Headlines archive

2015

Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts 12 new cases

Madison, Wisconsin - October 19, 2015

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has voted to accept 12 new cases and acted to deny review in a number of other cases. The case numbers, issues, and counties of origin of granted cases are listed below. Hyperlinks to Court of Appeals decisions are also provided where available. The synopses provided are not complete analyses of the issues presented. More information about any particular case before the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals can be found on the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Access website.

2013AP2316-CR State v. Sulla
This criminal case examines when an evidentiary hearing is or is not required. The Supreme Court reviews the question in light of three prior cases and potentially conflicting holdings:

  • State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996), which requires a hearing to be held if the defendant alleges facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief and allows a hearing to be denied if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief.
  • State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835, holding that agreeing to have a charge read-in is not an admission of guilt.
  • State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶73, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436, which held, as did Straszkowski, that a read-in charge necessarily exposes the defendant to a higher sentence and restitution.

Some background: The defendant, Richard J. Sulla, was charged with two counts of burglary, conspiracy to commit arson of a building, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, party to a crime, all as a repeater. He pled no contest to burglary while armed and burglary of a building or dwelling. The plea questionnaire/waiver of rights form stated that "although the judge may consider read-in charge when imposing sentence, the maximum penalty will not be increased" and the defendant "may be required to pay restitution on any read-in charges."

At the sentencing hearing, the court discussed the defendant's age at the time of the burglaries, 22 and 23 years old, and the fact he had 18 criminal convictions. The court also specifically addressed the read-in count of arson.

The court sentenced the defendant to 7½ years of initial confinement and 7½ years of extended supervision on the armed burglary count with a consecutive sentence of 2½ years of initial confinement and 2½ years of extended supervision on the burglary of a building or dwelling count.

The defendant filed a post-conviction motion asking the court to vacate the judgment of conviction and allow him to withdraw the no contest pleas.

Among other things, the defendant argued the plea was not entered knowingly and resulted in a manifest injustice because "he was misinformed and did not understand that for purposes of the read-in arson charge, he would effectively be considered to have committed the offense." He also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective.

The circuit court denied the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing, concluding that "the record conclusively demonstrates and shows that his counsel was not deficient and that there was not any prejudice to the defendant."

The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeals identified a "potential inconsistency . . . in the standards described in Bentley."

The Court of Appeals said given the potential for confusion that is inherent in the read-in concept, it concluded the defendant did allege facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief.

The Court of Appeals said to obtain an evidentiary hearing, a defendant seeking plea withdrawal must also allege that he would have pled differently if he had properly understood the information he claimed not to have understood. See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 313. The defendant's motion alleged that "if I had known that it [the read-in offense] was going to be considered as a negative at my sentencing I would have not have entered the no contest plea."

The state asserts that based on the Court of Appeals' decision, any time a defendant sets forth in an affidavit that in his own mind, whether it is based on something someone told him or came from other source, he did not understand that a read-in offense would be considered as a negative in sentencing, the defendant will be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

In taking the case to the Supreme Court, the state raises the following issues:

  • Did the Court of Appeals improperly extend this court's holding in Bentley by finding that Sulla's affidavit, asserting that he did not understand that by agreeing to the read-in charge of arson he was effectively admitting guilt and that the read-in charge would have a negative impact on his sentence, was sufficient as a matter of law under Bentley to alleged facts that require an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction motion for plea withdrawal?
  • Did the Court of Appeals improperly reverse the trial court's exercise of its discretion under Bentley to find that the record in its entirely, including the signed plea questionnaire, the plea colloquy and the sentencing memorandum outlining Sulla's criminal history, conclusively demonstrated that Sulla is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for plea withdrawal based solely on his affidavit asserting that Sulla did not understand the effect of the read-in offense on his sentence?
  • By ignoring supreme court precedent in Straszkowski, holding that agreeing to have a charge read-in is not an admission of guilt, and by ignoring supreme court precedent in both Straszkowski and Frey, holding that a read-in charge necessarily exposes the defendant to a higher sentence and restitution, did the Court of Appeals commit a fundamental error of law by finding that the statements in Sulla's affidavit were sufficient to require a hearing on his motion for plea withdrawal?

A decision by the Supreme Court is expected to clarify when an evidentiary hearing is or is not required, particularly as it relates to "read-in charges." From Jefferson County.

2013AP2686-CR State v. Salinas
This case examines Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1) and the circumstances under which crimes may be joined in one trial.

Crimes may be joined if they are similar or if they are connected as part of a common plan. Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1)provides, in part:

Two or more crimes may be charged in the same complaint [or] information . . . in a separate count for each crime if the crimes charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

Some background: In 2010, Luis C. Salinas was sentenced on several charges relating to domestic abuse. Salinas pled guilty to strangulation and suffocation and battery with use of a dangerous weapon in a domestic abuse setting. As part of a plea bargain, charges of physical abuse of a child and disorderly conduct—domestic abuse were dismissed and read in. A girlfriend at the time and a teenage girl spoke on the defendant's behalf. Sentence was withheld in favor of probation, and the defendant was ordered to serve nine months conditional jail time, for which he received 197 days credit for time already served.

Two days after the sentencing hearing in the domestic abuse case, the girl who spoke at the sentencing hearing told police that the defendant had sexually assaulted her repeatedly over a 2 ½-year period, most recently on the day of the domestic abuse incident. The defendant was charged with the three sexual assault counts as a result of the girl's allegations.

Three or four months later, police discovered from jail phone call recordings that the defendant tried to influence testimony of the girl and his girlfriend at his sentencing hearing in the domestic abuse case. These calls led to the two victim intimidation charges.

On the state's motion, and over defense objection, the trial court joined the victim intimidation charges with the sexual assault charges. Because the domestic abuse incident was deemed relevant to the victim intimidation charges, the domestic abuse evidence was introduced at trial on the joined cases.

The jury found Salinas guilty on all counts. He appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed with Salinas that the circuit court improperly joined the sexual assault and intimidation counts. The appellate court further concluded that the error was not harmless and reversed and remanded for new trials.

The Court of Appeals decided that allegations that Salinas sexually assaulted his girlfriend's child, and that he intimidated his girlfriend and her child, were not similar acts or connected as part of a common plan.

