Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts five new cases

Madison, Wisconsin - February 6, 2018

Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts five new cases

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has voted to accept five new cases and acted to deny review in a number of other cases. The case numbers, issues, and counties of origin of granted cases are listed below, along with a list of cases denied review. The synopses provided are not complete analyses of the issues.

More information about any particular case before the Wisconsin Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals can be found on the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Access website. The status of cases pending in the Supreme Court can be found here.

2016AP1599 E. Glenn Porter, III v. State of Wisconsin

Supreme Court case type: Petition for Review
Court of Appeals: Dist. II [Dist. III judges]
Circuit Court: Waukesha County, Judge Patrick C. Haughney, affirmed
Long caption: E. Glenn Porter, III and Highland Memorial Park, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of Wisconsin, Dave Ross and Wisconsin Funeral Directors Examining Board, Defendants-Respondents

Issues presented: This case examines the scope and application of "rational basis review." The Supreme Court reviews two issues presented by E. Glenn Porter, III and Highland Memorial Park, Inc.

  • Must statutes that restrict the ability of Wisconsin citizens to engage in otherwise lawful business activities bear a real and substantial relationship to some legitimate exercise of the state's police power in order to be constitutional?
  • If there must be a real and substantial relationship between a challenged law and a legitimate exercise of the police power, does the presumption of constitutionality permit courts to ignore disputed issues of material facts when considering a motion for summary judgment?

Some background: It has been unlawful in Wisconsin to own both a funeral home and a cemetery since 1939, due to what are referred to as "anti-combination laws." Wisconsin Statute § 445.12(6) prohibits funeral directors (or their agents) from receiving any compensation from any cemetery, mausoleum or crematory (or their agents or employees) "in connection with the sale or transfer of any cemetery lot, outer burial container, burial privilege or cremation." That subsection also prohibits funeral directors from operating a funeral establishment "located in" or financially connected with a cemetery, or from acting "as a broker or jobber of any cemetery property or interest therein."

A parallel provision, applicable to "cemetery authorities," imposes prohibitions reciprocal to those imposed on funeral directors. See § 157.067(2). The cemetery provision prohibits cemetery authorities from allowing funeral homes to locate in the cemetery, and also prohibits cemetery authorities from holding any financial interest in funeral establishments. § 157.067(2).

In this case, the state maintains, and the lower courts have agreed, that the anti-combination laws are constitutional because they are rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting consumers in particularly vulnerable circumstances.

E. Glenn Porter, III the president and one of the principal owners of Highland Memorial Park, a cemetery located in New Berlin (collectively, "Porter") disagree. Porter wants to expand his business by operating a funeral establishment in conjunction with his existing cemetery operations.

Porter filed the underlying lawsuit, seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the anti-combination laws violate equal protection and substantive due process; (2) an order permanently enjoining the state from enforcing the anti-combination laws; and (3) reasonable costs and attorney fees.

The state moved for summary judgment. During summary judgment briefing, the parties submitted competing expert reports. In support of its summary motion, the State submitted (among other things) a report authored by economics professor Jeffrey Sundberg, who opined to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that the anti-combination laws serve the state's claimed government interests. In response, Porter relied primarily on a report and affidavit authored by economics professor David Harrington, who opined to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that the anti-combination laws do not actually advance the state's claimed interests. Porter argued that any dispute as to that issue created a material question of fact requiring a trial.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the state, concluding that the anti-combination laws are constitutional because they are rationally related to a number of legitimate government interests; namely, "preserving competition, avoiding commingling of funds, preserving consumer choices, avoiding higher prices, fostering personal service, [and] avoiding undue pressure on consumers." The trial court explained it was "satisfied . . . that if there are arguments over whether some of this works or some of that doesn't work, it stands as proof then that there is a basis for the law."

The court emphasized that it was "not supposed to decide whether or not one type of law is better than the other, but only whether or not there's a rational basis for it." Given the trial court's determination that there was a rational basis for the anti-combination laws, it concluded it did not "need to go beyond summary judgment and to have a trial on the matter, because . . . there's enough information before the court that the court finds the law is constitutional."

Porter appealed, unsuccessfully. The Court of Appeals held that regardless of the standard of review employed – traditional rational basis review or rational basis with bite – the anti-combination laws are not unconstitutional on substantive due process or equal protection grounds.

