to nearly equally strong support for the Republican party—to the Democratic party's support for civil rights legislation beginning in the 1960s.”).

*126 This testimony was supported by various experts in the case. Dr. Burton testified that in the 1960s there was a “huge shift of African-Americans from the party of Lincoln, the Republican party, to the Democratic party and the shift of white conservatives from the Democratic party to the Republican party.” Tr. 1445:4-7. Dr. Ward testified that race has consistently been the best predictor of partisan preference since the end of the Civil War. Tr. 1343:14-25. Dr. Ward explained that racially polarized voting has “been

the predominant trend through political eras and political cycles” and even though “Black party preference has shifted dramatically from reconstruction to the present, [] more often than not, that party preference is dramatic and demonstrable.” Tr. 1343:17-20.

Moreover, Dr. Ward described how the composition and positions of political parties in Georgia were forged in response to the history of Black political participation. APAX 4, 3, 19-20. Dr. Burch's testimony regarding political science studies of the Black Belt is consistent: “living in Black belt areas with ... legacies of slavery predict white partisan identification and racial attitudes.” APAX 6, 33.

Empirically, Dr. Burton testified about the success of Black candidates in the light of the percentage of white voters in the district. ¹⁰⁴ The following chart was displayed during the trial and presents his findings:

Winning Candidates in 2020 in Georgia House of Representatives

Percentage white registered voters in district	White Republicans ¹⁹⁷	Black Democrats	White Democrats
Under 40%	0	48	7
40-46.2%	1	3	2
46.2-54.9	11	1	6
55-62.4%	23	0	5
Over 62.4%	68	0	0

Winning Candidates in 2020 in Georgia State Senate

Percentage white registered voters in district	White Republicans	Black Democrats	White Democrats
Under 47%	0	16	1
47-54.9%	3	0	3
Over 55%	51	0	0

PX 4, 56 (footnote content omitted).
 Clearly there is a meaningful difference in Black candidate success depending on the percentage of white voters in

a district. When the white voter percentage is lowest, Black Democratic candidates have the most success. This effect inverts as the percentage of white voters increases, culminating in *no* Black Democrat candidate success

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(regardless of party) when the white voter percentage reaches 47% (for the State Senate) or 55% (for the State House). PX 4, 56. These findings are consistent with Dr. Palmer's un rebutted findings about the challenged districts: Black voters voted for the same candidate, on average, 98.4% of the time and white voters voted for a different candidate, on average, 87.6% of the time. Stip. ¶¶ 219, 223.

In contrast to this evidence, Defendants' expert, Dr. Alford, provided the Court with data from the most recent Republican primary election where Herschel Walker was a candidate and received 60% of both Black and white voters votes. DX 8, 9 & tbl. 1; Tr. 2209:3–13. He qualified that the number of Black voters who voted in the Republican primary was small, therefore, he could not conclude that Mr. Walker was the Black-preferred candidate. Tr. 2237:18–19. But rather, the data showed that white voters did not vote as a bloc to defeat Walker's candidacy. Tr. 2237:19–21. His remaining analysis involved descriptive conclusions based on Dr. Handley's data set and, most importantly, did not offer additional support for a conclusion that voter behavior caused by partisanship rather than race. See generally DX 8.

*127 In light of the foregoing evidence, the Court finds that Senate Factor Two weighs heavily in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

(4) Senate Factor Five:¹⁰⁵ socioeconomic disparities

Senate Factor Five considers socioeconomic disparities between Black and white voters and these disparities' impact on Black voter participation. The Eleventh Circuit recognized in binding precedent that “disproportionate educational, employment, income level, and living conditions arising from past discrimination tend to depress minority political participation.” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d at 1568). “Where these conditions are shown, and where the level of black participation is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further causal nexus between their disparate socio-economic status and the depressed level of political participation.” Id. (quoting Marengo Cnty., 731 F.2d at 1568–69); Dallas Cnty. Comm'n, 739 F.2d at 1537 (“Once lower socio-economic status of [B]lacks has been shown, there is no need to show the causal link of this lower status on political participation.”).

(a) Black voter participation

The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have shown that Black voters have lower voter turnout rates than white voters. Dr. Burch testified that in the 2020 statewide general election that white voters had a turnout rate of 67.4%. Tr. 1051:7–12. Depending on whether she calculated the voting age population for SR Black¹⁰⁶ or Black alone and in combination¹⁰⁷, or registered Black voter turnout¹⁰⁸ ranged between 53.7% to 55.8%. Meaning, that that the disparity between white and Black voter turnout ranged from 11.6 to 13.7%. APAX 6, 6–7; Tr. 1051:7–18. Specifically, in the metro Atlanta clusters, Dr. Burch calculated that in the 2020 election, the east Atlanta cluster had a voter turnout gap between 11.8% and 14.6%, the southwest Atlanta cluster had a voter turnout gap between 9.2% and 12.4%, and southeast Atlanta cluster had a voter turnout gap between 10.1% and 13.0%. APAX 6, 10 & figs. 1–3.

In the 2022 general election, again, statewide white voter turnout exceeded Black voter turnout between 11.1% and 13.3%.¹⁰⁹ Tr. 1052:6–13. Dr. Burch determined that the turnout gap also persisted across the county clusters at issue in this case for both 2020 and 2022 general election data. Tr. 1051:22–1052:2 (“So with respect to the county clusters, I saw a pretty sizable turnout gap in 2020 for almost all of the county clusters that I analyzed no matter how I calculated it. And I think the lowest gap was I think – in 2020 was 8.9 percentage points. So even with those county clusters it was a sizable gap.”); id. at 1052, 114 S.Ct. 2647: 16–18 (“Again, in 2022, we still see gaps even in all of the turnout clusters—in all of the county clusters, Black voters still vote less than white voters in those clusters.”)¹¹⁰; APAX 6, 7–10, 11–13.

*128 Defendants did not put forth rebuttal evidence contesting that Black voter participation in the political process was lower than white voters. Defendants also did not challenge or rebut the accuracy of Dr. Burch's findings on voter turnout, but rather questioned the choices that she made when considering which elections to consider and what counties were included in which clusters. Tr. 1106:16–1115:6. On cross-examination, Defendant did not rebut that there is a voter turnout gap between white and Black voters in Georgia.

The Court also understands Defendant to argue that Black voter turnout is, at least, in part motivated by voter excitement for the candidate. Tr. 1114:1–22. The Court is not persuaded

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by this argument. Even assuming that Defendant's theory of voter mobilization could be a valid legal argument rebutting statistical evidence of depressed Black voter turnout, Defendants submitted no evidence connecting lower Black voter turnout to a lack of motivation to vote. Some nonempirical testimonial evidence on cross examination that the candidates on a ballot impact voter turnout is insufficient to rebut the expert statistical evidence presented by the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs that Black voter turnout is, on the whole and across elections, disproportionately lower than white voter turnout, and that Black voters participate less in the political process than white voters. Thus, the Court concludes that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs submitted evidence that Black Georgians participate in the political process, both generally and in voter turnout, less than white voters.

(b)socio-economic disparities

The Court also concludes that there is sufficient evidence in the Record to show disproportionate educational, employment, income level, and living conditions arising from past discrimination. Black Georgians suffer disparities in socioeconomic status, including in the areas of education, employment, and income. APAX 6, 13-21. As Defendant acknowledged, with respect to “[s]ocioeconomic disparities[,] I don't think you'll find a lot of disagreement from the parties here. The census numbers are what they are.” Tr. 49:4-6. According to Census estimates, the unemployment rate among Black Georgians is 8.7% and the unemployment rate among white Georgians is 4.4%. Stip. ¶ 342.

The Census estimates that 21.5% of Black Georgians are living below the poverty compared to 10.1% of white Georgians. Stip. ¶ 344. Black Georgians also receive SNAP benefits at a higher rate than white Georgians, with 22.7% of Black Georgians receiving SNAP benefits compared to 7.7% of white Georgians. Id. ¶ 345.

According to Census estimates, 13.3% of Black adults in Georgia lack a high school diploma, compared to 9.4% of white adults in Georgia. Stip. ¶ 346. 35% of white Georgians over the age of 25 have obtained a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to only 24% of Black Georgians over the age of 25. Id. ¶ 347. The rate of poverty for Black Georgians is more than twice that of white Georgians. Tr. 1059:2-4. The median income for Black Georgian households is about \$25,000 less than that of white Georgian households. Tr. 1059:4-6. Black

Georgians experience poverty rates more than double those of white Georgians. APAX 6, 19.

Black Georgians fare worse than white Georgians in terms of various health outcomes, such as infant mortality, hypertension, diabetes, obesity, overall mortality rates, and cancer. APAX 6, 31-33; Tr. 1063:22-1064:7. Black Georgians between the age of 19-64 years old are more likely to lack health insurance than white Georgians in the same age demographic, which affects access to health care and health outcomes. APAX 6, 32; Tr. 1064:11-16.

*129 The Court concludes that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to show that socio-economic disparities between white and Black Georgians, where Black Georgians are generally impacted more negatively than white Georgians on a number of metrics.

(c)conclusions on Senate Factor Five

Under binding precedent, the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have proven that rates of Black voter political participation are depressed as compared to white voters participation. The aforementioned evidence also shows that Black Georgians suffer from significant socioeconomic disparities, including educational attainment, unemployment rates, income levels, and healthcare access. When both of these showings have been made, the law does not require a causal link be proven between the socioeconomic status and Black voter participation. Wright, 979 F.3d at 1294.¹¹¹ Accordingly, the Court concludes that the socioeconomic evidence and the lower rates of Black voter participation support a finding that Senate Factor Five weighs heavily in favor of a Section 2 violation.

(5) Senate Factor Six: racial appeals in Georgia's political campaigns

Senate Factor Six “asks whether political campaigns in the area are characterized by subtle or overt racial appeals.” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1296. Courts have continually affirmed district courts’ findings of “overt and blatant” as well as “subtle and furtive” racial appeals. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 40, 106 S.Ct. 2752; see also Allen, 599 U.S. at 22-23, 143 S.Ct. 1487. However, in the Alabama district court proceedings, preceding the Allen appeal, the trial court assigned less weight to the evidence of racial appeals because the plaintiffs

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had only shown three examples of racial appeals in recent campaigns, but did not submit “any systematic or statistical evaluation of the extent to which political campaigns are *characterized* by racial appeals” and thus the court could not be evaluate if these appeals “occur frequently, regularly, occasionally, or rarely.” [Singleton](#), 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 (emphasis added).

Similarly here, the Court finds that there is evidence of isolated racial appeals in recent Georgia statewide campaigns. However, there is no evidence for the Court to determine if these appeals *characterize* political campaigns in Georgia. Thus, while the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs submitted evidence of discrete instances¹¹² in recent elections where racial appeals were invoked—which is “some evidence” of political campaigns being characterized by racial appeals—the Court cannot meaningfully evaluate whether these appeals “occur frequently, regularly, occasionally, or rarely” and thereby does not afford great weight to this factor. [Singleton](#), 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1024.

(6) Senate Factor Seven: minority candidate success

***130** Senate Factor Seven “focuses on ‘the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.’ ” [Wright](#), 979 F.3d at 1295 (quoting [LULAC](#), 548 U.S. at 426, 126 S.Ct. 2594). Unlike the second and third [Gingles](#) preconditions, the Court now must specifically look at the success of *Black* candidates, not just the success of Black preferred candidates. Assessing the results of Georgia’s recent elections, the Court finds that Black candidates have achieved little success, particularly in majority-white districts.

As a population, Black Georgians have historically been and continue to be underrepresented by Black elected officials across Georgia’s statewide offices. Georgia has never

elected a Black governor (Stip. ¶ 349) and Black candidates have otherwise only had isolated success in statewide partisan elections in the last 30-years. Specifically, in 2000, David Burgess was elected Public Service Commissioner, in 2002 and 2006 Mike Thurmond was elected to Labor Commissioner, and in 1998, 2002, and 2006 Thurbert Baker was elected Georgia Attorney General.¹¹³ Stip. ¶ 361. Most recently, after 230 years of exclusively white Senators, Senator Raphael Warnock was twice elected to U.S. Senate and in his most recent election he defeated a Black candidate. [APA](#) Doc. No. [284], 11. Finally, nine Black individuals have been elected to statewide nonpartisan office in Georgia. Stip. ¶ 362.

In Georgia’s congressional elections, only 12 Black candidates have ever been elected to the Congress. Tr. 1201:1–5. Five Black individuals serve in the United States House of Representatives from Georgia’s current congressional districts. Stip. ¶ 359. Four of these Black congresspersons are elected in majority-Black districts. PX 1, K-1. The other Black Representative, congresswoman Lucy McBath, represents Congressional District 7.