The court said the state failed to actually identify any common factors or evidence between the intimidation charges and the sexual assault charges. It also said the state's argument ignored the differing allegations with respect to the two victims.

The state argues the Court of Appeals' decision is in conflict with prior decisions dictating when joinder is appropriate and that joinder was appropriate because all charges against the defendant "are related to his overarching control, manipulation and abuse of both" the girl and the girlfriend.

Salinas says in arguing harmless error, the state fails to acknowledge that the intimidation charges arose post-plea and pre-sentencing in a domestic violence incident and the domestic violence case was disposed of prior to the filing of the intimidation or sexual assault charges. From Brown County.

2013AP2756-CR Marks v. Houston Cas. Co.
This insurance case examines how a claim of breach of duty to defend is evaluated and whether the Court of Appeals may have previously reshaped its own precedent in this area of the law.

Some background: David M. Marks is the trustee of two trusts, the Irrevocable Children's Trust (ICT) and the Irrevocable Children Trust No. 2 (ICT2). As trustee, Marks is responsible for investing, managing, and growing the corpus of the two trusts.  In the course of his duties as trustee, he allegedly invested and took a majority stock position in a company called Titan Global Holdings, Inc. He sat on the board of Titan, acted as the board's chair, and also served as an officer or director of Titan's subsidiaries. Marks alleged all of those positions were in furtherance of his duties as trustee.

Houston Casualty issued a professional liability errors and omissions insurance policy to Marks covering the period Oct. 28, 2008 to Oct. 28, 2009. The policy provides coverage up to $1,000,000 for any loss or expenses relating to any claims, demands, or suits based upon or arising out of Marks's profession. In an endorsement, the policy states that is a named insured's profession is "solely in the performance of services as the trustee of" ICT and/or ICT2. The policy, in part, contains the following exclusion:

IV. EXCLUSIONS

This Policy does not apply either directly or indirectly to any Claim and Claim Expenses: . . .
(b) For liability arising out of the Insured's services and/or capacity as:
(1) an officer, director, partner, trustee, or employee of a business enterprise not named in the Declarations or a charitable organization or pension, welfare, profit sharing, mutual or investment fund or trust.

Marks was sued six times in five different states for his actions related to Titan. He submitted claims to Houston Casualty for each suit. Houston Casualty either refused or failed to provide a defense for Marks for any of the lawsuits. In November of 2009, Marks sued Houston Casualty and Bedford, seeking various forms of relief based on Houston Casualty's failure or refusal to provide him a defense in the other lawsuits. Houston Casualty cross-claimed against Bedford, alleging that Houston Casualty was entitled to indemnity to the extent Houston Casualty was found liable to Marks.

All parties moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Houston Casualty and Bedford on Marks's claims and dismissed Houston Casualty's cross-claim against Bedford.

In the circuit court's (Judge Richard J. Sankovitz, Milwaukee County Circuit Court) oral remarks from the bench, the court concluded that three published cases of the Court of Appeals, Grube,( Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 496 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1992); Kenefick [(Kenefick v. Hitchcock, 187 Wis. 2d 218, 522 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1994)], and Radke,[( Radke v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 217 Wis. 2d 39, 577 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1998)]. lacked precedential authority.

The circuit court decided that Grube lacks precedential authority because the Court of Appeals panel that decided Grube lacked the authority to modify the estoppel rule that was previously stated in Professional Office Buildings, Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., [145 Wis. 2d 573, 427 N.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1988)]

Marks appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Marks contended that the circuit court erroneously concluded that Houston Casualty did not breach its duty to defend Marks in the other lawsuits. Marks argued that where there is a unilateral failure or refusal by the insurer to defend the insured so that the question is whether the insurer has breached its duty to defend, the insurer is not permitted to argue that an exclusion justified its refusal to defend. Marks's support for this argument comes from Grube, Kenefick, and Radke. The Court of Appeals agreed with the circuit court that in this respect, Grube, Kenefick, and Radke impermissibly conflict with the earlier decision in Professional Office Bldgs.

The Court of Appeals said to the extent that Grube, Kenefick, and Radke modified Professional Office Bldgs., the circuit court appropriately pointed out that the Court of Appeals lacked the authority to do so under Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). Although the Court of Appeals in this case did not use the words "overrule," "modify," or "withdraw language," it said that the three cases "do not establish precedent for the modification of how a claim of breach of duty to defend is evaluated . . ."

The court said regardless of the desirability of the Grube approach, it was bound by its earlier decision in Professional Office Bldgs.  Accordingly, it concluded the circuit court correctly assessed whether Houston Casualty breached its duty to defend by comparing the allegations in the complaints against Marks in the earlier lawsuits with the full Houston Casualty policy, including exclusions.

The Court of Appeals said nothing in Professional Office Bldgs. suggests that, in deciding breach of duty to defend issues, courts should deviate from the usual methodology which is to look to allegations in a complaint and first compare them with a policy's initial grant of coverage and, if coverage is found, then next see if any exclusions preclude coverage. If there are any such exclusions, a court must see if any exceptions to the exclusions reinstate coverage, the Court of Appeals said.

Marks says it was settled in Wisconsin that there are two tracks of analysis in duty to defend cases.  See generally, Olson v. Farrar, 2012 WI 3, ¶¶26-42, 338 Wis. 2d 215, 228-34, 809 N.W.2d 1.  If an insurer asks a court to review the policy to determine whether the insurer has a duty to defend, the insurer may litigate coverage by relying upon extrinsic evidence and policy exclusions.  Id. at ¶¶35-41.  If, however, the insurer makes a unilateral decision to deny coverage without seeking court approval, the insurer is barred from relying on either extrinsic evidence or police exclusions to litigate coverage.  Grube v. Daun, 173 Wis. 2d 30, 496 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1992).

Marks contends that the Court of Appeals' decision here dissolves the distinction between the two tracks of duty to defend law, overruling three prior published decisions and upsetting 20 years of established precedent. From Milwaukee County.

2014AP1213 Sorenson v. Batchelder
This case calls for an interpretation the service requirements involving claims against the state under § 893.82 and the law's provision that service "shall be served upon the attorney general at his or her office in the Capitol by certified mail."

