Headlines archive

2016

Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts 12 new cases

Madison, Wisconsin - January 21, 2016

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has voted to accept 12 new cases and acted to deny review in a number of other cases. The case numbers, issues, and counties of origin of granted cases are listed below. Hyperlinks to Court of Appeals' decisions are also provided where available. The synopses provided are not complete analyses of the issues presented. More information about any particular case before the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals can be found on the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Access website.

2012AP2578 Blake v. Jossart
This case involves a challenge to Wisconsin's caregiver law, 2009 Wis. Act 76, as codified in § 48.685(5)(br)5, which permanently bars those who have ever been convicted of specific predicate crimes from holding a child care license. The law has been in effect for approximately six years and has survived various constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Brown v. State Dep't of Children and Families, 2012 WI App 61, 341 Wis. 2d 449, 819 N.W.2d 827. See also Buckner v. Heidke, No. 2012AP2598 (Ct. App. July 3, 2014).

Some background: Sonja Blake was certified as a child care provider in 2001. Her certification was suspended in 2006, for failure to report that a son who had committed a murder was living in her home. She was recertified in 2008, and she reopened her certified child care business. From the fall of 2009 until Feb. 1, 2010, she also worked part-time as a caregiver in a licensed child care facility.

By letter dated Jan. 25, 2010, the Racine County Human Services Department informed Blake that her certification was being revoked under Act 76. The conviction that triggered revocation of the plaintiff's certification was misdemeanor welfare fraud, to which she pled no contest in 1986. The charge arose out of her failure to report two vehicles, a motorcycle and a car, registered to her as assets in 1985, resulting in overpayment in her public assistance.

Blake challenged revocation of her certification. She also moved for a temporary injunction, which was opposed by both the county and the state defendants. The county agreed to provide the plaintiff with an administrative hearing regarding the revocation of her child care certification. The county department upheld the revocation on administrative appeal. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded the conviction and uncorroborated criminal complaint, standing alone, were insufficient to show that the plaintiff had engaged in fraudulent activity, as needed to justify the revocation. Accordingly, the appellate court remanded for another hearing at which the county presented additional evidence and live testimony from two people who had been involved in the fraud investigation that led to the plaintiff's 1986 fraud conviction. The hearing examiner upheld the department's decision. The circuit court and Court of Appeals both affirmed. This court denied a petition for review.

The plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that her child care certification was unconstitutionally revoked. The circuit court denied the plaintiff's claim for a declaratory judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The appellate court said that the plaintiff's claim that § 48.685 was facially unconstitutional was previously rejected in Brown. The Court of Appeals said while the plaintiff may have also been trying to make an as applied equal protection argument, she did not specifically use that term, nor did she cite any case law or legal standard that would be relevant to such an analysis.

Blake asks the Supreme Court "to determine whether the most draconian provision of one of the most extreme occupational regulatory schemes in the nation passes constitutional muster." She says criminal records based disqualifications have increased dramatically over the last decade. She argues that § 48.685 violates equal protection both on its face and as applied to her. She argues that the statute creates classifications that are not rationally related to regulating the profession of child care.

The plaintiff also asserts the new law is not rationally related to the goal of protecting the Wisconsin Shares program from fraud, and she asserts that the classifications are arbitrary. She also contends that the statute violates substantive due process. Despite her past conviction, Blake says she can no more be presumed a threat to defraud the government than a person who has never been convicted of an offense "involving fraudulent activity." From Dane County.

2013AP1724 Singh v. Kemper
This case examines issues raised by both the state and the defendant relating to how positive adjustment time (PAT) may be applied retroactively, or not, to a prison sentence.

The defendant, Aman Singh, is a prisoner at the Racine Correctional Institution. He argues that  § 973.198, Stats., which changed the role the sentencing court plays in reviewing prisoners' potential early release based on PAT, is unconstitutional.

The state says the Court of Appeals appropriately held that the procedural change in § 973.198 did not violate the ex post facto clauses, and the Court of Appeals appropriately concluded that Singh is not entitled to PAT for time spent in the county jail.

The state contends the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the retroactive application of provisions of 2011 Wis. Act 38 resulted in a penalty that violates the ex post facto clauses. The state argues that the Court of Appeals failed to apply the proper inquiry as to what constitutes an ex post facto violation.

Some background: In 2010, Singh was convicted and sentenced for obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, a class H felony. He was placed on three years of probation with a three-year bifurcated sentence imposed and stayed. In July of 2011, he committed another similar violation, for which he was convicted in November of that year. His probation on the first offense was revoked on Dec. 13, 2011. Two weeks later he was sentenced to a five-year bifurcated sentence on the second offense, to be served consecutively to the first offense sentence.  His first day in prison was Jan. 4, 2012.  Before that he had spent months in jail.

In 2009, as part of the biennial budget, 2009 Wis. Act 28, the legislature enacted a statutory scheme that gave prisoners various chances for early release. The law was effective Oct. 1, 2009. Two years later, the legislature enacted 2011 Wis. Act 38, which repealed or modified the early release provisions established in the 2009 Act, effective Aug. 3, 2011. The 2011 Act also created § 973.0198, Stats., which altered the procedures for procuring early release based on PAT purportedly earned through Aug. 3, 2011.

After his arrival in prison in early 2012, Singh sought early release pursuant to the provisions of the 2009 Act. The state Department of Corrections declined to process his request, concluding that with the enactment of the 2011 Act, Singh was not eligible for early release. Singh petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. He appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Singh argued that he had passed his dates of eligibility for early release under the 2009 Act and should be considered for release under the law that was in effect at the time he committed or was convicted and sentenced on his offenses. He argued that applying the provisions of the 2011 Act to make him ineligible for early release violated the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions. He also argued that applying newly created § 973.198 violated the clauses, and he argued he was entitled to PAT based on time he spent in jail before he was sent to prison.

The Court of Appeals held that retroactive application of a law enacted after Singh committed crimes relevant to the appeal violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions by denying him the opportunity for early release from prison which existed when he committed the offenses.