Porter argues that the anti-combination laws must be examined under a "rational basis with bite" standard, a more stringent form of rational basis scrutiny that requires the state to produce evidence showing that the laws actually, not just conceivably, advance a legitimate government interest. See generally Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.

Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson concurred.

2016AP1517 Philip Myers v. Wisconsin DNR

Supreme Court case type: Petition for Review
Court of Appeals: District III
Circuit Court: Ashland County, Judge Robert E. Eaton, Affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded with directions
Long caption: Philip Myers and Terrie Myers, (the Myerses) Petitioners-Appellants-Cross-Respondents, v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR), Respondent-Respondent-Cross-Appellant

Issues presented: This case examines the process by which the DNR may or may not amend a construction permit for a previously permitted pier. The Supreme Court reviews the following questions as presented by the pier owners, Philip Myers and Terrie Myers:

  • May the DNR require removal and replacement of a 16-year old permitted pier by unilateral amendment of its permit without a trial or a contested case hearing, rather than following the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 30.03 and Wis. Admin. Code § NR 326.06-.08.
  • Is the DNR's unilateral permit amendment subject to the Grandfather Exemption and the Enforcement Exemptions to Wis. Stat. § 30.12 which, with limited exceptions, prohibit DNR from regulating or removing piers placed prior to April 17, 2012?
  • To the extent that factual issues relating to Exemption exceptions were relevant, were the Myerses entitled to a trial or contested case hearing on the allegations that their pier interfered with the riparian rights of others or was detrimental to the public interest, or could an appellate court substitute implicit findings made at an informational public hearing for actual factual findings made after notice and a hearing?

The Court may also consider some of these issues in light of the fact the pier at the heart of this dispute was apparently damaged by a storm after this appeal was filed.

Some background: In December 1999 the Myerses applied under Wis. Stat. § 30.12 to build a new pier on the bed of Lake Superior on Madeline Island next to the remnants of a 1930s pier that had deteriorated. The Myerses' application sought to construct a series of rock-filled cribs that would form the base of the pier.

The DNR received several objections to the Myerses' application on the ground that the pier as proposed would erode parts of the beach and block the wave action that produces littoral drift (the process of sediment, primarily sand, moving along the shoreline due to wave action).

The Myerses state that they made a number of changes to their proposed pier plan to address the DNR's concerns. Ultimately, their application went through a contested case hearing, at the conclusion of which the administrative law judge (ALJ) granted their permit.

While the ALJ acknowledged the objectors' concerns about blockage of littoral drift and beach erosion, he concluded that it was unlikely that the pier would have detrimental effects on the shoreline due to some of the plan revisions. Specifically, the permit required a 12-foot opening between the two cribs underneath the main length of the pier to allow water and sediment to flow through from one side of the pier to the other.

However, the ALJ also included the following language in the permit: "The authority herein granted can be amended or rescinded if the structure becomes a material obstruction to navigation or becomes detrimental to the public interest." The ALJ stated that this condition would be "protective of unexpected impacts on neighboring properties relating to sand accumulation or beach starvation" and would 'requir[e] modification if sand deposition or beach starvation became a problem."

The Myerses' pier was constructed pursuant to the design parameters of the permit in 2001.

In 2012 and 2013 the DNR received complaints from two neighbors who claimed that they had suffered erosion and "loss of riparian property" due to the Myerses' pier. The DNR sent the Myerses a letter regarding those complaints in March 2013. It demanded an inspection of the pier. A professional coastal engineer from the University of Wisconsin Sea Grant Institute inspected the pier and the neighboring properties. The DNR also consulted historical aerial photographs.

In July 2013, the DNR sent a letter to the Myerses, which demanded that they remove a crib remnant from the 1930s pier and that they also remove the two 24-foot cribs that the Myerses had placed on the sea bed to support the main length of the pier. The letter purported to modify the terms of the 2001 permit because it required the Myerses to remove the two cribs along the main section of the pier in order to allow the free movement of water and sediment.

The Myerses objected and petitioned for an administrative review. The DNR denied the request for a formal administrative review. Instead, it published a notice of a pending amendment to the permit and then held a public informational hearing (not a contested case hearing). After the hearing the DNR issued an amendment to the permit requiring the removal of the two cribs.