Some background: The plaintiff, Cheryl Sorenson, filed an action against the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA) and Richard A. Batchelder. Sorenson claimed that Batchelder had negligently operated his vehicle within the scope of his employment at the DOA, causing a collision in which the plaintiff suffered injuries.  Sorenson effected personal service of her notice of claim on the attorney general.  The state moved to dismiss the complaint against Batchelder on the grounds that the notice of claim was improperly served.  The state moved to dismiss the complaint against the DOA on sovereign immunity grounds.  The circuit court dismissed the DOA but denied the motion to dismiss as to Batchelder, holding that the notice of claim had been properly served.  In its oral ruling from the bench, the circuit court relied in large part on a federal district court case, Weis v. Board of Regents, 837 F. Supp. 2d 971 (E.D. Wis. 2011).  The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

The Court of Appeals noted that § 893.82(3) provides that no civil action may be brought against any state officer, employee or agent unless a claimant first timely serves written notice of claim upon the attorney general.  Section 893.82(5) requires that the notice "shall be served upon the attorney general at his or her office in the Capitol by certified mail."  The Court of Appeals concluded that a plain language interpretation of the statute showed that the plaintiff's (and the circuit court's) conclusion that service of a notice of claim by personal service rather than certified mail was not sufficient to comply with the statute.

The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in Hines v. Resnick, 2011 WI App 163, 338 Wis. 2d 190, 807 N.W.2d 687, which held, "Obviously, a claimant cannot comply with the statute by hand-delivering a notice to the attorney general's Capitol office because such service would not comply with the certified mail requirement."

While Sorenson conceded she did not serve the notice of claim by certified mail, she argued that the personal service she did accomplish was sufficient to comply with the notice of claim statute.
She presents the following issues to the Supreme Court:

  1. Can the plaintiff-respondent strictly comply with the service requirements for a notice of claim under Wis. Stat. § 893.82 without literally complying with the language of the statute?
  2. Does a literal interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 893.82 fulfill the statutory purpose and spirit intended in its creation?
  3. Is it against public policy to dismiss a valid claim which was filed in accordance with all statutory purposes under Wis. Stat. § 893.82? From Milwaukee County.

2014AP1177 John Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic Health System-EC
This case examines time limits for filing medical malpractice claims against a pediatrician who allegedly assaulted minor patients who did not realize at the time their genitals were examined that the examinations were not purely medical in nature.

Defendants include the physician, David A. Van de Loo, Mayo Clinic Health System – Eau Claire Clinic, Inc.; its insurer, ProAssurance Casualty Co.; and the Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund.

Plaintiffs include: John Doe 56, who received medical treatment from Van de Loo at a Mayo Clinic office in Eau Claire between 2003 and 2008, when he was 10 to 15 years old; and John Doe 57, who received medical treatment from Van de Loo at the clinic between 2003 and 2009, when he was eight to 14 years old.

Some background: Van de Loo commonly asked parents to leave the room when he was performing physical examinations on minor male patients. While providing medical treatment to John Does 56 and 57, Van de Loo touched their genitals.

In August 2012, Van de Loo was accused of inappropriately touching a different minor male's genitals during a medical examination.  As a result, in October 2012, the state criminally charged Van de Loo with one count of sexual assault by an employee of an entity and one count of exposing genitals or pubic area.  The state ultimately charged Van de Loo with a total of 16 felony counts based on his treatment of male patients at Mayo Clinic.  Van de Loo denied his conduct was criminal and argued it served a medical purpose.

A jury acquitted Van de Loo on 14 of the 16 counts, and did not reach a verdict on two of the counts.  Van de Loo ultimately agreed to give up his medical license in exchange for the dismissal of these two remaining counts.

John Does 56 and 57 alleged that the first time either of them knew that the treatment they had received from Van de Loo was improper was when they learned in October 2012 that the state had criminally charged him.  They alleged that they had suffered profound psychological damage as a result of Van de Loo's conduct, including depression, anxiety, self-esteem issues, and loss of enjoyment of life.

John Does 56 and 57 each asserted 11 claims against Van de Loo and Mayo Clinic:  sexual battery against Van de Loo; vicarious liability for Van de Loo's conduct against Mayo Clinic; medical malpractice against Van de Loo and Mayo Clinic; negligence, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision, and negligent failure to warn against Mayo Clinic; and fraud, fraud—intentional nondisclosure, and fraud—negligent misrepresentation against Mayo Clinic.  In addition, the parents of John Does 56 and 57 asserted a claim against Van de Loo and Mayo Clinic for loss of society and companionship.

Mayo Clinic and Van de Loo subsequently moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, arguing they were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.  Following a hearing, the trial court granted these motions and entered an order dismissing with prejudice all claims against Mayo Clinic, the Fund, and ProAssurance (as its interests related to those of Mayo Clinic) and dismissing with prejudice the medical malpractice claims against Van de Loo and ProAssurance (as its interests related to those of Van de Loo). 

The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that the accrual of the claims was unaffected by the plaintiffs' allegation that they did not realize the extent of their injuries at the time of the touching.  See John BBB Doe (citing Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995)].

Van de Loo's last alleged touching of the Does' genitals occurred no later than Dec. 31, 2008 for John Doe 56, and Dec. 31, 2009 for John Doe 57.  The plaintiffs did not file their complaint until October 2013.  The medical malpractice claims therefore fell outside of the three-year statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals found.

In taking their case to the Supreme Court, John Does 56 and 57 argue that their medical malpractice claims did not accrue until the state criminally charged Van de Loo in because the examinations did not immediately cause them any physical injury.

The Supreme Court reviews two issues presented by the plaintiffs:

  • Does the statute of limitations begin to run, under the rule set forth in Estate of Genrich v. OHIC Insurance Company, 2009 WI 67, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769 N.W.2d 481, on a minor's claim for emotional distress resulting from medical malpractice in the form of an improper genital examination at the time of the last treatment by the minor's pediatrician even though the minor has not sustained any injury and has no legally cognizable claim until years later when the minor learned that the pediatrician's genital exam had been improper?
  • Did the court err in applying the intentional acts rule from John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 565 N.W. 2d 94 (1997) to a claim for medical malpractice that took place in a health clinic during the course of a routine medical examination provided by the health clinic?