The Court of Appeals went on to conclude, however, that Singh was not eligible for PAT for the time he spent in the county jail, and it rejected Singh's claim that provisions in the new law adjusting the role of the sentencing court violates the ex post facto clauses. Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate. From Racine County.

2014AP195 Seifert v. Balink
This medical malpractice case examines Wis. Stat. § 907.02, which incorporates the Daubert standard for reviewing and admitting expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

A decision by the Supreme Court would provide the first guidance in Wisconsin on the standards for reviewing and admitting expert testimony under § 907.02 since that rule was amended in 2011 to incorporate the Daubert standard.

Some background: Dr. Kay M. Balink provided prenatal care to Kimberly Seifert beginning in December 2008. During her regular prenatal visits, Balink recorded Seifert's weight as well as fundal measurements, which measure fetal growth. Seifert also had five ultrasounds. Kimberly weighed 269 pounds at the start of her pregnancy and she gained approximately 36 pounds during the pregnancy. Using fundal measurements, weight gain, and a physical examination, Balink estimated that the baby would weigh eight pounds eight ounces at birth; his actual birth weight was nine pounds, 12 ounces. Balink also tested Kimberly for gestational diabetes using a one-hour glucose screening test. Kimberly's test result was 131 mg/dL. Balink testified that 131 mg/dL was within the normal range which she stated was below 140. Accordingly, she did not order a follow up three-hour tolerance test.

When the time for delivery approached in May 2009, Balink recommended induced labor. Seifert was induced and ready to deliver. After pushing for one hour, there was no significant progress in birthing the baby but she was exhausted. Based on the fatigue, Balink opted to use a vacuum device to assist in the delivery. After utilizing the vacuum, the baby's head emerged, but then retracted; a phenomenon that occurs when the baby's head and shoulder lodges on the mother's pelvis. Balink quickly diagnosed shoulder dystocia, which is a medical emergency that can result in nerve damage or even death due to total oxygen depletion. Balink then directed a series of obstetrical maneuvers to dislodge the baby's shoulder. The baby was born, without brain injury, but was later diagnosed with a brachial plexus nerve injury, permanently inhibiting the growth and use of his left arm.

On July 29, 2011, Seifert sued Balink for negligent care. At trial Seifert's counsel argued that Balink caused the injury by applying excessive traction while dislodging his shoulder. Balink argued that maternal pushing and contractions caused the injury. The plaintiffs' obstetrical expert, Dr. Jeffrey Wener, rendered four opinions critical of Balink, relating to glucose testing, ultrasounds, the use of vacuum assistance and the use of excessive traction force in an attempt to resolve shoulder dystocia.

Before trial, Balink unsuccessfully sought to exclude Wener's testimony on several points. Balink argued that his opinions were unreliable under § 907.02(1) because Wener provided no support for his opinions other than his own qualifications and personal preferences. She notes that Wener did not rely on any other sources of information which might evidence a reliable methodology, such as medical literature.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Wener's qualifications and personal preferences were sufficient to satisfy Daubert's reliability inquiry.

Balink argues that Wener's expert testimony was inadmissible under § 907.02(1), under the newer Daubert standard, because his opinions were not based on any reliable principles or methods. Specifically, she asserts: (1) Wener's testimony was based solely on his personal preferences in practicing medicine; (2) Wener did not support his opinion with reference to medical literature; and (3) Wener did not reliably apply his opinions to the facts of the case.

In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court examined Rule 702 and explained that the trial court serves as a gatekeeper to ensure that scientific testimony is both relevant and eliable. In order to meet this gate-keeping responsibility, Daubert ruled that the trial court must determine "whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue."

To answer these two questions, the Court provided a list of factors that a trial court may utilize in its analysis. These factors include: (1) whether the expert's theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested;" (2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;" (3) "the known or potential rate of error" of a particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the subject of the testimony has been generally accepted. The Court emphasized, however, that these factors did not establish "a definitive checklist or test" and that the test of reliability must be "flexible."

A decision by the Supreme Court is expected to clarify "reliable principles and methods" relating to expert testimony under § 907.02. From Grant County.

2014AP827-CR State v. McKellips
This case examines Wis. Stat. § 948.075, entitled "Use of a computer to facilitate a child sex crime." The Supreme Court is asked to interpret the term "computerized communication system" under the statute, to determine how it applies to the facts of this case, to determine whether it is unconstitutionally vague as applied to those facts, and whether the Court of Appeals should have engaged in a harmless error analysis.

Some background: Rory A. McKellips, a high-school basketball coach, was convicted of using a computerized communication system to facilitate a child sex crime and obstructing an officer. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison and five years of extended supervision. McKellips was in his mid-50s when the offenses occurred; the female victim was a freshman basketball player.

During the 2010-2011 school year, the girl and McKellips had conversations outside of basketball practice and games, although the conversations were generally focused on basketball. At the end of one such conversation, McKellips said, "I love you."

During a jury trial, the girl testified that her communications with McKellips increased after the basketball season ended. When the girl's mother found out that the girl had incurred roaming charges while talking on her cell phone to McKellips, the mother told her that she could no longer have cell phone conversations with him. When McKellips learned of this, he purchased a Motorola-made flip-phone with a pre-paid "TracFone" contract for the girl without her parents' knowledge. McKellips also purchased a similar cell phone for himself.

The state alleges that phone records showed that the cell phone given to the girl and the one used by McKellips contacted each other more than 8,300 times between Dec. 18, 2010, and July 27, 2011, with most of the communications being text messages. There is question as to whether 10 photos sent by the girl to McKellips were actually downloaded.

The day after McKellips gave the phone to the girl she severely injured her knee in an off-season tournament for a club team. McKellips subsequently increased their communication and began to call her "baby doll" and "sweetheart." He also started giving gifts to both the girl and her family. According to the girl, over the course of the summer of 2011, she and McKellips engaged in sexual activity, including oral sex.

Ultimately, the girl's father found the phone McKellips had given to her and notified the police. Based on the girl's description of these events and the fact that McKellips falsely told police that his phone had fallen into a coal pit, the state charged McKellips with four crimes: (1) repeated sexual assault of a child, (2) exposing his genitals to a child, (3) use of a computerized communication system to facilitate a child sex crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.075 and (4) obstructing an officer. McKellips filed a motion to dismiss the computerized communication system charge. The circuit court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial.