In State legislative districts, the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus has only 14 members in the Georgia State Senate (25%) and 41 members in the Georgia House of Representatives (less than 23%).¹¹⁴ Stip. ¶ 348. As incorporated in the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) case, Dr. Burton’s testimony referred to the 2020 and 2022 legislative elections, where Black candidates had little to no success when they did not make up the majority of a district.¹¹⁵ Specifically, Black candidates in the 2020 legislative elections did not have any success when they did not make up at least 45.1% of a House District or 53.8% of a Senate District.

Winning Candidates in 2020 in Georgia House of Representatives

Percentage white registered voters in district	White Republicans ¹⁹⁷	Black Democrats	White Democrats
Under 40%	0	48	7
40-46.2%	1	3	2
46.2-54.9	11	1	6
55-62.4%	23	0	5

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Over 62.4%	68	0	0
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Percentage white registered voters in district

White Republicans

Winning Candidates in 2020 in Georgia State Senate

Black Democrats

White Democrats

Under 47%

0

16

1

47-54.9%

3

0

3

Over 55%

51

0

0

PX 4, 56.

Although the Court finds that Black candidates have achieved some success in statewide elections following 2000, the Court ultimately concludes Senate Factor Seven weighs heavily in favor of the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court in Gingles, when discussing the success of a select few Black candidates, cautioned courts in conflating the success of a few minority candidates as dispositive. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 76, 106 S.Ct. 2752.

*131 In short, since Reconstruction, Georgia has only elected *four* Black candidates in statewide partisan elections: Mike Thurmond, Thurbert Baker, David Burgess, and Raphael Warnock. Stip. ¶ 361. For statewide non-partisan elections, Georgia has elected nine successful Black candidates: Robert Benham, Leah Ward-Sears, Harold Melton, Verda Colvin, John Ruffin, Clarence Cooper, Herbert Phipps, Yvette Miller, Clyde Reese. Stip. ¶ 362. Georgia has sent twelve successful Black candidates to the U.S. House of Representatives. Tr. 1201:1–5. Currently, there are 55 members of the Georgia General Assembly that are in Georgia's Legislative Black Caucus (of 236 total members), and all are elected from majority-minority districts. Stip. ¶ 348; APA Doc. No. [284], 8–9. The Court concludes that these isolated successes of Black candidates show that the Black population is underrepresented in Georgia's statewide elected offices. This conclusion is even stronger in majority-white districts.

To be sure, Dr. Burton acknowledged, and even affirmed that some academic scholarship indicates that “the future electoral prospects of African-American statewide nominees in growth states such as Georgia are indeed promising.” Tr. 1470:2–24. The Court likewise is hopeful about the prospects increased enfranchisement of all voters and for the potential success of minority candidates in Georgia. However, Dr.

Burton also emphasized that, specifically in Georgia, dating back to Reconstruction increased minority success led to “more legislation from whichever party is in power [to] disenfranchise or at least dilute or make the vote count less.” Tr. 1470:14–16. Accordingly, the optimism about Georgia's future elections does not rebut the contrary evidence of the present success of Black candidates; accordingly, the Court finds that Senate Factor Seven weighs heavily in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

(7) Senate Factor Eight: responsiveness to Black residents

Senate Factor Eight considers whether elected officials are responsive to the particularized needs of Black voters. A lack of responsiveness is “evidence that minorities have insufficient political influence to ensure that their desires are considered by those in power.” Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d at 1572. The Eleventh Circuit noted that “although a showing of unresponsiveness might have some probative value a showing of responsiveness would have very little.” Id. Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Burch, discussed the existence of significant socioeconomic disparities between Black and white Georgians, which he concluded contributed to the lower rates at which Blacks engage their elected representatives. APAX 6, 36. Id.

The Court cannot from the evidence before it find that its passage was due to the responsiveness or lack thereof to Black voters. There is no evidence that shows that a particular legislator received a complaint about pieces of legislation and ignored it. Accordingly, the Court finds that evidence about legislation is not persuasive.

Dr. Burch also concluded that socioeconomic disparities such as: education, residential conditions, incarceration rates, and healthcare concerns demonstrate that the Georgia legislature

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is not responsive to the Black community. APAX 6, 34. A number of lay witnesses testified about socioeconomic issues affecting Black voters. *Tr.* 639:24-640:25, Eric Woods Dep. *Tr.* 53:8-54:1; Phil Brown Dep. *Tr.* 67:12-68:1.¹¹⁶ However, there is evidence that concerns about healthcare access, education, property taxes, and gun safety are not unique to Black citizens. *Tr.* 639:24-640:25.

*132 The Court finds that the arguments regarding socioeconomic disparities are not particularly helpful in determining whether Georgia's elected officials are responsive to Black Georgians. The Court finds that although there is evidence about concerns that Black voters have, there is not sufficient evidence that their representatives are not responsive to their needs.¹¹⁷

Ultimately, there is an absence of evidence regarding the level of responsiveness of Georgia's elected representatives to Black voters and white voters. Due to the lack of evidence, the Court finds that Senate Factor Eight does not weigh in favor of finding a Section 2 violation. *See* [Greater Birmingham Ministries](#), 992 F.3d at 1334 (finding that failure to consider amendments to a particular piece of legislation does not show that legislatures were unresponsive to the needs of minority voters).

(8) Senate Factor Nine: justification for the Enacted Congressional Plan

The Court finds that the State's justification for the Enacted State Legislature Plans factor favors Defendants and thus weighs against finding a Section 2 violation.

At the trial, Ms. Wright testified that the Enacted Congressional Plan began with the creation of a blank map that largely balanced population that then could be modified based on input from legislators. *Tr.* 1622:11-13. Ms. Wright also relied on information obtained from the public hearings on redistricting. *Tr.* 1668:24-1670:5. Political performance was an important consideration in the design of the Enacted Congressional Plan. *Tr.* 1669:20-23. In Enacted CD-6 specifically, Ms. Wright justified that the four-way split of Cobb County by asserting that Cobb County was better able to handle a split of a congressional district than a smaller nearby county. *Tr.* 1672:9-1673:4. She further testified that the inclusion of parts of west Cobb County in Enacted CD-14 was because of population and political considerations, namely putting a democratic area into District 14 instead

of District 11 (which was more political competitive). *Tr.* 1674:6-1675:2.

Similarly, for the Enacted House Plan, Ms. Wright started with a blank map and the ideal district size given the population changes. *Tr.* 1642:7-23. Initially, she did not consider incumbency and instead drew a map based solely on population. *Tr.* 1642:15-18. Ms. Wright then integrated information from public hearings regarding the public's preferences. *Tr.* 1643-46. In the Macon-Bibb area, specifically, she testified that there were comments about wanting to keep House Districts 142 and 143, majority-Black districts, in Macon-Bibb because the representatives were well-liked in the community. *Tr.* 1659:6-15. Eventually, she drafted the maps to avoid incumbency pairings and county splits. *Tr.* 1448:9-21. Ms. Wright testified that the growth in Georgia was concentrated in the north (i.e., metro-Atlanta), which caused districts to be moved from the south into that area. *Tr.* 1469:16-19. Again, political performance was an important consideration in drafting the Enacted State House Plan. *Tr.* 1468:5-8.

*133 The [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs do not challenge that this is the process the State used to draw the Enacted Legislative Plans. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants' evidence that the Enacted Legislative Plans were drawn to further partisan goals to be a sufficient, non-tenuous justification. Accordingly, Senate Factor Nine does not weigh in favor of a Section 2 violation.¹¹⁸

(9) Proportionality

Finally, the Court determines that proportionality does not weigh against finding a Section 2 violation in the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs' case. Currently, 25% of the State Senate and 27.2% of the State House elect members from majority-Black districts and the AP Black population is 33.03% of the State. APAX 1 ¶¶ 15, 17, 41

Defendant argued, however, that Black voters have proportional representation in the General Assembly because 43% of the State House and 41% of the State Senate are Democrats, which is the Black-preferred candidate. *Tr.* 36:16-23. The Court categorically rejects Defendant's argument. First, the Court finds that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that every Democrat member of the General Assembly is a Black-preferred candidate.¹¹⁹ This suggestion, absent supporting empirical evidence, leans

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dangerously close to “the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial group ascribes to certain minority views that must be different from those of other citizens.” DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1027, 114 S.Ct. 2647.

Furthermore, the number of Black-preferred candidates who are successfully elected is not the proper consideration for proportionality. As the Court’s summary judgment order in the Pendergrass case reflects, the proper metric for determining proportionality is the number of majority-Black districts in proportion to the Black population, *not* the number of Black-preferred candidates elected. Pendergrass Doc. No. [215], 72; see also De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1014 n.11, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (“ ‘Proportionality’ as the term is used here links the number of majority-minority voting districts to minority members’ share of the relevant population ... This proviso speaks to the success of minority candidates, as distinct from the political or electoral power of minority voters.”).

Here, therefore, the relevant numbers to consider in the proportionality analysis are the number of majority-minority districts in the Enacted Legislative Plans. Only 25% of the State Senate districts are majority-Black (14 districts of 56 districts total). APAX 1 ¶ 15. In the State House, 27.2% of the districts are majority-Black (49 districts of the 180 districts total).¹²⁰ APAX 1 ¶ 17. The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ additional two State Senate districts that survive the Gingles preconditions bring the proportion of majority-Black Senate districts only to 28.6% of the total districts.¹²¹ And the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ additional one House district similarly only increases the proportion of majority-Black districts to be 27.8% of the total.¹²² These proportions fall below both the AP Black population in the State (33.03% (Stip. ¶ 97)) and the AP Black voting age population (31.73% (Stip. ¶ 104)). Thus, proportionality is not achieved in the State House or State Senate, under the Enacted Plan or with the addition of two State Senate districts and one State House district. Thus, the Court concludes that proportionality does not weigh against the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs.

(10) Conclusions of law

***134** The Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have met their burden in establishing that (1) the Black community in south-metro Atlanta is sufficiently numerous and compact to constitute two additional majority-Black Senate districts and one additional majority-Black House

district; (2) the Black community is politically cohesive in this area; and (3) that the white majority votes as a bloc to typically defeat the Black communities’ preferred candidate in these areas. The Court also finds that in evaluating the Senate Factors, Georgia’s electoral system is not equally open to Black voters in these regions of the State. Specifically, the Court finds that Senate Factors One, Two, Three, Five, and Seven weigh in favor of showing the present realities of a lack of opportunity for Black voters. The Court also finds that Senate Factor Six weighs slightly in favor finding a Section 2 violation. Thereby, only Senate Factors Four, Eight¹²³ and Nine did not weigh in favor of finding a Section 2 violation. The Court also found that proportionality does not weigh against the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs. In sum, the Court finds that a majority of the totality of the circumstances evidence weighs in favor of finding a Section 2 violation in the proposed districts in metro Atlanta. Because the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have carried their burden of proof on all of the legal requirements, the Court concludes that SB 1EX and HB 1EX violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

b) Grant

(1) Totality of circumstances inquiry standards and incorporation of the Pendergrass Case’s Analysis on Senate Factors One, Three, Five¹²⁴, Six, Seven, and Eight

The standards governing the Court’s totality of the circumstances inquiry are the same in Grant Plaintiffs’ case as they were in Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ case. See Section II(C)(4) *supra*. Hence, the Court considers the aforementioned Senate Factors to determine if Grant Plaintiffs met their burden to show that the political process is not equally open to minority voters in Georgia.

Moreover, the totality of the circumstances evidence in both the Pendergrass case and the Grant case is largely the same. The expert reports submitted (i.e., Dr. Burton¹²⁵ and Dr. Collingwood¹²⁶) are identical in the two cases. At trial, Pendergrass Plaintiffs and Grant Plaintiffs simultaneously questioned and cross-examined the totality of circumstances witnesses. For a number of the Senate Factors, moreover, the evidence submitted would be considered by the Court in an identical manner. Accordingly, to avoid needless duplication, the Court hereby incorporates *in toto* its analysis in the

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Pendergrass case, *supra*, on Senate Factors Three, Five¹²⁷, Six, Seven, and Eight.¹²⁸

*135 The Court also incorporates Senate Factor One, *see* Section II(C)(4)(a) *supra*, with the following alterations to its analysis regarding polling place closures:

With respect to the legislative districts in the metro Atlanta region, the Court in Pendergrass credited Dr. Burton's findings discussing polling place closures in Union City, Georgia. GX 4, 51. Union City, Georgia is located in the southwestern portion of the Fulton County. Both Esselstyn HD-64, and SD-28 have portions of their districts that are in southwest Fulton County. GX 1 ¶ 31 & fig.7; ¶ 49 & fig.14. Unlike Illustrative CD-6, which clearly shows city designations, Esselstyn HD-64 and SD-28 do not delineate which cities are contained within a specific district. Compare PX 1 ¶ 46 & fig.10, with GX 1 ¶ 31 & fig.7; ¶ 49 & fig.14. Thus, the Court will not rely on the specific evidence of polling place closures in Union City as evidence of discrimination in the specific districts. However, this evidence is relevant because it shows disproportionate impact of polling place closures in the vicinity of the illustrative districts. Thus, the evidence of the polling place closures in Union City is relevant, but less persuasive with respect to Mr. Esselstyn's Atlanta districts than it was with respect to Illustrative CD-6.