A decision by the Supreme Court is expected to clarify when a medical malpractice claim arising from allegedly assaultive behavior accrues under Wisconsin law. From Eau Claire County.

2014AP1508 Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins.
This case examines the scope of protections provided under Wis. Stat. § 895.52, the state's recreational immunity statute.

The Supreme Court reviews whether protections that apply to landowners under the statute may also apply to a non-landowner business that offers recreational activities on someone else's property.

Some background: Sundog Ballooning, LLC, Kerry Hanson, Jodi Hanson, and T.H.E. Insurance Company (collectively, Sundog) agreed to donate free tethered hot air balloon rides during a charity event in Dodge County.

Patti J. Roberts, who is plaintiff in this case along with her husband David, was standing in a line of people waiting to take a tethered hot air balloon ride, The balloon was tethered to two trees on the property and a large truck parked on the property. A gust of wind caused one of the balloon's tether lines to snap. The balloon and its basket slid along the ground and struck Patti, knocking her down and causing her injuries.

Sundog moved for, and the trial court granted, summary judgment dismissing all of Patti's claims because Wis. Stat. § 895.52 grants Sundog immunity from those claims.

Patti appealed, unsuccessfully.  She argued that Wis. Stat. § 895.52 does not apply here because "nothing about the land . . . caused [her] injuries."

The Court of Appeals held that the allegedly negligent activities that caused her injury were directly related to Sundog's occupancy of the land on which Patti was injured. 

Patti argues that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 has "turned any person just using the land into an 'owner'" entitled to statutory immunity. For instance, she contends that a drunken snowmobiler who crashes into another while riding on a snowmobile trail would be immune because the snowmobiler is "using" the property and thus is occupying it and thus is an owner under the rationale of the Court of Appeals.

She asks the Court of Appeals whether the defendants/respondents were "occupiers" of the property in question for purposes of the recreational immunity statute at the time of the accident in question. See Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d); see also Doane v. Helenville Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Wis. 2d 345, 575 N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1998).

Patti also contends a "release" she signed is unenforceable and asks the Supreme Court to review if the question of whether she signed a waiver is a fact for the jury to determine.

A decision by the Supreme Court is expected to clarify the scope of protections provided by state's recreational immunity statute. From Dodge County.

2012AP2095 Attic Angel Prairie Point (AAPP) v. City of Madison
This tax case examines whether case law developed to apply to a particular statute applies to a revised and amended version of the statute. 

Some background: Before 2009 Wis. Act 28, the tax exemption for "benevolent retirement homes for the aged" was located in Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).  It provided in relevant part:
Property owned and used exclusively by educational institutions offering regular courses  six months in the year; or by churches or religious, educational or benevolent associations, including benevolent nursing homes and retirement homes for the aged.

As part of 2009 Wisconsin Act 28 (effective on June 29, 2009 and first applied to the 2010 tax year), the legislature struck "retirement homes for the aged" from the above subsection, and created § 70.11(4d), a separate subsection for Benevolent Retirement Homes for the Aged.

The new section, § 70.11(4d), provides in part:

Property that is owned by a nonprofit entity that is a benevolent association and used as a retirement home for the aged, but not exceeding 30 acres of land necessary for the location and convenience of buildings, while such property is not used for profit, if the fair market value of the individual dwelling unit, as determined by the assessor for the taxation district in which the property is located, is less than 130 percent of the average equalized value under s. 70.57 of improved parcels of residential property located in the county . . ."

Under the former section of § 70.11(4), "benevolent associations" had to satisfy a three-part benevolence test in order to qualify for tax exemption.  That test required the organization to demonstrate:

  • that it is a benevolent organization; 
  • that it owns and exclusively uses the property; and 
  • that it uses the property for exempt use.
    Deustches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 82, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999). The test applied to entities seeking exemption under § 70.11(4) as a benevolent association, retirement home for the aged, nursing homes or hospitals.

Prior to this legislative change, in 2003, AAPP filed an action in the Dane County Circuit Court for the recovery of the 2002 and 2003 taxes, arguing they were a "benevolent retirement home for the aged" under the former version of § 70.11(4).

The Dane County Circuit Court ruled that AAPP did not satisfy the benevolence test; specifically, it ruled the property was not used for "benevolent purposes." The circuit court reasoned that AAPP provides housing for moderate to upper-income people and that is not "benevolence." That case was not appealed. 

In 2011, AAPP started a new action in the Dane County Circuit Court for the recovery of the 2010 real property taxes asserting the property is exempt from taxation under the new section § 70.11(4d). The City argued that the new statute still required a benevolent retirement home for the aged to satisfy the benevolence test because § 70.11(4d) still requires the entity to be a "benevolent association."  The city reasoned that AAPP does not satisfy the benevolence test because the use of the property is not for benevolent purposes for the same reasons stated by the circuit court in 2003.

The circuit court considered cross motions for summary judgment and ruled that AAPP is entitled to an exemption. The circuit court did not specifically state whether the benevolence test is still applicable under the new statutory subsection but rather relied heavily on the fact that AAPP has been granted 501(c)(3) status and is classified as "charitable" by the Internal Revenue Service.

The City of Madison appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the "so called benevolence test" was a statutory test setting forth requirements under the then existing statute and there is therefore "no additional stand-alone or carry-over benevolence test."

According to AAPP, the Legislature recognized the growing issue concerning the tax exempt status of benevolent retirement homes for the aged, and enacted § 70.11(4d), which specifically identifies the types of nonprofit, benevolent owned retirement homes for the aged that are exempt from general property taxes—those retirement home units that are less than 130 percent of the average equalized value under s. 70

A decision by the Supreme Court could have broad implications and determine what is necessary to obtain a tax exemption as a "benevolent retirement home for the aged" under the law. From Dane County.

2013AP1424-CR State v. Lagrone
The primary question in this case is whether the trial court erred by not conducting a colloquy at the second phase of a not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect proceeding to ascertain whether the defendant was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to testify.

Additionally, the court reviews whether the doctrine of harmless error applies when a circuit court fails to conduct a colloquy and the defendant asserts that he did not understand he could testify.