The court gave a jury instruction that combined the pattern jury instruction for the offense, Wis JI-Criminal 2135 (Apr. 2013), with a definition of "computer" that was taken from a different statute entitled "Computer Crimes," Wis. Stat. § 943.70. According to the state, McKellips did not object to the instruction.

McKellips was convicted of using a computerized communication system to facilitate a child sex crime and obstructing an officer; he was acquitted of sexual assault and exposure.

McKellips appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court had improperly used a jury instruction that asked whether McKellips' TracFone had constituted a computerized communication system. The Court of Appeals concluded that a new trial was required because a cell phone or other device can never, of itself, constitute a computerized communication system. The Court of Appeals said the circuit court should have asked the jury whether McKellips' various uses of his TracFone had constituted communications on a computerized communication system.

Further, the Court of Appeals asserted that when the circuit court added the statutory definition of a computer, the jury was certain to find that the cell phone was a computer because the cell phone clearly met the broad definition of a computer.

In taking the case to the Supreme Court, the state contends that the Court of Appeals vacated McKellips' conviction because of one sentence in the jury instruction, which directed the jury to determine "whether the phone constitutes a computerized communication system."

The state also contends that the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with this the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60, that the power to reverse a conviction in the interest of justice should be exercised only in exceptional cases where such an exceptional remedy is warranted.

The state says that the real controversy was fully tried, and the Court of Appeals' ruling was erroneous because it failed to consider whether the allegedly erroneous jury instruction was a harmless error.

McKellips argues that the state improperly attempts to require harmless error review in an interest of justice analysis. McKellips contends that there is already clear case law stating that harmless error analysis is in appropriate when the reversal of a conviction is premised on an appellate court's statutory power to reverse in the interest of justice.

McKellips implies that in order for the phone to have used a computerized communication system, it must have engaged the "data" side of the cellular network. Then he points to the fact that no witness for the state testified that he actually used the data side of his TracFone when communicating with the girl.

In addition to interpreting language in § 948.075, a decision by the Supreme Court may clarify whether the circuit court's jury instruction was truly erroneous in light of that interpretation, whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague, and whether harmless error analysis applies in this context. Justice David T. Prosser did not participate. From Marathon County.

2013AP646-CR State v. Salas Gayton
This criminal case examines whether a sentencing court may rely on a defendant's illegal immigrant status as a factor in fashioning a sentence.

Some background: Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton was convicted after pleading no contest on one count of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and one count of operating a motor vehicle without a license – causing death.

Gayton admitted that on Jan. 1, 2011, he drank at least 12 beers while driving around the Milwaukee metropolitan area, tossing the empty beer cans out of the window as he went.

Gayton turned onto an exit ramp and began driving the wrong way in the westbound lanes of I-94 in Milwaukee for approximately one mile. His vehicle scraped the side of a car that had pulled over to avoid a collision.  Ultimately, he collided head-on into another vehicle, killing the 34-year-old mother who was driving it. A blood draw taken approximately two hours and 20 minutes after the collision showed that Gayton's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the test was still 0.145 percent.

Gayton had entered the United States illegally 14 years before the collision. He moved to Milwaukee approximately two years earlier. His attorney told the circuit court that he had "an almost completely clean criminal record." Gayton had a history of drug and alcohol use, but had apparently been sober for over three years. His drinking on Jan. 1, 2011, was allegedly caused by a disagreement he had with his girlfriend.

At Gayton's sentencing hearing, the circuit court gave a fairly extended sentencing statement. It listed the goals of the sentence as restitution, punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, although it acknowledged that it was not sure if the rehabilitation parts of extended supervision would occur because the court did not know if Gayton would be deported upon completion of his initial confinement.

The sentencing judge spoke at some length about the serious nature of the crime that had resulted in the death of a young woman. He also emphasized that there was a community need for deterrence, stating he had "seen too many young people killed" and "too many parents have come here and said they're tired of burying their kids."

The circuit court also focused some of its remarks on Gayton's history and his remorse for having killed the driver of the other vehicle and referenced Gayton's illegal entry into the country.

In discussing the conditions of Gayton's extended supervision, the circuit court ordered to undergo a drug and alcohol assessment and to follow through with recommended treatment. In the course of discussing that topic the court noted:

"[Gayton] could have done that on his own, even as an illegal in this country [as] [t]here's plenty of places on the south side of Milwaukee that cater to Latinos that would help them with their drinking problems. He could have done that on his own. He didn't."

The circuit court concluded that Gayton's remorse was outweighed by the severity of his crime and that a prison sentence was necessary in order not to "unduly depreciate the seriousness of what [Gayton] did." The court ultimately sentenced Gayton to the maximum term of initial confinement of 15 years and required him to serve another seven years of extended supervision. The court also imposed a concurrent nine-month jail term on the count of driving without a license.

Gayton filed a motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that he should be able to withdraw his no contest plea because the court's recitation of the deportation warning did not follow the statute, and that he was entitled to resentencing because the circuit court had not adequately explained its sentencing rationale and had improperly relied on Gayton's immigration status. The circuit court denied the motion. (Judge Dennis R. Cimpl presided over the entry of the plea and sentencing; Judge Ellen R. Brostrom handled the post-conviction motion).

Gayton appealed, unsuccessfully challenging the circuit court's sentencing, among other issues. The Court of Appeals concluded that the circuit court had adequately explained its choice to impose the maximum fifteen years of initial confinement and had considered the required, relevant factors in a reasonable way. Consequently, it found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's sentencing statement.

Citing a series of cases decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Court of Appeals stated that a sentencing court may not rely on a defendant's race, color or nationality in reaching a sentence, see United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986), but it may consider a defendant's immigration status as long as the sentencing judge does not make "unreasonably inflammatory, provocative, or disparaging" comments regarding that immigration status. See United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Tovar-Pina, 713 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 2013).