The Court also finds that there is evidence that 38% of the State's polling places are in metro Atlanta, meanwhile nearly half of Georgia's voters and the majority of Black voters are registered to vote in metro Atlanta. GX 4, 51.

In the Macon-Bibb region, Dr. Burton discusses the number of polling places dropping in Macon-Bibb county from forty to thirty-two. GX 4, 49. These closures took place in primarily Black neighborhoods. *Id.* He also cites to a 2020 study that found that “about two-thirds of the polling places that had to stay open late for the June primary to accommodate waiting voters were in majority-Black neighborhoods, even though they made up only about one-third of the state's polling places.” GX 4, at 50 (citing Fowler, “Why Do Nonwhite Georgia Voters Have to Wait in Line for Hours?”). Defendants did not rebut this evidence.

The Court finds that a reasonable inference can be drawn to find that within the last decade that polling place closures, like those in Macon-Bibb County disproportionately impacted Black voters. Macon-Bibb closed 20% of their polling places,

primarily in majority-Black neighborhoods. Also, in the June 2020 primary, polling places that were in predominately Black neighbors disproportionately were forced to stay open late.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is evidence supporting the reasonable inference that the large number of closed polling places in the metro Atlanta and the Macon-Bibb regions disproportionately impacts Black voters. Thus, the Court finds that the evidence of polling place closures supports a conclusion that there are present realities of discrimination in voting for Senate Factor One.

The Court will separately address Senate Factors Two (racial polarization) and Nine (justification for the Enacted State House and Senate Plans) as well as the proportionality analysis, because the evidence presented on these factors differ, even if ever-so-slightly, between the cases. Ultimately, like in the Pendergrass case, the Court concludes that the totality of the circumstances inquiry weighs in favor of finding a Section 2 violation in the Grant Plaintiffs' case.

(2) Senate Factor Two: racial polarization

*136 The evidence presented in Grant Plaintiffs' case on racial polarization again draws on the *cause* of polarization: race or partisanship. Defendants have consistently argued that partisanship is a race-neutral explanation for polarization of voters in Georgia. *See, e.g.,* Tr. 2410:18–2411:14. Like in the Pendergrass case, the Court acknowledges that whether voter polarization is on account of partisanship and race is a difficult question to answer and again the Court focuses on the evidence before it of polarization in the Grant Plaintiffs' case. *See* Section II(C)(4)(b) *supra*.

Grant Plaintiffs' polarization expert indicated that “there is ... strong evidence of racially polarized voting within the districts comprising the five focus areas [(i.e., the areas near-and-around the proposed Illustrative districts)].” GX 2 ¶ 19; see also id. (“There is consistent evidence of racially polarized voting in every House district analyzed, and in 12 of the 14 Senate districts. Voting is generally less polarized in Senate District 44, and not polarized in Senate District 39.”).

In addressing Defendants' polarization argument, Plaintiffs also offered testimony about the strong connection between race and partisanship as it currently exists in Georgia.¹²⁹ Tr. 424:5–8 (affirming that “race and party cannot be separated

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for the purpose of [Dr. Palmer's] racial polarization analysis”); 1460:11–15 (“[O]ne party is highly supporting ... issues that are most important to minorities, particularly African Americans. And another party is not getting a good grade on how they're voting for them.”); GX 4, 75–76 (indicating the “opposing positions that members of Georgia's Democratic and Republican parties take on issues inexplicably linked to race.”).

In contrast to Grant Plaintiffs’ evidence, Defendants’ expert, Dr. Alford, only rendered descriptive conclusions based on Dr. Palmer's data set and, most importantly, did not offer additional support for a conclusion that voter behavior was caused by partisanship rather than race. DX 8. To be sure, Defendants did not offer any quantitative or qualitative evidence to support their theory that partisanship, not race, is controlling voting patterns in Georgia. Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Senate Factor Two weighs in favor of finding a Section 2 violation.

(3) Senate Factor Nine: justification for the Enacted Legislative Plans

The Court finds that the State's justification for the Enacted State Legislature Plans factor weighs in favor of Defendants and thus weighs against finding a Section 2 violation.

At the trial, Ms. Wright testified that she began drawing the Enacted Senate Plan by determining the new ideal district size given the population changes and then starting with a blank map. Tr. 1621. She used a visual layer of existing districts in an attempt to retain the core districts. Tr. 1621. From here, Ms. Wright collapsed and built districts based on the population changes. Tr. 1623. She did not pair incumbents seeking reelection and avoided county splits. Tr. 1627. She tried to accommodate elected officials’ requests. Tr. 1631. Admittedly, political performance was an important consideration in drafting the Enacted State Senate Plan. Tr. 1626.

Similarly, for the Enacted House Plan, Ms. Wright started with a blank map and the ideal district size given the population changes. Tr. 1641. Initially, she did not consider incumbency and instead drew a map based solely on population. Tr. 1641. Ms. Wright then integrated information from public hearings regarding the public's preferences. Tr. 1643–46. In the Macon-Bibb area, specifically, she testified that there were comments about wanting to keep House districts 142 and 143, majority-Black districts, in Macon-

Bibb because the representatives were well-liked in the community. Tr. 1658:6–15. Eventually, she drafted the maps to avoid incumbency pairings and county splits. Tr. 1467. Ms. Wright testified that the growth in Georgia was concentrated in the north (i.e., metro-Atlanta), which caused districts to be moved from the south into that area. Tr. 1468. Again, political performance was an important consideration in drafting the Enacted State House Plan. Tr. 1467.

*137 Grant Plaintiffs do not contest Ms. Wright's testimony on the process the State used to draw the Enacted maps and the Court has found Ms. Wright to be highly credible. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants’ evidence that the Enacted State House and Senate Plans were drawn to further partisan goals to be a sufficient, non-tenuous justification. Accordingly, Senate Factor Nine does not weigh in favor of a Section 2 violation. ¹³⁰

(4) Proportionality

Finally, the Court determines that, even more so than in Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ case, proportionality does not weigh against finding a Section 2 violation in Grant Plaintiffs’ case. In the Grant case, Defendants focus on the representation of Black *preferred* candidates as part of their proportionality analysis, submitting that both of Georgia's U.S. Senators are Black-preferred (and one himself is Black) and that 35.7% of the U.S. House of Representatives from Georgia are Black and Black-preferred. In the Georgia General Assembly, 43% of the members of the House of Representatives are Black-preferred (i.e., Democrats) and 41% of the Senators are Black-preferred (i.e., Democrats).

The argument about proportionality and the evidence submitted relate equally to Alpha Phi Alpha and Grant. Accordingly, the Court incorporates its analysis of proportionality in Alpha Phi Alpha (Section II(D)(4)(a)(9)) as fully set forth herein. Ultimately, the Court concludes that proportionality does not weigh against a Section 2 violation in the Grant Plaintiffs’ case.

(5) Conclusions of Law

The Court finds that Grant Plaintiffs have met their burden in establishing that (1) the Black community in the western-Atlanta metro area is sufficiently numerous and compact to constitute an additional majority-Black House district, in

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the Black community in southwestern Atlanta metro area is sufficiently numerous and compact to create one additional majority-Black House districts and two additional majority-Black Senate districts, and the Black community in the Macon-Bibb region is sufficiently numerous and compact to create two additional majority-Black House districts; (2) the Black community is politically cohesive in these areas; and (3) that the white majority votes as a bloc to typically defeat the Black communities' preferred candidate in these areas. The Court also finds that in evaluating the Senate Factors, Georgia's electoral system is not equally open to Black voters in these regions of the State. Specifically, the Court finds that Senate Factors One, Two, Three, Five, and Seven weigh in favor of showing the present realities of lack of opportunity for Black voters. The Court also finds that Senate Factor Six weighs slightly in favor finding a Section 2 violation. Accordingly, only Senate Factors Four, Eight¹³¹ and Nine did not weigh in favor of finding a Section 2 violation. The Court also found that proportionality does not weigh against Grant Plaintiffs. In sum, the Court finds that a majority of the totality of the circumstances evidence weighs in favor of finding a Section 2 violation in the proposed districts in the metro Atlanta and Macon-Bibb regions. Because Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden of proof on all of the legal requirements, the Court concludes that SB 1EX and HB 1EX violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

E. Injunction Factors

*138 To obtain a permanent injunction, Plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) that they have suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between Plaintiffs and Defendants, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). “[W]hether a permanent injunction is appropriate ... turns on whether [Plaintiffs] can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that this form of equitable relief is necessary.” Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1182 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007). “The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court.” eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837. However, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]n injunction should issue only if the traditional four-factor test is satisfied.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 157, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010).

1. Irreparable Harm and Inadequate Remedies at Law

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that an injury is irreparable “if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Cunningham v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). It has also been held that “[a]bridgement or dilution of a right so fundamental as the right to vote constitutes irreparable injury.” Cardona v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 785 F. Supp. 837, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Courts routinely deem restrictions on fundamental voting rights irreparable injury.”) (citations omitted).

In view of this Court's finding, *supra*, that the Enacted Plans violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,¹³² this Court further finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that the resulting injury of having to vote under unlawful plans cannot be undone through any form of monetary or post-election relief. See League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 247 (“[O]nce the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress.”). Defendants also do not contend that adequate legal remedies are available.

2. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest

The last two requirements for a permanent injunction involve a balancing of the equities between the Parties and the public. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837.

“Where the government is the party opposing the ... injunction, its interest and harm—the third and fourth elements—merge with the public interest.” Florida v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 19 F.4th 1271, 1293 (11th Cir. 2021). (citation omitted).¹³³ All Defendants in each of the cases at issue were named in their official capacities as governmental actors and oppose the permanent injunction. Therefore, the Court will address the third and fourth permanent injunction factors together in a merged format in accordance with applicable authority. See Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020) (indicating that the balance of the equities and public interest factors “ ‘merge’ when, as here, ‘the Government is the opposing party’ ” (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009))).

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*139 Thus, the Court proceeds to the issue of whether the threatened injuries to Plaintiffs outweigh the harm that the permanent injunction would cause Defendants and the public.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendants offered little to no evidence or argument at trial regarding what harm, if any, the public would suffer if a permanent injunction were to be issued. The State also offered no evidence or argument of what hardships it would suffer if it was enjoined from using the redistricting plans at issue. However, it is without doubt that the State would have to endure the cost of a special session of the General Assembly to create new redistricting plans. Nevertheless, placing an actual value on the monetary hardship would be a matter of speculation because the State has not specified its anticipated costs.

At the preliminary injunction phase, the State did offer specific evidence of harm and hardship. “More specifically, the evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing showed that elections are complex and election calendars are finely calibrated processes, and significant upheaval and voter confusion can result if changes are made late in the process.” [Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity](#), 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1324. This Court found that based upon that evidence “the public interest of the State of Georgia would be significantly undermined by altering the election calendar and unwinding the electoral process at this point.” *Id.* Similar temporal concerns are not at issue at the present stage of these cases.

This Court acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that court orders affecting elections “can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls[,]” and that “[a]s an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” [Purcell](#), 549 U.S. at 4–5, 127 S.Ct. 5 (per curiam). But even by issuing an injunction in October 2023 in these three cases, this Court is not “alter[ing] the election rules on the eve of an election” for the Congressional, State House, and Senate districts subject to elections set for November 2024. [Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.](#), 598 U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207, 206 L.Ed.2d 452 (2020). Therefore, the risk articulated in the [Purcell](#) jurisprudence is *de minimis* where, as here, the State has not alleged any harm which would result due to a shortly impending election. The Court also notes when the Court inquired as to if there is a “cutoff date” for the Secretary of State to prepare for the 2024 General Election in the event of an injunction, Defense Counsel represented in a pretrial conference call that there is no “magic day.” [Grant](#) Doc. No. [255], [Tr. 16:15–16](#). Counsel further indicated that to give

the “county officials time to get information entered into the voter registration database,” the new maps should be in place by “late January, early February.” [APA](#) Doc. No. [293], [Tr. 16:15–22](#); *see also* Doc. No. [285], [Pendergrass](#), Doc. Nos. [285], [296], [Grant](#) Doc. Nos. [247], [255].