Some background: In May 2011, a complaint was filed charging that James Elvin Lagrone forced his way into his ex-girlfriend's apartment at about 10:00 p.m. on April 30, 2011, and "proceeded to 'humiliate' her until approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 1, 2011."

During the time Lagrone held the woman captive, he choked her, urinated on her, and forced her to touch his genitals numerous times.  When one of the woman's friends came to the apartment, Lagrone fled in her car.

Lagrone later turned himself in to police.  He was charged with strangulation and suffocation, false imprisonment, second-degree sexual assault, first-degree recklessly endangering safety, and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent—all with the domestic abuse modifier.

Lagrone, who had been diagnosed with Paranoid Schizophrenia, pled not guilty to the charges by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI).  Consequently, a bifurcated proceeding took place as required by Wis. Stat. § 971.165.

During the first phase of the NGI proceeding, Lagrone pled guilty to all five counts.  Before accepting Lagrone's guilty plea, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Richard J. Sankovitz conducted a colloquy with Lagrone, inquiring whether he had read the plea questionnaire and waiver-of-rights form, discussed it with his attorney, and understood all of the rights "listed in these documents," including "the right to have a trial on whether you committed these crimes" and "the right to present witnesses."

Lagrone said that he did read the form and that his attorney helped him understand what the form said, and he said that he understood all of the rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty in the first phase of the proceeding.  One of the rights listed on the form was the "right to testify and present evidence at trial." Next to that phrase there was an additional handwritten notation explaining that Lagrone was giving up his right to testify for "phase I," but "[n]ot for [phase] II" of the proceeding.

During the second phase of the NGI proceeding (the mental responsibility phase), Lagrone stood trial but did not testify.  The trial court did not conduct an additional colloquy on the record regarding whether Lagrone understood his right to testify or that he was in effect waiving his right to do so.

Following the second phase, the trial court found that Lagrone did not lack substantial capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his actions or conform his behavior to the requirements of law, and entered a judgment of conviction finding him criminally responsible for the crimes charged. Lagrone was sentenced to 12 years (six years of initial confinement and six years of extended supervision).

After sentencing, Lagrone filed a post-conviction motion requesting an evidentiary hearing and seeking an order granting a new trial on the second phase of the NGI proceeding.  Lagrone argued that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an on-the-record colloquy regarding the waiver of his right to testify at the mental responsibility phase, and that he (Lagrone) did not understand that he had the right to testify at that phase.

Another judge denied Lagrone's post-conviction motion.  Lagrone appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that any error in failing to conduct an additional colloquy and/or denying Lagrone's request for an evidentiary hearing was harmless.

Lagrone argues that "[g]iven that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies at the second phase and the right to testify is a 'necessary corollary' to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination, see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987), it is only logical that the right to testify and accompanying law regarding an on-the-record colloquy is applicable to the mental responsibility phase."

The state suggests that because the second phase, unlike the first, "is not criminal in its attributes or purposes," it is not necessary to require a colloquy regarding a defendant's right to testify during the second phase.  The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this appears to be an issue of first impression (describing it as an "open question" and an "issue of first impression") but declined to reach it because it concluded that any error was harmless.

A decision by the Supreme Court is expected to clarify whether a colloquy is required at the second phase of a not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect proceeding to ascertain whether the defendant was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to testify. From Milwaukee County.

2014AP821 Fontana Builders v. Assurance Co. of Amer.
This case is on its second appeal and involves the interpretation of language in an insurance policy to determine what coverage may apply after a fire substantially damaged a house that was under construction in Fontana. The petitioners include a builder and a banker who appealed to the Supreme Court; the respondent is an insurer.

Some background: James Accola is the owner and president of Fontana, a residential homebuilding company. In 2005, Fontana began construction on a house in Lake Geneva for Accola and his family.

Anchor Bank made $1,276,000 in construction loans to Fontana. Repayment of Anchor's loans to Fontana was secured by mortgages recorded on the house. As required by the mortgages, Fontana obtained from Assurance a builder's risk policy of insurance insuring Fontana and Anchor. The Assurance policy had a policy period from Oct. 19, 2006 to Oct. 19, 2007, and a limit of $1,495,000. 

Although construction was not yet complete, on May 30, 2007, Accola moved his family (and more than $500,000 worth of their personal property) into the house. It was still titled to Fontana.  Shortly after the Accolas moved into the house, in anticipation of the transfer of the property from Fontana to the Accolas, the Accolas purchased a personal homeowner's policy from Chubb Insurance that carried a $2 million limit for the house and a $1 million limit for the contents in the house. Anchor, Fontana's mortgagee, required the Accolas to purchase homeowner's insurance before it would close on a loan with them.

On June 28, 2007, the house was significantly damaged by fire. The contemplated transfer of title from Fontana to the Accolas had not yet occurred; the house was still owned by Fontana.

Fontana filed a claim under the Assurance builder's risk policy.  The Accolas made a claim under their Chubb Insurance homeowner's policy, which provides that coverage would terminate "when permanent property insurance applies." Assurance denied coverage on grounds that the Chubb Insurance policy constituted "permanent property insurance" that "applied."

Effective Feb. 1, 2008, the Accolas entered into a settlement agreement with Chubb Insurance (and without Anchor) in which the Accolas settled their claims for damages caused by the fire for $1,500,000.  Anchor received $537,323.19 from the settlement proceeds, apparently leaving part of the loan balance unpaid.

Fontana then sued Assurance for breach of contract and bad faith.  The trial court ruled that the Assurance policy provided coverage as a matter of law, and a jury found that Assurance's denial constituted a bad faith breach of contract.  The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Fontana in the amount of $1,390,000 for property damage and $1,210,000 for the borrower's bad faith claim against Assurance. Assurance appealed.

In 2011, the Court of Appeals reversed.  The case was remanded with directions to have a jury determine whether permanent property insurance applied at the time of the fire; the Court of Appeals directed that the circuit court could not "preclude the jury from considering the Chubb Insurance policy or any other extrinsic evidence relevant to the Assurance policy."  At this point, Anchor intervened.