The Court of Appeals concluded that in this instance the sentencing judge "did not improperly rely on Gayton's status as an alien."

The Supreme Court has accepted the portion of Gayton's petition for review that asks whether it is proper for a sentencing judge to rely on a defendant's immigration status, and if not, whether such error automatically requires a resentencing or is subject to a harmless error analysis. Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack and Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate. Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson concurs. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley concurs, joined by Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson. From Milwaukee County.

2014AP400 Milwaukee Police Association v. City of Milwaukee
In this case, the Supreme Court reviews whether the Home Rule Amendment of the Wisconsin Constitution, Wis. Const. Art. XI, § 3(1), trumps the Wisconsin Legislature's enactment of § 66.0502, which restricts municipalities from imposing residency restrictions on their employees.

Some background: In 2013, the Wisconsin Legislature passed a law that restricts cities, villages, towns, counties and school districts from "requir[ing], as a condition of employment, that any employee or prospective employee reside within any jurisdictional limit." Wis. Stat. § 66.0502(3)(a).

The statute, entitled "Employee Residency Requirements Prohibited," provides, with some exceptions for police and fire personnel to live within 15 miles, no local governmental unit may require, as a condition of employment, that any employee or prospective employee reside within any jurisdictional limit.

After the law took effect, the Milwaukee Common Council promptly enacted a charter ordinance asserting that the new statute violates Milwaukee's constitutional home-rule authority under Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1), and ordering the continued enforcement of Milwaukee's local residency rule.

The City of Milwaukee enacted its residency Charter Ordinance more than 75 years ago, predicated on the home rule amendment, which differentiates it from Wisconsin municipalities that derive authority for such ordinances from statutory home rule. The ordinance requires all employees of the city of Milwaukee to establish and maintain their actual bona fide residences within the boundaries of the city or be terminated.

Representatives of the Milwaukee Firefighters and the Milwaukee Police Association brought a declaratory judgment that the state statute preempts the city ordinance.  The city responded that the ordinance controls, due to the Home Rule Amendment.  

The circuit court ruled that § 66.0502 preempts the City's ordinance. The circuit court ruled that residency requirements are of both state and local concern, but that state interests were paramount based on how the "test of paramountcy" had been applied in previous cases.

The circuit court held that even if the case primarily involved a matter of local affairs, "the City would still be bound by the statute since it satisfies the uniformity requirement." The circuit court reasoned that "[t]he legislature did not enact a statute which could only apply to the City of Milwaukee" but "[r]ather, all cities, villages, and towns are prohibited from requiring their employees to reside within the jurisdictional boundaries."

The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the residency ordinance can be enforced.  It concluded that: (1) § 66.0502 does not involve a matter of statewide concern and does not affect all local governmental units uniformly, so it does not trump the Milwaukee ordinance; and (2) § 66.0502 does not create a protectable liberty interest. The court also affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the City did not violate the constitutional rights of any member of the Police Association.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that "Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 directly affects the city's economy and tax base, which numerous courts have recognized is a local concern." The Court of Appeals also held that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 did not meet the uniformity test because "it will have an outsize impact on the City of Milwaukee," and "undoubtedly interferes with the ability of many municipalities-including the City of Milwaukee to promptly respond to emergencies."

The Court of Appeals did not strike down § 66.0502, holding instead that it "does not apply to the City of Milwaukee."

The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently clarified the legal analysis for analyzing a state law under the Home Rule Amendment in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337. When examining a Home Rule question, the court performs a two-step analysis. First, as a threshold matter, the court determines whether the statute concerns a matter of primarily statewide or primarily local concern. If the statute concerns a matter of primarily statewide interest, the home rule amendment is not implicated and our analysis ends. If, however, the statute concerns a matter of primarily local affairs, the reviewing court then examines whether the statute satisfies the uniformity requirement. If the statute does not, it violates the home rule amendment. 

In taking the case to the Supreme Court, the petitioners maintain that § 66.0502 is primarily a matter of statewide, not local, concern. They argue that because § 66.0502 applies, on its face, to every city, village, town and county, uniform application is plain.  The petitioners assert that in Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25 (1936),this Court recognized that differences in the way a statute may "impact" or "effect" municipalities is not determinative; indeed they claim it is irrelevant.

The Wisconsin Institute of Law & Liberty, which filed an amicus brief, observes that other cities and villages could pass a similar charter ordinance exempting themselves from the statute.  The state Department of Justice contends in its amicus brief that the Court of Appeals incorrectly focused exclusively on the effects the law would have on Milwaukee, and failed to acknowledge statewide interests recognized by this Court.

The City maintains that the Court of Appeals' analysis comports with Madison Teachers. Specifically, they argue that the Court of Appeals properly followed the two-part test set forth in Madison Teachers, tracking the language of the Home Rule Amendment: first, a determination whether a local or statewide public concern is involved and, second, a determination as to uniformity.  

A decision in this case could determine whether the Home Rule Amendment of the Wisconsin Constitution trumps the Wisconsin Legislature's enactment of § 66.0502. From Milwaukee County.

2014AP157 Dufour v. Progressive Classic Insurance Company
This case involves a dispute over insurance coverage arising from a motorcycle accident.
Some background: Dennis Dufour was involved in a motorcycle accident caused by Steven Lucero. Lucero's insurer, American Standard, paid Dufour its $100,000 policy limit for bodily injuries. Dufour's insurer, Dairyland, also paid Dufour its $100,000 policy limit for bodily injuries. In addition, pursuant to a settlement agreement, Dairyland paid Dufour $15,589.85 for his property damage. Dufour's bodily injuries exceed the total amount of insurance proceeds that he received.

Under a subrogation clause in its policy, Dairyland sought and received the property damage funds in subrogation from American Standard. A subrogation clause is a provision in a policy whereby the insurer acquires certain rights upon paying a claim for a loss under the policy, such as taking legal action on behalf of the insured to recover the amount of the loss from the party who caused the loss.

Dufour submitted a claim to Dairyland in which he asserted that he was entitled to the subrogated funds under Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 133 Wis. 2d 364, 396 N.W.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1986)], which has been substantially undermined by subsequent case law.