Where, as here, a permanent injunction would require a government defendant merely to comply with federal law, both the balance of hardships between the parties and the public interest weigh in favor of its issuance. *See, e.g., Project Vote/Voting For Am., Inc. v. Long*, 813 F. Supp. 2d 738, 744 (E.D. Va. 2011), *aff’d and remanded*, 682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The balance of hardships does not weigh in favor of the defendants, as a permanent injunction will simply compel the defendants to comply with their responsibilities under the NVRA and, thus, will prevent them from denying the public of a statutory right.”).

*140 Further, an injunction issued to prevent the continuous denial by the State of a statutorily-guaranteed right is necessarily in the public interest. “[I]t would not be equitable or in the public's interest to allow the state to violate the requirements of federal law, especially when there are no adequate remedies available.” [Montana Med. Ass'n v. Knudsen](#), 591 F. Supp. 3d 905, 917 (D. Mont. 2022) (cleaned up); *see also* [id.](#) (noting that “it is inherently against the public interest” to allow any State's laws to violate federal law).

Congress has also recognized that the public is benefitted when voting rights are enforced. *Cf. Torres v. Sachs*, 69 F.R.D. 343, 347 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e), voting rights enforcement proceedings).

Lacking direct evidence of how the State faces a legally cognizable hardship, or how its enjoinder would be contrary to the public interest, the balance of the final two factors weighs in favor of permanently enjoining the State's usage of the redistricting plans at issue in these three cases.

F. Affirmative Defenses

In this section, the Court addresses Defendants’ affirmative defenses. While these defenses were not specifically argued by Defendants during the bench trial, they were set forth in the Pretrial Order. [Grant](#) Doc. No. [243], 26; [Pendergrass](#) Doc. No. [231], 28-29; [APA](#) Doc. No. [280], 23-24. The affirmative defenses raised in each case are the same: (1) that Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity bars these cases, (2) that there is no private right of action under Section 2, (3) that these cases should be heard by a three-judge

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court, and (4) that to afford the Plaintiffs the requested relief requires interpreting the VRA in a way that violates the Constitution.¹³⁴ As notated below, the Court has previously rejected Defendants' affirmative defenses regarding Section 2's private right of action and that a three-judge court is required in these cases. APA Doc. No. [65], 6-34; Grant Doc. No. [43], 7-33; Pendergrass Doc. No. [50], 6-20. The Court now considers each of these affirmative defenses below.

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit suits against a State by a citizen of that State. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10–15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, however, Congress can abrogate States' sovereign immunity to redress discriminatory state action when Congress unequivocally expresses the intent to do so. Ala. State Conference of the Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 949 F.3d 647, 649–50, 654–55 (11th Cir. 2020), judgment vacated as moot, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 2618, 209 L.Ed.2d 746 (2021) (hereinafter "Alabama NAACP"). The Eleventh Circuit held that the VRA does just that:

By design, the VRA was intended to intrude on state sovereignty to eradicate state-sponsored racial discrimination in voting. Because the Fifteenth Amendment permits this intrusion, [the State] is not immune from suit under § 2 of the VRA. Nor is § 2 any great indignity to the State. Indeed, "it is a small thing and not a great intrusion into state autonomy to require the [S]tates to live up to their obligation to avoid discriminatory practices in the election process."

*141 Id. at 655 (footnote omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d at 1561).

Alabama NAACP also noted that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, and a three-judge panel in this district, have reached the same conclusion. Id. at 651 (citing OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 614 (5th Cir. 2017); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398–99 (6th Cir. 1999); Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1274-75 (N.D. Ga. 2017)).

Of course, the Court recognizes that Alabama NAACP is no longer controlling because the judgment was ultimately

vacated as moot. Ala. State Conf. of the NAACP, 141 S. Ct. 2618. Nevertheless, the analysis contained in the opinion is persuasive. See, e.g., Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir. 2009) ("We are free to give statements in a vacated opinion persuasive value if we think they deserve it."); Tallahassee Branch of NAACP v. Leon Cnty., 827 F.2d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that court was free to consider a vacated opinion as persuasive even though not binding).

In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Supreme Court held that, to abrogate a State's sovereign immunity, Congress must (1) make its intention to do so "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" and (2) act pursuant to a valid Grant of constitutional authority. 528 U.S. 62, 73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (cleaned up); accord Alabama NAACP, 949 F.3d at 650 (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001)). However, "an express abrogation clause is not required. Instead, a court may look to the entire statute, and its amendments, to determine whether Congress clearly abrogated sovereign immunity." Alabama NAACP, 949 F.3d at 650 (citing *inter alia*, Kimel, 528 U.S. at 76, 120 S.Ct. 631 ("[O]ur cases have never required that Congress make its clear statement in a single section or in statutory provisions enacted at the same time.")).

Alabama NAACP concluded that the first part of this test was met because the VRA explicitly permits private parties to sue to enforce its provisions, which prohibit States and political subdivisions from imposing practices or procedures that abridge a citizen's right to vote on account of race. 949 F.3d at 651–52. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

The VRA, as amended, clearly expresses an intent to allow private parties to sue the States. The language of § 2 and § 3, read together, imposes direct liability on States for discrimination in voting and explicitly provides remedies to private parties to address violations under the statute It is implausible that Congress designed a statute that primarily prohibits certain state conduct, made that statute enforceable by private parties, but did not intend

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for private parties to be able to sue States.

[Id.](#) at 652. This Court agrees.

As to the second part of the [Kimel](#) test, [Alabama NAACP](#) concluded that Congress can abrogate a State's sovereign immunity pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to "redress discriminatory state action." [949 F.3d at 649](#); see also [id.](#) at 654 ("While Congress may not abrogate a State's immunity when acting pursuant to its [Article I](#) powers, it may do so under its enforcement powers pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.... [I]f § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, so too must § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.").

*142 Notably, even though no longer controlling, [Alabama NAACP](#) was not the first Eleventh Circuit case to conclude that Congress acted pursuant to a valid [Grant](#) of authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in adopting Section 2. In determining that Section 2 was a proper exercise of that [Grant](#) of authority, [Alabama NAACP](#) relied on the prior Eleventh Circuit decision in [Marengo County. In Marengo County](#), the United States and private citizens challenged a county's at-large system of electing commissioners under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as Section 2. [731 F.2d at 1552](#). In considering the Section 2 claims, the Eleventh Circuit made clear that "[t]he Civil War Amendments overrode state autonomy apparently embodied in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments." [Id.](#) at 1560–61 (citations omitted). The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments thus provided direct authority for Congress to abrogate any sovereign immunity to which States might otherwise have been entitled under the Eleventh Amendment.

Given the aforementioned, the Court comfortably concludes that Section 2 is a valid expression of congressional enforcement power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Hence Defendants affirmative defenses asserting sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity are without merit.

2. Section 2 Private Right of Action

In adjudicating Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, the Court rejected their contentions that there is no private right

of action under Section 2 of the VRA. [APA](#) Doc. No. [65], 31-34; [Grant](#) Doc. No. [43], 30-33; [Pendergrass](#) Doc. No. [50], 17-20. Defendants maintain their contentions to perfect the record on appeal, but otherwise have offered no new arguments or evidence in favor of this defense. Thereby, the Court incorporates in this Order its prior conclusions of law from the Orders on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. [APA](#) Doc. No. [65], 31-34; [Grant](#) Doc. No. [43], 30-33; [Pendergrass](#) Doc. No. [50], 17-20. The Court also acknowledges that recently, the Supreme Court affirmed an Alabama three-judge court's preliminary injunction, which found that the private plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of success in proving that Alabama congressional map violated Section 2. [Allen](#), 143 S. Ct. 1487.¹³⁵ Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants' argument and affirmative defense that Section 2 does not contain a private right of action.

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2284: Three-Judge Court

In the Court's Orders denying Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Court also addressed in great detail Defendants' affirmative defenses that Plaintiffs' claims require adjudication by a three-judge court. [APA](#) Doc. No. [65], 6-31; [Grant](#) Doc. No. [43], 7-28; [Pendergrass](#) Doc. No. [50], 6-17. Defendants maintain their assertions for purposes of appeal, but again have not raised new arguments or evidence in support of this affirmative defense. Thus, the Court incorporates its prior analysis from its Orders on the Motions to Dismiss into this Order and rejects Defendants' contentions and affirmative defense that these cases ought to have been heard by a three-judge court. [APA](#) Doc. No. [65], 6-31; [Grant](#) Doc. No. [43], 7-28; [Pendergrass](#) Doc. No. [50], 6-17.

4. Section 2's Constitutionality

In Attachment D to the Pretrial Order, Defendants assert as an affirmative defense in each case that "[t]o [Grant](#) the relief Plaintiffs seek, the Court must interpret the Voting Rights Act in a way that violates the U.S. Constitution." [APA](#) Doc. No. [280], 24; [Grant](#) Doc. No. [243], 26; [Pendergrass](#) Doc. No. [231], 29. Defendants offered no argument or support for this assertion through motion practice or at trial. To the extent that Defendants are arguing generally that Section 2 of the VRA is unconstitutional, the Supreme recently rejected the same argument urged by the State of Alabama in [Allen v. Milligan](#), 599 U.S. 1, 41, 143 S.Ct. 1487, 216 L.Ed.2d 60, (2023).

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Accordingly, the Court concludes that there is no merit to the affirmative defenses challenging the constitutionality of Section 2 in the cases pending in this Court.

G. Remedy

*143 As correctly noted by Defense Counsel in his closing argument at trial, the parameters and the instructions around what the State of Georgia is supposed to do to comply with Section 2 of the VRA is a critical part of this Court's order, now that the Court has found in favor of Plaintiffs. *Tr. 2394:1–14*. The remedy involves an additional majority-Black congressional district in west-metro Atlanta; two additional majority-Black Senate districts in south-metro Atlanta; two additional majority-Black House districts in south-metro Atlanta, one additional majority-Black House district in west-metro Atlanta, and two additional majority-Black House districts in and around Macon-Bibb.¹³⁶

The Court is conscious of the powerful concerns for comity involved in interfering with the State's legislative responsibilities. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, “redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task with the federal courts should make every effort not to preempt.” *Wise v. Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535, 539, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). As such, it is “appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet” the requirements of Voting Rights Act “by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise ... its own plan.” *Id.* at 540, 98 S.Ct. 2493. The State cannot remedy the Section 2 violations described herein by eliminating minority opportunity districts elsewhere in the plans.

The Court also recognizes that Plaintiffs and other Black voters in Georgia whose voting rights have been injured by the violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act have suffered significant harm. Those citizens are entitled to vote as soon as possible for their representatives under a lawful apportionment plan. Therefore, the Court will require that new legislative maps be drawn forthwith to remedy the Section 2 violation.

The Court will provide the General Assembly the opportunity to adopt a remedial Congressional plan, Senate plan, and House plan by December 8, 2023, and consistent with, this Order.

This Court retains jurisdiction to determine whether the remedial plans adopted by the General Assembly remedy the Section 2 violations by incorporating additional legislative districts in which Black voters have a demonstrable opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.

An acceptable remedy must “completely remed[y] the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provide[] equal opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.” *United States v. Dallas Cnty. Comm'n*, 850 F.2d 1433, 1437–38 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting *S.REP. No. 97-417*, at 31 (1982)); see also *Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty.*, 831 F.2d 246, 252–53 (11th Cir. 1987) (“This Court cannot authorize an element of an election proposal that will not with certitude completely remedy the Section 2 violation.”). This will require the Court to evaluate a remedial proposal under the *Gingles* standard to determine whether it provides Black voters with an additional opportunity district. *Id.*

In the event that the State is unable or unwilling to enact remedial plans by December 8, 2023 that satisfy the requirements set forth above, the Court will proceed to draw or adopt remedial plans.

III. CONCLUSION

Having held a non-jury trial and considered the evidence and arguments of the Parties, based on the Court's holistic analysis and searching local appraisal of the facts under the Section 2 standard of the Voting Rights Act, the Court finds and concludes that:

*144 *Pendergrass* and *Grant* Plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit against the members of the State Election Board; thus, Sarah Tindall Ghazal, Janice W. Johnston, Edward Lindsey, and Matthew Mashburn are **DISMISSED** from this case.¹³⁷

Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have carried their burden of demonstrating a lack of equal openness in Georgia's election system as a result of the challenged redistricting plans, SB 1EX and HB 1EX, SB 1EX and HB 1EX, as to the following enacted districts/areas: Enacted Senate Districts 10, 16, 17, 34, 43, 44, and Enacted House Districts 74 and 78.¹³⁸ *Alpha Phi Alpha* Plaintiffs have not met their burden as to the remaining challenged districts.