At the second trial, over Fontana's objection, the circuit court permitted evidence of the fact, purpose, and amounts of settlement payments Chubb Insurance made to the Accolas on the homeowner policy.  At the second trial, the jury  found that the homeowner's policy was "permanent property insurance" which "applied" at the time of the fire, thus terminating coverage under the Assurance builder's risk policy. The circuit court denied Fontana's and Anchor's post-verdict motions and entered judgment on the verdict.  Fontana and Anchor appealed for a second time.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that an appellate court "will not upset a jury verdict if there is any credible evidence to support it."  Radford v. J.J.B. Enters., Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 534, 543, 472 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1991).  The Court of Appeals observed that this "is even more true when the trial court gives its explicit approval to the verdict by considering and denying post-verdict motions."   The Court of Appeals observed that on remand, the trial court "did precisely as we directed."  The jury was permitted to consider the Chubb Insurance policy, payments made pursuant to it, and under specific provisions of the Assurance policy.

Fontana and Anchor appealed to the Supreme Court. The crux of Anchor's complaint is that after the fire, the prospective homeowner settled with the homeowner's insurance provider for $1,500,000. Despite that payout, Anchor received only $537,323.19 from the funds paid under the homeowner's policy, leaving its loan balance unpaid.  The question as Fontana sees it is whether the homeowner's policy was "permanent property insurance" that "applies" such that the builder's risk policy terminated.  From Walworth County.

2014AP1248-51-CR State v. Tourville
This case addresses two issues arising from criminal charges against Patrick K. Tourville: Whether the state breached a plea agreement with Tourville by recommending consecutive sentences, and whether there was a sufficient factual basis to accept his guilty plea to theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a) (take and carry away) when Tourvile took no part in the taking and carrying away of property from its owner.

Some background: The facts are not in dispute.  Between 2011 and 2013, the state charged Tourville with various crimes in four separate Polk County cases:

  • 2011CF293: Theft, resisting/obstructing an officer, operating vehicle without owner's consent. 
  • 2011CF376: Burglary while armed, felony theft (two counts), misdemeanor theft, bail jumping, and felon in possession of a firearm. 
  • 2012CF27: Theft and felon in possession of a firearm. 
  • 2013CF107: Bail jumping (five counts) and possession of drug paraphernalia. 

The plea agreement at issue resolved all these matters.  Specifically at issue is 2012CF27 (Theft and felon in possession of a firearm) in violation of § 943.20(1)(a).  According to the amended criminal complaint, several men—but not Tourville—broke into a home and stole a safe containing firearms and other tools. The men then took the safe to Tourville, told him about the burglary, and asked for his help in opening the safe. Tourville went along with them to a campground where the men opened the safe and disposed of the contents.

The complaint erroneously cited the wrong statute but the language of the charging section alleged that Tourville "did take and carry away movable property of another." The post-conviction court later ruled that the erroneous statutory reference was a "scrivener's error."

At the April 18, 2013 plea hearing on all of the charges, the district attorney recited the terms of the plea agreement, stating that Tourville would plead guilty or no contest to one count in each of the cases, with dismissal of the other counts. In accordance with the plea agreement, Tourville pled guilty or no contest to four counts. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss and read in remaining counts.  

The court addressed whether there was a factual basis for the theft charge. Tourville told the court that he did not give the burglars anything and that he did not hide anything. The court then told Tourville that he was being charged because he "gave surroundings" to the other defendants. At that point, the court said, "And everybody agrees that that meets the elements of the crime?" The prosecutor agreed, but neither Tourville nor his attorney said anything on the record before the court accepted the plea. The prosecutor recommended that the court impose consecutive sentences on all four cases. Defense counsel did not object. 

On July 8, 2013, the court sentenced Tourville to consecutive prison sentences totaling 26 years (14½ years initial confinement plus 11½ years extended supervision). 

Tourville unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief, arguing to withdraw his plea because there was no factual basis for the element alleging that Tourville had taken and carried away movable property of another.

The circuit court held that Tourville's participation in disposing of the safe amounted to a violation of the statute. The court stated that Tourville understood what he was pleading to, and therefore there was no manifest injustice. The circuit court ruled further that the state did not breach the plea agreement by recommending consecutive sentences. The Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that "Tourville's plea agreement did not place any obligation on the State to 'recommend concurrent sentences.'"

Tourville says he never claimed that the state was obligated to recommend a concurrent sentence. Rather, that the state breached its agreement when it recommended consecutive sentences.

A decision by the Supreme Court could clarify circumstances under which a plea agreement may be breached by a sentencing recommendation what constitutes theft under the terms of Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a). From Polk County.

2014AP2097/2295 Prince Corporation v. Vandenberg
This matter involves a complicated garnishment proceeding that arose when four tenants in common sought to sell their property and it transpired that one of the owners (James Vandenberg) had numerous unpaid judgments and tax liens.

The Supreme Court reviews three issues:

  • Whether a circuit court may award garnishment sua sponte to a party who has not requested garnishment, and who has not complied with the statutory prerequisites therefore?
  • May a creditor who garnishes a payment owed to multiple persons obtain more than the debtor’s proportionate share of that payment?
  • Where both the vendors and the purchaser under a land contract request partition and sale of the property, should a court of equity grant such request?

Some background: On May 6, 2010, Prince Corporation (Prince) obtained a $165,000 judgment against James Vandenberg (James) in Brown County.  The judgment was docketed the same day.  Prince made various efforts to collect on the judgment but was unsuccessful. 

Meanwhile, James and three others (the Intervenors) owned a parcel of property in Brown County as tenants in common, with each owning a one-fourth interest. On July 14, 2011, they entered into a land contract to sell the property to Van De Hey Real Estate, LLC (Van De Hey). 

However, at the time they executed the land contract, James had several outstanding obligations, including a mortgage, delinquent taxes and other judgments that totaled more than $400,000.

On Feb. 17, 2012, after the first two payments were made but before the final payment, Prince commenced a non-earnings garnishment action, naming James as defendant and Van De Hey (the buyer) as garnishee defendant.  Prince asserted it was entitled to garnish the entire final land contract payment to satisfy its $165,000 judgment.  

Van De Hey filed an answer conceding it had possession or control of property belonging to James.  Van De Hey asserted, however, that garnishable property was limited to one-fourth of the final land contract payment plus interest, or $28,788.34.  Prince maintained the garnishable amount was one-fourth of the entire land contract price, or $85,425 and filed a motion to compel payment.