Dairyland denied Dufour's claim. When Dairyland refused to turn over the subrogated funds, Dufour amended his complaint to include breach of contract, bad faith, and punitive damages claims against Dairyland. Dairyland and Dufour filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Dufour's motion, in part, and awarded him the subrogated property damage funds plus interest. The court also granted Dairyland's motion in part and dismissed Dufour's bad faith and punitive damage claims. Dufour and Dairyland appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court order on summary judgment.  The appellate court agreed with the circuit court that Dairyland had no subrogation rights because its insured, Dufour, has not been made whole considering his total loss.  While the circuit court declined to find that Dairyland acted in bad faith, the Court of Appeals concluded Dairyland did act in bad faith when it denied Dufour's claim to the funds at issue.

The appellate court noted that subrogation is based on equitable principles, one of which is to prevent an insured from recovering in excess of his or her loss.  See Muller v. Society Ins., 2008 WI 50, 309 Wis. 2d 410, ¶23.  It said in cases where the insured is unable to fully recover his or her loss, an insurer will have no rights in subrogation.  This concept is known as the made whole doctrine, and whether the doctrine applies is dependent on the facts of each case.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Dufour established the necessary elements of a bad faith claim, and it remanded for proceedings on damages with respect to that claim. Dairyland asks the Supreme Court to determine the applicability of Valley Forge in light of subsequent cases, including Muller. Dairyland continues to argue that Muller dictates that the made whole doctrine does not apply. Dairyland asserts that allowing Dufour to recover the property damage funds that Dairyland received in subrogation not only permits Dufour to obtain a double recovery, which subrogation principles are designed to prevent, but also rewrites insurance law by requiring coverage for property damage to pay for the separate loss of bodily injury. 

Dufour says Muller was different because the insured voluntarily settled for less than the policy limits available when the policy limits were sufficient to make them whole for their loss. He says the Valley Forge decision was not based on who was paid the funds by the tortfeasor's insurer but rather who was entitled to the funds under subrogation law. 

A decision by the Supreme Court is expected to determine whether Dairyland is obligated to reimburse Dufour under the made whole doctrine and whether Dairyland acted in bad faith. From Dodge County.

2014AP1853 Moustakis v. DOJ
This case examines several issues arising from a public records request submitted by The Lakeland Times newspaper to the state Department of Justice (DOJ).

Some background: On July 18, 2013, the newspaper requested records any of "complaints or investigations regarding Vilas County District Attorney Al Moustakis."  The request covered records containing information "regarding any investigation of his conduct or handling of cases while district attorney" as well as records containing "information related to complaints and investigations regarding Mr. Moustakis that were completed or ended without any action taken against him."  The Lakeland Times also requested "any communications between Mr. Moustakis and [the DOJ] since he took office in 1995."

The DOJ prepared a response that consisted of redacted records and a cover letter, a copy of which was sent to Moustakis as a courtesy, not a statutory requirement, according to DOJ. On March 6, 2014, Moustakis notified DOJ he would be filing an action and asked that the DOJ withhold production of the records until resolution of the action.  Moustakis filed the action on March 10, 2014.  He sought an order under § 19.356(4), Stats., restraining the DOJ from providing access to the requested records.  Moustakis asserted the records concerned "the investigation of repeated allegations made by a former political rival," which allegations did not involve on-duty misconduct.  Moustakis also alleged that the DOJ investigation did not lead to any charges against him.

On May 23, 2014, the DOJ filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the records set for release were not of a type identified by § 19.356(2)(a) as requiring pre-release notice or judicial review.  The DOJ reasoned that Moustakis did not qualify as an "employee," as the term is defined in § 19.32(1bg), and as such the records did not contain "information relating to an employee" under § 19.356(2)(a)1.  The DOJ argued that as a result, Moustakis lacked standing to bring his action.  Following oral argument on the motion, the circuit court agreed with the state that the term "employee," as used in § 19.356(2)(a)1., did not include Moustakis because the term specifically excludes "an individual holding local public office or a state public office." The circuit court dismissed the suit, determining that various statutes cross-referenced by the Public Records law unambiguously established that district attorney is a "state public office."

On June 25, 2014, Moustakis had filed an amended complaint alleging two additional causes of action, the first seeking a writ of mandamus and the second asserting an as applied challenge to the constitutionality of § 19.356.  There was some dispute at the hearing as to whether the order resulting from the hearing would be final for purposes of appeal.  The DOJ moved to dismiss Moustakis's subsequent appeal from the order.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that Moustakis lacked standing to bring his suit.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the circuit court properly dismissed Moustakis's claim under Wisconsin's Public Records law because the records requested by The Lakeland Times do not "relate" to Moustakis as "an employee" under § 19.356(2)(a)1.

Moustakis argued that he fell within the second category of employees established by § 19.32(1bg), those who are "employed by an employer other than an authority." Moustakis's argument was that although his elected office was an "authority," he was not an employee of that office because his employment derives from the state constitution as well as salary fixing statutes that classify him as a holding a state public office.

2015AP157-CR State v. Loomis
This certification examines whether a court may rely on a pre-sentencing assessment known as COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) in whole or part when fashioning a sentence.

Some background: Eric Loomis pled guilty to attempting to flea or elude a traffic officer, as a repeater, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, as party to a crime, as a repeater. In addition to the two counts to which he pled guilty, Loomis was originally also charged with first-degree reckless endangering safety, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun or rifle, all as party to a crime and as a repeater.  The parties agreed that these three charges would be dismissed and read in for sentencing. 

A presentence investigation report was ordered. The Department of Corrections (DOC) agent who prepared the report included an attached COMPAS assessment.  At the sentencing hearing, both the state and the trial court referenced the COMPAS assessment and used it as a basis for incarcerating Loomis.  The state argued the COMPAS report and its assessments served as the basis for the appropriate sentence and said, "The COMPAS report that was completed in this case show the high risk and the high needs of the defendant.  There's a high risk of violence, high risk of recidivism, high pretrial risk; and so all of these are factors in determining an appropriate sentence."