The Myerses sought judicial review in the Bayfield County Circuit Court. The circuit court rejected the Myerses' claim that the DNR had lacked authority to amend the 2001 permit, but it remanded the matter to the agency for additional factual development as to whether the Myerses' pier was exempt from any amendment either under a grandfather clause (Wis. Stat. § 30.12(1k)(b)) or a prohibition on enforcement actions against piers that are in compliance with an original permit. The circuit court stated that it needed additional facts to resolve those issues.

The Myerses appealed the circuit court's order to the Court of Appeals. The DNR cross-appealed the circuit court's remand of the matter to the agency for additional fact-finding.

The Court of Appeals' affirmed the circuit court's order, which in turn affirmed, in part, the DNR's amendment of the permit and remanded the matter to the DNR for certain fact-finding.

The Court of Appeals concluded, among other things, that the DNR did not have to follow the modification procedure set forth in the statutes because it had reserved the power to modify in the original permit. The Court of Appeals said the grandfather clause did not apply because it believed that the DNR had implicitly found in its amendment decision that the Myerses' pier "was not in compliance with the original permit's terms."

The Myerses say there are procedures set forth in the statutes that the DNR must follow in order to issue an administrative order regarding unpermitted piers or piers that violate the terms of their permits. They point to Wis. Stat. § 30.03(4)(a), which provides that when the DNR learns of a possible violation of the statutes or of the public's rights relating to navigable waters, the DNR may order a hearing under Wis. Stat. ch. 227 and may request the hearing examiner to issue an order directing the responsible parties to take or refrain from taking certain actions to fully protect the public's interests in the waters.

Similarly, the Myerses say the DNR's own rules state that when a municipality or person makes a complaint about a pier (or other water-related structures), the DNR shall investigate the complaint and may then conduct a contested hearing. See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 326.06. These procedures require notice, a hearing, the meeting of a burden of proof, and an impartial decision-maker. The Myerses assert that the DNR's unilateral actions regarding their pier failed to provide them with any of these procedural safeguards.

The DNR contends that it is authorized by statute to modify or rescind any permit before the permit's authorization and that one of the statutory bases for such a modification is the DNR's charge to protect navigable waters from structures that are contrary to the public interest. See Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(d)2 and § 30.2095(2).

The DNR also argues that the procedure it followed for amending the Myerses' pier was consistent with existing law. Specifically, it asserts that the "condition" in the 2001 permit authorizing amendment of the permit if the pier became "detrimental to the public interest" comported with the DNR's statutory authority to "establish reasonable conditions to implement the criteria [relating to navigation, public interest, and flood flow capacity]." Wis. Stat. § 30.12(3m)(d)2; see also Wis. Admin. Code § NR 326.04(3)(b).

Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson writing separately.

2017AP1240 McAdams v. Marquette University

Supreme Court case type: Bypass
Court of Appeals: District I
Circuit Court: Milwaukee County, Judge David A. Hansher
Long caption: John McAdams, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marquette University, Defendant-Respondent

Issues presented:

  • Was the statement made by Professor John McAdams in a Nov. 9, 2014 post of his Marquette Warrior blog protected under the doctrines of academic freedom and freedom of expression?
  • Did the Circuit Court improperly deny McAdams a trial on the merits by deferring to the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by Marquette's internal Faculty Hearing Committee?

Some background: On Nov. 9, 2014, John McAdams, a tenured professor at Marquette University, published a blog post on his personal blog, Marquette Warrior, criticizing Cheryl Abbate, a graduate student and philosophy instructor. The blog post discussed Abbate's conversation with a student in her philosophy class.

The blog post said that Abbate had listed some issues on the board, including "gay rights." According to the blog post, Abbate "then airily said that 'everybody agrees on this, and there is no need to discuss it.'"

The blog post went on to say that the student, who disagrees with some of the notions of gay rights, such as gay marriage, approached Abbate after class and told her he thought the issue deserved to be discussed.

The blog post indicated that Abbate told the student "some opinions are not appropriate, such as racist opinions, sexist opinions." The blog post indicated Abbate told the student "you don't have a right in this class to make homophobic comments" and that she would "take offense" if the student said that women can't serve in particular roles and that somebody who is homosexual would experience similar offense if somebody opposed gay marriage in class.

The blog post indicated that Abbate said, "In this class, homophobic comments, racist comments, will not be tolerated," and she invited the student to drop the class. In addition to naming Abbate, the blog post included a clickable link to her contact information and personal website. Abbate immediately started receiving strongly negative emails, and several of the communications expressed violent thoughts about her.