The other property owners intervened in the garnishment action; Van De Hey then filed a cross-claim against them, seeking specific performance. 

On Nov. 6, 2012, the circuit court granted Prince's motion to compel payment reasoning that there was "little doubt" that Prince had a valid and enforceable lien against James that extended "not only to actual real estate owned, but also, proceeds from the sale of any ownership interest."  The court concluded Prince was "entitled to one-fourth of … [James's] entire interest in the land sale" and was "not limited to one-fourth of the final land sale payment."  The court ordered Van De Hey to remit $85,425 of the final land contract payment to Prince.

The court ordered the parties to mediate the disputes but mediation failed.  On Nov. 14, 2013, the Intervenors filed a third-party summons and complaint naming the Department of Revenue (DOR) as a third-party defendant. In its answer, the DOR stated it "claim[ed] an interest in the Property" pursuant to the three delinquent tax warrants against James.  It is undisputed that the first two tax warrants were docketed before Prince docketed its judgment against James.  The DOR requested judgment "in accordance with the foregoing[.]"

On April 9, 2014, the Intervenors moved for reconsideration of the circuit court's Nov. 6, 2012 order granting Prince's motion to compel payment. On Aug. 13, 2014, the circuit court granted the Intervenors' motion for reconsideration, explaining that reconsideration was warranted due to "changes in circumstances" since the Nov. 6, 2012 order—specifically, the fact that the court was now aware the DOR had "perfected liens against James'sproperty pursuant to docketed delinquent tax warrants[.]" 

Relying on Wis. Stat. § 71.91(4), the court concluded the two tax warrants docketed on Jan. 4, 2010 were superior to Prince's lien.  The court rejected the Intervenors' arguments that the final land contract payment was not subject to garnishment and that the garnishable amount, if any, was limited to one-fourth of the final payment and ordered Van De Hey to pay "the garnishable amount of $85,425" to the DOR.  The court denied the Intervenors' request for partition. It deemed Van De Hey's claim for specific performance of the land contract premature because the contract had not yet been breached. 

Prince and the Intervenors appealed.  The Court of Appeals affirmed all aspects of the circuit court decision in a published decision. The DOR claimed, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the DOR adequately "asserted its priority lien its [sic] answer to the Third-Party Complaint and demanded judgment in accordance with its interest in the funds."

The Intervenors contend that by "sua sponte awarding the DOR a garnishment remedy it never even requested, the Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals short-circuited those procedures . . ." They reason that if James sued Van De Hey, he could not recover $85,425 from Van De Hey, because Van De Hey has already paid James (or his creditors) two thirds of that money.

A decision by the Supreme Court could clarify law relating to garnishment actions and other issues presented under the circumstances here. From Brown County.

2014AP2238-CR State v. Jackson
This homicide case examines the inevitable discovery doctrine, which provides "evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means." State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 427, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1996).

The Supreme Court reviews a Court of Appeals' decision that applied the inevitable discovery doctrine to reverse a circuit court order suppressing evidence due to police misconduct.

Some background: On Feb. 21, 2012, officers were dispatched to a hotel room at the Road Star Inn in Grand Chute, where they discovered the body of Derrick Whitlow.  He had been stabbed approximately 25 times.

Later that afternoon, police made contact with the victim's wife, Mastella Jackson, at her residence.  She was taken to the police station in a manner the circuit court deemed consistent with custodial suspects.  She was placed in an interrogation room at about 4:30 p.m.

Jackson remained in the room for about two hours until police began questioning her.  Jackson was not informed of her Miranda rights.  About 30 minutes into the interview, Jackson began complaining of stomach pain. After about 30 minutes of intermittent pain, an officer offered to retrieve her prescription pain medication from her home.

At about 7:25 p.m., while doubled over and complaining of stomach pain, Jackson asked to leave, stating, "Can I go home right now, please, I don't want to talk . . . [C]an I go with you [to get the medication], can I just go home or do I have to stay[?]" One of the officers responded that he needed to make a phone call and left the room.  The other officer continued the interrogation. 

At about 8:36 p.m., Jackson began to make incriminating statements.  At around 9:19 p.m., she admitted going to Whitlow's hotel room earlier that afternoon.  She told police Whitlow attacked her when she arrived.  She conceded she may have brought a knife with her to the hotel. At 9:37 p.m., Jackson was allowed to take prescribed oxycodone for her pain.

After Jackson made incriminating statements, police applied for a warrant to search her house and garage.  The affidavit in support of the search warrant relied, in part, on Jackson's statements that she went to see Whitlow at the Road Star Inn that afternoon, she may have brought a knife, and she and Whitlow "[got] into a confrontation[.]"

In reliance on this warrant, police began searching Jackson's residence shortly after midnight. Meanwhile, Jackson's interrogation continued. Throughout the interrogation, numerous references were made. She was finally informed of and waived her Miranda rights at about 12:39 a.m., approximately six hours after her interrogation began.  Jackson subsequently admitted stabbing Whitlow and putting the knife and the bloody clothes she was wearing in a garbage can in her garage. Jackson's interrogation ended at 2:01 a.m.

Police then took Jackson home, where the search was still in progress.  Jackson then directed police to a garbage can they had not yet examined, in which they found a duffel bag containing a Winchester knife, bloody shoes, and bloody clothing.

The following day, Jackson was charged with one count of first-degree intentional homicide (domestic abuse) and one count of misdemeanor bail jumping.

Jackson filed a motion in circuit court to suppress all of her statements to police, as well as any physical evidence derived from those statements.  Following a series of hearings, the circuit court issued an oral ruling suppressing many of Jackson's statements as well as physical evidence.

The court found that Jackson was in custody for Miranda purposes at 7:25 p.m. on Feb. 21, 2012, and that police intentionally violated her rights by interrogating her after that point without providing Miranda warnings. The circuit court ordered suppression of all statements Jackson made to police between 7:25 p.m. and 12:39 a.m., the time she was finally advised of her Miranda rights.

Citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the circuit court also suppressed the statements Jackson made after she received the Miranda warning, including her statement telling police where to find the knife and bloody clothes.  The circuit court explicitly found that Jackson's statements were involuntary. 