The trial court said, "You're identified, through the COMPAS assessment, as an individual who is at high risk to the community." The trial court imposed consecutive sentences totaling six years of initial confinement and five years of extended supervision.

Loomis filed a motion for post-conviction relief seeking resentencing on two grounds: (1) that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in how it considered the read-in charges by declining to consider Loomis's explanation; and (2) Loomis's due process rights were violated by the circuit court relying on the COMPAS assessment in sentencing Loomis.  Following two hearings, the circuit court denied the motion.  Loomis appealed. 

In its certification, District IV Court of Appeals notes that a COMPAS assessment includes a "risk" portion and a "needs" portion.  Risk levels are intended to assist corrections professionals in deciding the level of supervision required by an offender.  Needs scales are designed to highlight areas in which the offender may need correctional services.

District IV says Loomis argues that the sentencing court's reliance on the COMPAS assessment violates his due process rights for a variety of reasons.  District IV believes the most significant arguments are whether the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging the COMPAS assessments' scientific validity, or because COMPAS assessments take gender into account.

District IV says there is a compelling argument that judges make better sentencing decisions with the benefit of evidence-based tools such as COMPAS, but if those tools lack scientific validity, or if defendants are unable to test the validity of the tools, then due process questions arise. 
District IV notes that Loomis asserts that COMPAS assessments were developed for use in allocating corrections resources and targeting offenders' programming needs, not for the purpose of determining sentence.  District IV notes the state does not seem to dispute Loomis's description of the evidence.  Instead, the state's position appears to be that Loomis's evidence, when taken at face value, fails to show that a COMPAS assessment contains or produces inaccurate information. 

District IV goes on to note that in State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409, this court held that "race and gender are improper factors [and] they may not be relied upon – at all – in the imposition of a sentence."  Id., ¶3.  District IV says Loomis appears to argue that COMPAS assessments include general scales administered to both men and women, as well as separate scales administered only to women.  It says the state concedes that COMPAS has a different automated risk and needs assessment specifically for women offenders.  District IV says as far it can tell, the fact that the COMPAS scales are different depending on the offender's gender means that, with all other factors being equal, assessment results will differ between men and women based on gender alone.  District IV says whether a sentencing court's reliance on a COMPAS assessment runs afoul of Harris's prohibition on gender-based sentencing is an important question in need of prompt resolution.

District IV notes that this court’s resolution of the use of COMPAS assessments may call into question the appellate court's decision in State v. Samsa, 2015 WI App 6, 359 Wis. 2d 580, 859 N.W.2d 149.  Samsa filed a petition for review in that case, which was denied. From La Crosse County.  

2014AP2484 Water Well Solutions Service Group v. Consolidated Ins. Co.
The issues in this case arise from a dispute over insurance coverage for problems with a municipal well in the city of Waukesha.

The Supreme Court reviews, among other issues, whether the "four-corners rule" requires the Court to ignore undisputed facts that prove neither the "your product" and "your work" exclusions applies, or whether there are limited exceptions to the rule that allow the Court to consider extrinsic evidence when evaluating the duty to defend of an insurer that has outright denied coverage.

Some background:  The city of Waukesha had hired Water Well to remove an old pump and install a new one. The pump later unthreaded and fell to the bottom of the well, allegedly because Water well failed to install two set screws. The insurer of Waukesha Water Utility sued Water Well in U.S. District Court alleging negligence and breach of contract. Water Well tendered its defense to Consolidated. Consolidated denied coverage and did not provide a defense, relying on exclusions in its insurance policy. Water Well sued Consolidated in state court claiming at least some of the damages were covered and Consolidated had breached its duty to defend.  The circuit court concluded that the insurer's duty to defend was determined by reviewing the four corners of the underlying complaint, without resort to extrinsic evidence. The Court of Appeals agreed. The Court of Appeals said the four-corners rule means that it must determine if the insured's duty to defend without considering extrinsic facts or evidence.

The Court of Appeals said the Consolidated policy covers property damage caused by an occurrence. It noted the underlying complaint alleged that Water Well's failure to reasonably and prudently install and reinstall the pump caused the pump to unthread and fall to the bottom of the well.  It said Consolidated did not dispute that there was an initial grant of coverage. Consolidated relied instead on the application of two policy exclusions: the "your product" and "your work" exclusions.

Water Well argued the undisputed facts show there was damage to pipe that was not Water Well's product. In addition, Water Well relied on the same affidavit that averred some of the subject work performed by a subcontractor, which would trigger the subcontractor exception to the "your work" exclusion and provide arguable coverage and a duty to defend.

Water Well says dissenting Judge Paul F. Reilly, District II Court of Appeals, correctly pointed out that there is a conflict in Wisconsin law as to whether the four-corners rule is subject to limited exceptions.  Water Well says recognizing and clarifying that there are exceptions to the four-corners rule would be consistent with precedent from this court stretching back nearly 50 years.

Consolidated says because the allegations in the underlying complaint do not allege a claim covered under the policy, Water Well tries to manufacture a conflict in well-settled law and asks that the court look outside the four corners of the underlying complaint to consider extrinsic evidence or, in the alternative, to simply disregard the policy exclusions all together. Consolidated says the lower courts correctly determined that Consolidated had no duty to defend Water Well in the underlying action and therefore did not breach its duty to defend. From Waukesha County.

2015AP869 State v. Booth
In this bypass of the Court of Appeals, the city of Eau Claire has raises two issues in a case that may resolve an apparent conflict in lower court decisions.

  • Does a circuit court lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter an OWI first offense civil judgment if a defendant has a prior unknown out-of-state OWI conviction?
  • Is a municipality legally preluded from pursuing a civil OWI citation if the defendant could also be charged criminally?

Some background: The defendant, Melissa Booth, was convicted of a civil first-offense OWI in Eau Claire County Circuit Court in 1992.  The case was prosecuted by the Eau Claire City Attorney's office.  The defendant had previously been convicted of OWI in Minnesota in 1990.  Following her 1992 first offense OWI conviction, the defendant was subsequently convicted of four more OWI offenses which counted both the 1992 Eau Claire first offense conviction and the 1990 Minnesota conviction as prior OWI offenses.  Booth was represented by an attorney in all of her subsequent OWI convictions. 