Pendergrass Plaintiffs have carried their burden of demonstrating a lack of equal openness in Georgia's

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election system as a result of the challenged redistricting plan, SB 2EX, as to the following enacted district/ areas: Enacted Congressional Districts 3, 6, 11, 13, and 14.

Grant Plaintiffs have carried their burden of demonstrating a lack of equal openness in Georgia's election system as a result of the challenged redistricting plans, SB 1EX and HB 1EX, SB 1EX and HB 1EX, as to the following enacted districts/areas: Enacted Senate Districts 10, 16, 17, 25, 28, 30, 34, 35, 44, and Enacted House Districts 61, 64, 78, 117, 133, 142, 143, 145, 147, and 149.¹³⁹ Grant Plaintiffs have not met their burden as to the remaining challenged districts.

This Court further concludes that declaratory and permanent injunctive relief are appropriate. The Court, therefore, **DECLARES** the rights of the parties as follows.

SB 2EX violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as to the following districts/areas: Enacted Congressional Districts 3, 6, 11, 13, and 14.

SB 1EX violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as to the following areas/districts: Enacted Senate Districts 10, 16, 17, 25, 28, 30, 34, 35, 43, and 44.

HB 1EX violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as to the following areas/districts: Enacted House Districts 61, 64, 74, 78, 117, 133, 142, 143, 145, 147, and 149.

The Court **PERMANENTLY ENJOINS** Defendant Raffensperger, as well as his agents and successors in office, from using SB 2EX, SB 1EX, and HB 1EX in any future election.

The Court's injunction affords the State a limited opportunity to enact new plans that comply with the Voting Rights Act by **DECEMBER 8, 2023**. This timeline balances the relevant equities and serves the public interest by providing the General Assembly with its rightful opportunity to craft a remedy in the first instance, while also ensuring that, if an acceptable remedy is not produced, there will be time for the Court to fashion one—as the Court will not allow

another election cycle on redistricting plans that the Court has determined on a full trial record to be unlawful.

***145** The Court is confident that the General Assembly can accomplish its task by **DECEMBER 8, 2023**: the General Assembly enacted the Plans quickly in 2021; the Legislature has been on notice since at least the time that this litigation was commenced nearly 22 months ago that new maps might be necessary; the General Assembly already has access to an experienced cartographer; and the General Assembly has an illustrative remedial plan to consult.

Pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58](#), the Clerk is **DIRECTED** to enter judgment in favor of the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs (in Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-05337), Pendergrass Plaintiffs (in Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-05339), and Grant Plaintiffs (in Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00122) and against Brad Raffensperger. Attorneys' fees and costs are also awarded to each set of Plaintiffs pursuant to [52 U.S.C. § 10310\(e\)](#) and [42 U.S.C. § 1988](#).

After entry of judgment, the Clerk is **DIRECTED** to close these three cases. The Court will retain jurisdiction over these matters for oversight and further remedial proceedings, if necessary.

* * * * *

The Court reiterates that Georgia has made great strides since 1965 towards equality in voting. However, the evidence before this Court shows that Georgia has not reached the point where the political process has equal openness and equal opportunity for everyone. Accordingly, the Court issues this Order to ensure that Georgia continues to move toward equal openness and equal opportunity for everyone to participate in the electoral system.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of October, 2023.

All Citations

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Footnotes

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- 1 In the interest of judicial economy, and to avoid confusion, the Court issues a single order that will be filed by the Clerk in each of the above-stated cases. Although the Court issues a single order, the Court has evaluated the merits of each case independently and reached its conclusions as follows.
- 2 This finding in no way requires that the number of majority-Black congressional or legislative district be proportionate to the Black population.
- 3 The Court has used the term “findings of fact” for simplicity’s sake, but the Court notes that some of the foregoing findings are also conclusions of law. Similarly, the “conclusions of law” section contains some findings of fact.
- 4 All citations are to the electronic docket unless otherwise noted, and all page numbers are those imprinted by the Court’s docketing software.
- 5 The Court cites to the Official Certified Hearing Transcript for the Trial provided by the court reporter. This transcript has not yet been filed on the docket.
- 6 Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs filed a *renewed* Motion for Preliminary Injunction on January 13, 2023. Doc. No. [39].
- 7 The Court did not find it necessary to rule on the substantial likelihood of success as to the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Senate Districts 17 and 28 and Illustrative House Districts 73, 110, and 111. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1267–68. The Court also did “not find that the Grant and Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs ha[d] established that they have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their claims that a third State Senate District should have been drawn in the Eastern Black Belt or that additional House Districts should have been drawn in the western Atlanta metropolitan area, central Georgia, or in the Eastern Black Belt.” Id. at 1271 n.23.
- 8 The procedural history for the Allen case shows that the case name changed from Merrill v. Milligan to Allen v. Milligan based upon the expiration of the term of Alabama’s Secretary of State and the swearing in of the successor.
- 9 For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court’s Allen decision, see APA Doc. No. [268].
- 10 Under the Local Rules, counsel are “directed to submit a statement of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in nonjury cases.” LR 16.4(B)(25), NDGa. The Court does not view these proposals as evidence or post-trial briefs. To the extent that any Party raised an argument in their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that was not raised in the Pretrial Order or at trial, that argument will be disregarded.
- 11 The Court notes for the record that Defendant Raffensperger is sued in his official capacity in all three lawsuits, the members of the SEB are sued in their official capacities in Pendergrass and Grant. As will be discussed below, the Court finds that the Pendergrass and Grant Plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence about the SEB’s ability to redress their injuries or that the injury is traceable to it. Thus, the Court ultimately finds that the Pendergrass and Grant Plaintiffs lack standing to sue the SEB. See Section II(A)(1)(b) *infra*. However, throughout this Opinion and Memorandum, the Court will collectively refer to all Defendants, even though the SEB is ultimately dismissed and was not sued by the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs. However, any relief will be directed to Secretary of State Raffensperger.
- 12 Defendants have filed a notice indicating that on September 1, 2023, the Honorable William S. Duffey, Jr., stepped down as a chair of the State Election Board. Pendergrass Doc. No. [270], Grant Doc. No. [279]. Because Duffey was sued in his official capacity, this resignation does not abate the action, but does lead to Duffey being terminated as a named-party under the applicable rules of civil procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; 25(d).

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- 13 The precleared plans were utilized in the 2012 election and will hereinafter be referred to as the “2012 Plans.”
- 14 “AP Black” is defined as the combined total of all persons who are single-race Black and persons who are two or more races and one of them is Black. Stip. ¶ 95. “[I]t is proper to look at *all* individuals who identify themselves as [B]lack” in their census responses, even if they “self-identify as both [B]lack and a member of another minority group,” because the inquiry involved is “an examination of only one minority group’s effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” [Georgia v. Ashcroft](#), 539 U.S. 461, 473 n.1, 123 S.Ct. 2498, 156 L.Ed.2d 428 (2003).
- 15 The Atlanta MSA consists of the following 29 counties: Barrow, Bartow, Butts, Carroll, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, Dawson, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Haralson, Heard, Henry, Jasper, Lamar, Meriwether, Morgan, Newton, Paulding, Pickens, Pike, Rockdale, Spalding, and Walton. Stip. ¶ 106. The Atlanta Regional Commission (“ARC”) is comprised of 11 core counties within the Atlanta MSA: Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, and Rockdale. Stip. ¶ 111.
- 16 The ideal population size of a congressional district is 765,136 people. Stip. ¶ 197.
- 17 The ideal population size for a Senate district is 191,284 people. Stip. ¶ 277.
- 18 The ideal population size for a House district is 59,511 people. Stip. ¶ 278.
- 19 The Court takes judicial notice of the Decennial Census data. See [United States v. Phillips](#), 287 F.3d 1053, 1055 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing [Hollis v. Davis](#), 941 F.2d 1471, 1474 (11th Cir. 1991) and [Moore v. Comfed Savings Bank](#), 908 F.2d 834, 841 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990)) (taking judicial notice of the United States Census Bureau’s 1990 census figures); [Grant](#) Doc. No. [229], at 9 n.10 (taking judicial notice of 2020 U.S. Census figures).
- 20 “The Reock test is an area-based measure that compares each district to a circle, which is considered to be the most compact shape possible. For each district, the Reock test computes the ratio of the area of the district to the area of the minimum enclosing circle for the district. The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.” [Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity](#), 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1275 n.24 (citation omitted).
- 21 “The Polsby-Popper test computes the ratio of the district area to the area of a circle with the same perimeter: $4\#Area/(Perimeter^2)$. The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact.” [Id.](#) at 1275 n.26.
- 22 The asterisk (*) denotes a majority AP Black district. Stip. ¶¶ 166, 167; [Pendergrass](#) Doc. Nos. [174-1], 61; [174-2], 25, 69.
- 23 The “NH DOJ Black CVAP” category includes voting age citizens who are either NH single-race Black or NH Black and White. An “Any Part Black CVAP” category that would include Black Hispanics cannot be calculated from the 5-Year ACS Census Bureau Special Tabulation.” PX 1 ¶ 57 n.10.
- 24 “‘VTD’ is a Census Bureau term meaning ‘voting tabulation district.’ VTDs generally correspond to precincts.” PX 1 ¶ 11 n.4.
- 25 The asterisk (*) denotes a majority AP Black district.
- 26 Mr. Morgan’s report does not provide a full citation for the [NAACP](#) case.
- 27 In [Alabama State Conference of the NAACP](#), the court stated that “the parameters for the elections [Dr. Handley] chose — only statewide elections with a black candidate running against a white candidate —

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exclude other relevant elections, thereby diminishing the credibility of her conclusions.” [Ala. State Conf. of Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama](#), 612 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2020); Tr. 857:4–859:16. The Court agrees that Dr. Handley's dataset may limit the applicability and breadth of her conclusions, as Dr. Alford himself indicated. Tr. 2199. The scope of Dr. Handley's conclusions, however, is a question for the Court's analysis on the [Gingles](#) 2 and 3 preconditions and not a question of Dr. Handley's credibility as an expert witness. Accordingly, the Court relies on the findings in her report as they have been largely unchallenged by Defendants.

- 28 The bolded data is for the proposed additional majority-Black district that is not a majority-Black district in the Enacted Congressional Plan. And any district that has an asterisk (*) is a majority-Black district.
- 29 Mr. Cooper testified that Cooper SD-28 correlates with Enacted SD-16. APAX 1 ¶ 99.
- 30 The Schwartzberg test is a perimeter-based measure that compares a simplified version of each district to a circle, which is considered to be the most compact shape possible. For each district, the Schwartzberg test computes the ratio of the perimeter of the simplified version of the district to the perimeter of a circle with the same area as the original district. This measure is usually greater than or equal to 1, with 1 being the most compact. GX 1, Attach. G.
- 31 The Area/Convex Hull test computes the ratio of the district area to the area of the convex hull of the district (minimum convex polygon which completely contains the district). The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact. GX 1, Attach. G.
- 32 The Cut Edges test counts the number of edges removed (“cut”) from the adjacency (dual) graph of the base layer to define the districting plan. The adjacency graph is defined by creating a node for each base layer area. An edge is added between two nodes if the two corresponding base layer areas are adjacent—which is to say, they share a common linear boundary. If such a boundary forms part of the district boundary, then its corresponding edge is cut by the plan. The measure is a single number for the plan. A smaller number implies a more compact plan. GX 1, Attach. G.
- 33 Homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological regression have been used for approximately 40 years. Tr. 864:17-20. These analytic tools were employed by the plaintiffs' expert in [Gingles](#) and were accepted by the Supreme Court. APAX 5, 4; [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 52–53, 80, 106 S.Ct. 2752.
- 34 Ecological regression (ER), uses information from all precincts, not simply the homogeneous ones, to derive estimates of the voting behavior of minorities and whites. If there is a strong linear relationship across precincts between the percentage of minorities and the percentage of votes cast for a given candidate, this relationship can be used to estimate the percentage of minority voters supporting the candidate. APAX 5, 3.
- 35 Dr. Handley used two forms of EI called “King's EI” and “EI RxC.” Tr. 873:18-21. APAX 5, 4-5. Defendant's expert, Dr. John Alford, agrees that EI RxC is “the best of the statistical methods for estimating voting behaviors.” Tr. 2215:23-25.
- 36 The Parties consented to allow Dr. Burton's trial testimony, the portions of his report that were directly referenced in the trial, and PX 14, GX 15, DX 107 to apply across all three cases. Tr. 1464:10–23, 1505:11–1506:1.
- 37 The Parties consented to allow Dr. Jones's trial testimony, the portions of her report that were directly referenced in the trial, and APAX 31, 266, DX 59 to apply across all three cases. Tr. 1244:10–1245:8, 1504:18–1505:10.