On Dec. 16, 2014, Dean Richard Holz advised McAdams that until further notice he was relieved of all teaching duties and faculty activities and that he would still receive his salary and benefits. On Jan. 2, 2015, Holz affirmed that McAdams was banned from campus. On Jan. 30, 2015, Holz advised McAdams that his "conduct clearly and substantially fails to meet the standards of personal and professional excellence that generally characterizes university faculties," and that Marquette was initiating the process to revoke his tenure and terminate his employment.

A Faculty Hearing Committee (FHC) comprised of seven tenured faculty members and chaired by a law professor held a hearing. Both parties were represented by counsel, and multiple witnesses were examined and cross-examined during a four-day hearing that occurred in September 2015.

Following the hearing, the FHC met and deliberated seven times and ultimately issued a 123-page report containing over 300 findings of fact. The FHC concluded that the university demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that McAdams' conduct was seriously irresponsible and his demonstrated failure to recognize his essential obligations to follow members of the Marquette community, and to conform his behavior accordingly will substantially impair his fitness to fulfill his responsibilities as a professor.

In accordance with McAdams' employment contract, Marquette's president reviewed and adopted the FHC findings and conclusions. Because the FHC had emphasized McAdams' refusal to acknowledge or accept his professional duties and thus was likely to repeat his misconduct, the president added a condition that McAdams be sent a private letter with the criteria for reinstatement that: required McAdams privately to acknowledge and accept the unanimous judgment of his peers; affirm his commitment that his future actions would adhere to the standards of higher education; acknowledge that the blog post was reckless and incompatible with the mission and values of Marquette University; and express regret for the harm caused to the graduate student. McAdams refused to accept these conditions. After eight months of discovery and 178 pages of briefing, the circuit court granted Marquette summary judgment. McAdams appealed.

McAdams says the circuit court's decision in favor of the University will have, and may already have had, a chilling effect on free expression by the faculty of other universities around the state, including professors at the University of Wisconsin. He contends there is a split of authority in the law on whether deference should be given to universities with respect to the administration of employment contracts.

Marquette says while McAdams is entitled to seek appellate review, reviewing the record of the proceedings to ensure that Marquette followed the contractual standards is the type of error correcting analysis typically performed by the Court of Appeals, not this court. Marquette argues that contrary to McAdams' assertions, he was not disciplined because of any controversial opinion that he holds or that he expressed. Rather, Marquette says the conduct that led to McAdams' suspension was his decision to put Abbate's name and her personal contact information on the internet, knowing that this could lead to negative communications.

Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler did not participate. Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (dissenting).

2014AP2498 Wingra Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Burial Sites Preservation Board

Supreme Court case type: Petition for Review
Court of Appeals: District IV
Circuit Court: Dane County, Judge Ellen K. Berz, affirmed
Long caption: Wingra Redi-Mix, Inc. d/b/a Wingra Stone Company, Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, v. Burial Sites Preservation Board, Respondent-Respondent, Ho-Chunk Nation, Other Party-Respondent.

Issues presented: This is one of two companion Supreme Court cases involving a dispute between a gravel pit operator and the Burial Sites Preservation Board. The Supreme Court reviews lower court decisions upholding an order of the board that denied Wingra Redi-Mix, Inc.'s petition to remove effigy mounds on its property from the catalog of human burial sites. (The second case is Wingra Redi-Mix, Inc. v. State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 2015AP1632 and 2015AP1844). The issue presented in that case is whether the Historical Society erred in denying Wingra's petition for permission to disturb the burial mounds.

Some background: In 1914, Native American effigy mounds referred to as the Ward Mound Group were identified and mapped on property now belonging to Wingra in Dane County. At the time, the group consisted of seven mounds. In 1989 and 1990, the Dane County Indian Mounds Identification Project investigated the site and found that a bird effigy and a portion of a tailed mammal effigy still exist. The other mounds had been destroyed over time. The property at issue was catalogued as a protected burial site in 1991. Wingra, which has operated the site as a gravel pit since 1961 and has owned it since 1982, did not challenge the finding at the time.

In September of 2010, Wingra sent the director a letter requesting that the mounds be removed from the burial sites catalog because "[t]here is no definitive evidence that human remains have been buried in any of the mounds."