In November 2014, while a seventh offense OWI charge was pending in Douglas County, the defendant filed a motion to vacate her 1992 Eau Claire first offense OWI civil judgment.  She argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case due to the existence of the 1990 Minnesota conviction.  Her request for relief cited § 806.07(1)(d), Stats., which provides that the court may relieve a party from a judgment if the judgment is void.

The city responded to the defendant's motion to vacate by arguing that any alleged loss of court authority to enter the 1992 OWI first offense civil judgment was a loss of court competency, not a loss of subject matter jurisdiction, and that the defendant had waived the right to challenge a loss of court competency.  The City also argued that municipalities are not legally preluded from pursing OWI citations if an unknown out-of-state prior OWI conviction exists.

The circuit court granted the motion to reopen, vacate and dismiss with prejudice the 1992 OWI first offense citation. The circuit court agreed with the defendant that the Eau Claire County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to find the defendant guilty of an OWI first offense based on this court's decision on Walworth County v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 721, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982).  The circuit court said Rohner points out that the legislature intends that only the state has the power to prosecute crimes and since a second offense OWI charge in Wisconsin, by necessity, is criminal, only a district attorney's office can prosecute such an offense.

The city says this case presents the court with an opportunity to provide needed clarity regarding Wisconsin Const. Art. VII § 8's grant of subject matter jurisdiction to circuit courts.  The city says this provision is being interpreted inconsistently across the state, leading to inequitable and unpredictable results.

The city points out that the Court of Appeals recently issued two unpublished opinions on this issue that directly contradict one another.  In City of Stevens Point v. Lowery, 2015 WI App 28, 361 Wis. 2d 285, 862 N.W.2d 619, the Court of Appeals concluded that a circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment on an OWI civil first offense when the defendant had prior OWI convictions.  The Court of Appeals relied on Rohner in support of its determination.  The circuit court in Lowery had denied the defendant's motion to vacate his first offense drunk driving conviction.

The city says a few months after Lowery was released, the Court of Appeals issued State v. Navrestad, 2014AP2273 (Wis. Ct. App. July 2, 2015) which concluded that subject matter jurisdiction was not revoked when a circuit court allegedly improperly entered an OWI civil first offense conviction when a defendant had a prior OWI conviction.  Navrestad determined that court competency, not subject matter jurisdiction, was implicated.  Navrestad also concluded that this court's decision in Mikrut superseded RohnerFrom Eau Claire County.

2014AP775 Clark v. American Cyanamid Company
The Court of Appeals has certified this appeal of a trial court order that denied a summary judgment motion brought by numerous manufacturers and sellers of white lead carbonate ("WLC"), including The Sherwin-Williams Company; Atlantic Richfield Company; American Cyanamid Company;  Armstrong Containers, Inc.; and E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company (hereafter, "WLC defendants").    Specifically, the Court of Appeals certified the following issue:  Does applying WIS. STAT. § 895.046 – which prohibits plaintiffs from asserting claims against manufacturers of white lead carbonate under the risk-contribution theory as articulated in Thomas v. Mallett,  2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523 – retroactively deprive a plaintiff of a vested property right in violation of the due process protections guaranteed by Article I, Section I of the Wisconsin Constitution?

Some background:  The plaintiff, Yasmine Clark, filed a negligence suit in 2006 through her guardian.  Clark alleged she suffered irreversible neurological damage from exposure to lead paint while living at different times in two Milwaukee rental units:  one from March 2003 to March 2004 when she was 2 and 3, and another from February 2006 to June 2006 when she was 5.  In addition to alleging negligence against the property owners, Clark made a strict liability claim against numerous WLC defendants.

Because Clark cannot identify which manufacturer or manufacturers produced the white lead carbonate to which she was exposed, Clark sued the WLC defendants under the risk-contribution theory first pronounced in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 193-95, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984), and later extended to cases involving white lead carbonate poisoning in ThomasThomas governs situations where a plaintiff claims injuries resulting from exposure to or ingestion of white lead carbonate but cannot identify the entity that produced or sold the white lead carbonate.  Generally speaking, Thomas holds that, so long as a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the manufacturer produced or marketed white lead carbonate sometime during the house's existence, then the burden is on each manufacturer to prove that it did not produce or market white lead carbonate either during the house's existence or in the geographical market where the house is located. 

In February 2011, the trial court stayed Clark's case while the federal courts and the Wisconsin legislature took various actions involving the Thomas ruling.   In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin ruled that Thomas expanded the risk-contribution theory in violation of a white lead carbonate manufacturer's federal due process rights.  See Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (E.D. Wis. 2010). The Eastern District later extended the decision to the other white lead carbonate defendants in that case. See Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d 998, 999 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (Gibson II). That decision was then appealed to – and reversed by – the Seventh Circuit.  See Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co., 760 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2311 (2015)(Gibson III).

Also during the stay of Clark's case, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 895.046 (2011-12), which abrogated Thomas prospectively as of Feb. 1, 2011.  Two years later, the legislature amended § 895.046 to make its abrogation of Thomas retroactive in nature.

The WLC manufacturers in Clark's case then filed a motion to lift the stay on her case and dismiss it.   Clark opposed the motion, arguing that the 2013 amendment to § 895.046 was unconstitutional.

The trial court converted the defendants' motion to a summary judgment motion. In March 2014, the trial court ruled against the defendants, saying the retroactive amendment was unconstitutional and violated Clark's right to due process.

About four months later, the 7th Circuit issued Gibson III, 760 F.3d 600 (7th Circ. 2014).  Generally speaking, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Gibson III that § 895.046 cannot be retroactively applied in light of the Wisconsin Constitution's guarantee of due process. 

The WLC defendants appealed the trial court's March 2014 decision.  The WLC defendants argued that § 895.046 is constitutional because it does not impair a vested right of Clark.  The WLC defendants claimed that because Clark's injuries did not allegedly occur until 2003 and 2004, and because Thomas did not expand the risk-contribution theory until issuance of the decision in 2005, Clark has no vested right to pursue her claims.  The WLC defendants also argued that the public's interest in abrogating Thomas retroactively outweighs Clark's private interest in her claims.