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- 38 Unlike reliance on the standing of at least one other plaintiff to find that all named Plaintiffs in Alpha Phi Alpha have standing, there is no authority to support reliance on standing against one named defendant to support standing as to other defendants. Therefore, the Court's reasoning with regarding to claims by Sixth District AME in Alpha Phi Alpha does not apply to claims brought against SEB in Grant and Pendergrass.
- 39 Because the Secretary of State is a named defendant in both Grant and Pendergrass, the absence of standing with regard to claims against the SEB does not alter the relief available to Plaintiffs. The Secretary of State is responsible for administering the elections, therefore, the Court can “enjoin the holding of elections pursuant to the [Enacted] plan ... and subsequently require elections to be conducted pursuant to a [legal] apportionment system” Larios v. Perdue, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1199 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
- 40 Although Alabama Legislative Black Caucus concerned constitutional redistricting challenges, the Supreme Court applied its analysis to a Section 2 challenge in Allen. Allen, 143 S. Ct. at 1503, 1519.
- 41 Although both maps are similar, the primary differences between the two configurations of Illustrative CD-6 are that in the preliminary injunction map, (1) Illustrative CD-6 did not keep Douglas County whole and (2) the southeastern part of the district reached into Fayetteville. Compare DX 154, Ex. K, with PX 1, Ex. I-2.
- 42 Additionally, the Court finds that Illustrative CD-13 is 0.06 more compact on Reock and 0.13 more compact on Polsby-Popper than Enacted CD-13. Illustrative CD-5 and Enacted CD-5 have identical compactness scores and Enacted CD-4 is 0.03 more compact than Illustrative CD-4 on both compactness measures. Thus, the challenged district, and the other majority-Black districts are comparably compact if not more compact than the Enacted majority-Black congressional districts.
- 43 Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that upon showing of racial predominance, the state must “satisfy strict scrutiny” by demonstrating that the race-based plan “is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest”). In this context, narrow tailoring does not “require an exact connection between the means and ends of redistricting,” but rather just “ ‘good reasons’ to draft a district in which race predominated over traditional districting criteria.” Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 1064 (quoting Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 575 U.S. at 278, 135 S.Ct. 1257). Miller, 515 U.S. at 920, 115 S.Ct. 2475. The U.S. Supreme Court has “assume[d], without deciding, that ... complying with the Voting Rights Act was compelling.” Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 193, 137 S.Ct. 788, 197 L.Ed.2d 85 (2017). Indeed, the redistricting guidelines adopted by the General Assembly confirm that Georgia understands compliance with the Voting Rights Act to be a compelling state interest. See JX1–2.
- 44 The record evidence does not dispute, and even reiterates, conclusions made in prior cases about political cohesion among Black Georgians. See, e.g., Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1313 (noting that, in ten elections for Sumter County Board of Education with Black candidates, “the overwhelming majority of African Americans voted for the same candidate”); Lowery v. Deal, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“Black voters in Fulton and DeKalb counties have demonstrated a cohesive political identity by consistently supporting [B]lack candidates.”).
- 45 The Court notes that the Black preferred candidate in all of the examined races was the Democrat candidate and the white-preferred candidate was a Republican. Stip. ¶¶ 194, 215–16. The Court finds that the inquiry into whether partisanship is the motivating factor behind the polarization is not relevant to the Gingles precondition inquiry, but may be relevant to the overall totality of the circumstances. See Section II(D)(4) (b), *infra*.
- 46 Again, the evidence in this case does not dispute, and even reiterates, conclusions made in prior cases about racially polarized voting. See, e.g., Fair Fight Action, 634 F. Supp. 3d at 1247 (finding racial polarization in Georgia voting); Whitest v. Crisp Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:17-CV-109 LAG, 2021 WL 4483802, at *3 (M.D.

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Ga. Aug. 20, 2021) (“African Americans in Crisp County are politically cohesive in elections for members of the Board of Education, but the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to defeat the candidates preferred by Black voters in elections for members of the Board of Education.”); [Wright](#), 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1317 (finding that “[t]he third [Gingles](#) factor is satisfied” after concluding that “there can be no doubt black and white voters consistently prefer different candidates” and that “white voters are usually able to the defeat the candidate preferred by African Americans”).

- 47 Although Dr. Jones was solely retained as an expert in the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) case, the Court notes that at the trial, the Parties consented to adopt the testimony of Dr. Jones into the [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief. [Tr. 1244:10–1245:8, 1589:3–1591:21](#). Thus, the Court may rely on Dr. Jones’s trial testimony any portions of her report that were directly referenced at trial.
- 48 The Court considers both Senate Factors One and Three together because there is significant overlap in the trial evidence for the two factors. *Cf.*, e.g., [Singleton](#), 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1020, *aff’d sub nom. Allen*, 599 U.S. 1, 143 S.Ct. 1487, 216 L.Ed.2d 60 (considering Senate Factors One, Three, and Five together).
- 49 On the Record, Dr. Burton clearly stated and the Court would like to reiterate, this Order, in no way states or implies that the General Assembly or Georgia Republicans are racist. [Tr. 1473:18–1474:9](#). As articulated by Dr. Burton, “[n]o. I’m not saying that the legislature is [racist]—I am saying that some of the legislation that comes out has a disparity—it affects Black citizens differently than white citizens to the disadvantage of Black citizens, but I am not saying that they are racist. But the effect has a disparate impact among whites and Blacks and other minorities.” [Tr. 1474:4–9](#). Section 2 of the VRA does not require the Court to find that the General Assembly passed the challenged maps to discriminate against Black voters, or that the General Assembly is racist in any way. Nothing in this Order should be construed to indicate otherwise.
- 50 While it may have been true at the time of this report that Georgia had made cuts to early voting, the Court acknowledges Mr. Germany’s trial testimony was that SB 202 increased early voting opportunities by adding two mandatory Saturdays and expressly permitted counties to hold early voting on Sundays, at their discretion. [Tr. 2269:9–21](#).
- 51 The Court may evaluate statewide evidence to determine whether Black voters have an equal opportunity in the election process. [LULAC](#), 548 U.S. at 438, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006) (“[S]everal of the [] factors in the totality of circumstances have been characterized with reference to the State as a whole.”); *see also Allen*, 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (crediting the three-judge court’s findings of lack of equal openness with respect to statewide evidence (citing [Singleton](#), 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1018–1024); [Gingles](#), 478 U.S. at 80, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (crediting district court’s findings of lack of equal opportunity that was supported by statewide evidence (citing [Gingles v. Edmisten](#), 590 F. Supp. 345, 359–75 (E.D.N.C. 1984))).
- 52 The Court notes that on October 11, 2023, the district court hearing the case ruled on a pending motion for preliminary injunction that involves Section 2 and constitutional challenges to several provisions in SB 202. [In re SB 202](#), 1:21-mi-55555, ECF No. 686 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 11, 2023). The court denied the plaintiffs motions for preliminary injunction and found that there was not a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims. [Id.](#) at 61, 106 S.Ct. 2752. No rulings in that case are binding on this Court. [McGinley v. Houston](#), 361 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] district judge’s decision neither binds another district judge nor binds him”). However, the Court is cautious in its discussion of SB 202 to avoid inconsistent rulings and creating confusion.
- 53 To be abundantly clear, this Court does not have a challenge to SB 202 before it. Plaintiffs’ experts have provided evidence regarding potential motivations behind SB 202 and the impact that its passage had on

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Black voters. APAX 2; PX 4; GX 4. And Defendants provided counter evidence. See [Tr. 2261–2307 \(testimony of Ryan Germany\)](#). The Court evaluates solely the evidence adduced in this case.

- 54 Drs. Burton and Jones concluded that certain portions of SB 202 have an actual or perceived negative impact on Black voters. [See Tr. 1185:17–1186:16](#) (Dr. Jones opining that Black voters increased use of absentee ballots and their use of drop boxes correlated with the passage of SB 202); [Tr. 1445: 1–25](#) (Dr. Burton opining that certain provisions of SB 202 were put in place because of the gains made by Black voters in the electorate).
- 55 The Court notes that on cross-examination Mr. Germany explained that SB 202 received numerous complaints; however, he is unable to quantify whether those complaints primarily came from Black voters because the Secretary of State's Office does not analyze the impact of the legislation on particular categories of voters—i.e., white voters v. Black voters. In his opinion, that analysis is not helpful to the overall goal to “make it easy for everyone, regardless of race.” [Tr. 2283:2–2285:5](#).
- 56 As discussed in greater detail, [infra](#), Black voter turnout rate decreased by 15 points from the 2020 election cycle to the 2022 election cycle and recorded the lowest voter turnout rate in a decade. [See](#) Section II(D) (4)(e)(1) [infra](#).
- 57 Senate Factor 4—a history of candidate slating for congressional elections—is not at issue because Georgia's congressional elections do not use a slating process. Doc. No. [173-1], 32; [see also Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1317](#).
- 58 In 2022 the percentage of Black voter turnout slightly exceeded white turnout in Clayton, Henry, and Rockdale counties. PX 6, 16.
- 59 Defendants did not rebut these findings regarding Black voter participation in the political process.
- 60 To the extent that Defendants rely on the 2012 presidential election and the 2018 gubernatorial election because of the race of the candidate, the Court determines that the whole of the evidence does not support that the race of the candidate explains voter turnout. Specifically, in 2020, where the disparity in voter turnout was 12.6%, Senator Warnock was running for the U.S. Senate and became the first Black Senator in Georgia's history. Jud. Not., 11. Similarly, in 2022, where the disparity in voter turnout was 13.3%, Stacey Abrams ran for Governor and Senator Warnock ran against Herschel Walker for U.S. Senate. [Id.](#) In both of the 2020 election contests, Black candidates were at the top of the ballot, like in the 2012 and the 2018 elections, but turnout gap was greater than in the preceding election.
- 61 While not required as a matter of law, as a matter of social science, Dr. Collingwood's report indicates that the academic literature “demonstrates a strong and consistent link between socioeconomic status [] and voter turnout.” PX 6, 7. He describes this link in terms of resources causally driving behavior. [Id.](#) At trial, Dr. Collingwood also testified to the same. [Tr. 688:15–689:3](#).
- 62 None of the evidence of racial appeals occurred in congressional races.
- 63 [Pendergrass](#) Plaintiffs have provided evidence of six racial appeals used in recent Georgia elections across the past few election cycles:
- In the 2018 gubernatorial election, then-Secretary of State Kemp, (now twice-elected Governor) used a social media campaign to associate Stacey Abrams with the Black Panther Party and ran a commercial advertisement where he discussed rounding up illegal immigrants in his pickup truck. PX 4, 67; [Tr. 1364:12–16](#).

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In the 2020 U.S. Senatorial election, then-Senator Kelly Loeffler ran an ad against “a dangerous Raphael Warnock,” whose skin had been darkened, and who was also associated with communism, protests, and civil unrest. [Tr. 1193:19–1195:5](#); APAX 31; APAX 2, 39.

In 2022, during the senatorial race between Senator Warnock and Herschel Walker, Mr. Walker ran an advertisement that aimed to distinguish “between the Black candidate and himself” as the Republican candidate, in order to “associate himself with the white voter [and] mak[e] the Black candidate look menacing and problematic” [Tr. 1198:1–1199:10](#); APAX 2, 43–44.

Also in 2022, in the Republican primary for governor, former Senator David Purdue stated in an interview, that Abrams was “demeaning her own race” and should “go back where she came from.” PX 4, 70 (citing Ewan Palmer, “David Perdue Doubles Down on ‘Racist’ Stacey Abrams Remarks in TV Interview,” *Newsweek*, (May 24, 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/david-perdue-racist-stacey-abrams-go-back-georgia-1709429>). Later, in the general gubernatorial election, Governor Kemp darkened Abrams’s face in ads and repeatedly attacked Abrams in the general election as “upset and mad,” evoking the trope and dog whistle of the “angry Black Woman.” PX 4, 70.