In January 2011, Wingra submitted a petition to the director seeking removal of the mounds from the catalog of burial sites. The petition alleged that the mounds were cataloged in 1991 with no evidence of human remains and the director did not offer Wingra an opportunity to appeal the decision to catalog the mounds, in violation of Wingra's right to due process. The petition also alleged that effigy mounds are understood to have functioned as ceremonial locations and only sometimes as burial sites. The petition further alleged that a 1998 investigation on behalf of the Ho-Chunk Nation using ground penetrating radar identified only "one or more anomalies within the portions of one of the mound remnants," which were "not dispositive of the presence of human remains."

The Ho-Chunk Nation was permitted to join the proceedings as an interested party. It opposed Wingra's removal petition. The director of the Historical Society denied the petition. Wingra appealed to the Burial Sites Preservation Board. The Board received briefs, held a contested hearing, and ultimately affirmed the director's final decision and adopted it as its own. The Board concluded that Wingra's challenges to the validity and scope of the original cataloging decision were time barred. The board went on to say even if they were not time barred, Wingra's arguments that the director should not have cataloged the site and that the director cataloged too much land were inconsistent with the purpose of § 157.70.

The board held Wingra failed to establish grounds for removing the site from the catalog, and it denied Wingra's petition. The circuit court affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals.

In reviewing the board's decision, the Court of Appeals reviewed somewhat conflicting testimony from a geologist and an archeologist about whether it seems likely or not that human remains are located at the site.

The Court of Appeals concluded there was substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that Wingra failed to provide sufficient evidence that the mounds do not contain human remains.

The Court of Appeals said Wis. Admin Code § HS 2.03(6)(a), (b) imposes on Wingra the burden of presenting "sufficient evidence to indicate that a cataloged site does not contain any burials" or "human remains." The appellate court said the board simply applied the standard that is found in the code.

The Court of Appeals went on to note that the board reviewed historical literature relied on by Wingra and pointed out that the authors cited by Wingra clearly stated that most effigy mounds contained human burials.

Wingra argues that there is no site specific factual support that the effigy mounds on its property contain human remains and complains it is being prohibited from mining a three-acre parcel. "This case exemplifies the harm caused to private property owners by an unaccountable administrative agency driven by an agenda of its own making, regardless whether that agenda comports with the dictates set forth by the legislature," Wingra contends.

Wingra also says, if in fact, a party must conclusively establish that no human remains exist, then Wingra suffered a violation of its due process rights because it was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to challenge the initial cataloging. The company adds that conclusive proof of the absence of human remains cannot be achieved without invasive surveying, which the Historical Society has also rejected.

2015AP1632/2015AP1844 Wingra Redi-Mix, Inc. v. State Hist. Society. of Wis.

Supreme Court case type: Petition for Review
Court of Appeals: Dist. IV
Circuit Court: Dane County, Judge John C. Albert, reversed
Long caption: Wingra Redi-Mix, Inc. d/b/a Wingra Stone Company, Petitioner-Respondent-Cross-Appellant-Petitioner, v. State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, Ho-Chunk Nation, Intervenor-Co-Appellant-Cross-Respondent

Issues presented: This consolidated case is the second of two companion Supreme Court cases involving a dispute between Wingra Redi-Mix, a gravel pit operator, and the Burial Sites Preservation Board or the State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

While the companion case, 2014AP2498, dealt with Wingra's petition to remove the effigy mounds at issue from the State Historical Society's catalog of burial sites, this case deals with Wingra's petition to disturb two Native American effigy mounds that are part of the Ward Mound Group, located in Dane County. The Ho-Chunk Nation has intervened on behalf of the Historical Society.

Some Background: In 1914, Native American effigy mounds referred to as the Ward Mound Group were identified and mapped on property now belonging to Wingra. The property at issue was catalogued as a protected burial site in 1991.

Wingra has operated the site as a gravel pit since 1961 and has owned it since 1982. The cataloged burial site at issue consists of about three acres, located within a 57-acre sand and gravel pit.

Over the years, Wingra has conducted its mining and quarrying activities around the mound group, which the company says has resulted in a 50-foot tall mesa in the middle of its quarry. On Sept. 17, 2010, Wingra applied for a permit that would allow the company to disturb three "anomalies" found at the site to confirm, consistent with its expert's report, that those anomalies were not human remains.