The circuit court also suppressed the physical evidence obtained during the search of Jackson's residence.  The circuit court explained that when Jackson's improperly obtained statements were excised from the search warrant affidavit, he deemed the remaining facts insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant to search her home. 

The circuit court rejected the state's argument that the physical evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.  To establish that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, the state must demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence that: 1) a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means but for the police misconduct, 2) the leads making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the government at the time of the misconduct, and 3) prior to the unlawful search the government was also actively pursuing some alternative line of investigation. Id.at 427-28; State v. Avery,2011 WI App 124, ¶29, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216.

The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine was satisfied.  The Court of Appeals ruled that this evidence was sufficient to conclude there was a fair probability a search of Jackson's residence would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.  See State v. Romero, 2009 WI 32, ¶3, 317 Wis. 2d 12, 765 N.W.2d 756. Moreover, on de novo review, the Court of Appeals determined that it was reasonably probable that the knife, clothes, and shoes would eventually have been discovered by lawful means. State v. Jackson, 2015 WI App 49, ¶25, 363 Wis. 2d 554, 866 N.W.2d 768.

Jackson argues that the proper standard is that the state must show that the alternate line of investigation began "prior to the misconduct" which in this case was the questioning before Miranda warning.

A decision by the Supreme Court could clarify and potentially develop the law for the benefit of law enforcement, the bench and bar. From Outagamie County.  

Review denied: The Supreme Court denied review in the following cases. As the state's law-developing court, the Supreme Court exercises its discretion to select for review only those cases that fit certain statutory criteria (see Wis. Stat. § 809.62). Except where indicated, these cases came to the Court via petition for review by the party who lost in the lower court:

Brown
2014AP1254-CR State v. Schabow
2014AP1361 State v. Loomis
2014AP2219-CR State v. Greenwood

Chippewa
2014AP1457-CR State v. Dillon

Columbia
2014AP811-CR State v. Undraitis

Dane
2013AP2657-CR State v. Alvarez-Valencia
2014AP550 Seamonson v. Nazareth Health - Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissents.
2014AP1112 Ashmore v. Smith
2014AP1550-CR State v. Kosinski
2014AP2860-CR State v. Relyea
2014AP2881-CR State v. Etienne
2014AP2568-W Duarte v. Richardson
2015AP1081-W Kuranda v. Hamblin

Dodge
2014AP2570-71 Derrick P. v. Anita P.

Eau Claire
2014AP2191-CR State v. Lizan

Fond du Lac
2014AP57-CR State v. Earls
2014AP1497 State v. Cass

Jefferson
2014AP1127 Zick & Weber LLP v. Stangler
2014AP1310-CR State v. Smiley
2014AP2199-CR State v. Vivar

Juneau
2014AP1507 Roberts v. McCulloch

Kenosha
2014AP1504-CR State v. Minnick
2014AP1524 State v. Karasti
2014AP2945 Kenosha Co. v. James H. - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. did not participate.

La Crosse
2013AP2629-CR State v. Steiner
2014AP2768-69 Christine B. v. Angela S. - Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson dissents.

Manitowoc
2014AP2299-CR State v. Roseti

Marathon
2014AP643 State v. Hendrickson
2014AP794-97 State v. Seehafer

Milwaukee
2013AP2782-CR State v. Faulkner
2013AP2789-CR State v. Tyree
2013AP2859-60 State v. Jackson
2014AP130 Oden v. City of Milw.
2014AP142 State v. Arron A.-R.
2014AP170-71 State v. Rones
2014AP214 Bjorgo v. Bjorgo
2014AP364 Fisher v. Sulieman
2014AP700-CR State v. Salinas
2014AP763 Marchese v. Treul Ent.
2014AP777 Siddique v. Bd. of Regents - Justice Ann Walsh Bradley did not participate.
2014AP1023-CR State v. Garcia
2014AP1121 State v. Shallcross
2014AP1138-W McFarland v. Hepp
2014AP1174 State v. Robinson
2014AP1189-CR State v. Price - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. dissents.
2014AP1288-CR State v. Smith
2014AP1381 Simon v. Sheedy
2014AP1566-67 State v. Hawthorne
2014AP1634 State v. Rouse
2014AP1669-CR State v. Dubose - Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack did not participate.
2014AP1759-CR State v. Howard
2014AP1760-CR State v. Lewkowski
2014AP1769-CR State v. Butler
2014AP1944 State v. Winant
2014AP2545-CR State v. Lee
2014AP2812 Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients and Families Comp. Fund
2014AP2911 State v. Kamille M.
2015AP55-57 State v. Mary G.
2015AP270-OA Singh v. Wis. DOC
2015AP737-W Hopson v. Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Co.
2015AP986-88 State v. K.K.
2015AP1526-W O'Boyle v. Pollard

Monroe
2014AP2785 State v. Brandon L. P-D.

Polk
2014AP1995-CR State v. Krueger

Racine
2014AP1175-CR State v. Henderson
2014AP1532 State v. Gimino

Richland
2015AP864 Morris v. National Interstate Ins. Co.

Rock
2013AP2497-CRNM  State v. Cox

Shawano
2014AP1004-CR State v. Holub

Sheboygan
2014AP1460-CR State v. Basped

St. Croix
2014AP2370-CR State v. Schaffhausen

Trempealeau
2014AP1937 State v. Pruett

Vilas
2014AP2688 Vilas Co. v. Accola
2014AP2760 City of Eagle River v. Slusarczyk

Walworth
2014AP23-24-CR State v. Austin
2014AP1662-CRNM State v. Felski
2014AP2654-CR State v. Rodriguez

Washington
2014AP968-CR State v. Leszynski

Waukesha
2013AP2336-CR State v. Gleiss
2014AP932-CR State v. Zoellick
2014AP1851 Dilger v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. did not participate.
2014AP1982 MIL Acquisition Venture v. Bouraxis Properties - Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack dissents.
2014AP2495 Kay & Kay Law Firm v. Stangler
2014AP2604-CR State v. Smart

Wood
2013AP1391-CR State v. Maier
2014AP1256 Voice of WI Rapids v. WI Rapids Pub. School Dist.

Contact:
Tom Sheehan
Court Information Officer
(608) 261-6640

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