- 64 The Court takes judicial notice of the elections that each candidate successfully won. [See *Scott v. Garlock*, 2:18-cv-981-WKW-WC, 2019 WL 4200400, at *3 n. 4 \(M.D. Ala. July 31, 2019\)](#) (taking judicial notice of the publicly filed election results).
- 65 The Court takes judicial notice of the following election results. Justice Robert Benham was elected to Georgia Court of Appeals in 1984 and was re-elected to the Georgia Supreme Court Justice five times following his 1989 appointment until his 2020 retirement. Justice Leah Ward-Sears was re-elected to the Georgia Supreme Court after her appointment in 1992 and served until her retirement in 2009. Justice Harold Melton was re-elected to the Georgia Supreme Court following his appointment in 2005 and served until his retirement in 2021. Justice Verda Colvin was appointed to the Georgia Supreme Court in 2021 and was re-elected in 2022. Judge John Ruffin was re-elected to the Georgia Court of Appeals following his appointment in 1994 and served until his retirement in 2008. Judge Clarence Cooper served as a judge on the Georgia Court of Appeals from 1990 until 1994 when he was appointed to the Northern District of Georgia. Judge Herbert Phipps was appointed to the Georgia Court of Appeals in 1999 and was re-elected twice before his retirement in 2016. Judge Yvette Miller was appointed to the Georgia Court of Appeals in 1999, has been re-elected since and continues to serve in this role. Judge Clyde Reese was appointed to the Georgia Court of Appeals in 2016 and was re-elected in 2018, where he served until his death in 2022.
- 66 Congresswoman McBath first defeated white candidate Karen Handel in the 2018 Congressional District 6 election, in a district that had a white voting age population of 58.11%. *Jud. Not.*, pp. 9–11; *Stip.* ¶ 167; PX 1, 64, Ex. F.
- 67 The Enacted Senate Plan contains 14 majority-Black districts. *Stip.* ¶ 186; APAX 1, M-1. The Enacted House Plan contains 49 majority-Black districts. *Stip.* ¶¶ 183, 186, APAX 1, Z-1.
- 68 The Court notes that Erick Allen was elected to Georgia House District 40 in 2018 and re-elected in 2020. [Tr. 1012:2–12](#). House district 40 was not a majority-Black district in 2018 or 2020. [Id.](#)
- 69 Consistent with the operative legal standards, this factor must be accorded less weight to Senate Factor Nine in a Section 2 case given that Section 2 is an effects test and that a legislatures’ intent in drawing map is irrelevant.
- 70 The Parties have stipulated to the data for the 2021 Enacted Plan contained in Dr. Cooper’s report at Exhibit K-1. [See](#) PX 1, Exs. K-1. Exhibit K-1 reflects the 2020 Census population statistics. PX 1 ¶¶ 38, 62. The Court notes that under the various data sets, the number of majority-Black districts fluctuates between 2 and

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4 districts. Using the NH DOJ CVAP and total AP Black numbers there are four majority-Black districts. PX 1, Exs. G, K-1. However, using the AP BVAP percentages only two districts are majority-Black CD-4 (54.52%), CD-13 (66.75%). PX 1, Ex. K-1. Enacted CD-2 has an AP BVAP of 49.29% and CD-5 has an AP BVAP of 49.60%. Id.

District	18+ Pop	18+ SR Black	%18+ SR Black	18+ AP Black	% 18+ AP Black	18+ Latino	%18+ Latino	18+ NH White	%18+NH White
001	589266	157770	26.77%	166025	28.17%	39938	6.78%	440636	57.59%
002	587555	281564	47.92%	289612	49.29%	30074	5.12%	305611	39.94%
003	586319	130099	22.19%	136708	23.32%	31274	5.33%	492494	64.37%
004	589470	308266	52.30%	321379	54.52%	59670	10.12%	197536	25.82%
005	621515	295885	47.61%	308271	49.60%	41432	6.67%	273819	35.79%
006	574797	50334	8.76%	56969	9.91%	52353	9.11%	487400	63.70%
007	566934	157650	27.81%	169071	29.82%	120604	21.27%	225905	29.52%
008	585857	170421	29.09%	175967	30.04%	35732	6.10%	443123	57.91%
009	592520	56416	9.52%	61747	10.42%	76361	12.89%	495078	64.70%
010	588874	126798	21.53%	133097	22.60%	38336	6.51%	486487	63.58%
011	595201	98212	16.50%	106811	17.95%	66802	11.22%	469264	61.33%
012	588119	207872	35.35%	215958	36.72%	28628	4.87%	398843	52.13%
013	574789	370024	64.38%	383663	66.75%	60467	10.52%	125106	16.35%
014	579058	77108	13.32%	82708	14.28%	61247	10.58%	520854	68.07%
Total	8220274	2488419	30.27%	2607986	31.73%	742918	9.04%	5362156	65.23%

PX 1, Ex. K-1.

The Parties have stipulated that the 2021 Enacted Plan contains 3 majority-Black congressional districts in the Atlanta MSA. Stip. ¶ 162. Enacted CD-2 is not in the MSA, but according to the Census data in the aforementioned exhibits, has an AP Black population that exceeds 50%. See PX 1, Ex. K-1 (showing CD-2 with an AP Black of 51.39%) & Ex. G (showing CD-2 with a non-Hispanic Black population of 49.03%). For purposes of this Order, the Court will use the total AP Black statistics for determining whether a district is majority-Black, because these are the statistics that were seemingly contemplated in the Parties' stipulations.

71 4/14 is approximately 28.6%.

72 5/14 is approximately 35.7%. Conversely, with the added majority Black district in the Illustrative Congressional Plan, the proportion of majority-white districts drops to approximately 64.3% (i.e., 9 of 14 districts), which is closer to the proportion of the white population in Georgia (55.7%) (see PX 1 ¶ 18 & fig.2).

73 Achieving proportional representation is not a factor to weigh against finding a Section 2 violation. De Grandy was evaluating proportionality under the Enacted Congressional Plan, not the remedial plan. Its statement that proportionality cannot prove a Section 2 case does not readily extend to say that achieving proportionality

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weighs *against* a Section 2 case. [Id.](#) at 1000, 114 S.Ct. 2647. See [Allen](#), 599 U.S. at 26–30, 143 S.Ct. 1487; see also [id.](#) at 71–73, 143 S.Ct. 1487 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

- 74 The Eleventh Circuit found that Senate Factor Eight is given little weight. [Marengo Cnty. Comm'n](#), 731 F.2d at 1572. And the Court gives less weight to Senate Factor Nine because this is not an intentional discrimination case.
- 75 See [Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration](#), 301 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1326 (M.D. Ga. 2018), [aff'd](#), 979 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2020) (opining that an illustrative plan can be “far from perfect” in terms of compactness yet satisfy the first [Gingles](#) precondition).
- 76 Esselstyn's State Senate districts in metro-Atlanta do not correlate to any of the enacted State Senate districts. Compare GX 1 ¶ 27 & fig. 4, with GX 1, attach D. Accordingly, the Court will compare the Esselstyn State Senate districts to the overall Enacted Senate Plan's statistics.
- 77 As stated *supra*, the Court compares Esselstyn SD-28 to the Enacted Senate Plan as a whole. See Section II(D)(1)(b)(2)(b)(i) *supra*.
- 78 The statistics for the VTD splits can be found on page 14 of subdivision of the Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Enacted and page 14 of Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Illustrative. GX 1, Attach. L.
- 79 Esselstyn HD-64 also contains parts of Paulding County, and Illustrative CD-6 combines areas in Cobb and Fayette Counties.
- 80 The statistics for the VTD splits can be found on pages 11 and 15 of subdivision of the Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Enacted and page 2 of Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Illustrative. GX 1, Attach. L.
- 81 Mr. Esselstyn, however, crossed over I-75 in another district. [Tr.](#) 571:16–21
- 82 The statistics for the VTD splits can be found on page 13 of subdivision of the Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Enacted and page 13 of Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Illustrative. GX 1, Attach. L.
- 83 The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to incorporate Dr. Evans's testimony as part of the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) record. [Tr.](#) 633:18-634:10.
- 84 The statistics for the VTD splits can be found on pages 7 and 13 of subdivision of the Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Enacted and pages 8 and 13 of Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Illustrative. GX 1, Attach. L.
- 85 The Court notes that although Esselstyn HD-149 splits Bibb County, this split does not show less respect for communities of interest than the Enacted House Plan. Both the Enacted and Esselstyn House Plans split Bibb County four ways (Enacted HD-142, Hd-143, HD-144, and HD-145) and (Esselstyn HD-142, HD-143, HD-145, and HD-149). GX 1, Attach. L.
- 86 The statistics for the VTD splits can be found on pages 7–8 of Political Subdivisions Chart entitled GA House Illustrative.
- 87 The Court measured the distance using the diagonal beginning at the top of Wilkinson County to the portion of Telfair County that borders Ben Hill County. GX 1, Attach. I. This measurement cuts across part of Laurens

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County in the neighboring district, Enacted HD-155. If the Court were to take the same measurement and avoid cutting across Enacted HD-155, however, the length of Enacted HD-149 would be longer.

- 88 Mr. Cooper testified that the split of Lee County was to eliminate a four way split of Dougherty County. [Tr. 290:10–12](#). Under the Cooper House Plan, Dougherty County is split between three districts (Cooper HD-153, HD-154, and HD-171).
- 89 The Court notes that Dr. Alford opined that the Black preferred candidate was always the Democrat. [See, e.g., Tr. 2144:11–25](#); [see also](#) [Stip. ¶¶ 319, 325, 331](#). As noted above and in the Court's summary judgment order ([APA Doc. No. \[268\]](#)), the Court found that partisan affiliation is not relevant to the second and third [Gingles](#) preconditions. Accordingly, Dr. Alford's conclusions regard partisanship are not relevant, here. However, the Court will consider his conclusions as a part of Senate Factor Two. [See](#) Section (D)(4)(b)(3) [infra](#).
- 90 The Court's reference to proportionality here is only to support a general observation regarding the trajectory of minority voters' equal access to the political system in Georgia.
- 91 The Georgia Legislative Black Caucus, however, only has 41 members in the Georgia House of Representatives. [Stip. ¶ 348](#).
- 92 Like in the [Pendergrass](#) case, the Court considers both Senate Factors One and Three together because there is significant overlap in the trial evidence for the two factors. [Cf., e.g., Singleton, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1020](#) (considering Senate Factors One, Three, and Five together).
- 93 The numbering in Dr. Ward's report resets after the first two pages. As the substance of Dr. Ward's report starts on the second page 1, the Court intends for its citations to refer to the pages of Dr. Ward's substantive findings and conclusions.
- 94 The Parties agreed and the Court permitted [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs to incorporate Dr. Burton's trial testimony and portions of his expert report that were directly testified about into the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) case. [Tr. 1464:11-25](#).
- 95 The Court reiterates that Dr. Burton clearly denied that the General Assembly or Georgia Republicans are racist. [Tr. 1473:18–1474:9](#). As articulated by Dr. Burton, “I am not saying that the legislature is [racist]—I am saying that some of the legislation that comes out has a disparity—it affects Black citizens differently than white citizens to the disadvantage on Black citizens, but I am not saying that they are racist. But the effect has a disparate impact among whites and Blacks and other minorities.” [Tr. 1474:4–9](#). Section 2 of the VRA does not require the Court to find that the General Assembly passed the challenged maps to discriminate against Black voters, or that the General Assembly is racist in any way. Nothing in this Order should be construed to indicate otherwise.
- 96 While it may have been true at the time of this report that Georgia had made cuts to early voting, the Court acknowledges Mr. Germany's trial testimony was that SB 202 increased early voting opportunities by adding two mandatory Saturdays and expressly permitted counties to hold early voting on Sundays at their discretion. [Tr. 2269:8–21](#).
- 97 The Court may evaluate statewide evidence to determine whether Black voters have an equal opportunity in the election process. [LULAC, 548 U.S. at 438, 126 S.Ct. 2594](#) (“[S]everal of the [] factors in the totality of circumstances have been characterized with reference to the State as a whole.”); [see also Allen, 599 U.S. at 22, 143 S.Ct. 1487](#) (crediting the three-judge court's finding lack of equal openness with respect to state wide evidence (citing [Singleton, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1018–24](#)); [Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80, 106 S.Ct. 2752](#) (crediting district court's findings of lack of equal opportunity that was supported by statewide evidence)).