The State Historical Society denied the petition, as did the state Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA). DHA determined that evidence of whether human remains exist in the mounds is not material under the statute controlling the process for handling a permit to disturb.

The circuit court reversed the DHA, and the circuit court was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected all of Wingra's arguments challenging the denial of the permit, and affirmed the decision denying the petition to disturb.

The Court of Appeals said it is required to affirm an agency's decision unless it finds a ground for setting aside, modifying, remanding, or ordering agency action. In addition, it noted it will uphold an agency's factual findings if they are reasonable under § 157.70(5)(c)2.

The DHA concluded the Ho-Chunk Nation has a legitimate tribal and religious affiliation with the mounds and an interest in preserving the site. The Court of Appeals said it was satisfied that decision was based on substantial evidence.

In taking the case to the Supreme Court, Wingra argues that review by the Supreme Court is necessary "to rein in the administrative state by insuring that it acts within the bounds set by the legislature and protect the rights of private parties that are targeted by administrative agencies."

Wingra accuses the Court of Appeals of ignoring questions of law and applying a highly deferential "substantial evidence" test, which ends up expanding the DHA, and the Historical Society's authority in excess of what the legislature intended. Wingra argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously reframed Wingra's issues as factual disputes and in doing so confused, rather than clarified, the appropriate interpretation of the Burial Sites Preservation statute.

The Historical Society said the near universal policy of deep respect for sites where the dead are buried was codified in Wisconsin law by the enactment of the Burial Sites Preservation Law. It says the statute sought to "assure that all human burials be accorded equal treatment and respect for human dignity without reference to ethnic origins, cultural backgrounds, or religious affiliations." 1985 Wis. Act 316, § 1(2)(a).

The Historical Society also noted that the Burial Sites Preservation law is expressly intended to "balance the interests of scientists, landowners, developers and others with an interest in a burial site, including those with a kinship interest and those with a general cultural, tribal, or religious affiliation with the burial site."

Review denied: The Supreme Court denied review in the following cases. As the state's law-developing court, the Supreme Court exercises its discretion to select for review only those cases that fit certain statutory criteria (see Wis. Stat. § 809.62). Except where indicated, these cases came to the Court via petition for review by the party who lost in the lower court:

Clark County
2017AP165-CR State v. Page

Columbia County
2016AP1784-CR State v. Loring
2017AP134-CR State v. Morales

Dane County
2016AP1181-82-CR State v. Brooks
2016AP1881 Balele v. Crabb
2017AP1578-80 Dane County DHS v. S.J.

Dodge County
2016AP1076 Multerer v. DOR

Fond du Lac County
2015AP690-CRNM State v. Wilcox

Juneau County
2016AP853-CR State v. Tetting

Kenosha County
2016AP1794-95-CR State v. Garza
2016AP1923-CR State v. Zamora
2016AP2253-CR State v. Williams

Lafayette County
2016AP2038-CR State v. Olmstead

Manitowoc County
2016AP930-CRNM State v. Mills—Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissent.

Milwaukee County
2015AP512 Fariole v. Foster
2015AP1419-CR State v. Winston
2015AP2643-W Williams v. Clements
2016AP1119 State v. Patterson
2016AP1124 State v. Burkett
2016AP1180 State v. K.H.—Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley did not participate. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissent.
2016AP1292-CR State v. Moore
2016AP1373-CR State v. Carter
2016AP1803-CR State v. Huber
2016AP1820-CRNM State v. Jones—Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack did not participate.
2016AP1912-CR State v. Tally-Clayborne
2016AP2045-46 State v. M.W.—Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissent.
2016AP2076 State v. A.S.F.—Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissent.
2016AP2077 State v. V.C.—Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissent.
2016AP2104-05 State v. M.P.
2016AP2311-12-CR State v. Hearvey
2017AP191-CR State v. Rivera
2017AP633-CR State v. Edwards—Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissents.
2017AP1109-W Shaw v. Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee Cty.

Ozaukee County
2016AP807/1539 Team Prop. Mgmt. v. Diedrich

Racine County
2016AP717 State v. Tran
2016AP1061-CR State v. Torres—Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissents.

Richland County
2016AP1779 TCAT Corp. v. LIRC

Rock County
2016AP529 State v. Ramon Stewart

Waukesha County
2016AP2390-CR State v. Olson
2017AP1874-W Prouty v. Strahota

Tom Sheehan
Court Information Officer
(608) 261-6640

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