Clark countered that she does have a vested right to pursue her claims that arose in 2003 because Thomas applies retroactively.  Clark also argued that, by the time of her initial injury in 2003, Wisconsin law had already adopted the risk-contribution theory in Collins, which left the door open for expansion in similar situations.  Clark further argued that whatever public purpose supports § 895.046's retroactive application is greatly diminished by depriving her and other similarly-situated children poisoned by lead paint of their causes of action.

On September 29, 2015, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this court, providing the following reasons in support of certification: 

  • Whether Wis. Stat. § 895.046 is constitutional is currently unsettled and the question of its validity is likely to recur.
  • This litigation has been delayed for many years, and a certification prevents further delay. 
  • If the Court of Appeals were to hold that § 895.046 is in fact constitutional, this holding would directly conflict with the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Gibson III

Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate. From Milwaukee County.

Review denied: The Supreme Court denied review in the following cases. As the state's law-developing court, the Supreme Court exercises its discretion to select for review only those cases that fit certain statutory criteria (see Wis. Stat. § 809.62). Except where indicated, these cases came to the Court via petition for review by the party who lost in the lower court:

Brown
2013AP270 Green Bay Prof. Police Assoc. v. City of Green Bay
2014AP2239 Hall v. Village of Ashwaubenon Board of Directors
2014AP2727 Green Bay Prof. Police Assoc. v. City of Green Bay - Chief Justice Patience D. Roggensack and Justice Rebecca G. Bradley dissent.
2015AP1580-W Brooks v. Foster
2015AP1655-56-CR State v. Casteel

Chippewa
2014AP2699-CR State v. Golden
2014AP2921-CR State v. Hartl

Columbia
2012AP1425 State v. Humphrey
2015AP640-CR State v. Fullmer

Dane
2011AP1147 State v. Mey
2013AP1766 State v. Warren
2013AP2451 State v. Homelsey
2014AP520-W Zaring v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Co.
2014AP676 State v. Beasley
2014AP2291 Dane co. DHS v. D.M.
2015AP850-CR State v. Singh

Dodge
2014AP1061-CR State v. Ismert

Door
2014AP2671 Wesolowski v. Coltman

Eau Claire
2014AP2323 Pettis v. Progressive Universal Ins.
2015AP170-CR State v. Weaver

Green Lake
2015AP1709-11-W Hertzberg v. Hepp

Jefferson
2015AP162-CR State v. Calzadas - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. dissents.

Kenosha
2014AP480-CR State v. Evans
2014AP1716-CR State v. Travis
2015AP151 Kenosha Co. DHS v. A.C.
2015AP1049-W Holt v. Kemper

La Crosse
2014AP2103-CR State v. Lee

Marinette
2015AP1115-W Kline v. Foster

Milwaukee
2012AP2795-CRNM  State v. Salim - Chief Justice Patience D. Roggensack and Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2013AP1309 State v. Love
2013AP1649 State v. Adams
2014AP834 State v. Hooker
2014AP1151 Robinson v. Aurora St. Lukes Medical Center
2014AP1318-CR  State v. Freeman
2014AP1607-CR State v. Bransford
2014AP1694 State v. Stechauner
2014AP1707 Sasson v. Braun - Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler did not participate.
2014AP1824-CR State v. Lewis
2014AP1873-CR State v. Gilmer - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2014AP1877-79-CR State v. Smith
2014AP1957 Glidewell v. Glidewell
2014AP1990-CR State v. Chairse - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2014AP2094-CR State v. Moore - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2014AP2108 Hinton v. Housing Auth. Of the City of Milwaukee
2014AP2176-CR State v. McKee - Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack and Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2014AP2230-CR State v. James
2014AP2264 State v. Keith - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley  did not participate.
2014AP2477-CR State v. Rodriguez - Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack and Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2014AP2521-CR State v. Hunter - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2014AP2623-CR State v. Farmer - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2014AP2707-CR State v. Carter - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. dissents. Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2015AP235-CRNM State v. Bass
2015AP388 Milwaukee Co. v. Kent F. - Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissent.
2015AP441-CRNM State v. Robinson - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2015AP451-52-CR State v. Madison - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2015AP522-CR State v. Brown - Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.
2015AP618 Sasson v. Kravit - Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler did not participate.
2015AP695-CRNM State v. Thompson
2015AP711 State v. M.H.
2015AP857 State v. T.P. - Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissent.
2015AP1269-W Vance v. Hepp

Monroe
2014AP1810-CR State v. Delaney

Pepin
2014AP1456-CR State v. Owens

Polk
2014AP1833-CR State v. Dean

Rock
2014AP1085-CR State v. Dawson
2014AP1476 Sarow v. Vike - Chief Justice Patience D. Roggensack dissents. Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate.

Rusk
2015AP1972-OA Wilder v. Anderson

Sauk
2013AP1936-CR State v. Yates

Sheboygan
2015AP208 Teske v. Wilson Mut. Ins. Co.

St. Croix
2013AP1272 State v. Whyte

Walworth
2014AP2845 Walworth Co. DH&HS v. M.M.L.
2015AP82-CRNM State v. Biesterveld

Washburn
2014AP792-CR State v. Warren

Washington
2014AP2099-CR State v. Ott
2014AP2493 Szerbowski v. Trinka
2014AP2547-CR State v. Thimm

Waukesha
2013AP1539 Chauvin v. Hedrick
2014AP750 State v. Wagner
2014AP1679 Kraft v. Steinhafel - Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler did not participate.
2014AP2207 Lenz v. Nelson
2014AP2304 Lee v. DOT - Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack dissents.
2014AP2655 Baade v. Hayes - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. did not participate.
2014AP2680 Lenz v. DOR
2015AP1568-W McCormick v. Haines
2015AP1629-W Hansen v. Dutcher

Winnebago
2014AP1502-CRNM  State v. Falls

Contact:
Tom Sheehan
Court Information Officer
(608) 261-6640

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