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- 98 In light of the Court's ruling allowing Dr. Burton's testimony and specific references to his report to be incorporated into the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) case (1464:11-25), the Court may rely on Dr. Burton's report's analysis of the Commission's report in the [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) case. [See Tr. 1441:25–1442:15](#) (Dr. Burton referencing his report and testifying about the U.S. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, [An Assessment of Minority Voting Rights Access in the United States: 2018 Statutory Enforcement Report](#) (Washington, 2018), 369).
- 99 The Court notes that on October 11, 2023, the district court assigned the SB 202 case ruled on a pending motion for preliminary injunction that involves Section 2 and constitutional challenges to several provisions in SB 202. [In re SB 202](#), 1:21-mi-55555, ECF No. 686 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 11, 2023). The court denied the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction and found that there was not a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims. [Id.](#) at 61, 106 S.Ct. 2752. No rulings in that case are binding on this Court. [McGinley](#), 361 F.3d at 1331 (“[A] district judge's decision neither binds another district judge[.]”). However, the Court is cautious in its discussion of SB 202 to avoid inconsistent rulings and creating confusion.
- 100 To be abundantly clear, this Court does not have a challenge to SB 202 before it. Plaintiffs' experts have provided evidence regarding potential motivations behind SB 202 and the impact that its passage had on Black voters. [See APAX 2](#), PX 4, GX 4. And Defendants provided counter evidence. [See generally Tr. 2261–2307](#) (testimony of Ryan Germany). The Court evaluates solely the evidence adduced in this case.
- 101 Drs. Burton and Jones concluded that certain portions of SB 202 have an actual or perceived negative impact on Black voters. [See Tr. 1185:17–1186:16](#) (Dr. Jones opining that Black voters increased use of absentee ballots and their use of drop boxes correlated with the passage of SB 202); [Tr. 1445: 1–25](#) (Dr. Burton opining that certain provisions of SB 202 were put in place because of the gains made by Black voters in the electorate).
- 102 The Court notes that on cross-examination Mr. Germany explained that SB 202 received numerous complaints; however, he is unable to quantify whether those complaints primarily came from Black voters because the Secretary of State's Office does not analyze the impact of the legislation on particular categories of voters—i.e., white voters v. Black voters. In his opinion, that analysis is not helpful to the overall goal to “make it easy for everyone, regardless of race.” [Tr. 2283:2–2285:5](#).
- 103 As discussed in greater detail, [infra](#), Black voter turnout rate decreased by 15 points from the 2020 election cycle to the 2022 election cycle and recorded the lowest voter turnout rate in a decade. [See](#) Section II(D) (4)(e)(1) [infra](#).
- 104 Race of a candidate is not dispositive for a polarization inquiry. [DeGrandy](#), 512 U.S. at 1027, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (“The assumption that majority-minority districts elect only minority representatives, or that majority-white districts elect only white representatives, is false as an empirical matter. And on a more fundamental level, the assumption reflects the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain minority views that must be different from those of other citizens.” (Kennedy, J, concurring in part) (citation omitted)). The Court, however, finds that an assessment of the success of Black candidates in reference to different percentages of white voters, is good evidence that partisanship is not the best logical explanation of racial voting patterns in Georgia. [Cf. Johnson](#), 196 F.3d at 1221–22 (“We do not mean to imply that district courts *should* give elections involving [B]lack candidates more weight; rather, we merely note that in light of existing case law district courts may do so without committing clear error.”).
- 105 Senate Factor Four—a history of candidate slating—is not at issue because Georgia does not use a slating process. [Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, Inc.](#), 587 F. Supp. 3d at 1317.
- 106 Voter turnout for SR BVAP is 55.8%. [APAX 6](#), 6–7. The white voting age population's turnout rate was 67.4%; thus, there was a 11.6% turnout gap. [Id.](#); [Tr. 1051:13–16](#).

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- 107 Voter turnout for SR BVAP is 53.7%. APAX 6, 6–7. The white voting age population's turnout rate was 67.4%; thus, there was a 13.7% turnout gap. [Id.](#)
- 108 Black registered voter turnout was 60.0% and white registered voter turnout was 72.6%; thus, there was a 12.6% turnout gap. [Id.](#); [Tr. 1051:16–18.](#)
- 109 Voter turnout for SR BVAP was 42.3%. APAX 6, 10. The white voting age population's turnout rate was 53.4%; thus, there was a 11.1% turnout gap. [Id.](#) Voter turnout for SR BVAP was 41.4%. [Id.](#) The white voting age population's turnout rate was 53.4%; thus, there was a 12.0% turnout gap. [Id.](#) Black registered voter turnout was 45.0% and white registered voter turnout was 58.3%; thus, there was a 13.3% turnout gap. [Id.](#)
- 110 Specifically, in the metro Atlanta clusters, Dr. Burch calculated that in the 2022 election, the east Atlanta cluster had a voter turnout gap between 10.8% and 13%, the southwest Atlanta cluster had a voter turnout gap between 3.2% and 9.1%, and southeast Atlanta cluster had a voter turnout gap between 5.7% and 10.1%. APAX 6, 11–13 & figs. 4–6.
- 111 While not required as a matter of law, as a matter of social science, Dr. Burch's report indicates that the academic literature demonstrates a strong and consistent link between socioeconomic status and voter turnout. [Tr. 1055:4–10.](#)
- 112 The [Alpha Phi Alpha](#) Plaintiffs have provided the following evidence of racial appeals used in recent Georgia elections across the past few election cycles:
- In the 2018 gubernatorial election, then-Secretary of State Kemp, (now twice-elected Governor) used a social media campaign to associate Stacey Abrams with the Black Panther Party and ran a commercial advertisement where he discussed rounding up illegal immigrants in his pickup truck. APAX 2, 38; [Tr. 1364:12–16.](#)
- In the 2020 U.S. Senatorial election, then-Senator Kelly Loeffler ran a campaign ad against “a dangerous Raphael Warnock,” whose skin had been darkened, and who was also associated with communism, protests, and civil unrest. [Tr. 1193:19–1195:5](#); APAX 31; APAX 2, 39.
- In 2022, during the senatorial race between Senator Warnock and Herschel Walker, Mr. Walker ran an advertisement that aimed to distinguish “between the Black candidate and himself” as the Republican candidate, in order to “associate himself with the white voter [and] mak[e] the Black candidate look menacing and problematic” [Tr. 1198:9–1199:4](#); APAX 2, 43–44.
- Also in 2022, in the Republican primary for governor, former Senator David Purdue stated in an interview, that Abrams was “demeaning her own race” and to let her “go back where she came from.” APAX 2, 38 (quoting Reid J. Epstein, “David Perdue Makes Racist Remarks about Stacey Abrams as He Ends a Lackluster Campaign, [N.Y. Times](#), (May 23, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/23/us/politics/david-perdue-staceyabrams-racist-remarks.html>).
- 113 The Court takes judicial notice of the specific elections that each candidate successfully won. [See Scott](#), 2019 WL 4200400, at *3 n. 4 (taking judicial notice of the publicly filed election results); [see also](#) n.65 *supra*.
- 114 The Enacted Senate Plan contains 14 majority-Black districts. [Stip. ¶¶ 176, 186](#); APAX 1, M-1. The Enacted House Plan contains 49 majority-Black districts. [Stip. ¶¶ 183, 186](#), APAX 1, Z-1.
- 115 Erick Allen was elected to Georgia House District 40 in 2018 and re-elected in 2020, even though House District 40 was not a majority-Black district in 2018 or 2020. [Tr. 1012:2–12.](#)

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- 116 The Parties submitted designations, counter designations, and objections to the named Plaintiffs' depositions to the Court prior to the start of the Trial. APA Doc. No. [275], Pendergrass Doc. No. [223], Grant Doc. No. [232]. At the Pretrial Conference, the Parties agreed to the admission of these depositions following the Court's ruling on the objections. APA Doc. No. [285], Pendergrass Doc. No. [274], Grant Doc. No. [247]. The Court issued rulings on the deposition objections and they are part of the Record. APA Doc. No. [292], Pendergrass Doc. No. [243], Grant Doc. No. [254].
- 117 The Court notes that Dr. Evans testified that she attempted to call her State Senator, Representative, and county commissioner about redistricting concerns and her calls were generally unanswered. Tr.637:7–19. The Court acknowledges that Dr. Evans's representatives were unresponsive in this instance; however, the Court cannot extrapolate from this isolated occurrence that, as a whole, Georgia's elected officials are unresponsive to Black voters.
- 118 As in the Pendergrass case, however, this factor will be accorded less weight given that, in Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs' Section 2 case, a legislature's intent in drawing map is irrelevant.
- 119 Although the Black-preferred candidate in all of the races examined by Dr. Handley were Democrats, Dr. Handley's research was confined to specific areas of the State and she did not evaluate whether all current Democrat members of the General Assembly were the Black-preferred candidate. Stip. ¶¶ 309–15.
- 120 However, the Georgia Legislature's Black Caucus has only 41 members in the State House. Stip. ¶ 348.
- 121 $16/56 =$ approximately 28.6%.
- 122 $50/180 =$ approximately 27.8%.
- 123 Senate Factor Eight is given little weight. [Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d at 1572](#).
- 124 The evidence on Senate Factor Five is largely the same for the Atlanta and Macon-Bibb region. However, Dr. Collingwood did provide specific evidence that he concluded that the “trend” in the Black Belt region “is very similar to the overall statewide trend for both the 2020 and 2022 general elections.” Rep at 20. Dr. Collingwood furthermore determined that “whites vote at higher rates than [] Blacks in the clear majority of the precincts.” Rep at 22. These findings are consistent with his findings in the metro Atlanta region where Black voters, generally, had lower turnout rates than white voters. Accordingly, the Court finds that Senate Factor Five weighs in favor of a Section 2 violation in Macon-Bibb region with the same force as the districts in the metro Atlanta region.
- 125 In Pendergrass, Dr. Burton's report is designated PX 4. In Grant, it is designated GX 4. The report's content and page numbers, however, do not change between the cases.
- 126 In Pendergrass, Dr. Collingwood's report is designated PX 5. In Grant, it is designated GX 5. Again, the content and pages numbers in the report are identical in the cases.
- 127 As noted in the Pendergrass case, for Senate Factor Five's consideration of minority voter participation in the political process, in 2022, voter turnout in Clayton, Henry, and Rockdale counties “slightly exceeded” white voter turnout. GX 5, 16. While these counties are directly implicated in the districts satisfying the Gingles preconditions in Grant Plaintiffs' Illustrative plan, the Court does not find this “slight” evidence to outweigh the strong evidence otherwise that Black Georgians participate less than white Georgians in the political process. See Section II(C)(4)(d) *supra*.
- 128 Again, Senate Factor Four—a history of candidate slating for elections—is not at issue because Georgia's elections do not use a slating process.

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- 129 The Court also finds Dr. Burton's assessment that the success of Black candidates depends on the percentage of white voters in a district to be persuasive in Grant Plaintiffs' case on this Senate Factor. SeesupraPendergrass.
- 130 As in the Pendergrass case, however, this factor will be accorded less weight given that, in Grant Plaintiffs' Section 2 case, a legislature's intent in drawing map is irrelevant.
- 131 The Eleventh Circuit found that Senate Factor Eight is given little weight. Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d at 1572.
- 132 See generally Section II(D)–(F) *supra*.
- 133 The Court recognizes that the Florida case, cited above, involved a preliminary injunction determination and that a permanent, rather than preliminary injunction is at issue in the cases *sub judice*. Nevertheless, considering the overlapping language in the permanent injunction and preliminary injunction standards (as set forth in the Court's preliminary injunction order), it appears to the Court that this principle of merging the government's interest and harm with the public interest applies equally in the permanent injunction context. SeeAmoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.”).
- 134 Defendants also raised affirmative defenses regarding constitutional and statutory standing. Grant Doc. No. [243] at 26; Pendergrass Doc. No. [231] at 28; APA Doc. No. [280] at 23. However, these issues have been addressed above. See Section I(A)*supra*.
- 135 Although the Supreme Court did not comment on the private right of action issue, it affirmed a preliminary injunction order that analyzed whether Section 2 created a private right of action. Allen, 143 S. Ct. at 1517; Singleton, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1031–32.
- 136 The Court notes that there is significant overlap in the metro Atlanta districts drawn by Mr. Cooper and Mr. Esselstyn. The Court **ORDERS** the above remedy collectively for Alpha Phi Alpha and Grant Plaintiffs.
- 137 As stated herein, the Clerk is **DIRECTED** to terminate William Duffey, Jr. as a named party based upon his September 1, 2023 resignation from the State Election Board.
- 138 These districts are derived from Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs' Complaint (APA Doc. No. [141]) and Mr. Cooper's expert report (APAX 1).
- 139 These districts are derived from Grant Plaintiffs' Complaint (Grant Doc. No. [118]) and Mr. Esselstyn's expert report (GX 1).

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CERTIFICATION REGARDING APPENDIX

I certify that the appendix meets the form requirements governing a respondent's appendix contained in Wis. Stat. §809.19(3)(b) and further certify that if the record is required by law to be confidential, the portions of the record included in the appendix are reproduced using one or more initials or other appropriate pseudonym or designation instead of full names of persons, specifically including juveniles and parents of juveniles, with a notation that the portions of the record have been so reproduced to preserve confidentiality and with appropriate references to the record.

Dated this 28th day of December, 2023.

Respectfully submitted,

Electronically Signed by
Kevin M. St. John

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